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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

EASTERN AFFAIRS

PART 31

JULY - DEC.

1932

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CONFIDENTIAL

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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

EASTERN AFFAIRS

PART XXXI

JULY TO DECEMBER 1932

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

No. and Name.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page
Chapter I.—ARABIA.			
	1932		
1 Sir G. Clerk (Constantinople) to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda) No. 207	June 21	Visit of the Emir Feisal to Turkey ...	1
2 Sir A. Ryan (Jedda) No. 107. Tel.	July 1	Beni Atiya raid ... Gives summary of note from Hejaz-Nejd Ministry for Foreign Affairs deploring raid and pressing for investigation and settlement	2
3 Sir A. Ryan No. 111. Tel.	July 2	Beni Atiya raid ... Outlines view of Hejaz Government	3
4 High Commissioner for Transjordan to Secretary of State for the Colonies No. 62. Tel.	July 2	Revolt of Ibn Rifada ... Discusses beginning of Ibn Rifada's incursion	3
5 Secretary of State for the Colonies to High Commissioner for Transjordan No. 70. Tel.	July 4	Visit of ex-King Ali to Transjordan. Transjordan-Hejazi relations ... Discusses possible dangers of visit and desirability of mutual recognition and Transjordan-Hejazi Treaty of Friendship	3
6 Secretary of State for the Colonies to High Commissioner for Transjordan No. 72. Tel.	July 5	Beni Atiya raid ... Desirability of reprimanding Amir Abdullah	4
7 To Sir A. Ryan No. 83. Tel.	July 6	Revolt of Ibn Rifada ...	5
8 High Commissioner for Transjordan to Secretary of State for the Colonies No. 66. Tel.	July 6	Transjordan-Hejazi relations ... Replies to Nos. 5 and 6. Possibility of mutual recognition and Transjordan-Hejazi Treaty of Friendship. Increase in British personnel of Arab Legion	5
9 Sir A. Ryan No. 116. Tel.	July 7	Transjordan-Hejazi relations ... Refers to No. 7. Summarises Hejazi note regarding rumour that Amir Abdullah is stirring up rebellion in Wadi Sirhan	5
10 Secretary of State for the Colonies to High Commissioner for Transjordan No. 74. Tel.	July 7	Transjordan-Hejazi relations ... Refers to No. 8. Discusses best method of persuading Amir to agree to conclusion of treaty	6

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

iii

No. and Name.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page
	1932		
11 Sir A. Ryan No. 112. Tel.	July 9	Transjordan-Hejazi relations ... Refers to No. 9. Reports lines of reply to Hejazi notes of 15th and 30th June, and letter of 30th June from Ministry for Foreign Affairs	6
12 Sir A. Ryan Nos. 124 and 122. Tel.	July 13	Transjordan-Hejazi relations ... Refers to No. 11. Summarises Hejazi note of 11th July raising question of enquiry into responsibility for the Rifada revolt and seeks instructions	6
13 High Commissioner for Transjordan to Secretary of State for the Colonies No. 63. Tel.	July 9	Transjordan-Hejazi relations ... Refers to No. 10. Reports interview with the Amir, and outlines his attitude towards Ibn Saud	7
14 Sir A. Ryan No. 247	June 14	Transjordan-Hejazi relations ... Reports three conversations with Sheikh Yusuf Yasin regarding the action taken by His Majesty's Government and the Transjordan Government in regard to the revolt of Ibn Rifada	7
15 Sir A. Ryan No. 250	June 17	Internal politics ... Reports speech of Ibn Saud to Hejazi notables on the 28th May	10
16 Sir A. Ryan No. 206	June 21	Internal politics ... Uneasiness of Ibn Saud at situation round Taif, in the south, and as regard to Ibn Rifada. Conflict between Fudl Hassan and Yusuf Yasin. Arrest of launch under French flag	11
17 High Commissioner for Iraq to Secretary of State for the Colonies No. 263. Tel.	July 13	Transjordan-Hejazi relations ... Reports offer of King Feisal to mediate between Ibn Saud and Abdullah. Requests observations	13
18 Secretary of State for the Colonies to High Commissioner for Transjordan No. 73. Tel. Secret	July 15	Transjordan-Hejazi relations ... Requests comments on No. 17	13
19 High Commissioner for Transjordan to Secretary of State for the Colonies Secret	July 9	Transjordan-Hejazi relations ... Refers to No. 13. Reports interview with the Amir Abdullah, and outlines arguments against raising treaty question at present	13
20 Secretary of State for the Colonies to High Commissioner for Transjordan No. 79. Tel. Secret	July 18	Transjordan-Hejazi relations ... Refers to No. 19. Enquires what steps Amir is taking to publish his disapproval of Ibn Rifada's revolt and position in Wadi Sirhan	15
21 High Commissioner for Transjordan to Secretary of State for the Colonies No. 71. Tel. Secret	July 19	Transjordan-Hejazi relations ... Refers to No. 18. Welcomes King Feisal's offer of mediation	16

No. and Name.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page
	1932		
22 Secretary of State for the Colonies to High Commissioner for Iraq No. 183. Tel.	July 20	Transjordan-Hejazi relations ... Refers to No. 17. Welcomes King Feisal's offer of mediation, and states desirability of Transjordan-Hejazi Treaty of Friendship	16
23 Secretary of State for the Colonies to High Commissioner for Transjordan No. 81. Tel.	July 20	Transjordan-Hejazi relations ... Refers to No. 18. Agrees that question of Treaty of Friendship should not at present be raised with Amir	16
24 To Sir A. Ryan No. 91. Tel.	July 21	Transjordan-Hejazi relations ... Refers to No. 12. Declines joint investigation and gives reasons why it cannot be claimed under article 6 of Hadda Agreement	16
25 Sir A. Ryan No. 133. Tel.	July 21	Revolt of Ibn Rifada ... Reports movements of Hejazi forces	17
26 Sir A. Ryan No. 136. Tel.	July 22	Transjordan-Hejazi relations ... Refers to No. 24. Reports conversations with Hejazi Minister for Foreign Affairs regarding complicity of Amir Abdullah in Ibn Rifada revolt	17
27 Sir A. Ryan No. 137. Tel.	July 24	Anti-Ibn Saud conspiracy ... Enquires as to truth of reports regarding activities of Daldagh family and other conspirators	18
28 High Commissioner for Transjordan to Secretary of State for the Colonies No. 74. Tel.	July 21	Transjordan-Hejazi relations ... Refers to No. 20 and No. 9. Reports actions of Amir disavowing Ibn Rifada, and story implicating Amir Shakir in endeavour to stir up tribes	18
29 Sir A. Ryan No. 139. Tel.	July 27	Revolt of Ibn Rifada ... Refers to No. 25. Movements of Hejazi forces	18
30 Political Resident in the Persian Gulf to Secretary of State for the Colonies Confidential	June 29	Qusabi family ... Encloses despatch from Political Agent, Bahrain, reporting differences between the Qusabi family and Ibn Saud	19
31 To Sir A. Ryan No. 94. Tel.	July 28	Transjordan-Hejazi relations ... Refers to No. 9 and No. 28. Directs terms of reply to Hejazi note of 6th July	20
32 Sir A. Ryan No. 140. Tel.	July 20	Transjordan-Hejazi relations ... Refers to No. 31. Reports conversation with Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs	20
33 To Sir A. Ryan No. 95. Tel.	July 30	Transjordan-Hejazi relations ... Refers to No. 26. Directs line to be taken with Ibn Saud regarding King Feisal's offer of mediation	20
34 Sir A. Ryan No. 141. Tel.	July 30	Internal politics... Refers to No. 16. Reports and comments on mobilisation of troops at Taif	21
35 Sir A. Ryan No. 142. Tel.	July 31	Revolt of Ibn Rifada ... Refers to No. 29. Reports defeat and death of Ibn Rifada	21

No. and Name.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page
	1932		
36 Sir A. Ryan No. 144. Tel.	Aug. 1	Transjordan-Hejazi relations ... Refers to No. 33. Reports conversation with Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs regarding rapprochement between Ibn Saud and Abdullah and King Feisal's offer of mediation	21
37 Sir A. Ryan No. 145. Tel.	Aug. 1	Internal politics... Refers to No. 34. Explains mobilisation at Taif, and outlines general position of Ibn Saud	22
38 Sir A. Ryan No. 284	July 9	Internal politics... Refers to No. 15. Describes recent severity of Hejazi authorities	22
39 Sir F. Humphrys (Bagdad) to Sir P. Cuscliffe-Lister (Confidential. B)	July 14	Amir Feisal's visit to Iraq ... Reports on visit and encloses translation of telegram from Amir to High Commissioner, Bagdad	23
40 Sir A. Ryan No. 303	July 17	Jedda report for May and June 1932 ...	25
41 India Office to Foreign Office	Aug. 5	Arab air route ... Encloses copy of agreement with Sheikh of Shargah	41
42 Sir A. Ryan No. 2. Tel. Saving	July 28	Disarmament ... Reports conversation with Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs regarding President Hoover's disarmament proposal	43
43 Sir A. Ryan Nos. 6 and 7. Tel. Saving	July 28	Transjordan-Hejazi relations ... Refers to No. 26. Reports conversations with Hejazi authorities regarding possibility of joint investigation of causes of Ibn Rifada's revolt	43
44 Sir A. Ryan No. 151. Tel.	Aug. 8	Transjordan-Hejazi relations ... Refers to No. 43. Discusses private memorandum from Ibn Saud regarding Abdullah, summarised in No. 43, and reports conversation with Fudl Hamza and Yusuf Yasin	45
45 Sir A. Ryan No. 152. Tel.	Aug. 8	Transjordan-Hejazi relations ... Refers to No. 44. Gives summary of private memorandum from Ibn Saud, which details charges against Abdullah and requests his deposition or guarantee of his good conduct by His Majesty's Government	45
46 Sir A. Ryan (No. 202) to Political Resident, Aden No. 153. Tel.	Aug. 8	Anti-Ibn Saud conspiracy ... Refers to No. 27. Reports receipt from Ibn Saud of letter from Tahir-ad-Dabbagh to the Amir Shakir	46
47 Sir A. Ryan (No. 207) to High Commissioner for Transjordan No. 153. Tel.	Aug. 9	Revolt of Ibn Rifada ... Refers to No. 35. Documents published in Umm-al-Qura	46
48 Sir A. Ryan No. 159. Tel.	Aug. 12	Revolt of Ibn Rifada ... Refers to No. 47. Discusses possible dangerous effect of inflammation of Akhwan and public feeling against Abdullah and His Majesty's Government	47

No. and Name.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page
	1932		
49 Sir A. Ryan No. 162. Tel.	Aug. 15	Revolt of Ibn Rifada ... Refers to No. 48. Reports dispersal of Akhwan by Ibn Saud	47
50 Sir P. Lorraine (Cairo) No. 761	Aug. 5	Revolt of Ibn Rifada ... Action taken by Egyptian Government to control sea-borne traffic from Egyptian ports to the Hejaz	48
51 Sir F. Humphrys (Bagdad) to Sir P. Cunliffe-Lister (communicated by Colonial Office) Secret	Aug. 2	Relations between the Hashimite rulers and Ibn Saud ... Reports conversations with the Amir Shakir and King Faisal	49
52 Sir A. Ryan No. 298	July 12	Financial situation of Hejaz-Nejd ... Examines newly issued regulation regarding mode of settlement of Government debts, and encloses translation	50
53 Sir A. Ryan No. 328	Aug. 1	Transjordan-Hejazi relations ... Reports series of conversations with Sheikh Yusuf Yasin	52
54 Sir A. Ryan No. 330	Aug. 2	Transjordan-Hejazi relations ... Reports further discussions with Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, with special reference to proposed mediation of King Faisal between Ibn Saud and Abdullah	54
55 To Sir A. Ryan No. 108. Tel.	Aug. 18	Transjordan-Hejazi relations ... Refers to Nos. 44 and 45. Gives preliminary views of His Majesty's Government on Ibn Saud's memorandum	56
56 High Commissioner for Transjordan to Secretary of State for the Colonies No. 94. Tel.	Aug. 18	Anti-Ibn Saud conspiracy ... Gives particulars of Hamid-el-Wadi, Sherif Sharraf, Tahir and Hussein-el-Dabbagh, and movements of Abdul Raouf Sabbah	57
57 Lord Tyrrell (Paris) No. 1125	Aug. 17	Franco-Hejazi relations ... Transmits text of Franco-Hejazi Treaty of Friendship	57
58 Lord Tyrrell No. 1136	Aug. 18	Franco-Hejazi relations ... Transmits text of treaty between the Hejaz and Syria	61
59 Sir A. Ryan No. 165. Tel.	Aug. 21	Transjordan-Hejazi relations ... Refers to No. 56. Gives observations on views of His Majesty's Government regarding Ibn Saud's memorandum	65
60 High Commissioner for Transjordan to Secretary of State for the Colonies No. 105. Tel. Secret	Aug. 27	Transjordan-Hejazi relations ... Discusses possibility of Abdullah's deposition and means of effecting rapprochement with Ibn Saud	67
61 Sir A. Ryan No. 340	Aug. 5	Transjordan-Hejazi relations ... Refers to No. 44. Transmits, with comments, translations of letter from Sheikh Yusuf Yasin and memorandum by Ibn Saud regarding Abdullah	67

No. and Name.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page
	1932		
62 Sir A. Ryan No. 350	Aug. 15	Revolt of Ibn Rifada ... Refers to No. 48. Discusses feeling raised in the Akhwan by the revolt	72
63 High Commissioner for Transjordan to Secretary of State for the Colonies No. 110. Tel.	Sept. 2	Transjordan-Hejazi relations ... Reports interview with Abdullah regarding mutual recognition and possibility of treaty of friendship	73
64 Sir A. Ryan No. 376	Aug. 30	Transjordan-Hejazi relations ... Reports two audiences with Ibn Saud and attitude of Ibn Saud towards Abdullah	74
65 Chargé d'Affaires, Jeddah No. 180. Tel.	Sept. 22	Institution of Kingdom of Saudi Arabia ... Reports issue of Royal decree establishing kingdom	75
66 Chargé d'Affaires, Jeddah No. 181. Tel.	Sept. 22	Institution of Kingdom of Saudi Arabia ... Refers to No. 65. Reports publication of petitions demanding union	75
67 Mr. Hope Gill No. 183. Tel.	Sept. 24	Institution of Kingdom of Saudi Arabia ... Discusses objects of step	76
68 Sir A. Ryan No. 379	Sept. 2	Pilgrimage ... Transmits report on the pilgrimage of 1932	76
69 Mr. Hope Gill No. 384	Sept. 8	Death of the Governor of Jeddah ... Reports death of Hajji Abdullah Ali Raza and appointment of Abdul Aziz-bin-Muhammad	125
70 Mr. Hope Gill No. 387	Sept. 8	Jeddah report for July and August 1932 ...	126
71 Secretary of State for the Colonies to High Commissioner for Transjordan No. 127. Tel.	Sept. 30	Transjordan-Hejazi relations ... Gives conclusions of His Majesty's Government regarding mutual recognition of Ibn Saud and Abdullah and treaty settlement	155
72 Secretary of State for the Colonies to High Commissioner for Transjordan No. 128. Tel.	Sept. 30	Transjordan-Hejazi relations ... Refers to No. 71. Gives text of proposed reply to Ibn Saud's memorandum of 6th August	156
73 To Mr. Hope Gill No. 129. Tel.	Oct. 5	Transjordan-Hejazi relations ... Refers to No. 72. Gives instructions for communication of reply to Ibn Saud's memorandum	159
74 To Mr. Hope Gill No. 335	Oct. 6	Institution of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia ... Refers to No. 65. Transmits copy of note from Hejaz-Nejd Legation and gives official English translation of new name	157
75 To Sir G. Clerk (Angora) No. ???	Oct. 10	Turkish supply of arms to Ibn Saud ... Records conversation with Turkish Ambassador	157
76 Mr. Hope Gill No. 399	Sept. 28	Internal politics... Reports interview given by Ibn Saud to the <i>Sa'at al-Hijaz</i> , regarding situation in Northern Hejaz, relations with neighbour States and Arab Congress	158

No. and Name.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page
	1932		
77 Mr. Hope Gill No. 401	Sept. 25	Institution of Kingdom of Saudi Arabia ... Reports on origins of new move and discusses its reasons	139
78 Mr. Hope Gill No. 406	Sept. 26	Slavery ... Repatriation of a slave belonging to Amir Muhammad	140
79 Mr. Hope Gill No. 188. Tel.	Oct. 14	Transjordan-Hejazi relations ... Refers to No. 78. Reports Ibn Saud's reply, stating willingness to recognise Abdullah and conclude treaty settlement	141
80 Foreign Office Memorandum	Nov. 11	Memorandum respecting the Hadramut ...	141
81 Mr. Hope Gill No. 427	Oct. 19	Institution of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia ... Reports conversation with Fuad Hamza regarding future constitution of Saudi Arabia	144
82 Mr. Hope Gill No. 428	Oct. 19	Finance ... Reports conversation with manager of Dutch Bank at Jeddah regarding debts of Saudi Government	144
83 Chargé d'Affaires, Jedda No. 214. Tel.	Nov. 25	Asir ... Reports fighting in Asir, withdrawal of Idriai into Yemen and Saudi preparations	145
84 Chargé d'Affaires, Jedda No. 216. Tel.	Nov. 27	Transjordan-Hejazi relations ... Summarises Saudi memorandum reporting excitement in Nejd at activities of Hashimites and others in Transjordan	146
85 Sir P. Lorrain No. 1030. Conf.	Nov. 18	Iraqi-Yemeni relations ... Reports conversation between Iraqi consul-general (Dr. Kadri) and oriental secretary regarding Soviet and Italian penetration in Yemen and state of the Hejaz under Ibn Saud	146
86 Chargé d'Affaires, Jedda No. 216. Tel.	Nov. 29	Transjordan-Hejazi relations ... Refers to No. 84. Discusses motives of Saudi memorandum	147
87 Chargé d'Affaires, Jedda No. 217. Tel.	Nov. 29	Transjordan-Hejazi relations ... Refers to No. 86. Suggests action against Amir Shukir. Discusses position of His Majesty's Government as between Abdullah and Ibn Saud	148
88 Colonial Office to High Commissioner for Transjordan No. 165. Tel.	Dec. 2	Transjordan-Hejazi relations ... Summarises No. 87, and urges drastic action against anti-Saudi conspiracy in Transjordan, and representations to Amir. Outlines possible reply to Saudi Government	149
89 Mr. Hope Gill No. 443	Nov. 7	Jedda report for September and October 1932 ...	150
90 Mr. Hope Gill No. 450	Nov. 17	Asir ... Encloses translation of Saudi memorandum regarding dispute between the Idriai and the Saudi Amir	158
91 High Commissioner for Transjordan to Secretary of State for the Colonies No. 162. Tel.	Dec. 5	Transjordan-Hejazi relations ... Gives instances of action taken by Abdullah to comply with policy of His Majesty's Government in regard to Ibn Saud. Discusses possibility of action against anti-Saudi conspirators	160

No. and Name.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page
	1932		
92 High Commissioner for Transjordan to Secretary of State for the Colonies No. 170. Tel.	Dec. 8	Transjordan-Hejazi relations ... Refers to No. 91. Reports conversation with Abdullah, who undertook not to engage in anti-Saudi conspiracy	160
93 Mr. Hope Gill No. 467	Nov. 30	Finance ... Encloses, and comments on, translation of memorandum by Saudi Government regarding payment of debts	162
94 Secretary of State for the Colonies to High Commissioner for Transjordan No. 167. Tel.	Dec. 23	Transjordan-Hejazi relations ... Outlines attitude which would be adopted by His Majesty's Government in event of Akhwan incursion into Transjordan	164
95 High Commissioner for Transjordan to Secretary of State for the Colonies No. 175. Tel.	Dec. 24	Transjordan-Hejazi relations ... Refers to No. 94. Reports rumours of Akhwan concentration, and presses for meeting between Glubb and Ibn Zaid	164
96 Sir A. Ryan No. 225. Tel.	Dec. 28	Asir ... Reports Saudi operations in Asir, death of Khalid-ben-Luway, and visit of Italian sloop to Jeddah. Saudi suspicion of Italians	165
97 Sir A. Ryan No. 226. Tel.	Dec. 29	Anti-Saudi conspirators ... Requests permission to discuss attitude of His Majesty's Government with Saudi Government. Expresses regret at impossibility of action against Shukir and Hamid-el-Wadi	165
98 Sir A. Ryan No. 232. Tel.	Dec. 31	Asir ... Reports on submission of tribes and attitude of Imam	166
99 To Sir A. Ryan No. 162. Tel.	Dec. 31	Transjordan-Hejazi relations ... Refers to No. 97. Possibility of action against anti-Saudi intrigues in Transjordan. Authorises use of present information, if necessary	166

Chapter II.—SYRIA.

	1932		
100 Consul Hale (Damascus) No. 47. Conf.	June 16	Syrian political situation ... Refers to Part XXX, No. 129. Reports conclusion of business and adjournment of Chamber until the autumn. Reports election of new President of the Republic (Mohamed Ali-el-Abed), and formation of new Cabinet under Hakkî-el-Azim	167
101 Acting Consul-General Urquhart (Beirut) No. 81	July 6	Lebanon: General situation ... Reports departure of M. Ponsot to consult M. Herriot, and reviews his achievements in politics and economics in Syria and the Lebanon	168
102 Lord Tyrrell No. 1478	Nov. 3	Franco-Syrian Treaty ... Reports rumoured signature of treaty on lines of Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, with a view to ending the mandate. In reply to enquiries, French Ministry for Foreign Affairs stated that this was the French policy, but that it was being indefinitely postponed by disunion in Syria	169

No. and Name.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page
103 Acting Consul-General Urquhart No. 83	1932 Oct. 26	Syrian political situation Reports return of M. Ponsot, who is rumoured to have elaborated a solution of the political situation and who restarted negotiations at a great pace. Estimates their chances of success and reports briefly on political and economic situation in the Lebanon	170
104 League of Nations...	Oct. 3	Iraq-Syrian frontier Discussion and adoption by the Council of the report of the Commission of Enquiry set up on 9th December, 1931	171
106 Sir G. Clerk (Angora) No. 365	Nov. 6	Syrian-Turkish relations Summarises Franco-Turkish agreement on (a) "basse syrienne" and (b) Syrian-Turkish frontier railway (Bagdad Railway)	174
106 Sir G. Clerk No. 372	Nov. 12	Syrian-Turkish relations Transmits copy of railway agreement referred to in No. 105	175
107 Vice-Consul Napier (Damascus) No. 71. Conf.	Nov. 2	Syrian political situation Refers to No. 100. Reports reassembly of Syrian Parliament on 29th October, and comments on first two days' proceedings. Refers to No. 103, and reports meagre results of M. Ponsot's negotiations	178
108 League of Nations...	Nov. 25	Iraq-Syrian frontier Report of the Permanent Mandates Commission	179
109 Consul-General Sir H. Satow (Beirut) No. 57	Nov. 25	Syrian political situation Refers to No. 105. Reports that M. Ponsot left on 22nd November to present his report to the Permanent Mandates Commission. Reproduces views of M. Ponsot expressed at interview on 21st November, and reports concentration of political activity on Syria, with relative neglect of Lebanon	181

Chapter III.—IRAQ.

110 To Lord Tyrrell No. 1429. Conf.	1932 July 4	Judicial system: French rights Rehearses history of the existing judicial system of Iraq, and instructs Lord Tyrrell to invite the French Government to renounce the rights of French nationals under the capitulatory régime, to which Iraq would otherwise revert on termination of the mandate	183
111 To Mr. Hoare (Tehran) No. 376. Conf.	July 4	Judicial system: Persian rights See No. 110. Instructs Mr. Hoare to invite Persian Government to renounce, before admission of Iraq to the League of Nations, any claim to special jurisdictional rights which they may have possessed in the former Ottoman Empire	184
112 United States Embassy	July 8	Proposed termination of the mandate Aide-memoire stating that the United States Government, while not insisting on fulfilment of its rights in the case of Iraq, has not abandoned the principle, established in 1921, that the approval of the United States is essential to the validity of any determination which may be reached regarding mandated territories	187

No. and Name.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page
113 Colonial Office (communicated)	1932 July 20	Royal Air Force cantonment at Hinaidi Exchange of letters between Sir F. Humphrys and Jafar Pasha, 28th April and 9th June, regarding future position of Royal Iraqi Air Force at Hinaidi	188
114 To Mr. Atherton (United States Embassy)	July 22	Proposed termination of the mandate Transmits copy of Iraqi Declaration of Guarantees, and draws the attention of the United States Government to the question of the future status of American citizens	189
115 To Secretary-General, League of Nations	July 26	Entry of Iraq to League of Nations Transmits letter from Prime Minister of Iraq, requesting that the Kingdom of Iraq may be admitted to the League of Nations, with explanatory memorandum and copy of Iraqi Declaration of Guarantees	191
116 Colonial Office (communicated)	July 28	Future duties of Royal Air Force in Iraq Despatch from Secretary of State for Colonies to High Commissioner, Bagdad, regarding conditions which should govern the use of the R.A.F. in Iraq after the termination of the mandate and the entry into force of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930, other than in time of war or menace of war	193
117 To Secretary-General, League of Nations	Sept. 8	Assyrian question Transmits signed copy of petition, dated 17th June, 1932, by certain Assyrian leaders and representatives of levies in Iraq, with thirty copies of memorandum containing His Majesty's Government's observations on the same, with appendices	196
118 French Ambassador	Sept. 7	Iraqi financial engagements Asks to be supplied with a list of the international engagements which His Majesty's Government and the Iraqi Government consider to be covered by the phrase in the Declaration of Guarantees: "droit d'acquiescer et d'engager finances." Refers in particular to the treaty of 23rd December, 1920	227
119 Colonial Office (communicated)	Aug. 23- Sept. 8	Iraq-Koweit frontier Correspondence between Prime Minister of Iraq, High Commissioner and Acting High Commissioner, Political Agent, Koweit, and Ruler of Koweit regarding the reaffirmation of the existing frontier between Iraq and Koweit	227
120 Colonial Office (communicated)	Sept. 10	Iraq census Despatch from High Commissioner, enclosing population and racial statistics	229
121 Colonial Office (communicated)	Sept. 16	Movements of Imperial forces in Iraq Correspondence between High Commissioner, Jafar Pasha, Nuri Pasha and Air Vice-Marshal Ludlow-Hewitt regarding article 7 of the military annexure to the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930	232
122 Colonial Office (communicated)	Sept. 20	Assyrian question Despatch from Sir H. Young regarding King Faisal's meeting with Mr. Shimon and His Majesty's views on Assyrians. Transmits accounts of interviews which took place	233

No. and Name.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page
	1932		
123 To French Ambassador	Sept. 21	Iraqi financial engagements ... Refers to No. 118. Gives a list of engagements, as requested. The Franco-British convention of 23rd December, 1930, while not included under the Declaration of Guarantees, is one of the responsibilities accepted by Iraq under paragraph 2 of article 6 of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930	236
124 To Secretary-General, League of Nations	Sept. 21	Judicial system ... Reports that His Majesty's Government have secured renunciation, by all Powers concerned, of the maintenance in Iraq, on the termination of the mandate, of the capitulatory rights which they possessed in the former Ottoman Empire	237
125 Mr. Atherton (United States Embassy)	Sept. 20	Proposed termination of the mandate ... Refers to No. 112 and subsequent correspondence. Enquires whether His Majesty's Government intend to communicate above documents to the League of Nations. States that the United States Government will, in any case, wish to do so, being anxious to make their position clear	238
126 To Mr. Atherton (United States Embassy)	Sept. 24	Proposed termination of the mandate ... Refers to No. 125. Subject to agreement as to which correspondence is meant, His Majesty's Government agree to communicate documents, as requested, and suggest Permanent Mandates Commission as appropriate League organ to receive them	238
127 Consul, Geneva No. 330. Tel.	Sept. 27	Syrian-Iraqi frontier ... From Mr. Cadogan. Reports state of negotiations for private agreement between Sir F. Humphrys and M. Ponsot. Requests authorisation for Sir F. Humphrys to accept in principle frontier recommended by commission, including majority recommendation	239
128 To Consul, Geneva No. 408. Tel.	Sept. 28	Syrian-Iraqi frontier ... Refers to No. 127. For Mr. Cadogan. Agrees	239
129 League of Nations (M. Castaldi)	Sept. 28	Judicial system ... Refers to No. 124. Has noted contents and communicated letter to the Council	240
130 To Secretary-General, League of Nations	Oct. 11	Proposed termination of the mandate ... Transmits correspondence with the United States Government, at the latter's wish, and requests circulation	240
131 United Kingdom Delegation, Geneva No. 286	Oct. 10	Entry of Iraq to League of Nations ... Reports proceedings and formalities in connexion with successful reception of Iraq as member of the League of Nations	243
132 United Kingdom Delegation No. 308	Oct. 14	Termination of the mandate ... Transmits copies of the signed protocol and exchange of notes with French delegation regarding assumption by Iraq of obligations formerly borne by His Majesty's Government under the San Remo Oil Agreement of 24th April, 1920, and the Anglo-French Convention of 23rd December, 1920	243
133 Sir H. Young No. 1000. Secret	Oct. 15	Entry of Iraq to League of Nations ... Describes in detail the Bagdad official celebrations on 6th October. Transmits translation of King Faisal's speech	245

No. and Name.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page
	1932		
134 Sir H. Young No. 335. Tel.	Oct. 29	Political situation ... Reports return of Nuri Pasha to Bagdad and resignation of his Cabinet. Gives details of King Faisal's attitude to Nuri and Yasin. King has sent for Naji Shaukat	248
135 Sir H. Young No. 336. Tel.	Oct. 31	Political situation ... Refers to No. 134. Invitation to Naji Shaukat has been cancelled, since Nuri has unexpectedly agreed to serve as Minister for Foreign Affairs under Yasin. Asks for instructions in view of Yasin's avowed hostility to the treaty	249
136 To Sir H. Young No. 344. Tel.	Nov. 2	Political situation ... Refers to No. 135. Instructs Sir H. Young to delay King Faisal's decision until Sir F. Humphrys's return, in view of unfortunate effect upon His Majesty's Government of Yasin's appointment so soon after termination of mandate	249
137 League of Nations (M. Castaldi)	Nov. 11	Termination of the mandate ... Refers to No. 130. Has noted contents and will circulate as requested	249
138 Sir H. Young No. 1060. Secret	Nov. 8	Political situation ... Gives fully detailed account of circumstances leading to Nuri's resignation, of subsequent conversations with Nuri, King Faisal and Sir K. Cornwallis, and of invitation to Naji Shaukat to form a new Ministry	250
139 Secretary-General, League of Nations	Nov. 14	Assyrian question ... Transmits report of Permanent Mandates Commission on Assyrian petitions	255
140 Sir F. Humphrys No. 1078. Conf.	Nov. 10	Presentation of credentials ... Reports on ceremony and transmits copies of speeches delivered. Had a private audience later	260
141 Sir F. Humphrys No. 1093. Secret	Nov. 17	Political situation ... Refers to No. 138. Reports dissolution of Parliament on 9th November, and discusses possible consequences	261
142 Sir F. Humphrys No. 1093. Conf.	Nov. 17	Political situation ... Refers to No. 140, paragraph 5. Reports private conversation with King Faisal after presenting credentials. Talk included gratitude of Iraq to His Majesty's Government, future of Syria, Assyrian question, economic development, and present political crisis	262
143 Sir F. Humphrys No. 1094. Conf.	Nov. 17	Political situation ... Transmits, with observations, translation of text of Naji Beg Shaukat's programme as published	263
144 To Sir F. Humphrys No. 657. Secret	Dec. 6	Status of British officials in Iraqi service ... Owing to undesirability and impropriety of continuing to use British officials in Iraqi service as sources of confidential and reliable information pending development of consular service in Iraq, instructs Sir F. Humphrys to obtain King Faisal's and Prime Minister's oral assent to Sir K. Cornwallis communicating any important information affecting internal security of Iraq to His Majesty's Ambassador	268

No. and Name.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page
	1932		
145 To Sir F. Humphrys (from Consul, Geneva, No. 21) No. 431. Tel.	Dec. 4	Assyrian question ... From Secretary of State. Reports League Council's misgivings regarding Assyrians and requests observations on Council's desire to send League commissioner to Iraq to report on possi- bilities of settlement	269
146 Sir F. Humphrys ... (to Consul, Ge- neva, No. 240) No. 364. Tel.	Dec. 4	Assyrian question ... Refers to No. 147. Following for United Kingdom delegation. Communication to Mar Shimun regarding future conditions of levy service and Assyrians' petitions to League of Nations	270
147 Sir F. Humphrys ... (to Consul, Ge- neva, No. 241) No. 365. Tel.	Dec. 4	Assyrian question ... Refers to No. 146. Denies statements in <i>Journal de Genève</i> and <i>Church Times</i> . Only assurances given to Assyrians in preceding summer given in No. 146. Comments on possibilities of settlement and attitude of League Council	270
148 Consul, Geneva ... No. 432. Tel.	Dec. 6	Assyrian question ... From Mr. Cadogan for Sir R. Vansittart. Reports that League Council has begun consideration of Assyrian petitions and appointed committee to examine Permanent Mandates Commission's report	271
149 Sir F. Humphrys ... (to Consul, Ge- neva, No. 242) No. 366. Tel.	Dec. 7	Assyrian question ... Refers to No. 145. Has conferred with King Feisal and Prime Minister, who would regard despatch of League Commissioner as insulting to Iraqi honour and likely cause of bloodshed between Assyrians and Kurds, and blame League for its decision of December 1925	272
150 Sir F. Humphrys ... (to Consul, Ge- neva, No. 243) No. 367. Tel.	Dec. 7	Assyrian question ... Refers to No. 149. Supports arguments of King and Prime Minister, and submits points for urgent decision by League Council	272
151 Sir F. Humphrys ... (to Consul, Ge- neva, No. 244) No. 368. Tel.	Dec. 7	Assyrian question ... Refers to No. 148. Submits arguments for use of United Kingdom representative on sub- committee of Council	273
152 League of Nations		Assyrian question ... Minutes of 69th session of the League of Nations Council: 11th meeting held on 5th December, 1932, to consider Assyrian petitions	273
153 Sir F. Humphrys ... (to Consul, Ge- neva, No. 250) No. 373. Tel.	Dec. 11	Assyrian question ... Submits summary of salient facts of Assyrian case. Responsibility now rests entirely on Iraqi Government, which must therefore be allowed to take the final decision on its own judgment	279
154 Sir F. Humphrys ... (to Consul, Ge- neva, No. 251) No. 374. Tel.	Dec. 12	Assyrian question ... Text of amended draft resolution for submission to League Council	280
155 Sir F. Humphrys ... (to Consul, Ge- neva, No. 255) No. 375. Tel.	Dec. 15	Assyrian question ... Iraq Government accept redrafted resolution as passed by League Council and thank United Kingdom delegation for their help	280

No. and Name.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page
	1932		
156 Sir F. Humphrys ... No. 1137. Secret	Dec. 15	Royal Air Force in Iraq ... Reviews His Majesty's Government's obliga- tions under the 1930 treaty, and gives detailed reasons for urging that Iraq should be excluded from the operation of the proposed renunciation of aerial bombing or bombing of civilians	280
157 Sir F. Humphrys ... No. 1164. Secret	Dec. 21	Proposed Pan-Arab Congress at Bagdad ... Reports conversation with King Feisal on 20th December, in which Sir F. Humphrys urged that too active support of the Pan-Arab move- ment might weaken rather than strengthen Iraq's position among her neighbours. Congress, if held, should not be allowed to deal with politics. Asks for views of His Majesty's Government	284
158 Sir F. Humphrys ... No. 1166	Dec. 22	Iraqi-Persian Frontier Agreement ... Transmits text of identic notes exchanged by Persian and Iraqi Governments on 6th December	286

Chapter IV.—PALESTINE AND TRANSJORDAN.

	1932		
159 To Lord Tyrrell ... No. 1415	July 2	Proposed extension of Imperial preference to Palestine ... His Majesty's Government propose to extend Imperial preference to imports from Palestine and certain other territories under British mandate without extending same benefits to other nations under most-favoured-nation clause. Instructs Lord Tyrrell to seek French concurrence in this proposal	289
160 To Sir R. Lindsay (Washington) No. 390	July 2	Proposed extension of Imperial preference to Palestine ... His Majesty's Government propose to extend Imperial preference to exports from Palestine and certain other territories under British mandate, but do not consider that the United States of America is entitled to benefit. Instructs Sir R. Lindsay to enquire whether United States Govern- ment have any objections. [Similar requests sent to Rome, Madrid and Rio de Janeiro]	290
161 Mr. Murray (Rome) No. 641 (C)	Aug. 10	Proposed extension of Imperial preference to Palestine ... Refers to No. 160 [to Rome]. Transmits note verbale from Italian Government insisting on rights under Anglo-Italian Commercial Treaty of 1893. Palestine, with other mandated territories, must be considered as a foreign country and not as forming part of the British Empire	290
162 Lord Tyrrell No. 1192	Sept. 2	Proposed extension of Imperial preference to Palestine ... Refers to No. 159. Transmits note from French Government, which has no objection to this proposal	291
163 Mr. Osborne (Washington) No. 1314	Aug. 30	Proposed extension of Imperial preference to Palestine ... Refers to No. 160. Transmits note from United States Government insisting on rights under Convention of Commerce of 1815, and considering Palestine as a foreign country in common with other territories under British mandate	291

No. and Name.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
164 High Commissioner for Transjordan to Secretary of State for the Colonies Secret	1932 Sept. 8	Transjordan-Saudi relations ... Reports interview with Amir Abdullah at Amman on 1st September, and reproduces Amir's views on (a) recognition of Ibn Saud, (b) conclusion of "hon-voustage" agreement with Saudi Arabia, and (c) rebellion of Ibn Rifada. Amir is expecting visit from King of Iraq	292
165 Sir G. Grahame ... (Madrid) No. 308	Sept. 12	Proposed extension of Imperial preference to Palestine ... Refers to No. 160 [to Madrid]. Transmits note from Spanish Government insisting on rights. Palestine and other territories under British mandate are foreign countries and not part of British Empire	294
166 Sir F. Humphrys ... No. 1106	Nov. 24	Proposed Bagdad-Haifa Railway ... Reports interview with Amir Abdullah in Bagdad on 16th November. Amir much interested in proposed railway, anticipating large benefits from pilgrim traffic, provided Ibn Saud rebuilds Mudawara-Medina section of Hejaz Railway. Praises Zarka valley to Mafrak alignment for Bagdad-Haifa line. Praises His Majesty's Government's liberality towards Iraq as good example to French in Syria	296
167 To Lord Tyrrell ... No. 2473	Dec. 19	Proposed extension of Imperial preference to Palestine ... Transmits conditional concurrence of Brazilian Government. In view of replies received, will not put proposal into execution, but appreciates French attitude thereto	298

Chapter V.—GENERAL.

168 Lord Tyrrell ... No. 206	1932 July 1	Renunciation of capitulatory rights ... Transmits note from Ministry for Foreign Affairs acknowledging assurance that on the emancipation of any Levant State under French mandate His Majesty's Government will not show less goodwill regarding capitulatory rights than did the French Government on the emancipation of Iraq	297
169 Colonial Office ... (communicated)	Oct. 20	Iraq-Transjordan frontier ... Correspondence between Prime Minister of Iraq, Chief Minister of Government of Transjordan, and British Resident at Amman regarding definition of Iraq-Transjordan frontier	297
170 Sir G. Clerk ... No. 353	Oct. 31	Proposed Turco-Persian-Iraqi-British Security Pact ... Reports intention of Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs to negotiate new agreement on supposition that Treaty of Angora is rendered inapplicable by emancipation of Iraq, and to discuss matter with Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs	299
171 Sir G. Clerk ... No. 363	Nov. 18	Proposed Turco-Persian-Iraqi-British Security Pact ... Refers to No. 170. Transmits, with observations, memorandum by Mr. Morgan on Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs' proposal to give "regional" application to principles of Briand-Kellogg Pact and Covenant of the League	300

SUBJECT INDEX.

[The figures refer to serial numbers of documents.]

Chapter I.—ARABIA.

AIR ROUTE.—41	IRAQI-HEJAZI RELATIONS.—80, 81.
ANTI-IBN SAUD CONSPIRACY.—25, 46, 56, 97.	IRAQI-YEMENI RELATIONS.—85.
ASIR.—88, 90, 96, 98.	JEDDA REPORTS.—40, 70, 80.
IBNI ATTHA.—3, 6.	PILGRIMAGE.—68.
DISARMAMENT.—42.	QURASHI FAMILY.—30.
FRISAL'S TOUR.—1, 39.	SAUDI ARABIA, INSTITUTION OF KINGDOM OF.—65, 66, 67, 74, 77, 81.
FINANCE.—52, 82, 93.	SLAVERY.—78.
FRANCO-HEJAZI RELATIONS.—59.	TRANSJORDAN-HEJAZI RELATIONS.—5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 29, 31, 32, 33, 36, 43, 44, 45, 51, 53, 54, 55, 59, 60, 61, 65, 64, 71, 72, 73, 79, 84, 86, 87, 88, 91, 92, 94, 95, 99.
GOVERNOR OF JEDDA.—60.	TURCO-HEJAZI RELATIONS.—1.
HABESHAWY.—80.	TURKISH SUPPLY OF ARMS TO IBN SAUD.—25.
HASHIMITE.—51.	
IBN RIFADA, REVOLT OF.—4, 7, 25, 29, 35, 47, 49, 49, 50, 62.	
INTERNAL POLITICS.—15, 16, 34, 37, 38, 76.	

Chapter II.—SYRIA.

FRANCO-SYRIAN TREATY.—102.	SYRIAN POLITICAL SITUATION.—100, 101, 103, 107, 109.
IRAQ-SYRIAN FRONTIER.—104, 108, 127, 129.	SYRIAN-TURKISH RELATIONS.—105, 106.
LIBANON: GENERAL SITUATION.—101, 105.	

Chapter III.—IRAQ.

ASSYRIAN QUESTION.—117, 122, 129, 145-155.	JUDICIAL SYSTEM.—110, 111, 114, 124, 129.
ENTRY TO LAGOS OF NATOK.—115, 118, 131-133.	MANDATE, TERMINATION OF.—110-112, 114-118, 121, 123-126, 129, 130, 132, 137, 140.
IRAQ CENSUS.—120.	PAN-ARAB CONGRESS AT BAGDAD.—157.
IRAQ, FINANCIAL ENGAGEMENTS OF.—118, 120.	ROYAL AIR FORCE IN IRAQ.—113, 116, 121, 150.
IRAQ-KOWHET FRONTIER.—119.	STATUS OF DROYING OFFICIALS IN IRAQI SERVICE.—144.
IRAQ-PERSIAN FRONTIER AGREEMENT.—128.	
IRAQ POLITICAL SITUATION.—124-126, 128, 141-143.	

Chapter IV.—PALESTINE AND TRANSJORDAN.

BAGDAD-HAIFA RAILWAY (PROPOSED).—165.	SAUDI-TRANSJORDAN RELATIONS.—164.
EXTENSION OF IMPERIAL PREFERENCE TO PALESTINE (PROPOSED).—159-163, 165, 167.	

Chapter V.—GENERAL.

CAPITULATORY RIGHTS, RENUNCIATION OF.—169.	IRAQ-TRANSJORDAN FRONTIER.— Proposed Security Pact between His Majesty's Government, Turkey, Persia and Iraq.—170, 171.
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CONFIDENTIAL.

Further Correspondence respecting Eastern Affairs.

PART XXXI.

CHAPTER I ARABIA.

E 3277 1494 25

No. 1

Sir G. Clerk to Sir John Simon — (Received July 1)

(No. 207)

Constantinople, June 21, 1932

Sir,
I HAVE the honour to report that on the 8th June His Highness the Emir Feisal, son of the King of Hejaz Nejd, arrived in Constantinople by Soviet steamer from Odessa. He was accompanied to Turkey by M. Florinski, Soviet Minister in Constantinople. Since his arrival in Turkey has been the object of assiduous attentions on the part of members of the Soviet Embassy.

2. After a short stay in Constantinople, the Emir, with his suite, among whom were the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and H. H. Eyubi Bey, aide-de-camp, left for Angora in a special saloon coach placed at their disposal. He remained in Angora from the 12th to the 15th June, afterwards returning to Constantinople, where he is to spend a few days before leaving for Tehran via the Caucasus, and thence for Bagdad.

3. While in Angora the Emir was received by the President of the Republic who gave a dinner in his honour at his new residence at Cankaya, and was the guest of the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Teyfik Riza Bey, Kâzım İsmail, President of the Grand National Assembly, and Hikmet Bey, secretary-general of the Gazi. In deference to the opinions of the Emir, no alcoholic refreshments were served at these gatherings. In his turn, the Emir gave a dinner to the President of the Republic and leading Turks. Before leaving Angora the Emir had an interview with the Iraqi representative at the Iraq Legation with His Highness the Emir Zeid, Minister of Iraq and brother to the King of that country.

4. In the course of the dinner given at Cankaya by the President of the Republic, speeches were exchanged which, while on conventional lines, were marked with slightly more restraint on the Wahabi than on the Turkish side. The Emir expressed his pleasure at the efforts which were being made to set the Hejaz and Nejd on the way of progress and his best wishes for the future of those countries under the strong administration of King Abdulaziz, while the Emir confined himself to acknowledging with thanks the Gazi's wishes and reciprocating them. The official communiqué issued on the conclusion of the visit referred to cordial and sincere conversations, harmony of views, feelings of mutual confidence, and the influence of that visit on the consolidation of peace in the Near East.

5. The time between banquets was devoted to inspections of banking and military establishments. In this latter connexion it is noticeable that the visit of the Emir to Turkey is distinguished from that of other important personages by the extensive inspection of Turkey's military resources and by the rather unusual participation, in his reception and in his send-off, of high military

at the time the air was shown over military factories and barracks, under the command of Asit Pasha, Army Inspector, he assisted at tactical exercises, was present at a display of military horsemanship, and witnessed an aerial review in which some twenty-five military aeroplanes from Eskişehir took part. One of these flew into an obstacle when starting and the pilot was killed. The others indulged in formation flying, which to a lay observer seemed rather ragged, but the diving and other acrobatic feats seemed temerarious but successful.

6. Press comment on the visit is curiously unanimous in insisting that Turkey's interest in Hejaz and Nejd arises out of pleasure at their having won complete independence. It is said that the Turkish Government desire that Moslem States detached from the Ottoman Empire should have complete independence. For this reason she has always disliked the term "mandate," which signifies subjection. She had only consented to cede the Vilayet of Mosul because the cession was to be made to an independent Iraq. The line to be followed in regard to Syria by France, which is at present enjoying a "bad press" in Turkey, is thus clearly indicated. Yunus Nadi, writing as usual with his tongue in his cheek, after proclaiming Turkey's yearning for the independence of her former possessions, praises the austere organiser of the Hejaz and Nejd who has subjected his subjects, has endowed them with a strong Government, dealing out severe justice and ruling with iron discipline and he concludes with an outburst of joy at the progress made by the Arab peoples, Turkey's co-religionists.

7. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Jeddah I have, &c.

GEORGE R. CLERK

E 3328 76 25]

No. 2

Sir A. Ryan to Sir R. Vansittart.—(Received July 1)

(No. 107)

(Telegraphic) R

MY telegram No. 109

Jedda, July 1, 1932

Following is summary of official note from Minister for Foreign Affairs dated 30th June in reply to my message:—

Minister for Foreign Affairs thanks me for the information. Hejazi Government share regret of His Majesty's Government that the party were able to set out from Transjordan to raid their territory. They believed that after His Majesty's Government had undertaken to restrain Beni Atiya and guarantees had been taken tribe would be unable to engage in hostile action, but it appears that encouragement given by certain people in Transjordan has egged them on.

Hejazi Government receive daily news about Transjordan and attitude of Amir, who tempts tribesmen to raid Hejaz territory and aids them. They have not wished to convey this information to His Majesty's Government, firstly, from unwillingness to worry latter after they had undertaken to guard frontier and prevent raids on the part of Beni Atiya in particular, secondly, disbelief that Amir would dare to act against wishes of His Majesty's Government.

Now that forces from Nejd have started and will soon reach frontier district Hejazi Government do not fear [1 group omitted] or similar party, whether of Beni Atiya or others, but these incidents increase difficulty on frontier by alarming people of Nejd and inducing them towards rebellion.

Hejazi Government request, firstly, investigation as to who instigated party and punishment of those who guaranteed abstention of Beni Atiya from hostile action, and, secondly, they ask insistently for earliest possible institution of negotiation for agreement to solve difficulties between them and Transjordan on lines already suggested. Failing urgent steps in this direction, it cannot be expected that affairs on frontier will be put in order.

I am sending interim answer formally expressing regret of His Majesty's Government and conveying information in Transjordanian telegram No. 58 to me. (Repeated to Transjordan, No. 135)

E 3328 76 25

No. 1

Sir A. Ryan to Sir R. Vansittart.—(Received July 2)

(No. 111)

(Telegraphic)

Jedda, July 2, 1932

YO (R telegram No. 76

The altered attitude of Minister for Foreign Affairs was maintained throughout, conversation ending 28th June, and he has not even taken the obvious opportunity afforded by the Beni Atiya raid to revert explicitly to his note of the 11th June. My personal view is that it would be better to use paragraphs 2 to 4 of your telegram under reference to the extent which I may find desirable when Minister for Foreign Affairs returns to Jedda, and to incorporate paragraph 5 in any reply you may wish me to return to note and letter numbered in my telegram No. 107 and 110.

As regards paragraph 4, I concur. Hejaz enquiry may be taken as relating to the future, but I think thesis of Hejaz Government is that Abdullah, having no organised force at his free disposal, is determined to use tribes to attack Hejaz, and that Ibn Rifada's affair was the first step in the execution of this plan. This view derives some support from a doubt now existing as to whether Ibn Rifada simply dashed across bottle-neck with force equipped in Egypt and from the Beni Atiya affair.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 143)

E 3364 76/25]

No. 4

High Commissioner for Transjordan to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—(Received in Foreign Office, July 5)

(No. 62)

(Telegraphic)

July 2, 1932

CAIRO telegram No. 67 of 28th June.

All my information which has been given in my previous telegrams shows that Ibn Rifada and his band came from Sunai. There is no evidence that band was formed in Transjordan or Palestine territory.

I have not yet established that Ibn Rifada was in Transjordan later than Ramadan. This point is being investigated in connexion with Foreign Office memorandum regarding complicity of Amir Abdullah, enclosed in your despatch, Secret, of 13th June.

(Repeated to Jedda, No. 63, and Cairo, No. 64)

E 3375/76 25]

No. 5

Secretary of State for the Colonies to the High Commissioner for Transjordan.—(Received in Foreign Office, July 6)

(No. 70)

(Telegraphic)

Colonial Office, July 4, 1932

MY telegram No. 68. Your telegram No. 56 and Jedda telegram to Foreign Office No. 104. In spite of views expressed in your telegram and by High Commissioner for Iraq (see telegram 261 June) as to the necessity of Ali's visit to Abdulla, His Majesty's Government feel some anxiety that visit should be taking place at present juncture. See in this connexion my telegram No. 62 containing text of very confidential report from Cairo. As to Ali's lack of resources, is it safe to assume that he and Abdulla could not raise funds for a venture which might ultimately bring them a big return? Or might they not at least make attractive promises to possible rebels in regard to their future treatment should territory involved in rebellion at any time change its allegiance?

2. It is for consideration whether anything can be done at this stage to minimise possibility of intrigue and to improve relations between Transjordan and Hejaz-Nejd. Under article 5 of Transjordan Agreement Amir has pledged himself to be guided by advice of His Majesty's Government in matters of foreign

[8079]

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policy, and fact that Transjordan Government are financially dependent upon His Majesty's Government. It is realised that pressure on Abdulla will not necessarily have same result as pressure on Amir. In any case Abdulla cannot divest himself of responsibility for Ali's behaviour while in Transjordan.

1. I am writing to you in view of your suggestion. You might summon Amir to Jerusalem to discuss political questions, or on any other ground which you think fit. You may want to know whether it is obligatory under the Transjordan Agreement to do so. The answer is that it is not. You may want to know whether it is desirable to do so. The answer is that it is not. You may want to know whether it is possible to do so. The answer is that it is possible. You may want to know whether it is wise to do so. The answer is that it is wise.

2. All the powers of the King of Hejaz Nejd are in normal diplomatic relations with Hejaz Nejd, Amir's position in despite of his obligation under article 5 of Transjordan Agreement to accede to recognition of Ibn Saud. During their visit to London Hejaz Nejd mission emphasised Ibn Saud's keenness to conclude with Transjordan treaties of friendship and extradition on similar lines to those recently concluded with Iraq. While there are difficulties in the way of negotiation and operation of extradition treaty, it may be possible to make some practical arrangement to cover this ground. In any case a simple treaty of friendship should present no real difficulty.

3. In considering suggestion in paragraph 3 you will no doubt give due weight to the fact that the relations of Amir with the mandatory Power. Among other things Amir might be asked to consider the possibility of a treaty of friendship for revision of Transjordan Agreement.

4. Despatch follows upon details connected with proposed treaty, but if you would appear to present a convenient opportunity, which may not soon recur, of dealing with this question, it would be well to do so. It may be delayed for my despatch which does not affect main question at issue.
(Repeated to Jedda, No. 81)

E 3410 76 25] No. 6
Secretary of State for the Colonies to the High Commissioner for Transjordan.—
(Received in Foreign Office, July 6.)

(No. 72.)
(Telegraphic)
Colonial Office, July 5, 1932
Your telegram No. 70 was drafted before receipt of your telegram No. 60. Should you decide to summon Amir to Jerusalem and give him sharp warning regarding the matter, the point of ex-King Ali's case will not be lost. Consider advisability of speaking strongly to him regarding Beni Atiya case. Reports of Amir's connexion with this unfortunate incident, which seem to have obtained wide credence in Arabia, to have convinced British Resident of Amir's complicity and to have necessitated his removal from office. He has been frequently alluded to by Hejaz-Nejd Government and have caused His Majesty's Government much concern.

E 3328 76 25] No. 7
Sir R. Vansittart (for the Secretary of State) to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda)

(No. 83.)
(Telegraphic)
Foreign Office, July 6 1932
YOUR telegram No. 111 of the 2nd July. Transjordan complicity in Hejazi rebellion.
Material in my telegram No. 76 of the 30th June appears generally applicable to points raised in Hejazi note of 30th June and Minister for Foreign Affairs' letter as well as to note of 15th June. You may use all or part of that material in whatever way you think best in replying to all or any of three Hejazi communications.
(Addressed to Jedda, No. 83 Repeated to Transjordan No. 73.)

No. 8.
High Commissioner for Transjordan to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Received in Foreign Office, July 7)

(No. 86.)
(Telegraphic)
July 6, 1932.
YOUR telegrams Nos. 70 and 72. I intend to see the Amir immediately and to speak to him about ex-King Ali and about Beni Atiya case. I have considered your suggestion that I should ask Amir to agree forthwith to recognise Ibn Saud and to conclude a treaty of friendship. It is, of course, certain that he would be most reluctant to do so at present. I should prefer not to make suggestion to him if it is going to be open to him to turn it down or procrastinate unduly. I propose, therefore, to raise the subject with him as a preliminary step. I anticipate that nothing short of compulsory measures, such as direct threat of deposition, would cause Amir to agree at present time to recognise Ibn Saud.

Another subject which I should like to raise in my conversation with the Amir is desirability, in light of recent developments, of making a further increase in British personnel of Arab Legion. I have recently come to conclusion that a fourth British officer is required and I shall be addressing you by despatch on this subject. I regard this as a particularly favourable time for telling the Amir, who will not relish the proposal that a fourth British officer is to be appointed. I shall be glad to have your approval.

E 3416 76 25] No. 9
Sir A. Ryan to Sir R. Vansittart.—(Received July 7.)
(No. 116.)
(Telegraphic) R.
Jedda, July 7, 1932.

YOUR telegram No. 83.
I will take appropriate action within two or three days. Its form will depend on whether Minister for Foreign Affairs visits Jedda. Meanwhile, he has sent further note, dated 6th July, regarding a report that Abdullah is now attempting to stir up rebellion in Wadi Sirhan as he did in Akaba region. He makes usual request for precautionary measures, and suggests that if report is confirmed on investigation by His Majesty's Government time has come to give effect to proposal in his note of 14th May for joint action by them and Hejazi Government to resist insurrection engineered by Amir in defiance of undertaking of His Majesty's Government. He asks for urgent reply regarding report in question.
I do not understand specific reference to note of 14th May
(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 149)

No. 10

(No. 74)

Colonial Office, July 7, 1932

I am prepared to leave this to your judgment. You realize that we are in a great position to judge whether a particular line will be effective and what its reactions may be.

E 3448 '76 25]

No. 11

(No. 118.)

Jedda June 10 1932

Minister for Foreign Affairs shows no sign of coming to Jeddah. I am therefore sending him a reply to his letter of 18th and 30th June and letter of 30th June. I have used material in paragraph 3 of your telegram No 76 suggesting I will incur a considerable expense of personal confidence in the King's ability to prevent retaliation of the kind mentioned in note of 30th June.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 153)

No 12

(Nos. 124 and 125.)

Sesido, July 13, 1932

I have received reply, dated 11th July, from Minister for Foreign Affairs, Government of India, in which he has expressed his sympathy for the Government of Madras in what is treated as a matter of common interest. He, however, makes the following points:—

(a) While Hajian Government hopes that measures taken will suffice, this does not prevent them from making requests stated at the end of paragraph 5 of their letter of 10th June 1978. I enclose paragraph 5 of my telegram No 72.

(b) Minister for Foreign Affairs agrees that practice of responsibility is less urgent than that of the destruction of races. It does not preclude agreement on the basis of discussion of this matter even if discussion itself is postponed. Proposal for joint enquiry is justified by article 17 of Hagan Agreement. Minister for Foreign Affairs invites His Majesty's Government to express their views as to the best procedure to establish responsibility and award punishment after considering information in communications, ending with that embodied in my telegram No. 156 to Cairo and referring to treaty article invoked.

(c) Hojazi Government welcome statement as to attitude of His Majesty's Government in the event of aggression by Transjordan, a statement made after

information regarding intentions of Abdullah had been supplied. Troops have been instructed not to attack Transjordan. His Majesty's Government will be informed as soon as they reach frontier area, and all steps will be taken to prevent attack on Transjordan so long as His Majesty's Government continue to direct its affairs.

My second reference is those to the importance of unity amongst us for greater success and that it is only the ability of friendly British Government to overcome the difficulties. (End of R)

I consider note satisfactory on the whole, and think mine of 10th July has served its purpose. It has, I think, expressed the substance of article 6 of Hadda Agreement. Language of Minister for Foreign Affairs is occasionally ambiguous, but reaffirmation of previous suggestion at (a) is mild, and the assurance at (c) is of value despite the qualification that might be read into it.

I do not consider the note calls for an early reply. I would propose again to await possible opportunities of a personal discussion. If none of this I should like your instructions on the line to take regarding (b). In my opinion article 6 cannot be strained to cover what would, in effect, be an enquiry into the alleged ultimate responsibility of Amir and others.

In the interval between the notes I received the High Commissioner's telegram No. 69, which I regard as being for my information only. It would be useless for me to discuss it with the Government of Transjordan. I myself said Ah without being able to say that they had satisfied His Majesty's Government. (Repeated to Transjordan, No 163 and 164)

E 8453 76 251

No. 13

*High Commissioner for Transjordan to the Secretary of State for the Colonies
(Received in Foreign Office, July 11)*

(No. 85)

(Telegraphic)

July 9, 1932

YOUR No. 74. I am sending by to-day's mail full report of my interview with the Amir. He gave me his promise actively to support policy of His Majesty's Government and accepted responsibility for good conduct of his brother. Ah, while in Transjordan

I did not raise question of Treaty of Friendship. I am quite ready to do this, but at present I think it is right to postpone it till a more favourable opportunity. Abdulla thinks that the present situation does not offer a favourable opportunity. Abdulla thinks that the British power will not be able to enter into an alliance with the ruler of the south of Hejaz. Consequently, if I raise question now, though he may not give a direct refusal, he would employ every means possible for procrastination and delay. Without making a threat of deposition I see no way to compel him to conclude the treaty.

I suggest, therefore, that I should not raise the subject until Ibn Saud has re-established his power and position. It would be unfortunate if the Amir has at no time shown any hostility towards British Government, though he is inevitably antagonistic at heart to Ibn Saud.

「E 3494/76/25」

No. 14.

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received July 18.)

(No 247)

51

Jeddo, June 14, 1932

WITH reference to my telegram No. 74 of the 11th June, I have the honour to submit a general account of developments connected with the Ibn Rifada affair during the recent visit of Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, who arrived in Jedda on the evening of the 10th June and returned to Taif this morning. I do not think it necessary to record my conversation with the Sheikh in detail but will give a brief summary of the main points of the discussion. The H. Govt. Government

2. On the evening of the 10th June, Sheikh Yusuf sent me the letter which I summed up briefly in paragraph 2 of my telegram under reference. I enclose

6. I referred to the death of every poet. I told him that it was a good rule, if one's house were on fire, to get on with extinguishing the fire before talking about respectful burial, which seemed so insistent on doing. If he forced on me a lecture about the death of poets, I would tell him that it would only be filled with respectful burial for poets, which I had neither heard of what he had promoted by grave and not that any one of its own, such as in this case, could be attributed to it. His Majesty's Government or Iraq or him. I expressed the reluctance of His Majesty's Government to give any takings which could not be carried out on to the sound of which there must be a tax, versus, as far as such which had arisen in the past, and over the use of the Minister, which had had no practical effect long after the process, differently to the act of His Majesty's Government Iraq and Kuwait of the Nuri rebellion of 1929. The end

11. I am sending copies of the report to His Majesty's High Commissioners for Transjordan, Iraq and Egypt.

(¹) Not printed

No. 15

(No. 250.)

Sir,

Jedda, June 17, 1932

WITH reference to Mr Hope Gill's despatch No. 205 of the 11th May, commenting on Ibn Saud's speech at his pilgrim banquet on the 12th April, I have the honour to state that the King seems to have created somewhat of a sensation by another flight of eloquence when he addressed a company of Hejazi notables in Mecca on the eve of his departure for Taif on the 23rd May. According to private accounts of the gathering, His Majesty indulged in extremely strong language about the abuses complained of by pilgrims, and, while excusing the irregularities practiced by the authorities, he reported some of them in the severest terms people in intermediate positions, and most of all those of the highest rank. According to it is said, his own officials. He is reported to have spoken of the "black flag" as a symbol of rebellion, and of the "white flag" as a symbol of submission, but he also stated that the "black flag" was a warning to the rebels to return to the fold of Islam, and that the "white flag" was a call to read the Koran, practice the pilgrimage, and to follow the ways of the Prophet.

2. You may be a good host of a party, but I have summarized the proceedings as follows: "The speaker has been told as a fact, that the people of the Hejaz. The central Quraysh, and the people of the Hejaz. It is possible to detect the boom of munice in the sea of somewhat militant piety to which Ibn Saud has accustomed his Moslem hearers. "You know," he said, "that we entered the Hejaz only after we have been fought against in our home. By God, we do not withstand anything unless we are first attacked, and if we are attacked we defend our religion, ourselves, our nation and home, and God grants us success, which is a blessing from Him. When we arrive at a place we order its people to follow the commands in the Holy Book and the traditions of the Prophet. We are only warriors in the cause of God."

3. The King, according to the "Umm-al-Qura" report, described his readiness to enquire into the state of the people and his care for their welfare. "O people of this town and these villages, I look at each of you as my father, the most dear to me, but I am not the young as you are. What I say is what I believe and God is the best witness." He went on to define his attitude towards modern civilisation. He would depart in nothing from the commands of God as far as he could, but he would accept what was beneficial and permitted by Islam, opposing what was contrary to it. There was no civilisation preferable or better than that of Islam.

4. Presently the King delivered himself of the following passages —

" You must advise ignorant people and guide them to the right path. If he follows the advice, thank God; but if he refuses he will be responsible for his sin.

"I swear by God that I like peace and endeavour to maintain it, but in case I am afflicted, I keep still till the very end, and if the time of defence comes I will defend the religion and country."

"If there is nothing to ride on except spear-heads, the compelled one cannot help riding on them. Then there will be one of two alternatives: either happiness or martyrdom, and each of them is a blessing from God. We are prepared to meet either of them with open arms and cheerful faces, as this is the tradition of the Prophet of God and his friends after him."

6. The King went on to divide people generally into three classes, the helpers, the indifferent, whom efforts should be made to guide in the right way, and the opposers, whose punishment would be great in this world and in the next. He called upon his hearers as being the chiefs and leaders of the nation to submit any complaints to him and to give him their guidance, bearing in mind however the injunction of the Prophet Muhammad who sought to advise him that it should be "between me and him." He would investigate any complaint he received. His hearers should engage in useful work. "The land of God is so vast and broad, you should go round about and do some work, eschewing laziness."

which brings evil results." He had brought them together to counsel them, so that the stupid might not be tempted by clemency to persevere in error. He warned them against apostasy and deviation from Islam in these holy lands. Any that he saw guilty of such deviation would be severely punished, as would be those who were tempted by the devil to commit subversive actions. These he would treat as dynamite. Anyone who had a grievance against another could appeal to him, even though the complaint was against his son Faisal, and, if he neglected the complaint and upheld his son, then his own conduct would give just ground for complaint.

6. His Majesty ended his speech, as reported in the "Umm-al-Qura," with a promise that all those who were obedient to the commands of Islam, a renewal of his warning to those who might be tempted by the devil, for I am sure we keep his word, and, if I say, I do, and, if I do, I continue and do not care for the consequences"); an intimation that he had wished to punish some of those who strayed from the faith or had evil intentions against the country, but had preferred to give a general warning, and a final exhortation to the inhabitants of the city, who were men of good will, to adhere to God's commands and the traditions of the Prophet.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN

E 3505/78 251

No. 16

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received July 13.)

(No. 258.)

515.

Jeddo, June 21, 1932

SINCE writing my despatch No. 234 of the 17th June, I have heard various reports, most of which rank no higher than rumours, but which are worth recording, in connexion with the Ibn Rifada affair and its repercussions or possible repercussions elsewhere in the Hejaz. The principal sources are my Indian vice-consul, who recently made a short stay at Taif, and the French Chargé d'Affaires, with whom I had a most unusual amount of general conversation on the 5th and 20th June.

2. There has undoubtedly been much malaise in Hejazi circles for some time past. It was stimulated by the King's trenchant address to the notables at Mecca on the 22nd May, which has formed the subject of a separate report. The news of Ibn Saud's adventures has, as a result of public opinion prepared for every kind of untoward eventuality. Fear of Ibn Saud, fear of war and doubt as to the stability of the régime are among the characteristic symptoms of the general uneasiness.

A. And it was found that the King was concerned at Tair. The King received him, but confined himself to conventional conversation on topics like the weather and my health. The Khan Bahadur saw, however, the president of the Legislative Council and said that he was aware of a situation from which it would appear that the King is perturbed not only by the situation in the north, but by the state of feeling among the majority among the Tair. It was said that many of the leading men had been imprisoned, and that some were released after a few days, while others were detained. The King was also said to be looking suspiciously towards the Yemen to suspect Hashimite activity in that direction, and to be contemplating measures in Asir, including the despatch of a force of the family of the late General of Egypt.

4. It was reported that the King had summoned the well-known military leader Khadidjah al-Jefali from Tanjma for consultation and that a few days later fifty lorry loads of soldiers, which had been standing by outside the palace, left Tanjma possibly to be placed under Khadidjah's command. The vice-consul saw personally a certain Sheikh Abdullah Jefali, who played a rôle in the last war in the Hejaz, mainly, I gather, on the commissariat side. This person was expecting to be sent to Medina. The Amir Neshmi, who has apparently been in these parts, is said to have been despatched with a force to Wejeh. What with these movements and the turn out of tribal forces from the regions of Hail, Jauf, &c., the vice-consul's informants estimated that Ibn Saud was mobilising at least 5,000 men, with the object of inflicting a crushing defeat on the present rebels and giving a salutary lesson to all and sundry.

U. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioners for Transjordan, Iraq and Egypt.

I have, &c.
ANDREW RYAN

No. 17

(Repeated to Jerusalem and Jedda, No. 198)

No. 18

BAGDAD telegram to Colonial Office No 203, repeated to you. Shall be glad to have your comments

No. 10

The Beni Atiya had been quiet in Transjordan until June. On or about June 9, 1918, they returned to Amman within a few days of their return to Kerak, seventy of them set out for the frontier and crossed it on the 26th. From this, I said, I could not but think that these leaders received encouragement when in Amman.

9. He would also promise not only to continue to act correctly, but also to make it known to all concerned that he was actively supporting the British Resident and His Majesty's Government in all measures to prevent support from reaching the rebels under Ibn Rifada, and that he would not in any way countenance the movement.

High Commissioner for Transjordan

(Repeated to Jedda, No. 67)

E 3742 3674 25]

No. 27

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received July 24.)

(No. 137)
(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, July 24, 1932

FOLLOWING addressed to Aden, No. 181:—

Your letter No. 864 received by despatch of 20th July appears to which

"Cairo informed me on 14th July of unconfirmed report that 2,500 rifles, &c., had been sent by dhows from Jibuti to Birk. Hejaz Government connect this with the activities of Ad Dabbagh, whom they now describe as being engaged with two brothers and many other named persons in a conspiracy to run arms from Massawa, where one brother bought three dhows from the British Consulate. It is stated that the brothers have widespread connexions in Arabia, including Hejaz, as well as in Egypt and with Sherifs of Aden. The brothers are said to have a bank in Egypt through Mizr Bank and a bank in Aden. No actual arrivals of arms in Asir have been reported.

"Can you throw light on the above?"

"Fuller details follow by earliest opportunity."

"I am asking Cairo to communicate despatch under reference and this telegram to Senior Naval Officer."

(Repeated to Cairo, No. 182, and Transjordan, No. 183.)

E 3753 76 25]

No. 28

High Commissioner for Transjordan to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Received in Foreign Office, July 25)(No. 74)
(Telegraphic.)

July 21, 1932

YOUR telegram No. 70.

Amir has issued letter to Officer Commanding Arab Legion that latter should give the necessary instructions "with a view to expressing desirability that no person or party should give to Ibn Rifada and those with him and that we are against those who have such an idea." Also when I flew over Transjordan on Monday the Amir sent me a telegram in which he expressed appreciation of the work of the forces in Maan area. There is nothing in his public utterances which is improper. I do not see what further steps he could take in the way of publicly disavowing Ibn Rifada.

As regards Jedda telegram to Foreign Office, No. 116 (see my No. 73 of the 20th July) I call to your attention the fact that a wide-spread story is being told in the Maan area and in the neighbourhood of the Amir Shaker that Government had given permission to everyone to raid. They were told that the story was untrue. It may be that Hejaz Government have heard of this or similar story; but it would be helpful if particulars were given as to who are being stirred up. Glubb has been directed by the British Resident to investigate Hejaz report. I think Hejaz Government might be told that according to my present information there is no truth in it.

As regards Bagdad telegram, see my telegram No. 71 of the 14th July
(Repeated to Jedda, No. 78, Secret)

E 3808, 76/25]

No. 29

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received July 27)

(No. 189)
(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, July 27, 1932

MY telegram No. 133.

Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me this morning, for information of yourself and British authorities only, that force estimated at 1,000 men, supported by cars, was leaving Dhaha to-day. Another is advancing through the mountains and should reach scene of action two or three days hence, and battle might be expected on third or fourth day from now.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 187 and High Commission, Egypt, No. 188.)

E 3816 3816 25]

No. 30

Political Resident in the Persian Gulf to Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated by Colonial Office, July 28)

(Confidential.)

THE Honourable the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for the Colonies, London, and has the honour to transmit to him a copy of the under-mentioned document.

2 Copy is being sent to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Simla, and His Majesty's Minister, Jedda.

Bushire, June 29, 1932

Enclosure in No. 30

Political Agent, Bahrain, to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Bahrain, June 26, 1932

I HAVE the honour to say that matters have a fairly close connection with the late Sheikh of the power of Qasbi. I have conversed with the late Sheikh's son, a person known as Qasbi, who is now in the Gulf. He stated all the brothers had combined and signed a letter to Ibn Saud saying that they would not supply him with any goods on credit unless he made some arrangement for settling their outstanding debts, which amount to some 17 lakhs of rupees. Abdulla Qasbi expressed himself with unusual heat, and stated that they had even given an ultimatum to their Royal master to the effect that, if their demands were not met, they would remove their families from Nejd to Bahrain and apply to be registered as Bahrain subjects.

2. I have little doubt that the situation is perfectly correctly described. Abdul Aziz went to Jedda with the thinly-veiled intention of extracting some money from Ibn Saud, and it is obvious from other information I have received that he has completely failed. I have also noticed that the usual shipments on behalf of His Majesty were not being made by the Qasabis, but were being made by other firms, and news has been received of a consignment of 17,000 bags of rice due to be shipped by the Gulf through Bahrain to the Gulf and other arrangements being made by the late Sheikh's son, a person known as Qasbi, who was formerly Kaimakam of Jedda. This consignment is to be paid for in instalments, though it is very doubtful that they will be any more successful in extracting payment than the all-powerful Qasabis have found themselves to be.

3. The Qasabis are undoubtedly pledged to the hilt with Ibn Saud and can ill afford to break with him, for any repudiation or delay in settling his debt of 17 lakhs coming on top of the sum they have lost in the insolvency of Habib Rosenthal, may have a disastrous effect on them, and render it difficult for them to pay the instalments due to pearl dealers in Bahrain. However foolish

Abdulla may be, Abdul Aziz, the senior partner and creator of the firm, has great intelligence, and I do not doubt that he will find some means of bringing Ibn Saud to terms, even though it may take time, though his task will be facilitated when the firms who are taking their place discover the difficulty in obtaining payment from their august client.

I have, &c
C. G. PRIOR
Political Agent, Bahrain

E 3753/76 25]

No. 31

Sir John Simon to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda)

(No. 94.)

(Telegraphic) R

Foreign Office, July 28, 1932

YOUR telegram No. 110 of 7th July. Alleged intrigues of Amir Abdullah in Wadi Sirhan.

You may reply as suggested in second paragraph of Transjordan telegram No. 74 of the 21st July to Colonial Office.
(Repeated to Transjordan No. 86)

E 3858 76 25]

No. 32

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received July 29.)

(No. 140.)

(Telegraphic)

Jedda, July 29, 1932

FOREIGN Office telegram No. 94

I told Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs on 21st July that no trouble was known to exist in Wadi Sirhan. He did not question my statement, but merely said Hejaz Government had communicated their information to His Majesty's Government and left them to deal with it. As it referred in terms to Amir's alleged activities, I should prefer to add nothing at present to what I have already said, unless you think it essential. Further statements might encourage Hejazi tendency to harp on question of Amir's responsibility. I have reported conversations on this subject in Saving telegram due to arrive in London about 8th August.

E 3741 76 25]

No. 33

Sir John Simon to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda)

(No. 95.)

(Telegraphic)

Foreign Office, July 30, 1932.

YOUR telegram No. 136 of 23rd July, paragraph 3. Relations between Ibn Saud and Amir Abdullah.

For your own information, I may explain that decision to postpone reply to Amir was based on the fact that His Majesty's Government were not yet in a position to give a definite answer to the question.

You may inform His Majesty's Government of Amir's suggestion, and let him know, in whatever way you think best, that he would be well advised to act thereon.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 88)

E 3859/76 25]

No. 34

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received July 31)

(No. 141.)

(Telegraphic)

Jedda, July 30, 1932

MY despatch No. 258.

When we were discussing quite different matters yesterday, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs let slip remark that 10,000 troops had recently arrived at Jeddah. I am not sure whether the King is seriously concerned as to a general situation, what with rebellion in the north, danger in Asir (compare recent report on Ad Dabbagh plot) and possible unrest elsewhere.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 191)

E 3861 76 25]

No. 35.

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received August 1)

(No. 142.)

(Telegraphic) R.

Jedda, July 31, 1932.

MY telegram No. 139

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs communicated the following information this morning. After several days of fighting rebels they were surrounded, and battle ending in complete Government success took place from morning to evening at Jeddah Shar. Ibn R. Fada and two sons were killed, and his head has been sent to Jeddah. Submarine Admiral Von Dreyer with five of his brothers and one shoreef were also killed. The latter has not been identified, but may possibly be Mohammed Badwaiwi, distant relative of Amir, who lived in Transjordan. Rebels lost 370 killed. Government not more than 14 other losses have not yet been reported. Total number of rebels is unknown. But Minister for Foreign Affairs thought original force might have grown to about 1,000 men. Some rebels escaped and are being pursued in the direction of the frontier. It is hoped to capture them before they reach it.

I congratulated the King and the Government. I expressed the personal hope that the former would use mercy in dealing with the more insignificant survivors.

(Addressed to Foreign Office. Repeated to Transjordan, No. 192, and Cairo, No. 193)

E 3883 1241 25]

No. 36

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received August 2.)

(No. 144.)

(Telegraphic)

Jedda, August 1, 1932

YOUR telegram No. 95, paragraph 2.

I spoke to Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs last evening. He had not heard of the suggestion but we discussed it at some length. I stressed the advantage of it as means of approach to better relations, which would provide a setting for desired treaty settlement. He questioned me as to legality of status of Transjordan, and as to who would be parties to such a settlement. I replied that this was one of the legal questions which presented difficulty, that it admitted of no definite answer at present, and that the great thing now was to establish healthy relations.

Yusuf Yasin told me to-day, under telegraphic instructions, that King welcomed the principle of the suggestion but must await the Emir Feisal's return from Riyadh before deciding, and would then like to discuss certain preliminary matters with His Majesty's Government. I gathered that Ibn Saud had heard little or nothing of the subject from his side. I expressed my view that latter must be awaited, but urged that matter, which was simple in itself, should not be complicated by premature introduction of other issues.

[8079]

c 3

I confined myself as regards His Majesty's Government to explanation of suggestion and statement of your general views, but used every personal argument I could use to convince the King of the necessity of the King of Iraq as method of bringing Ibn Saud and Abdullah together, and facilitating settlement of the boundary dispute. I think this is best means of encouraging King to adopt suggestion, and trust you will approve of my course.

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs left for Taif to-day
(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 195.)

E 3866 62 25]

No. 37

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received August 2.)

(No. 145.)

(Telegraphic.)

MY telegram No. 141

Jedda, August 1, 1932

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs explained privately and very candidly to me the reasons for the distribution of presents to and [group omitted] tribesmen at Riadh. This year he has brought them to Taif for that purpose. Minister for Foreign Affairs confessed that King had been doubtful as to the magnitude of the movement for Riadh, but had decided to do so in view of the pressure being put on him in every direction, including Iraq frontier and borderland of Yemen.

Mobilisation at Taif was part of plan to cope with all eventualities.

I did not gather to what extent other forces had been sent in directions named above, and I am still puzzled as to how many Akhwan actually assembled at Al Ula. My present impression, however, is that Ibn Saud has demonstrated his grip on the general situation, and, subject to financial difficulties, will emerge with increased strength. I now think he has destroyed Ibn Radda. Compare Kuwait intelligence report of 7th July.

Another estimate yesterday put assemblage at Taif at 15,000 men
(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 198.)

E 3896 62 25]

No. 38

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received August 3.)

(No. 204.)

Sir

Jedda, July 2, 1932.

IN my despatch No. 250 of the 17th June I reported on a speech by Ibn Saud which revealed his attitude towards the townspeople of the Hejaz, and in my despatch No. 258 of the 21st June I dealt with various matters bearing on the uneasy internal situation in this country. This reflection in the public mind of this uneasiness has been greatly stimulated by the somewhat drastic proceedings of the police and the Government during the last couple of weeks.

2. It is stated that on the night of the 25th June the Director of Police of Mecca, a powerful and arbitrary official, created no small emotion by posting armed men all over the town, with the ostensible object, it appeared afterwards, of searching a house where country wine was supposed to be made, and in which a large number of women were actually found.

3. The same report reproduces a story for which I should be sorry to vouch, and which only serves to add to the sort of gossip that goes about in excited and fearful atmospheres. It is said that the King sent back some soldiers who had come from Khurma to Taif, and that the Amir Khalid-bin Lowai had explained that His Majesty did not require them, that the English would bring Ibn Radda to Taif for delivery to the King, who would strike off his head, and that the English had further promised to turn the "dirty pig" Abdullah out of Transjordan and send him to Iraq.

4. More importance attaches to certain police proceedings in Jedda in the light of the 25th June, when a large number of residents were arrested. Some of them were released at once, some others within a few days; but several were

sent to the interior. I need not quote the rumours on this subject, as the Government took the unusual course of publishing a communiqué in the "Umm-al Qura" of the 1st July. I enclose a translation of this document, minus the pious exordium which explains that this holy land is a place for prayer and work, not for propaganda (!).

5. It is interesting to note that the avowed object of the raid in Jedda was to discourage the circulation of rumours, a subject on which I have had conversations with Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, in circumstances described in the correspondence arising out of the Ibn Rifada affair. One of the persons deported to the interior is a well-known Hadhrani sheikh. I believe him to be entitled to British protection and am keeping his case in mind, although I do not feel that I can prudently intervene on his behalf at the present moment.

6. The public execution in Jedda on the 1st July of a murderer, a man of the Jubeina tribe, has also created an impression, though, apart from the barbarity with which it was carried out and the fact that the man had excited interest some weeks before by escaping from prison, this incident need not call for much comment at a normal time. The man seems to have richly deserved his fate.

7. It was reported at the end of June that the playing of football had been prohibited. It is not clear that any formal prohibition was enacted, but there was a strong belief in interested circles that persons who continued to play might be arrested. The feeling against football in high quarters is due to a belief that it brings young men together in clubs and affords an opportunity for subversive talk. There is probably some foundation for this belief.

8. What emerges from all this is that the authorities are nervous at the state of public feeling, and have taken action which aims as much at intimidating the townsmen as at repressing particular activities. The former object has been achieved in Jedda. The people hardly dare to talk and are shy of foreigners. My French colleague goes so far as to speak of "une terreur générale." It is likely to be intensified by the appointment of a head of police of an arrogant official who held a similar post at Rabigh. This man, Syed Kurdi, is believed to come from Ras-al-Ain, near Aleppo. The town is said to be full of spies. Even the innocent-looking and in itself legitimate census excites mistrust. Apart from the common oriental fear that it is a prelude to conscription or taxation, there is widespread doubt as to whether it is safer to declare oneself a Hejazi and put oneself at the mercy of the Government, or to claim foreign nationality and risk their vindictiveness. There is talk of other arrests, including that of a clerk in the now vacant German consulate, who is said to be a Turkish subject.

I have &c

ANDREW RYAN

(1) Not printed

E 3947 3108 25

No. 30

Sir P. Humphrys to Sir P. Cunliffe-Lister.—(Communicated by Colonial Office, August 3.)

(Confidential B.)

Sir,

Bagdad, July 14, 1932

I HAVE the honour to refer to my telegram No. 252, dated the 4th July, 1932, and to make the following report on the Amir Feisal's visit to Iraq—

2. His Highness arrived at Khanaqin on the evening of the 7th July. He was met by Dr. Najid Asad, the Iraqi Charge d'Affaires at Jedda, and by representatives of King Feisal and the Iraqi Government. From Khanaqin his Highness was brought to Bagdad by a special train in which he was accommodated in the Royal saloon. On arrival he was received by the Acting Prime Minister, Mr. P. S. P. and by a large number of officials and officers of the army and navy. A guard of honour was presented to him by the British and French forces.

3. His Majesty King Feisal put his country house at Harthiyah at the disposal of his guest, and I had the honour of being received by him there shortly after his arrival. I found his Highness looking very tired but doing his best to maintain an appearance of pleased interest in all that was being done to honour and entertain him. A little later, after his visit to the King, the Amir returned my call at the Residency in company with Fuad Beg Hamza. His

[8079]

c 4

Highness gave me a friendly message from his father, and was good enough to say that King Abdul Aziz had been present at the conference on board H.M.S. "Lynx" in 1930 had given him.

4. On the first evening of his visit his Highness was entertained at a banquet given in his honour at the palace; the following evening he attended another banquet given by the Acting Prime Minister in the Municipal Gardens, and on the last day of his stay I had the pleasure of receiving his Highness and his guests at the Residency. Early in the morning of the 11th July, the Amir left Bagdad for Koweit in a Royal Air Force Victoria, which the Air Officer Commanding had kindly placed at his Highness's disposal.

5. The Amir's visit passed off quietly without incident, and his pleasant manners created an agreeable impression on all with whom he came in contact. Before his arrival, I had advised King Feisal that he should endeavour to profit from his Highness's visit, not only to settle outstanding differences between the Iraqi and Nejd Hejazi Governments concerning the location of the Iraqi Legation in Mecca, but also to suggest that the Iraqi Legation should be in Jeddah, provided that the Hejazi Government would allow the Iraqi mission to have an unofficial house at Mecca which they could use when they visited the capital on business. I also hinted that the Iraqi mission might be less suspiciously received, if His Majesty were to appoint as its chief a man who was not compromised in the eyes of the Nejd-Hejazi Government by previous personal contact with Hejazi officers. As regards relations between the Hejaz and Transjordan, I recalled the immediate relaxation of dangerous tension which had followed on His Majesty's meeting with the King Ibn Saud in 1930, and said that I was confident that similarly beneficial results could be obtained from a rapprochement between King Ibn Saud and the Amir Abdullah, if His Majesty would use his good offices to bring this about.

6. At the Amir's departure the King said that he had discussed both these matters on the lines I had suggested. He was hopeful that the compromise proposed about the location of the Iraqi Legation would be accepted by King Ibn Saud, but he anticipated that the latter might ask for the Iraqi representative to be a Minister and not a Chargé d'Affaires. I think King Feisal would agree to this, provided that the Minister is allowed to have a house in Mecca and an official residence in Jeddah. He will be treated properly and not shunned by spies, as Dr. Najid Asil complains he always was when he went to Mecca.

7. As regards Transjordan-Nejd relations, the King said that the Amir Feisal had been to try to persuade his father to telegraph to His Majesty requesting his mediation with a view to the conclusion of a good neighbourly relations treaty between Transjordan and Nejd and the Hejaz on the lines of that which had recently been concluded between Iraq and Nejd and the Hejaz. The King seemed hopeful that King Ibn Saud would do this and said that in that event he would go to Amman to persuade the Amir Abdullah to come into line.

8. His Majesty also revealed to me that he had learnt that the Amir was far from pleased with Fuad Hamza who had been too self-assertive during their tour in Europe. He thought that the latter would not long remain in power after his return to Nejd.

9. In my own talks with the Amir I kept to general topics, but in conversation with Fuad Hamza I gathered that he regarded the Ibn Rifada invasion as a matter of second-rate importance and that he was convinced that His Majesty's Government were doing everything that was possible to bring it to a ignominious conclusion.

10. I enclose a copy of a telegram which I received from the Amir Feisal after his departure from Bagdad.

11. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Jeddah and to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Transjordan.

I have, &c.

F. H. HUMPHREYS,
High Commissioner for Iraq

Enclosure in No. 39

Translation of Telegram from the Amir Feisal to the British High Commissioner, Bagdad

Zubair, July 11, 1932

ON my departure from Iraq I consider it necessary that I should express my deep gratitude for the kindness shown by you during my stay in Bagdad. I am glad to express my appreciation of the friendly relations which have existed with your Excellency. I bid you farewell in the hope that we will meet again.

[E 3903 1197/25]

No. 40

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received August 3.)

(No. 303)

Jedda, July 17, 1932

Sir, I HAVE the honour to forward herewith the Jedda report for May and June. I have adhered to the system adopted by Mr. Hope Gill in the report for April of numbering the paragraphs in such a way as to make the numeration consecutive throughout the year.

2. I am sending copies of this despatch and enclosure to Cairo, Jerusalem, Beirut, Damascus, Bagdad, Basra, Bushire, Koweit, Simla, Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Aden, Addis Ababa, Lagos, Khartum, Port Sudan, the Senior Naval Officer in Red Sea Sloops, and the Royal Air Force Officer Commanding in Palestine and Transjordan.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN

Enclosure in No. 40

Jedda Report for May and June 1932

INDEX

I.—Internal Affairs—		III.—Foreign relations—contd.)	
Legation in Mecca	100	Hejaz Air Force	201-202
Minister for Foreign Affairs	100	Emergency landing grounds	203-204
Hejazi Constitution	102	Alleged aerial trespass in Hejaz	205-206
Finance	102	Nejd territory	207
Economic Development	102		208
Wireless	102	IV.—Ar matters—	
Postal Communication	102	Hejaz Air Force	215-216
Legislation on Rents	102	Emergency landing grounds	217
Canals	102	Alleged aerial trespass in Hejaz	218
The Rub-al-Khali	102	Nejd territory	219
II.—Transjordan—		V.—Military matters	219
Frontier situation	102	VI.—Naval matters	
MacDonnell investigation	102		221
Legation in Mecca	102	VII.—Pilgrimage	221
Koweit and Basra	102	VIII.—Slavery	222-223
Aden and Yemen	102	IX.—Miscellaneous—	
General: Hejaz mission	102	Legation staff	224
International conferences, &c.	102	Deportation	225
Great Britain	102		
(Paragraphs 197 and 198 omitted.)			

(Confidential.)

Chapter I—Internal Affairs

Ibn Saud and General

153. THE King was already in Jedda on the 1st May, and received the foreign representatives in a series of formal audiences that day. The unfavourable impression formed by His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires of his physical state is recorded in the previous report (paragraph 115). It is in striking contrast

with that formed in January by the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, who found His Majesty hale, hearty and young for his age. He dislikes all Hejazi climates as being too hot, too damp or too dry. He had just been through the strenuous labours of the pilgrimage, and he has had the problems of the Hejaz increasingly in his mind and on his nerves. These factors may well account for his appearance on the 1st May. There is no reason to suppose that his health is particularly robust. It may be noted that an American doctor from the mission hospital at Bahrein left for Taif on the 20th May in response to an urgent summons, but it is supposed that he was principally required to attend a woman whose husband, the King, has been much concerned. The doctor was still at Taif late in June, and appeared to be greatly in demand among the notables there.

154. Ibn Saud left Jeddah on the 2nd May, sooner than had been anticipated. He moved to Taif on the 22nd May, and was still there at the end of June. He had been expected to go to Nejd in the course of that month, but was doubtless influenced to delay his departure by the situation in the Northern Hejaz (see below). It is, indeed, somewhat remarkable that he did not proceed to some spot nearer to Saudi territory, e.g. Medina. It is, however, a fact that the unruly tribes round Taif have been so restless that the King's presence in that area is necessary to control the situation.

155. The King's speech at the assembly, which he delivered to a gathering of notables at Mecca on the 1st June, was a most fervent and resembled in many respects the address recorded in the last report of the 1st June. It is, however, a speech which would be very common to the Hejazis. This note is struck in the version published in the "Umm-al-Qura." According to private reports, His Majesty was much more outspoken than appeared from the version of the speech which was published. He was, as a rule, very tactful, and he was particularly to those in high places, including his own officials, and to people of the middle class, he could excuse persons of the meaner sort for their share in the exploitation of pilgrims, which would appear to have been one of the objects of the address. A later version of the speech, which was more favourable towards modern political ideas and European materialism the King deprecated.

156. Such utterances are part of the King's reaction to the growing unpopularity of his régime in the towns. The malaise was intensified in June by a disturbed situation which was prevailing in the Northern Hejaz, of unrest in the Taif region, perhaps also in Asir. One arrest in Mecca probably had a direct connexion with the theory of a widespread Hashimite conspiracy, that of Faudhi Bey Kawokji, who was removed last year, after a short tenure, from the post of Director General of Military Organisation. The Government have shown other signs of nervous suspicion. Tribal notables are said to have been arrested at Taif or Mecca. Laughter was aroused by the action of the director of police in the latter city in filling the town with armed men at midnight, with no greater object, it subsequently appeared, than to locate illicit alcohol, a small quantity of which was discovered. More anxiety was caused when on the night of the 28th June some forty people were arrested in Jeddah. The majority were released at once and some others later, but a fair number, variously estimated, were held in custody. The bag was so mixed that it was difficult to detect the common factor. Some suppose that these proceedings are merely intended to instil a general fear. The public execution in Jeddah of a murderer, a tribesman, on the 1st July, may have fortified this impression, although he seems to have deserved his fate and was interesting only because he had made a spirited get away from gaol as the record of his escape was made. It is said that a black slave, who had been sold off his head, and that his wife and children were compelled to attend as a counter-agent to possible heredity, but these details cannot be vouched for.

157. As for the young men, interest has centred round the question whether football, latterly much in vogue at Jeddah and Mecca, is now prohibited or not. The game can hardly be said to be forbidden by the sacred law. The Prophet is said to have played ball with his followers, and the Amir Faisal played the game early in his career in London. It is not the football itself which has been under suspicion, but the fact that it brings young men together in clubs. One of those interested explained gravely about the end of June that the King,

deferring to the views of a liberal entourage, had not prohibited the game, but that it was uncertain whether those who persisted in playing it might not be arrested. The sportsmen's dilemma is the more difficult for having not quite visible horns.

158. Some little importance may attach to suggestions that all is not well between the Amir Faisal and the King. It has been suggested that the Amir will be detained in Riyadh on his return from his tour. He himself spoke to Sir A. Ryan in London in May of the possibility of his being delayed there. One story is that the Amir has made the removal of Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman from office a condition of his continuing to serve as Viceroy, another, that he has come under the influence of a strong minded new wife of half Turkish parentage, who has determined to make a man of him. The interest of such reports, unauthenticated as they are, lies in the fact that the Amir, with his local experience, his European experiences, and his penchant for modern-minded Syrians, might well aspire to a dominant rôle in a distressed Hejaz.

159. The very youthful Amir Muhammad, who was appointed to act for the Amir Faisal as President of the Council, &c., left for Riyadh after a short incumbency, and was replaced by his still more youthful brother the Amir Khalid.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs

160. Sheikh Yusuf Ya'asin continued to act as Minister throughout May and June in the absence of the Amir Faisal and Fuad Bey Hamza. He visited Jeddah from the 30th April to the 7th May, the 26th May to the 27th May, the 2nd June to the 8th June, the 10th to the 14th and the 21st to the 27th. The Ministry now maintains a permanent branch in Jeddah to the extent of having on duty Sheikh Ali Taha, who was formerly assistant to the Governor of Jeddah. He was formerly a member of the Legislative Council and is now in the Foreign Affairs Department. He is, however, a useful postman, especially as he takes delivery of letters which the Legation formerly had to pay postage to Mecca, and he has been the medium for the transmission of cypher messages both ways by telephone in connexion with the Ibn Rifada affair (see below).

Hejazi Constitution.

161. Mr Hope Gill completed in May a compilation from all available sources of all known regulations affecting the Constitution of the Hejaz since 1926. Despite the incoherent manner in which constitutional changes have been effected, this collection is of great importance and it is therefore worth recording that it was sent to the Foreign Office in Legation despatch No. 213 of the 18th May, 1932.

Finance.

162. There was no material change in the current financial situation. The Dutch financial adviser worked busily on reports. He appears to enjoy life, being happily not dependent on his salary and having no intention of outstaying the year. He is, however, a useful postman, especially as he takes delivery of letters which the Legation formerly had to pay postage to Mecca, and he has been the medium for the transmission of cypher messages both ways by telephone in connexion with the Ibn Rifada affair (see below).

163. On the 17th June the Hejazi Government published a decree instituting revenue regulations for settling old debts. It began by saying that those which were the subject of agreements would be paid according to these agreements. Arrears due to scholars, jurists and clerics would be paid by issuing supplies in kind monthly in addition to current wages; rents in accordance with the special regulations on the delayed payment of rents (see paragraph 173); Twenty-five per cent. of the customs revenue would be assigned to the payment of all other debts, for which drafts on customs would be issued in cases where this had not already been done. Government employees and other persons not in the import trade would arrange with a named importing merchant in whose name the drafts would be issued. The wording of these clauses is obscure, but the effect appears to be that all debts must be converted into drafts on customs to be accepted in payment of one-fourth of the duty on newly-imported goods. The discount market for such drafts is extremely poor, as might be expected. Otherwise, it is too soon to appreciate the practical effect of the new regulation.

164. The position in regard to all important claims in which the Legation is interested remained vague and unsatisfactory. Mr. Hope Gill pressed some of them in May, notably the Egyptian Shell claim in respect of stolen benzine and the claim of His Majesty's Government for the Hejazi contribution to the cost of the MacDonnell enquiry. Sir A. Ryan reviewed most of the claims in general conversation with the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs towards the end of June, but did not press the individual cases owing to the predominance of the of the Transjordan frontier question over all other matters. Earlier in June the long-suffering chauffeurs employed in the Government companies had been offered one-third of their claims in full settlement, and Sir A. Ryan had informed Sheikh Yusuf Yasin on the 12th June that he could not encourage British chauffeurs to accept so miserable an offer, but would not stand in the way of its being voluntarily accepted, subject to the proviso that he would regard the claims of any who refused the offer as being valid for the full amount and that he would expect any who accepted to be left free to leave the country when they had discharged their private duties. It is stated that the chauffeurs were concerned from hoodwinking some simple chauffeurs into accepting the offer by telling them that it had been arranged with the Legation.

165. The Hejazi Mission appealed to His Majesty's Government to make a loan of £500,000 gold or to help them to raise one. They were told that His Majesty's Government regretted their inability to comply with the request, and it was further explained to them at a meeting at the Bank of England on the 17th May, that the Government were unable to do so. The mission presumably made similar efforts in other western countries. The Soviet Union, however, was approached. A message from Ibn Saud renewing his appeal for financial assistance was delivered to Sir A. Ryan a personal message from Ibn Saud renewing his appeal for financial assistance. The Soviet, he explained, were willing to lend him anything up to a million—in gold or in kind. He might be driven to this course, though even if he were he would confine the treaty within narrow limits. His Majesty's Government could not do so. Representatives of various types of high finance visited Jedda. The "Amir" Lutfullah came from Egypt towards the end of May to pursue his project of an Arab National Bank and was entertained at Taif. He left Jedda on the 4th June not having accomplished anything definite. A representative of the ex-Khedive of Egypt brought about the same time offers of financial assistance in return for banking concessions and/or economic concessions. It was said that definite proposals were to be communicated to the Hejazi Government on the 5th July. There may also have been a formal denial of the activities of Mr. Yasin to be described in the following sub-section.

166. There was an echo from India in May of the stale rumour that His Majesty's Government were about to buy the Hejazi coast for £500,000 on various conditions including the provision of landing grounds on the Hama Coast. It had been reported that the British would consider the offer if it were made by the Government of India. A formal denial should be issued by the Government of India, but without reference to the reported conditions, as the question of landing grounds was in fact under discussion with the Hejazi Government, though on quite different lines.

Economic Development

167. Mr. Twitchell was again in Jedda during the greater part of May and left towards the end of the month. It is understood that during this visit he was in the pay of the Hejazi Government and not, as previously, of Mr. Crane. It is, however, uncertain whether he will return to the Hejaz in view of the unfavourable reports of the Khabris disposition towards him. His colleague Mr. Murray who was prospecting for oil and gas in the desert left in March and has not reappeared but hopes of returning at a later date. The Khabris seem to have refused even the £100,000 offer. This government is also impressed by the necessities of the water from the Waziriya well outside Jedda but it is not confirmed that he supported a proposal which was spoken of in May to close down the Tula and serve as an impetus of more concerted efforts to bring the Waziriya water to the town. The idea apparently aims at the failure of these

efforts hitherto has been due to sabotage by other interests and that there would be less danger of this, if the condenser water was not available.

168. Mr. Hope Gill was able to send home on the 18th May further information regarding Mr. Yasin's activities. He sent a copy of a "somewhat testy" letter which he addressed to the King on the 27th February, regarding his efforts generally and various causes militating against their success in spite of the possibilities of the country.

169. Men of larger and vaguer ideas than those of Mr. Twitchell floated about in May and June. Reference has been made in paragraph 165 to the approaches made to the Hejazi Government by the Amir Lutfullah and an agent of the "Amir" Lutfullah. Another man who put forward his claims in the forefront of his dreams and schemes, is Mr. A. Ydlibi, the enterprising head of a small business in Manchester. Having spied out the land in Jedda in January and February in association with another Syrian, named Awami, an intimate of Fuad Bey Hamza, he appears to have gone home and to have sought to enlist interest in oil and possible railway concessions in the Hejaz. From a statement made by Sheikh Yusuf Yasin on the 24th June, it seems that Mr. Ydlibi claims to have got the support of the Calico Printers' Association, (Limited), who had, however, according to the same statement, been given discouraging advice by His Majesty's Government. The true facts of what had passed in England were not known in Jedda up to the end of June.

170. It was announced on the 9th May that the Hejazi Government had arranged to import a large quantity of machinery to be distributed to farmers in the Hejaz and Nejd and to be paid for by them in annual instalments.

Wireless

171. The wireless station at Qaf was completed in May and June, but the Marconi expert, M. Bouricault, is understood to have gone to Hama to work in that area. It is not certain that he completed the station at Qaf before leaving as was supposed (see January March report, paragraph 16).

Postal Communication.

172. Following on Sir H. V. Biscoe's conversations with Ibn Saud in January the Government of India agreed in May to the establishment of a postal service between Hama and the outer world via Bahrain, and communicated to the Legation, for transmission to the Hejazi Government, their proposals as to how it should be organised.

Legislation on Rents.

173. A regulation published on the 6th May affirmed the right of landlords to dispose freely of their property. It however prescribed that in cases of non-agreement with their tenants, they could not evict the latter before the 6th June, 1932, and it established a moratorium for arrears of rent, which were made payable in two instalments in December 1932 and December 1933 at the rate of 10 riyals to the pound (i.e., the pound gold).

Census.

174. A regulation published on the 24th June, after a certain amount of preliminary discussion, gave a general idea of the measures had to be taken to do a census of the population. It was understood that the main object was to determine the number of natives and foreigners and the number of those who were not natives but who were not foreigners. It was also understood that the census was to be taken in the form of a declaration of nationality in the forms distributed. They were the more unhappy because of the difficulty of deciding between the risks, great each way, of admitting themselves to be Hejazis or claiming to be aliens.

The Rub-al Khali

175. The "Umm-al-Qara" of the 13th and 20th May had two long articles on the Rub al Khali, with special reference to Mr. Philby's journey. This is

represented as having been a sort of pendant to the despatch by the Amir of Hama of a force sent to pursue certain criminals not accounted for by an earlier expedition of the same kind a year before and to collect information. The first article reproduces an interesting letter from Mr. Philby to the King asking permission to take the opportunity afforded by the despatch of the force subject to the following undertakings —

- (1) No responsibility to attach to the King and his Government, and no claim to lie against them in the event of Mr. Philby's death or illness.
- (2) All information obtained to be communicated to the Hejazi Government, to be their property and not to be published without their permission.
- (3) The British Government to have no right to claim anything in consequence of discoveries made by Mr. Philby, and all territory discovered, as well as information obtained, to be Ibn Saud's property.
- (4) Mr. Philby and the King's servants to place his "flags of victory" in all high places passed by.
- (5) All remains discovered and all plans and maps made to be the property of the Hejazi Government and not to be disposed of without the King's authority, and a list of all funds to be submitted to the King, for such orders as he might choose to issue, on Mr. Philby's return.

The articles then describe how the expedition was first reported, the remaining criminals who had been captured, and how the mission, i.e., Mr. Philby's presence in the country, was carried out and Mr. Philby's return to the capital, the capital, etc.

176. It is also stated that Mr. Philby went to Fajr and to May to reap a rich harvest of laurels. Before doing so he closed down for a moment the Jeddah branch of Sharqeh (Limited), his management of which has been described in the preceding chapter as a feat of exploration.

Chapter II Frontier Questions

Transjordan.

Frontier Situation

177. No raids in the ordinary sense were complained of by either side during May and June excepting one which the Hejazi Government mentioned in a note of the 14th May (see below) as having occurred in April. These they cited, admittedly without having full particulars, as examples of the way in which the Beni Atiya, whom they suspected of the raids, were encouraged by their acceptance in Transjordan to engage in nefarious enterprise. Peace reigned on the frontier during the first twenty days of May. There were no meetings between Captain Glubb and Ibn Zeid. Even the diplomatic atmosphere was clear until the Legation received on the 15th May the Hejazi note of the previous day.

178. This note was a long and contentious reply to Mr. Hope Gill's short one of the 22nd April about the Beni Atiya (see last report, paragraph 123), but its subsequent importance lay in its dealing with an extraneous subject, the alleged activities of one Hamid-bin-Rifada-al-Awar, who was stated to be working in Egypt under the instructions of the Amir Abdullah, to be giving money to fugitive Hejazi tribesmen, and to be sending them to Aqaba in order that they should return to their homes, there to await future operations. The Hejazi Government had learnt that the Amir would aid these people with money and troops when necessary, and that there were parties at Aqaba suborned to prepare for operations directed against the peace of the Hejaz. The note asked that a decision should be taken regarding the Beni Atiya, as to whether they belonged to the Hejaz and should be expelled from Transjordan or, if not, that a settlement should be reached with Transjordan on the lines of the agreement concluded between Hejaz Nejd and Iraq, and that an explanation should be furnished regarding the arrangements made by the Amir of Transjordan to provide a detachment in the Akhwan area.

179. The Hejazi note presented no urgent appearance. Mr. Hope Gill answered it on the 22nd May, asking the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs to elucidate many points, including the serious but vague allegations in

the paragraph about Ibn Rifada. He sent copies of the correspondence to London and Jerusalem by bag. Four days later General Wauchop reported that a party of from 200 to 400 men, who had passed through Aqaba on their way from Sinai to the Hejaz. A further report, dated a day or two later, said that the party, now estimated at from 400 to 450 men, had passed north of Aqaba on the night of the 20th May and proceeded to a place some 7 kilom. from the frontier, where they were met by a force of 100 men. It appeared from an order or proclamation issued by the Amir Abdullah immediately on the receipt of the first news that the leader was Ibn Rifada. The Amir intimated that these people were not to be expected to return to their families and that steps should be taken to prevent the passage through Transjordan of suspicious characters.

180. The first reports suggested a dash in force straight from Sinai to the Hejaz across the narrow strips of Palestine and Transjordan territory which converge to the head of the Gulf of Aqaba. It is not so certain from later reports that the operation was so simple. It is still too soon to decide at what point the invaders actually concentrated, to what extent the numbers of any who may have come from Sinai were swollen by accretions from Palestine or Transjordan. How far the Amir was cognisant of or sympathetic towards the enterprise; or what supplies the raiders derived from Transjordan sources in the early stages. These questions have been, and are likely to be, disputed. The one clear fact is that since the morning of the 21st May a rebel force which has grown considerably, although not to really formidable dimensions, has been in being in the north-west of the Hejaz, in the district of the Hejaz territory.

181. Ibn Saud appears to have had no news of the incursion until Mr. Hope Gill's report reached him on the morning of the 30th May. It would be impossible to do justice in this report to the flood of correspondence which ensued from the 30th May to the 30th June. The main facts which emerge from it may be summed up as follows:—

(a) The Hejazi Government took immediate military measures of two kinds. They ordered out the Akhwan from the village settlements in the nearer parts of Nejd to the estimated number of perhaps 5,000 or 6,000, sent important reinforcements by car to strengthen their garrisons in the north, and they despatched other soldiers and supplies in the barge, fitted with auxiliary motor and one small gun, which they recently purchased in Bahrain. This dhow seems to have gone on a reef near Umley with the result that the soldiers, &c., had to be transported in smaller boats to Wadi. It was apparently almost impossible to bring the ordinary troops into action owing to the inaccessibility to motor transport of Ibn Rifada's force, the demolition of which was left for the Akhwan. These were to concentrate at Al-Ula and to get to grips with the rebels by a movement so planned as to cut off their retreat into Transjordan. They were expected to reach Al-Ula about the beginning of July, but up to the 30th June there was no certain news of them.

(b) On the diplomatic side the Hejazi Government made strong representations to His Majesty's Government, taking "Told you so" as their text. They suggested, not apparently without some reason, the existence of a widespread Hashimite plot with ramifications extending from Egypt to Iraq, were violently suspicious of the Amir Abdullah, who they felt to be a weak King Al-waon they also suspected of being a tool of a conspiracy against King Faisal and the Iraqi Government. But beyond the Amir's loyalty to the Zairi line. During the first half of June they addressed numerous demands to His Majesty's Government. Some of them had been anticipated by the latter and by the High Commissioner for Transjordan, some like the Hejazi requests for a complete closing of the frontier and a promise to punish any rebel crossing it, could not be complied with. Some like their request for investigation of responsibilities, to be conducted jointly by the two Governments, were at the very least premature, and the request rested in part on a faulty view of His Majesty's Government since being about a new settlement between Hejaz Nejd and Transjordan similar to that arrived at last year with Iraq rested on a question with His Majesty's Government had already undertaken in discussion with the Hejazi mission in London to consider seriously, but which they regarded as independent of the immediate problem created by Ibn Rifada. From the very outset the authorities in Transjordan took vigorous measures to prevent the rebels

from getting assistance from that country both by prohibition and by reinforcing the frontier police. Steps were taken to prevent the Beni Atiya from joining the rebellion, and guarantees were taken from the sheikhs of other tribes in Southern Transjordan. The considered attitude of His Majesty's Government towards the Hejazi representations was defined in a note sent by the Legation to the Acting Hejazi Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 11th June. His Majesty's Government regretted that Ibn Rifada and his party had succeeded in slipping from Sinai into the Hejaz in a very few hours before the authorities in Palestine and Transjordan were aware of the movement. They explained that it was physically impossible to close the frontier, and that it was for the Hejazi Government, whose forces must not, however, enter Transjordan, to bar the exit of rebels. They nevertheless would take all steps to assist the Hejazi authorities, and they promised that fugitive rebels entering Transjordan would, as far as possible, be disarmed and removed to safe places. The note described in general terms the measures already taken in Transjordan. His Majesty's Government refused to guarantee the surrender of fugitive rebels, but promised that everything possible would be done to prevent such persons from causing fresh trouble. The question of a treaty settlement between Hejaz Nejd and Transjordan was dealt with in the lines indicated above. The first reaction of the Hejazi Government to this note was highly critical. In a reply of the 15th June they complained that the action of the British authorities was inadequate and stressed the question of responsibilities. Some days later they changed their tactics. In a series of conversations from the 21st to 23rd June the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs did not revert to his note. He merely accepted the position that His Majesty's Government were doing all they could, and confined himself to discussing practical questions of co-operation between the British and Hejazi Governments, always on the underlying assumption that the Amir Abdullah was the common enemy. It was unnecessary to continue the discussion of the wider aspects of the affair up to the end of June.

(c) In those circumstances it became increasingly, as the month wore on, a matter of co-ordinating the measures of the authorities in Transjordan and of the Hejazi Government. A certain amount of information, not very plentiful on either side, was exchanged. Arrangements were made in principle for wireless communication between Hejazi and Transjordan posts, but it had not been effectively established up to the 30th June. H.M.S. "Penzance" was sent to Aqaba, and arrived there on the 14th June. H.M.S. "Hastings" also left Port Sudan for the north of the Red Sea on the 27th June. The despatch of "Penzance" was decided on for general reasons, but anticipated a request by the Hejazi Government on the 18th June that measures should be taken to guard against assistance reaching the rebels by sea, and that it was expected that any maritime movement of craft, loaded or unloaded, which might bring supplies or facilitate any movement, whether of attack or flight.

(d) Early in June the Hejazi Government manifested extreme displeasure against Egypt, and the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs spoke of a rupture with that country. This mood passed partly, perhaps, because of the language of Sir A. Ryan. As a matter of fact, the Egyptian Government, while denying, both privately and publicly, that Ibn Rifada's expedition could have been fitted out in Egypt, has shown every readiness, at the instance of His Majesty's Government, to apply and co-operate in measures to prevent assistance from reaching the rebels from Egypt either by land or sea.

182. The foregoing summary ignores many details, but gives an adequate account of the Ibn Rifada affair and its sequel. It is noteworthy that the Hejazi Government, while preparing a formidable demonstration of force, have shown no great concern in stopping it. They have probably banked on the fact that Ibn Rifada has presented no appearance of having provoked any widespread rebellion, and has remained confined to the littoral area. It is possible that Ibn Saud's object in making preparations so formidable in relation to the apparently small proportions of the menace is partly to overawe his own tribes generally and to impress on the Amir Abdullah and others the futility of attempts to upset his régime in the Hejaz.

183. It has been most difficult meanwhile to gauge the position of Ibn Rifada himself. His base appears to be Haikl, a place close to the sea, some 30 miles south of Aqaba. His total force had grown by the latter part of June to

anything from perhaps 800 to 1,800 men, not in all probability very fully armed or mounted, and a portion of it may have been strung along the region to the south of Haikl. There is no evidence of his having reached any important place in May, or of his having reached any important place in June. It is probable that he has not yet reached an important place in the Hejaz, and that he has not yet reached an important place in the Hejaz.

184. A new and disconcerting element was introduced into the situation when, on the night of the 26th June, a party of seventy Beni Atiya crossed the frontier into the Hejaz to the east of Mudawwana, despite the attempts of a small force of Hejazi troops to stop them. It was reported that the party had been sent for by the Hejazi Government, but this was doubtful owing to the failure of the Hejazi Government to pay its members. Nothing further had been heard of these raiders up to the 30th June. The Hejazi Government, faithful to the altered policy described in paragraph 181 above, received the news fairly philosophically. They did not fail, however, to point the morals of the incident from their point of view, renewing their accusations against the Amir Abdullah and their demand for an early treaty settlement. The Transjordan authorities promptly incarcerated at Kerak three leading sheikhs in order to discourage a further party of Beni Atiya from crossing the Hejaz frontier.

MacDonnell Investigation

185. As stated elsewhere, Mr. Hope Gill pressed in May for the settlement of the Hejazi Government's contribution to the cost of this enquiry. Sir A. Ryan reverted to the subject in June, but the moment was not propitious for energetic action, and the claim remained unsettled.

Customs Relations

186. Final form had been given in March to the reply to be given to the Hejazi Government, if they should revert (but not otherwise) to this long standing question, which has been in abeyance for practical purposes since 1930. In the absence of any fresh representations from the Hejazi side, the reply continued to be held up throughout May and June, nor did the Legation inform the Hejazi Government of a decision of the Transjordan Government, reported by the High Commissioner in May, to authorities, subject to certain conditions, the passage through Transjordan between Syria and Hejaz Nejd of goods, other than arms and ammunition, the importation of which into Transjordan itself is prohibited.

Iraq

187. Some trouble arose in February owing to the arrival of a Nejd force of twenty-five men and two armed cars at a well called Judaidat-al-Arar on the Iraq-Nejd frontier. The force withdrew on the arrival of two Iraqi desert police cars, but the Nejd force reappeared in March, and the claim to tax any tribesmen entering Nejd territory, to which apparently the Hejaz Nejd Government consider Judaidat al Arar to belong, was reasserted in a letter from the Governor of Skaka to the Sheikh of the Iraqi Aneyza. Although the Iraqi Government have stated in at least one communication that Judaidat is considered to be an Iraqi well, they do not seem to be very sure of their ground for a territorial claim, and to rely more on an article in the Uqair protocols prohibiting any military use by either side of watering places near the frontier. The Legation took no notice of the position on the spot during May and June, but, from language held by the Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires to Sir A. Ryan on the 6th June, it appeared that the dispute was still in being. The Nejd spoke of the possibility of regarding the well as lying actually on the frontier and being bisected by it.

188. The Ibn Rifada affair gave rise to rumours of more widespread trouble involving the frontier with Iraq, and they were perhaps stimulated by the news of the sudden resignation of Sir I. Humphry, to Baghdad, due in fact to quite other reasons, about that time. The Legation has no knowledge of any real malaise on that frontier, apart from the Judaidat affair. The best of the bazaar yarns was that King Feisal's son had gone against his father and engaged in some

anti Saudian enterprise down south, and that King Faisal had addressed a letter of explanation and apology to Ibn Saud.

Koweit and Bahrein

189. Further progress was made in May and June in the following up of the various matters discussed by the Political Resident during his visit to Ibn Saud at Hofuf in January. The question of the best approach to a more official discussion of the Koweit blockade still presented difficulty, and final instructions had not reached the Legation up to the end of June. The question of the circumstances described in paragraph 217 below. The position regarding postal communication between the Hejaz and the outer world is discussed in paragraph 172. The Hejazi Government have not attempted to reopen the question of the status of their agents at Koweit and Bahrein since receiving the Political Resident's explanation of the difficulties in the way of recognising them officially. News was received at Jeddah in May of the local settlement of the question arising out of a fresh intrusion of Ibn Saud's people into Koweit territory in March, an apology for which was tendered by the King's chief frontier officer and accepted by the sheikh. In June His Majesty's Minister conveyed to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sir H. V. Bouverie, that the arrangement made at Hofuf to enable Hindu traders, known as Bunniahis, to visit Qatif for periods not exceeding two months, should be extended to Jubail, with permission to prolong the stay in either case to three months. Ibn Saud agreed to the prolongation of time, but refused access to Jubail.

190. Sir A. Ryan expressed to Sheikh Yusuf Yasin on the 5th June, the gratification with which His Majesty's Government had received the message sent by Ibn Saud through the Political Resident (see January March report, paragraph 44). The message had been sent in the month of February, or reasons partly connected with the difficult situation between the Governments in February and March.

191. Sheikh Yusuf Yasin protested orally on the 23rd June against alleged action by the Bahrein authorities in requiring, it was said, a cargo of rice for the Hejazi Government to be landed instead of allowing it to be unloaded direct into dhows sent from the mainland. This was apparently the first case arising under the arrangements described in the January March report, paragraph 49, which arrangements, according to explanations furnished in a report from the Political Agent, were more the concern of the shipowners concerned than the subject of an agreement entered into by him, although he had stated to the British Government that the rice was for the use of the Bahrein Government and other interests adversely affected by overland delivery. In the particular case about which Sheikh Yusuf Yasin protested, it was possible to reply that the rice had been shipped in the ordinary way of transit, and that no notice had been given by the steamship company that it was for overland delivery, to refute an allegation that it had been landed at the instance of the Bahrein authorities after having been actually first unloaded into dhows from the mainland and to add that the Bahrein Government had remitted the duty as an exceptional measure. The incident, nevertheless, seems to necessitate a further examination of the somewhat difficult questions of principle involved.

192. In May, Sir H. V. Bouverie, the Political Resident, spoke to Mr. Rendel at the Foreign Office about the more general question of transit dues at Bahrein, and had spoken of the Hejazi Government's project of creating a port of their own at Ras Tanura as being a consequence of the refusal of the Bahrein authorities to waive duty in the case of goods for Ibn Saud and his Government. Fuad Bey was told that the matter would be examined.

Asir and Yemen

193. No development in the relations between Hejaz Nejd and the Yemen were noted. The Political Resident, Sir H. V. Bouverie, reported regarding the internal situation in Asir, which seemed to be well held. It was stated in June that the King was undertaking considerable reorganisation of the Asir administration, and was sending thither some eighty officials, mostly Hejazi, with a view to making the country productive from a revenue point of view. It is confirmed that a new Amir, a Nejd, was recently appointed.

Chapter III—Foreign Relations.

General Hejazi Mission.

194. The mission arrived in Paris about the beginning of May, after a short stay in Geneva. They came on from Paris to London on the 7th May and stayed until the 16th May. They subsequently visited The Hague (the 16th to the 19th May), Berlin (the 20th to the 24th May), Warsaw (the 25th to the 28th May), Vienna (the 29th to the 31st May), Constantinople (the 1st to the 3rd June), and Angora (the 13th to the 16th June, or earlier). They were expected to reach Tehran via Constantinople and Baku on the 28th June. The dates given are approximate. Various references are made elsewhere to the business done. On the ceremonial side, the mission seem to have been received with much honour in all the capitals from which information has been received, but to have attracted comparatively little public attention. They lunched with President Doumer just before his assassination, and Fuad Bey flew from London to Paris to attend the funeral. They were given military honours at Dover, and met at Victoria by representatives of the King and Sir John Simon. In London they stayed as the guests of His Majesty's Government at the Dorchester; visited Windsor privately on the 8th May, were received by His Majesty the King at Buckingham Palace on the 9th May, and visited the Morris Works in pouring rain that afternoon, attended a reception by the Hejazi Minister on the 10th May and dined that evening with His Majesty's Government at the Foreign Office, Sir John Simon presiding; were shown the Port of London, including the wine vaults full of alcoholic fumes, on the 11th May; and saw a display at Aldershot on the 12th May. The Amir attended their Majesty's Court on the 11th May, and Fuad Bey the second Court on the 12th May. The Amir showed intelligent interest in what he saw, acquitted himself well at all functions, and appeared to enjoy his visit, in spite of a heavy cold, contracted in France, happily. Fuad Bey attended as few functions as possible, saw to the business side, which the Amir left entirely to him, and visited the House of Commons. The Amir was made a G.B.E., Fuad Bey a K.B.E. The official visit ended on the 14th May and the mission tended for themselves during the Whitsun week-end. The farewell messages were most cordial and included a happily drafted message to the "charming people" of Great Britain, as well as the more conventional expressions of thanks to the King, &c. At The Hague the mission was received by the Queen, and visited the Netherlands East Indies Exhibition. A day was spent in Amsterdam. Little information is available regarding the subsequent visits, except that on the Russian frontier the mission was hailed not only by officials but by brass bands, which "played the International and various Arabian airs," and were in Moscow welcomed by the Mayor, the Governor, or State guests of the second category of importance. They also visited Leningrad.

International Conferences, &c.

195. There is nothing important to record.

Great Britain

196. The Hejazi Mission (i.e., for practical purposes Fuad Bey Hamza, as the Amir's representative, the first business meeting which was both more than formal) raised the following questions, which were discussed at official meetings on the 9th and 13th May.

- (1) *General Relations.*—The mission expressed Ibn Saud's misgivings as to whether His Majesty's Government could be guided in his policy by the views of His Majesty's Government, to whom he looked for both moral and material support. Sir L. Oliphant made cordial and reassuring statements in general terms on behalf of His Majesty's Government.
- (2) *Possibility of a Loan and Economic Developments.*—As regards the former, see paragraph 165. As regards the latter, Fuad Bey mentioned Mr. Twitchell's surveys and the King's desire to look to Great Britain in all things. Nothing conclusive emerged.

desiderata

Fuad Bey threw his first statement on this subject into a request by Ibn Saud for advice. He was told that His Majesty's Government concerned the views and tenets of the Soviet Government to be very different from those of Ibn Saud, but that if the latter saw reason to alter the policy of coldness which according to Fuad Bey, he had hitherto pursued towards the U S S R, His Majesty's Government could not feel aggrieved. Fuad Bey explained that the refusal of a loan by His Majesty's Government was not a matter of principle, but his last word was that "As regards the Soviet, he thought it unlikely that there would be any important change in the attitude of his Government."

(Paragraphs 197 and 198 omitted.)

2000. Sir A. Ryan left London a few days after the mission's departure. He was in London from 11 May to 11 June. He was in London at 1.30 p.m. on 11 May when he first arrived in London, and there was an evident desire on the part of the King and the Hejazi Government to see him. The fact which had compelled his prolonged absence had really rolled by. From then until the 30th June the Ibn Rifada affair and its aftermath occupied the attention of the two Governments. The latter, to be sure, also dealt with other matters. Despite the critical attitude of the Hejazi Government during the first half of the period, the diplomatic situation was easy throughout the whole of it.

201 Little is known of any business done by the Hejazi Mission in Paris except that the French Government has been paying it \$100,000 annually for its work in the support of the part of other powers to maintain the League of Nations.

Prati

consul at Port Said and to have been recently in their Embassy at Madrid. Nothing is known as to the date of his arrival but he has made enquiries about housing, servants, &c., which reveal a pathetic ignorance as to what he is in for

《毛泽东同志在延安》

206 M de Haas himself left Jedda in June, leaving the German consulate deserted.

207 Reference is made elsewhere to the possibility of a new orientation of the Saud's policy towards the U S S R under pressure of economic and financial

US. Relations with the USSR have been characterized by a series of developments. In the past, the USSR has been a major ally of the United States. However, in recent years, the relationship has become more complex. The USSR has been accused of supporting terrorism and of being a major threat to world peace. The United States has responded by increasing its military presence in the Middle East and by imposing economic sanctions on the USSR. The relationship between the two countries remains tense and uncertain.

200. The dispute regarding the seat of the Iraqi Legation in the Hejaz remained unsettled throughout May and June. Dr. Naji Asali continued to reside in Jeddah and was unable to present his letters, but was nevertheless received in Mecca on the 10 May 1919. The new treaty was signed in Jeddah (the place on that day) of the treaties concluded last year. The Acting Hejazi Minister for Foreign Affairs accused him in confidential conversation with Sir A.

210. The Iraqi Government are still anxious for an agreement over the less contentious but long drawn out question of the organisations of an overland motor route for pilgrims from Iraq.

211 The Afghan Mission (see March report, paragraph 58), concluded a treaty with Hejaz-Ned on the 5th May, after Ahmad Shah Khan had presented credentials to Ibn Saud on the 3rd May. The treaty had not been published at the 30th. The signing of the treaty took place in Jedda. It was categorically stated in the account of the former in the "Umm al Qura" that the presentation of letters had been refused on the grounds that, "for religious and traditional reasons, no diplomatic ceremonies can be held". The Hejazi Government were doubtless anxious to strengthen their case in the quarrel over the seat of the Iraqi Legation. It is unfortunate that the differences were not settled before the Afghan Mission left Jedda via India on the 14th May.

213 The Afghan Mission, while in Mecca, arranged to buy an existing house, belonging to the Governor of Jeddah, to serve as the projected hostel for pilgrims.

214 There is nothing in the report to show except that the
 1. of the National Bank of the City of New York, New York, was
 2. of the property of the National Bank of the City of New York, New York, for the carrying on
 3. of the business of the National Bank of the City of New York, New York, interest were made in

Hejazi Air Force

1. *Содержание*

Emergency Landing Grounds.

Alleged Aerial Trespass in Hejaz-Najd Territory.

Chapter V - Military Matters

Chapter VI – Novel Matters

Chapter VII.—Pilgrimage

[8079]

Chapter VIII.—Slavery

222. Five male and three female slaves took refuge in the Legation in May and June. They were disposed of as follows:—

Manumitted and repatriated 3 males
Locally manumitted 1 male and 1 female
Left the Legation voluntarily before being dealt with 1 male
On hand at end of June 2 females.

223. The cases of two women of presumed Abyssinian origin were referred by telegraph to His Majesty's Minister in Addis Ababa, in pursuance of the arrangements recommended last year (November–December report, paragraph 78), with a request that he should ascertain whether the Ethiopian Government would make itself responsible for them. The matter was still pending at the end of June and seemed unlikely to be settled. It is a difficult question, requiring accurate particulars, a difficulty likely to arise in the case of all slaves captured in early childhood and brought up in Arabia.

224. The Hejazi Mission in London made no attempt to reopen the question of Royal slaves nor was it adverted to in Jedda. The mission took with them as servant an ex-slave, possibly though not certainly manumitted *ad hoc*. He proved an intelligent observer of things seen on the tour.

Chapter IX.—Miscellaneous.

Legation Staff

225. His Majesty's Minister returned to Jedda on the 30th May, as already stated. Probationer Vice-Consul Gamble arrived on the 8th May to take up the post of an acting vice-consul, attached to the Legation, for the sole purpose of studying Arabic, subject to a proviso that he might be employed for a strictly limited time daily on other work in connection with the routine. Mr Hope and Mr Furlong both proceeded on leave on the 3rd June, a coincidence resulting from Mr Hope Gill's long detention during Sir A. Ryan's absence.

226. The Medical Officer, Mr. [Name], arrived in Jedda on the 14th May. There were some changes in the subordinate personnel of the medical section.

Deportation.

227. Certain questions of principle connected with deportation were discussed in a formal meeting of the Legation on the 4th May. In view of the arbitrary attitude sometimes taken up by the Hejazi authorities in connexion with the deportation of British subjects, the Legation was authorized, if it should think it desirable, to endeavour to obtain some reciprocal agreement with the Hejazi Government for a more rigid application of the usual international procedure. It was pointed out that the view was shared by Sir A. Ryan, shared, that it would be better, instead of inviting a general discussion of principles, to try to get that Government to apply such practice in individual cases.

228. In one case the Sudan Government sent to Jedda a person, claimed to be a Hejazi, who had entered the Sudan irregularly, without awaiting the formal assent of the Hejazi Government. The latter asked rather insistently that he should be sent back to the Sudan, but it was possible to put the matter to them in such a way that they did not return to the charge up to the 30th June. The man was at least half-crazy and had assumed many names (including that of President Hindenburg) at various times, so that his actual origin was hard to determine.

[E 3985 98 91]

No. 41

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 6.)

Sir,

India Office, August 5, 1932

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to transmit to you, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a letter from the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf (with enclosures) on the subject of the Arab air route.

I am, &c
S F STEWART

Enclosure 1 in No. 41

Political Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, Simla

(Confidential)

Bushire, July 26, 1932

IN continuation of correspondence ending with Colonel Dickson's telegram dated the 23rd July, 1932, I have the honour to forward herewith copies of

- (a) Agreement, dated the 22nd July, 1932, concluded with the Sheikh of Shargah,
- (b) Letter of Assurance, dated the 22nd July, 1932, given to the Sheikh of Shargah.

A report on the negotiations by Colonel Dickson will follow later.

I am sending copies of this letter and of its enclosures to His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, the Air Officer Commanding in Iraq, Bagdad, and the Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf Division.

I have, &c
(For Political Resident in the Persian Gulf)
C L F CHAUNCEY

Enclosure 2 in No. 41

Agreement between Sheikh Sultan Ibn Saqar, Ruler of Shargah, and the British Government for the Establishment of an Air Station at Shargah

IT having been intimated to me, Sultan Ibn Saqar, Sheikh of Shargah and its villages, by Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Hugh Buxton, Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, that the High British Government desire to establish an air route along the Arab coast for the aeroplanes of the Imperial Airways Company (hereinafter referred to as the company), and that they wish to have an air station at Shargah at which British aeroplanes can land, I hereby agree to grant to the said company the following facilities:

1. The company may select a landing ground at Shargah, and may put on it a building for the use of the company as a rest house for its staff on that ground.
2. I will construct a rest house for the passengers and staff of the company on a site to be selected by the company and in accordance with plans drawn up by them, and under the supervision of an engineer of the British Government. The house and fixed fittings to be considered as my property.
3. The company shall have the right to import, free of duty, petrol and spare parts for aircraft, provisions for the passengers and staff, and whatever may be required for their service.
4. The company may send their employees to reside in the rest house, but neither they nor the passengers shall enter the town of Shargah without my permission.

I further accept full responsibility for the protection of the staff and subjects of the company and their aircraft, so far as my dependents, relatives and subjects are concerned, and, further, for their protection as far as possible against marauders from outside my jurisdiction.

I will supply thirty-five guards and two head guards.

In return for the above it is agreed that the British Government shall make me the following payments:—

1. Pay for thirty-six guards and two chiefs at the rate of 20 rupees per month for each guard, and 40 rupees per month for each of the two head guards, payment to commence from the date the guards are appointed.

2. Rent for the air station, 800 rupees per month, payment to commence from the date the first commercial aeroplane lands.

3. Rent for the rest house, 300 rupees per month.

The Government shall advance me by instalments such sums as may be considered reasonable by the engineer supervising the work for the construction of the building, and no rent shall be payable to me.

I will supply gratis doors, windows and steel joists and corrugated iron.

4. For the responsibility that I have accepted, a personal subsidy of 500 rupees per month, to commence from the 1st July, 1932.

5. A landing fee of 5 rupees for every commercial aeroplane that lands on the aerodrome. No charge shall be made for aeroplanes belonging to the Royal Air Force.

The company and their employees shall not deal direct with the sheikh, but through the Residency Agent or Political Resident.

This agreement shall be for eleven years, but payments will only be made for so long as the facilities are utilized.

Should the British Government require to renew this agreement at the end of the above period, they may do so provided three months' notice is given me.

Should there be any dispute as to the text of this agreement, the English wording shall prevail.

H. R. P. DICKSON, Lieutenant-Colonel
(For the Honourable the Political Resident
in the Persian Gulf)

July 22, 1932

(Signed and sealed) SULTAN IBN SAQAR,
Ruler of Shargah.

Witnesses

EDWARD C. DICKSON, Captain, R.N.
Commanding H.M.S. Bedford

H. R. P. DICKSON, Lieutenant-Colonel

Residency Agent, Shargah

Enclosure 3 in No. 41

Political Resident in the Persian Gulf to Sultan Ibn Saqar, Sheikh of Shargah.

(After compliments.)

Shargah, July 22, 1932

IN connexion with the agreement for the aerodrome at Shargah, which you have signed, you have expressed a fear lest the establishment of an air station might involve interference with your independence and freedom.

2. I have to assure you that the British Government will respect your and your successors' independence, complete freedom and authority over your subjects and properties and will do nothing to take away your lands from you, and will not interfere in your internal affairs or with your servants, male or female, or your divers, and if any of the coastal sheikhs attempt to interfere with the agreement which we have come to the British Government will support you.

3. Further, the representatives of the company residing in Shargah will have no official position, but will be representatives of a commercial firm.

4. And no evil-doers shall be allowed to take refuge in the rest house.

5. Further, the guards shall be entirely under your orders, and you will be entitled to forbid any of your people, townsmen or otherwise, to enter the rest house, except the employees and servants of the company and persons sent by the Residency Agent.

6. And if, which God forbid, any incident should occur, the British Government will not exact punishment except after enquiry and investigation and the punishment of your subjects will be with you.

7. But if the offence has been committed by persons from outside your jurisdiction, you will do your best to trace them and inform the Government, but punishment will be with the High Government.

8. Finally, I am glad to inform you that the Government has undertaken that the mail steamer shall call at Shargah.

9. I hope that this will bring prosperity to you and your people.

(Usual ending.)

H. R. P. DICKSON, Lieutenant-Colonel
(On behalf of the Honourable the Political
Resident in the Persian Gulf)

E 4003 4003 251

No. 42

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received August 8)

(No. 8. Saving)

(Telegraphic) R

FOUR despatch No. 62

Jedda, July 28, 1932

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs surprised me on 23rd July by speaking of President Hoover's disarmament proposal.

He said that his Government were considering it and were disposed to agree as certain other Powers had done, but that they had to think of situation in the north. As at first he seemed to refer to immediate situation I pointed out that proposal was one for consideration by the conference and could produce no effect in the early future. I gathered later that he was thinking of the general question of security on frontier and he spoke of consulting His Majesty's Government as regards possible reservations. He asked for my views.

I said that I could not possibly express personal opinion on such a subject, and that it would be better to consult His Majesty's Government through their Minister in London, who was also their delegate at the conference. I added however, that if he cared to write me an unofficial letter on the points which interested him, I would put them before you. He said that he would have to consult the King, and perhaps Fund Bey, before deciding whether to do this.

I did not encourage Sheikh Yusuf Yasin to develop orally what was in his mind as it seemed to me that it might lead too far in the direction suggested, with Transjordan.

E 4001 75 251

No. 43

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received August 8)

(Nos. 6 and 7. Saving)

(Telegraphic)

Jedda July 28, 1932

(R.) MY telegram No. 138

I informed Minister for Foreign Affairs on 23rd July of views expressed in your telegram No. 91. I insisted as from myself on the absurdity of any other conclusion, as tribunal would manifestly be inappropriate means of establishing responsibility of Ibn Rifada, whom the King has taken measures to destroy, or investigating responsibility attributed by Hejaz Government to Emir and other high personages.

(E 4025 1241/25)

[illegible]

- Jeddah, August 8, 1932*

I assured myself that Fuad Bey Hamza was aware of these communications, which I last night discussed with him and Sheikh Yusuf Yasin. I remarked that the alternatives suggested by Ibn Saud were very grave and that the second appeared to supersede the Hejazi Government's earlier proposal, which they had repeated at the time of Ibn Rifada's revolt, that a settlement on lines similar to that concluded with Iraq should be reached with Transjordan. They agreed that this was so. I told them that the increasing proofs of the Amir Abdullah's guilt were responsible for the change of policy.

As it appeared to me that you might wish to see the full text of Ibn Saud's memorandum and perhaps also to consult me while on leave of absence, I indicated that an early answer was not to be expected. This suggestion appeared to cause no objection. It is to be noted that the Hejazi Minister in London is not to be Nejd shortly and it is apparently not proposed that the Hejazi Minister in London should be used as a channel of communication.

E 4028 1241 25

Sir A. Ryon to Sir John Simon.—(Received August 9.)

Jelida, August 8, 1932.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

I took the line I did because object of Hejaz Government has clearly been to implicate Emir up to the hilt and take advantage of the ensuing situation. On 26th July Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs more than hinted in passing that the British Government was not responsible for the situation and that they had to establish claim to compensation. You will remember that the right to do this was reserved at early stage in correspondence.

King does not blame Abdullah, who is his enemy and with whom he has no covenant. Object of memorandum is to protest against Amir's activities and to ask how the King may be reassured and may preserve friendship with His Majesty's Government in regard to Transjordan. Speaking as a friend and not as an enemy, it is pointed out that the King's Government has no interest of His Majesty's Government, that means cannot be found to avoid discord so long as Abdullah remains in Transjordan, and that he should be replaced by a trustworthy person whether British, Arab, Transjordan or other, but in that case King would undertake to comply with the wishes of His Majesty's Government with regard to peace on frontier, and to give all assistance to person chosen. Alternatively if His Majesty's Government maintain Abdullah, which is

(Repeated to Transjordan, Nos. 1 and 2)

Sir A. Ryan (No. 202) to Political Resident, Aden. — (Repeated to Foreign Office, Received August 2.)

Jeddo, August 8, 1932

The Saud has sent me, for the private information of His Majesty's Government, copy of letter of which Hejazi Government have the original. It was written at Lakej on 20th February by Tahir Addashbagh on behalf of Yemen branch of Hizb-al-Ahwar al-Hejazi and addressed to Amir Shukir at Amman. It refers to steps taken to organize movement centred at Qahma with the assistance of Munjnah tribe to instructions issued at Massawa, to despatch of messengers in various directions, including Mawriha and Idriisi country; to letter from Hizb at Amman, and to telegram sent to Hamid Pasha at Lausanne.

I understand Hamed Pasha is head of Amir Abdallah's diwan
(Reported to Transjordan, No. 203, and Cairo, No. 204)

Sir A. Ryan (No. 207) to High Commissioner, Transjordan.—(Repealed to Foreign Office. Received August 10.)

Todd, August 9, 1932

Numerous documents published in "Umm al Qura" on 6th August include the following —

- (a) Undated telegram from Ibn Aqil reporting slaughter of parties of rebels and Bedouins in the desert. Amir's telegram to Ibn Aqil. He says his forces will not go to Transjordan frontier unless ordered to do so.
- (b) Communiqué by Amir's diwan on Hejazi Minister's letter in "Times" of 15th July with editorial comment, which amongst other things accuses diwan of trying to embarrass Faisal, who has pursued sound Arab policy and has earned the gratitude of Ibn Saud and people of Nejd.

1904

1. The first part of the document is a letter from the President of the United States to the Congress, dated January 1, 1861. It is a formal communication, and it is written in a very formal and dignified style. The President begins by addressing the Congress, and then he proceeds to discuss the state of the Union. He mentions the progress of the country, and he also mentions the challenges that the country is facing. He ends the letter by expressing his confidence in the Congress and his belief that the country will continue to prosper.

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathcal{N}_1 &= \{x \in \mathcal{X} \mid \exists y \in \mathcal{Y} \text{ s.t. } (x, y) \in \mathcal{R}\} \\
\mathcal{N}_2 &= \{x \in \mathcal{X} \mid \exists y \in \mathcal{Y} \text{ s.t. } (x, y) \in \mathcal{R}\} \\
\mathcal{N}_3 &= \{x \in \mathcal{X} \mid \exists y \in \mathcal{Y} \text{ s.t. } (x, y) \in \mathcal{R}\} \\
\mathcal{N}_4 &= \{x \in \mathcal{X} \mid \exists y \in \mathcal{Y} \text{ s.t. } (x, y) \in \mathcal{R}\} \\
\mathcal{N}_5 &= \{x \in \mathcal{X} \mid \exists y \in \mathcal{Y} \text{ s.t. } (x, y) \in \mathcal{R}\} \\
\mathcal{N}_6 &= \{x \in \mathcal{X} \mid \exists y \in \mathcal{Y} \text{ s.t. } (x, y) \in \mathcal{R}\} \\
\mathcal{N}_7 &= \{x \in \mathcal{X} \mid \exists y \in \mathcal{Y} \text{ s.t. } (x, y) \in \mathcal{R}\} \\
\mathcal{N}_8 &= \{x \in \mathcal{X} \mid \exists y \in \mathcal{Y} \text{ s.t. } (x, y) \in \mathcal{R}\} \\
\mathcal{N}_9 &= \{x \in \mathcal{X} \mid \exists y \in \mathcal{Y} \text{ s.t. } (x, y) \in \mathcal{R}\} \\
\mathcal{N}_{10} &= \{x \in \mathcal{X} \mid \exists y \in \mathcal{Y} \text{ s.t. } (x, y) \in \mathcal{R}\}
\end{aligned}$$

As regards the Diwan and statement have given great offence to the King and encouraging private utterances.

I consider it far from negligible, even if it be exaggerated. I deduce from conversation with Furd that Ibu Saud realizes the danger of complications with His Majesty's Government and is really anxious that things should not go too far, but he needs possible assistance.

I send this after reflection at the risk of appearing alarmist. I have said
a) I can here to urge moderation.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No 211)

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon (Received August 15.)

Judda, August 15, 1932

[illegible]

(Repeated to Transjordan, No 218.)

[E 4119/76/25]

No. 50

Sir P. Lorusse to Sir John Simon.—(Received August 15.)

(No. 751)

Sir,

Ramlah, August 6, 1932

ALTHOUGH recent developments in the Northern Hejaz and the rout of Ibn Rifada and his rebels, as reported in Jedda telegram No. 142 of the 31st July, would seem to remove any necessity of further control of sea-borne traffic from Egyptian ports to the Hejaz, it may be of interest that I should briefly record the measures of administrative control which they have been persuaded, as a maximum, to sanction. These measures will remain in force pending your decision.

2 In conversation with the oriental secretary on the 28th July, Abel Hamid Bedawi Pasha, head of the State Legal Department, expressed the opinion that the measures already enforced and those to be continued constituted the generalisation of a system which seemed to have no legal basis. On what ground, he asked, could the Egyptian Government put a stop to a normal maritime trade in food-stuffs carried on by Egyptian subjects? The cargoes were manifested to the ports of destination. He suggested that the Hejaz Government should ensure that they were not deflected to ports under rebel control. What we were asking was more than would be expected in time of war. Mr. Smart remarked that, precisely because there was no regular state of war, stronger measures could be taken, since the rebels had not acquired the status of belligerents. Bedawi Pasha maintained that the Hejaz Government were responsible for the control of their own coasts.

3. It had been suggested, he continued, that the dhow "Taif" should be sent back from Kussair to Suez, where a board of assessment could assess the owner's damages. Who was going to pay the bill? He particularly disliked the idea of paying for the loss of a vessel to a port to another. This appeared to him excessive. What right had the Egyptian Government to impose escorts on Egyptian vessels pursuing a normal trade?

4. Mr. Smart suggested that the Egyptian Government could, in the interest of sovereignty, impose restrictions in the interest of relations of "bon voisinage". The Government of Transjordan and Palestine had imposed an absolute veto on the export of food-stuffs to the Hejaz. He quoted the "Gazana" case, when the Mixed Court of Appeal in 1927 had held that the Egyptian Government, in the interest of neighbourly Moslem relations, were justified in preventing the shipment of arms to the Hejaz—at that time a cockpit of the Ibn Saud-Hashimite struggle. Bedawi Pasha said that, in the present question of transshipment of an arms cargo in an Egyptian port and interference with a normal trade, the Egyptian Government were not bound to follow the precedent of the Egyptian Government in 1927. For political reasons with which he was not concerned, the Egyptian Government did not wish to recognise the present Hejaz Government, and they had to be careful not to take action or issue regulations which would seem to involve recognition.

5. The oriental secretary urged the consideration of political expediency. It was desirable that Egypt should not give any opening to those who were suggesting that she was favourable to the rebels. He argued that, a defection to a port under rebel control would constitute an irregularity in respect of the declared manifest of the offending vessel, the Egyptian Government might possibly devise some system of guarantees. Bedawi Pasha undertook to consider this question as sympathetically as possible, but he expressed the hope that we should recognise the real difficulties of the Egyptian Government.

6. The matter was again discussed with Bedawi Pasha and with the Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of the Interior, by the acting oriental secretary on the 1st August. The measures which the Egyptian authorities finally declared themselves prepared to enforce. In the course of this discussion reference was again made to the Egyptian Government's wish to avoid any implication of recognition of the present Hejaz Government such as might

(1) Not printed.

be suggested by official intervention on King Ibn Saud's behalf as against his Egyptian Government's action.

7. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister, Jedda, and to the Senior Naval Officer, Red Sea.

I have, &c.

(For the High Commissioner,

RONALD CAMPBELL.

E 4215 1241 25]

No. 51

Sir P. Humphrys to Sir P. Cunliffe-Lister.—(Communicated by Colonial Office, August 17.)

(Secret.)

Sir,

Bagdad, August 2, 1932

I HAVE the honour to report that the Amir Shakir, cousin of His Majesty King Feisal, arrived in Bagdad on the 28th July from Amman and returned on the 1st August.

2. The Amir Shakir, who is a close friend of His Majesty, is doing his utmost to support his efforts to persuade the Amir Abdallah to agree to meet King Ibn Saud.

3. The Amir Shakir is also doing his utmost to persuade the Amir Abdallah's mind to receive favourably the mediation which he is hoping King Ibn Saud will accept.

4. King Feisal has not yet received the telegram to which I referred in my letter of the 17th July. This delay is possibly explained by the fact that the Amir Feisal was held up for several days at Koweit on account of an accident to one of his motor cars.

5. During the talks which I had with the Amir Shakir when he called on me and when I returned his call, his Highness explained to me that, while it could not be expected that the friends of Ibn Saud, they were willing, when necessary, to set aside personal and family feelings in the common interests of the Arab peoples. The Amir Abdallah was, however, not so ready to do so, but he was confident that he would yield to the wishes of his brother and to the advice of the British Government.

6. The Amir also spoke to me about the frontier between Transjordan and Syria, the demarcation of which has recently been finished. He said that the new alignment had given much satisfaction in Transjordan, where it was appreciated that many of the modifications effected by the final settlement of this question were of considerable advantage to the country.

7. Our conversations also touched on the Ibn Rifada revolt in the Hejaz. The Amir's view was that, while no one could be certain how this affair would end, present circumstances were favourable to the insurgents. The Hejaz was in a state of confusion and the rebels were doing their utmost to exploit this situation. Discontent was consequently rife and there was every chance that the revolt would spread.

8. King Feisal has also spoken to me a good deal recently about the situation in the Arabian peninsula. He professes to have reliable information of a widespread and well-organised movement aiming at overthrowing Ibn Saud. He considers that Ibn Rifada's incursion into Northern Hejaz is only part of a big plan and that the lack of general response to Ibn Rifada's lead should be attributed to his having come forward prematurely and not to any lack of sympathy with his aims. His Majesty believes that in about a month's time serious disturbances will break out, not only in the Hejaz but also in Nejd, where many of the tribes are loyal to the Hashimite dynasty. Only the Harb are still loyal, but even the Harb sections living in the Hejaz would not stand by Ibn Saud.

9. His Majesty explained that he would not have spoken to me before obtaining further information. He said that he had removed if I had not been leaving Iraq in a few days, but in view of my early departure and probable absence for several weeks he had thought it better to take me into his confidence.

10. I asked His Majesty what he thought would happen in Arabia if Ibn Saud's power collapsed. He said that complete anarchy would ensue, and he feared that the Iraqi frontier would be exposed to serious raiding by the Nejd tribes. What, he asked, should be the policy of the Iraqi Government in such circumstances?

11. I replied that the Iraqi Government would of course have to do all they could to defend their territory from incursions of Nejd raiders, but I thought it would be a great mistake for them to attempt to meddle in any way in the internal affairs of Nejd or the Hejaz. Their best policy would be to adopt an attitude of strict neutrality. Entanglement in the internecine struggles of warring tribal factions in the Arabian peninsula could bring Iraq no profit, and might only too easily involve her in great loss. In particular, I warned him against allowing his territory to be used as a base of operations against his neighbour.

12. His Majesty professed to accept my view, and said that while he must frankly confess that, as Faisal bin Hussein, Ibn Saud must always be his enemy, as Faisal, King of Iraq, he would always put the interests of his country before those of his house. It was, however, his conviction that Ibn Saud could not for much longer maintain his present position, either in Nejd or in the Hejaz.

13. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Palestine and Transjordan in Jerusalem, and to His Majesty's Minister at Jeddah.

I have, &c

F. H. HUMPHRYS

High Commissioner for Iraq.

E 4169 185/25]

No. 52

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received August 18)

(No. 208.)

Sir,

Jedda, July 12, 1932.

WITH reference to Mr. Hope Gill's despatch No. 140 of the 20th March and previous correspondence relative to the financial situation of this country, I have the honour to forward a translation of a regulation published in the "Umm-al-Qura" of the 17th June, regarding the mode of settlement of Government debts. The wording of the regulation is in some respects obscure, and I should not like to vouch for the complete accuracy of the translation. The principle appears to be that all debts (meaning, presumably, debts dating from before the 1st January 1932) are to be paid by drafts on customs, where such drafts have not already been issued. If such drafts are not issued, they will be issued in the proportion of 25 per cent. of the customs revenue. Claimants who are not themselves importing merchants are to nominate such merchants, in whose name the drafts will be issued. I understand that, as might be expected, the market for drafts on customs is very poor, but it is too soon to judge of the practical effect of the regulation.

I have also received a letter from the Acting Hejazi Minister for Foreign Affairs regarding the discouraging advice allowed to be given by His Majesty's Government to the business friends of a M. Ydlibi, who is interested in enterprise in this country. I suggested, in this connexion, to Sheikh Yussuf Yasin that the Hejazi Government were themselves destroying any credit they might have. This advice was given on the 20th June his general views about the financial situation. He spoke of the poverty of the Hejaz and the conditions in other countries suffering from the loss imposed on so many people by Great Britain's abandonment of the gold standard.

3. I explained to Sheikh Yussuf at some length that what I complained of was not the effect of the advice, but the fact that the Hejaz was a right well-governed country, and that the Hejazi Government were not doing enough to improve the position. I pointed out that the Hejazi Government were such that no creditor knew where he stood. I had not, I said, pressed him on the subject of claims in which His Majesty's Government were interested because we had been absorbed in the Transjordan frontier, but I ran him through

the list in order to illustrate my thesis. It had been announced last autumn that one-fourth of the whole revenue would be assigned to the payment of old debts, and I had in January given Sheikh Fudl Hamza my views as to how the arrangement of last autumn seemed to have been lost sight of, and there was now a new regulation which I did not quite understand, but which seemed to produce certain definite effects.

4. I told Sheikh Yussuf that article 1 of the new regulation seemed to me to be a grand arrangement for creditors who had special arrangements. I expected to hear that the Government had agreed to pay the amounts due for the benzine which the Government had acquired in peculiar circumstances last September, and in respect of which the Director-General of Finance had made and then dishonoured a special agreement. I was interested, however, in other claims, about which no special arrangements had been made. I gave, as one example, the small sum due to His Majesty's Government for the Hejazi share in the expenditure on the Macdonnell investigation. Was it really intended, I asked, that I should take out drafts on customs and get a local importing merchant to discount them for me? The sheikh replied in a rather shocked tone that the Government would not do that. I then mentioned a subject on which I had spoken to him on the 12th June but with which I have not felt it necessary to trouble you, namely, the action (successful in some cases) of the Directorate-General of Finance in trying to get chauffeurs employed in Government-controlled motor companies to accept one-third of the arrears due to them in full settlement.

5. If the Hejazi Government would only adopt some sensible method of dealing with the floating debt on a moratorium basis and stick to it, I should not be so hard on them. As it is, the prospects of creditors are pretty desperate. I hope that, if the political situation grows easier, I may be able, before going on to bring up to date the position, to discuss the claims in which His Majesty's Government are interested. If so, I will report on the particular cases as may be necessary.

I have, &c

ANDREW RYAN

Enclosure in No. 52

Extract from "Umm-al-Qura" of Safar 12, 1351 (June 17, 1932)

DECISION IN RESPECT OF DEBTS

(Translation)

THE following has been received from the Press Department:—

The Ministry of Finance makes the following declaration regarding debts due by the Government.

1. Debts concerning which an arrangement has already been reached with the creditors will be dealt with in accordance with that agreement.

2. With regard to debts in respect of which no arrangement has been reached, the Government has given to the creditors drafts on the customs, 25 per cent. of the customs revenue will be set aside for the creditors in payment of the amount due to them. These drafts will remain valid as issued.

3. With regard to debts in respect of which the creditors do not hold drafts of the customs, the Directorate of Finance is prepared to give to the creditors in payment drafts in payment, so that the drafts may be set off against the customs duty payable by the creditor at the rate of 25 per cent.

4. Every Government employee whose salary is in arrear may take a draft on the customs, as may any merchant who does not import goods through the customs. Such an employee or such a merchant must make an agreement with the Government, whereby he will do import goods, and forward his name to the Government, whereupon a draft will be given to the specified merchant in respect of the amount due to the (original) merchant, which will be set off against the customs duty payable by him (the specified merchant) at the rate of 25 per cent. The said merchant (No. 2) is not allowed to sell the draft to another person.

6. Debts due by the Government in respect of house rent will be settled in accordance with the special regulation in respect of delayed payments of house rent.

1994

10

I HAVE referred in many recent telegrams, ending with my No. 142 of the 31st July, to conversations with the Acting Hejazi Minister for Foreign Affairs regarding the Ibn Rifada affair and connected matters. As you are aware, I became somewhat perturbed by his failure to come to Jeddah for a considerable time after his departure for Taif on the 27th June, and at last addressed to him, on the 10th July, the note enclosed in my printed despatch No. 207 of that date, in which I expressed my surprise at his conduct, and my regret that it had not been a useful purpose, although it had caused Sheikh Yusuf to invoke article 6 of the U. S. Consular Convention of 1892, which places the responsibility for the Ibn Rifada affair, and (b) that it would be better to await an opportunity for personal conversation before pursuing the discussion further, a suggestion of which you approved in due course.

3. My conversations with Sheikh Yussuf, from the 21st July up to to-day, were of wider range than those in June. In addition to matters directly connected with the rebellion in the north, we discussed the Ad Dabbagh plot on the lines recorded in despatches to Aden, of which I have sent you copies, and a fair amount of current business, with which I have dealt, so far as is necessary in so far as reports. My present object is to amplify somewhat my telegrams dealing

5 I also spoke to Sheikh Yussuf on the 21st July about the recent arrests in Jodda, which I said were a little on my conscience, as the victims were expressly

[illegible]

On the 27th July we dealt with one or two points which have a bearing on Transjordan. Sheikh Yussuf startled me by speaking of President Hoover's disarmament proposal on the lines described in my Saving telegram. He was very friendly towards me, and spoke of security for Hejaz-Nejd, with special reference to security on the Transjordan side. I took the opportunity of telling him that morning that H.M.S. "Hastings" had had to leave for the Mediterranean, and that it had become rather a question as to how H.M.S. "Penzance" could be most usefully employed; but, as I had had

[8079]

no reply to my telegram No. 138 of the 24th July, I did not dwell on this problem or give Sheikh Yussuf an opportunity of expressing views. I pointed out, however, that it was increasingly important for us to be informed as to the military situation. This elicited some information, which I duly telegraphed to you and which is now out of date.

9. On the 31st July Sheikh Yussuf telephoned the news of the defeat of Ibn Rifada, and called later. After he had answered some questions on that subject, I gave him General Wauchop's message about the party of Amran tribesmen who had crossed the frontier into Transjordan, near Rum. I also asked him about the army at Taif, which he had mentioned incidentally two days before as needing all the attention of Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman, who could not therefore deal immediately with the Shell benzene affair. I elicited the private and confidential information summed up in my telegram No. 141 of the 30th July. We had some talk about the press, *à propos* mainly of the "Times" article of the 14th July. I bended off a suggestion that I should ask His Majesty's Government to influence the press. I said that I had observed the general attitude of the papers pretty closely, and had seen nothing very terrible except in the "Daily Herald" and certain Egyptian papers. Sheikh Yussuf spoke of the refusal of the "Morning Post" to print a letter from Sheikh Hafiz Wahba refuting something that had appeared in it. I said that the columns of the "Times" were always open.

10. I enclose the Hejazi communiqué, which reached me later in the day. It adds nothing to what I telegraphed, but the preamble about "deceivers" behind the rebels is of some interest. I have not sent home such few communiqués as were issued during the previous two or three weeks, as they were almost uniformly uninformative. I have not troubled you, either, with various articles in the local press. They consisted of the usual tirades, weighed with excerpts from foreign papers, mainly Egyptian, which were reproduced to show that some people at any rate took a sane view of the situation in the Hejaz.

11. I am dealing in a separate despatch with my conversations with Sheikh Yussuf Yasin on the evening of the 31st July and morning of the 1st August about King Feisal's proposed intervention.

12. I am sending copies of this despatch and its enclosures to His Majesty's High Commissioners at Cairo, Jerusalem and Bagdad.

I have, &c

ANDREW RYAN

(*) Not printed.

E 4189 1241 251

No. 54.

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received August 18)

No. 53

54

Jedda, August 2, 1932.

I AM sending you by this bag a general report on matters connected with the Transjordan frontier situation. I prefer to deal separately with my conversations with Sheikh Yussuf Yasin on the evening of the 31st July and morning of the 1st August in amplification of my telegram No. 144 of the latter date, relative to the proposed intervention of King Feisal as an intermediary between Ibn Saud and the Amir Abdullah. I should say at the outset that the Amir Feisal seems either to have attached little importance to the suggestion of the King of Iraq or to have been very discreet, as Sheikh Yussuf clearly knew nothing of it and gave me the impression on the 1st August that the King had heard little or nothing at all, notwithstanding the fact that Fuad Bey Hamza returned to Taif on the 24th July. I may say, however, that the Amir Feisal is thought to have had too much of Fuad Bey's bumptiousness during their tour. This may be the explanation.

2. I went to see Sheikh Yussuf on the evening of the 31st July, intending to make a short communication. Finding him ignorant, I had to explain the matter fully. His immediate personal reaction was favourable. "As an Arab he is a suggestion attractive. Indeed, he was so spontaneous in this sense,

that he felt later that he had sounded too forthcoming and emphasised the need for consultation with the King. I took advantage of his attitude to add my own embroidery to the bare communication of the views of His Majesty's Government. I said that I myself had at first been doubtful, as I did not know how Ibn Saud would like the idea of applying to King Feisal and it might also be thought that His Majesty's Government were evading the task of bringing the former and the Amir Abdullah together. I had come to the conclusion on reflection that the Hejazi Government had not concealed the fact that there were difficulties, the general nature of which I had indicated a few days before. King Feisal could not be expected to take the same view as the Amir Abdullah, and to approach the matter in a different way from His Majesty's Government, as a brother and not as a directing authority.

3. Sheikh Yussuf broached the subject of the status of Transjordan and the character of a future treaty settlement as regards the question of who would be the parties to it. He was curious as to how agreements between Transjordan and other countries, *e.g.*, Syria, had been concluded. I admitted that the point was one of those needing consideration. I knew that Transjordan had made a treaty with Iraq but was not sufficiently well informed to speak of other cases. I observed that similar questions frequently arose and presented difficulty when countries were under mandate or a protectorate. I instanced the case of Morocco, of which I had had personal experience. In the present instance, I said, the matter was complicated by a grave abnormality. His Majesty's Government recognised both Hejaz Nejd and Transjordan. Transjordan recognised Ibn Saud as King of Nejd but not as King of the Hejaz. Ibn Saud did not recognise the King of Iraq. There had been a treaty between the Hejaz and Iraq, but the position was not clear. I thought King Feisal might well help to clear up the abnormality of which I had spoken.

4. Sheikh Yussuf brought me Ibn Saud's answer on the 1st August, shortly after his return from Taif. The King's answer was very brief and to the point. He had been delighted with the idea of Arab rulers helping each other. He would not take a decision until the Amir Feisal got back from Riyadh. Sheikh Yussuf could not tell me when the Amir was to be expected, but thought he would be arriving quite soon. I agreed that it would be reasonable to await him. Presently, I discovered a larger fly in the ointment. The King had said in his telegram that he would wish not only to consult his son, but also to exchange views on certain undefined preliminary points with His Majesty's Government. I exerted myself to show that this would merely complicate the matter. I pointed out that we were now only concerned with a promising approach to the questions which would need discussion later. The Sheikh promised to keep me informed. In order to reinforce what I had said, I asked his permission to give him a purely personal statement of a general kind. I had begun to think seriously, I said, of the possibility of a settlement between Hejaz Nejd and Transjordan when the King had been in the spring of last year. I did not then know what the views of Ibn Saud would be, but when the Hejazi Government had first expressed a wish for a similar settlement with Transjordan last autumn, I had considered the matter further, had seen the difficulties and had concluded that such a settlement should be regarded as a definite objective though it might take time. The visit of the Hejazi mission to London had given the matter a new impetus. The Ibn Rifada affair had given it a further impetus, because, while His Majesty's Government had insisted that it was independent of the immediate issues created by that affair, it had intensified the study which had been promised in London.

5. I added that the Ibn Rifada affair had also had a disadvantage. It had caused the Hejazi Government to press very hard a question of responsibility, with special reference to the Amir Abdullah. I had told Sheikh Yussuf Yasin that the Hejazi Government might prejudice the chances of a general settlement. If two rulers (and the Amir was a ruler, though not so great a one as Ibn Saud or his brother Feisal) were brought together, it was very likely that they would find themselves making accusations, however justified he might himself consider them, against the other.

In any case, I thought that a pursuit of the question of responsibilities would lead nowhere, if only because every public act of the Amir Abdullah throughout the Ibn Rifada business had been eminently correct and because there were many people who might like to upset the present régime in this country without wanting to bring the shereefs back to it.

6. Sheikh Yusuf Yasin listened with great care, thanked me and promised to lay all I had said before the King. I realise that in discussing all the elements in the question, viz., the difficulties in the way of a treaty settlement between Hejaz-Nejd and Transjordan, the question of responsibility for recent events and the reasons for supporting King Feisal's suggestion, I have gone a long way towards interpreting the mind of His Majesty's Government. I am convinced that the use of such language as I have employed affords the best means of overcoming Hejazi suspicion and of influencing Ibn Saud in the only way in which I can at present influence him i.e., through Sheikh Yusuf. My recent intimacy with the latter has been of distinct advantage, not that he is always easy to handle, but because he has a simpler nature than that of Fuad Bey and is more completely in the King's confidence. For these reasons I ask your indulgence, if I should seem to have talked too much or too openly.

7. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioners at Jerusalem, Bagdad and Cairo.

I have &c.
ANDREW RYAN

E 4082 1241 25]

No. 55

Sir John Simon to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda)

No. 108)

(Telegraphic)

Foreign Office, August 18, 1932

YOUR telegrams Nos. 151 and 152 of 8th August: Relations between Transjordan and Hejaz-Nejd

1. His Majesty's Government will study Ibn Saud's memorandum on receipt of text, but following are their preliminary views—

2. They are not prepared to discuss either of Ibn Saud's alternative suggestions.

3. Following paragraph is of no practical value. It is a statement of fact which would be quite impracticable in view of general position in Transjordan and Palestine, while Ibn Saud's second alternative would involve a detailed discussion, into which His Majesty's Government are not prepared to be drawn, of their position and responsibilities in Transjordan. It would in any case be difficult for them (and, indeed, unnecessary even from the point of view of the Hejaz-Nejd Government) to attempt to define that position more closely than it has been defined already in paragraph 4 of my telegram No. 76 of 30th June). Moreover, vigorous action taken by His Majesty's Government in connection with the position of Ibn Saud's revolt is a direct result of their attitude. From the practical point of view there is no need to discuss the position further.

4. In the view of His Majesty's Government the questions now raised by the Hejaz-Nejd Government, important though they are, are nevertheless side issues. Main object of His Majesty's Government is to place Transjordan-Hejaz-Nejd relations on a more satisfactory basis for the future. Discussion of the origin of the recent rebellion or of the responsibilities of His Majesty's Government in Transjordan is not likely to further this object. Most useful step to be taken would be to reach a direct settlement of the issues already reached by the Hejaz-Nejd with Iraq, as repeatedly urged by Ibn Saud himself. Last sentence of your telegram No. 152 suggests that His Majesty is still ready to accept King Feisal's offer to use his influence with Abdullah in this direction, and His Majesty's Government remain strongly of the opinion that he would be well advised to inform King Feisal accordingly. This matter is, however, entirely one for Ibn Saud himself to decide.

5. It may be well to acquaint Hejaz-Nejd Government orally, or otherwise, with preliminary views set forth in paragraphs 2 and 4 above in order to forestall any suggestion that His Majesty's Government are not in a position to do so, however, I shall await your observations and those of High Commissioner for Transjordan.

6. In any case it will be desirable to avoid giving the impression that His Majesty's Government attach grave importance to suggestions in the King's memorandum. The less they are discussed the better, emphasis being mainly laid on the desirability of a direct rapprochement with Transjordan, as a necessary step towards improved relations which King Feisal may possibly be able to further.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 101)

E 4222 2674/25]

No. 56

High Commissioner for Transjordan to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Received in Foreign Office, August 20.)

(No. 94.)

Telegraphic) P.

August 18, 1932

YOUR telegram No. 90

Hasan Elwan, is a prominent member of the Hashemite family. He arrived on the 12th July from last visit to Abbas Halmi in Lausanne, and has more than once visited Damascus.

Three persons bear the name of Sherif Sharraf, two of them live in Mecca, but the third, who is probably the man concerned, is Sherif Sharraf bin Rajah, cousin of Shakir, who worked Hashemites during Great War. He spent two months in Amman a year ago, but since then he has been living in Bagdad.

Taher Eldabbagh is a prominent member of Hisebi Hejazi.

The British Resident has heard from the palace sources that some of money which had been sent to Hussein Eldabbagh by Abdul Raouf Sabhan was to be spent in the neighbourhood of the Hashemite family. He is reported to have come from Hadramaut to join Maasriha tribe in Asir so as to participate in a rising against Ibn Saud.

Amir Shakir returned on the 5th August from Bagdad to Amman and British Resident has heard from the palace sources that he is expected to return to Abdullah advising him most strongly to get rid of Abdul Raouf Sabhan so that Amman would be free from his influence.

Abdul Raouf Sabhan left Amman on the 1st August for Damascus, and Damascus for Egypt on the 6th August, and is still absent.

(Repeated to Jedda, No. 105)

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No. 57

Lord Tyrrell to Sir John Simon.—(Received August 22)

(No. 1125)

His Majesty's representative at Paris presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit to him copy of an extract from the "Journal officiel" of the 12th August, 1932, respecting the law promulgating the treaty of friendship between France and Hejaz, Nejd and dependencies.

Paris, August 17, 1932

Extract from the "Journal officiel" of August 12, 1932

PROMULGATION DU TRAITÉ D'AMITIÉ SIGNÉ À DJEDDAH, LE 10 NOVEMBRE 1931, ENTRE LA FRANCE ET LES ROYAUMES DU HEDJAZ, NEDJ ET DÉPENDANCES

Le Président de la République française,
Sur la proposition du Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères,
Décrète

ARTICLE 1^{er}

Un traité d'amitié ayant été signé à Djeddah le 10 novembre 1931, entre la France et les Royaumes du Hedjaz, Nedj et dépendances et les ratifications de cet acte ayant été échangées à Djeddah le 24 juin 1932, ledit traité, dont la teneur suit, recevra sa pleine et entière exécution.

Traité d'El Djeddah

Le Président de la République française, d'une part, et
Sa Majesté le Roi du Hedjaz, Nedj et dépendances, d'autre part
Désireux de consacrer et d'affermir les liens d'amitié qui existent si heureusement entre les deux peuples et de régler dans cet esprit les différends qui viendraient à les diviser
Ont décidé de conclure à cet effet un traité d'amitié et de bonne entente et ont désigné pour plénipotentiaires

Le Président de la République française
M. Maigret (Jacques Roger) Chargé d'Affaires de France dans les Royaumes du Hedjaz, Nedj et dépendances, officier de la Légion d'Honneur, et
Sa Majesté le Roi du Hedjaz, Nedj et dépendances
Son Altesse royale l'Emir Fayçal Ibn Abdel Aziz, Ministre des Affaires étrangères

Lesquels, après avoir échangé leurs pleins pouvoirs, reconnus en bonne et due forme, sont convenus des dispositions suivantes

ARTICLE 1^{er}

Le Gouvernement de la République française reconnaît comme Etat libre, souverain et indépendant, le Royaume du Hedjaz, Nedj et dépendances.

ARTICLE 2

Les hautes parties contractantes confirment solennellement leur volonté d'entretenir en tout temps des relations pacifiques et de régler dans cet esprit les différends qui viendraient à les diviser.

Les représentants diplomatiques et consulaires que chacune des hautes parties contractantes accréditera ou nommera auprès de l'autre jouiront, sur le territoire de celle-ci, d'un traitement conforme aux règles et usages du droit international public.

ARTICLE 3

Chacune des hautes parties contractantes s'engage à employer tous les moyens en son pouvoir en vue d'empêcher que ses territoires ne soient utilisés comme base pour les menées illégitimes tendant à affecter la paix et la sécurité sur les territoires de l'autre partie.

ARTICLE 4

Le pèlerinage aux Lieux Saints bedjaziens de l'Islam sera libre pour tous les ressortissants, sujets ou protégés de l'une ou l'autre des parties contractantes.

Gouvernement du Hedjaz, Nedj et dépendances déclare que ces pèlerins jouiront, pendant leur séjour au Hedjaz, d'une entière sécurité personnelle et matérielle, ainsi que du traitement et des droits accordés ou reconnus aux ressortissants de la nation la plus favorisée.

ARTICLE 5

Les Français établis dans les pays du Hedjaz ou au Nedj et qui ne posséderaient pas de représentants légaux dans ces pays seront, après accomplissement des formalités et paiement des droits prescrits par la législation locale, remis au représentant de la France à Djeddah ou à un mandataire désigné par lui à cet effet, contre reçu, pour être transférés aux avants droit du défunt.

Réciproquement, les biens trouvés en la possession des ressortissants bedjaziens ou nedjiens décédés dans les pays placés sous l'autorité française et qui ne posséderaient pas de représentants légaux dans ces pays seront, après accomplissement des formalités et paiement des droits prescrits par la législation locale, remis, contre reçu, aux représentants de Sa Majesté le Roi du Hedjaz, Nedj et dépendances, s'il n'en trouve dans le pays où le décès a eu lieu, ou, à défaut, par l'entremise du représentant français à Djeddah.

ARTICLE 6

Le Gouvernement de la République française reconnaît la nationalité bedjazienne ou nedjiennne des sujets de Sa Majesté le Roi du Hedjaz, Nedj et dépendances. Sous réserve des règlements en vigueur, ces derniers auront toute liberté d'accès et de séjour dans les pays placés sous l'autorité ou le contrôle du Gouvernement de la République française, et ils y jouiront, conformément aux lois locales, d'une entière protection dans leurs personnes et dans leurs biens.

Réciproquement, Sa Majesté le Roi du Hedjaz, Nedj et dépendances reconnaît la sujétion française des individus originaires des territoires placés sous la souveraineté de la France, ainsi que le statut national propre des ressortissants des Etats dont le Gouvernement de la République française assume la représentation diplomatique et consulaire à l'étranger. Sous réserve des règlements en vigueur, ces divers ressortissants auront, de même, toute liberté d'accès et de séjour au Hedjaz, Nedj et dépendances, et ils y jouiront, conformément aux lois locales, d'une entière protection dans leurs personnes et dans leurs biens.

ARTICLE 7

Les hautes parties contractantes s'accordent réciproquement le bénéfice du traitement de la nation la plus favorisée pour tout ce qui a trait aux impositions, à l'exercice des professions, des industries et du commerce et à la navigation sur leurs territoires respectifs.

ARTICLE 8

Les dispositions du présent traité ne seront pas applicables aux relations que les Etats de Syrie et du Liban entretiennent avec le Royaume du Hedjaz, Nedj et dépendances.

Ces rapports feront l'objet d'une convention spéciale, que les hautes parties contractantes s'engagent à négocier dans les délais les plus brefs.

ARTICLE 9

Le présent traité sera ratifié et les ratifications seront échangées à Djeddah dans les plus courts délais possibles.

Il entrera en vigueur au jour de l'échange des ratifications et pour une durée de dix années à compter de cette dernière date.

A défaut d'un préavis donné six mois avant l'expiration de cette période de dix années, les hautes parties contractantes s'engagent à renouveler par tacite reconduction pour une nouvelle période de dix années.

ARTICLE 10

Le présent traité, qui portera le nom de "Traité d'El Djézirah," a été rédigé en français et en arabe, chacun des deux textes ayant même force et valeur.

Fait à Djeddah, le 10 novembre 1931, correspondant au 29 Djoumada II 1350 de l'Hégire, en quatre exemplaires, dont deux resteront déposés dans les archives du Gouvernement de la République française et deux dans celles du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Roi du Hedjaz, Nedj et dépendances.

R MAIGRET
FAYÇAL.

A son Excellence M. Maigret, Chargé d'Affaires de France à Djeddah

29 Djoumada II 1350 (10 novembre 1931)

A son Excellence M. le Chargé d'Affaires,

Me référant à l'article 6 du traité d'amitié et de bonne entente conclu à la date de ce jour entre nos deux Gouvernements, je vous serais très reconnaissant de vouloir bien me confirmer votre accord sur l'interprétation suivante de la formule "les règlements en vigueur".

Dans l'esprit du Gouvernement royal, cette formule désigne les règlements existant au jour de la signature du traité ainsi que ceux qui pourraient intervenir ultérieurement pendant la durée du traité.

Je prie, etc.
FAYÇAL
Ministre des Affaires étrangères

A son Altesse royale l'Emir Fayçal Ibn Abdel Aziz, Ministre des Affaires étrangères

Altesse,

Djeddah, le 10 novembre 1931

J'ai l'honneur d'accuser réception à votre Altesse de sa lettre du 10 novembre 1931 (29 Djoumada II 1350) me référant à l'article 6 du traité d'amitié et de bonne entente conclu à la date de ce jour entre nos deux Gouvernements.

En réponse, j'ai l'honneur de confirmer à votre Altesse que, dans l'esprit de mon Gouvernement, la formule "règlements en vigueur" désigne les règlements existant au jour de la signature du traité, ainsi que ceux qui pourraient intervenir ultérieurement pendant la durée du traité.

Je prie, etc.
Le Chargé d'Affaires de France,
R. MAIGRET

ARTICLE 2

Le Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères, est chargé de l'exécution du présent décret.

Fait à Paris, le 5 août 1932.

ALBERT LERRUN

Par le Président de la République :

Le Président du Conseil,
Ministre des Affaires étrangères,
EDUARD HERRIOT

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No. 58

Lord Tyrrell to Sir John Simon.—(Received August 22)

(No. 1136)

HIS Majesty's representative at Paris presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit to him copy of an extract from the "Journal officiel" of the 12th August, 1932, respecting the promulgation of a treaty between Syria and Hejaz, Nejd and dependencies.

Paris, August 18, 1932

Enclosure in No. 58

Extract from the "Journal officiel" of August 12, 1932.

Promulgation de la Convention d'Amitié et de bon Voisinage entre la République française, agissant en qualité de Puissance mandataire pour la Syrie et le Liban, et le Gouvernement du Hedjaz, Nedj et dépendances, faite à Djeddah, le 10 novembre 1931.

LE Président de la République française

Sur la proposition du Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères,
Vu l'article 3 du mandat pour la Syrie et le Liban confié à la France,

Décète

ARTICLE 1^{er}

Une Convention d'Amitié et de bon Voisinage ayant été signée à Djeddah, le 10 novembre 1931, entre le Gouvernement de la République française, agissant en qualité de Puissance mandataire pour la Syrie et le Liban, et le Gouvernement des Royaumes du Hedjaz, Nedj et dépendances, et les ratifications de la France et des Royaumes du Hedjaz, Nedj et dépendances sur cette convention ayant été échangées à Djeddah le 24 juin 1932, ledit acte, dont la teneur suit, recevra sa pleine et entière exécution.

Convention

Le Gouvernement de la République française, agissant au nom de la Syrie et du Liban,

D'une part, et

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Roi du Hedjaz, Nedj et dépendances,

D'autre part,

Ont décidé de conclure une convention à cet effet et ont désigné pour leurs plénipotentiaires respectifs

Pour le Gouvernement de la République française, agissant au nom de la Syrie et du Liban

M. Maigret (Jacques Roger), Chargé d'Affaires de France dans les Royaumes du Hedjaz, Nedj et dépendances, Officier de la Légation d'Honneur et

Pour le Gouvernement du Hedjaz, Nedj et dépendances

Son Altesse royale l'Emir Fayçal Ibn Abdel Aziz, Ministre des Affaires étrangères

Lesquels, après avoir échangé leurs pleins pouvoirs, reconnus en bonne et due forme, sont convenus des dispositions suivantes

Chapitre I^{er} Dispositions générales.ARTICLE 1^{er}

Le Gouvernement du Hedjaz, Nedj et dépendances et les Etats de Syrie et du Liban entretiendront en tout temps des relations amicales. Ils n'encourageront ni ne toléreront sur leur territoire aucune menace illégitime de nature à affecter la paix ou l'ordre sur les territoires de l'autre partie.

ARTICLE 2

Les ressortissants hedjaziens et nedjiens jouiront en Syrie et au Liban et les ressortissants syriens et libanais jouiront au Hedjaz, Nedj et dépendances du traitement et des droits de la nation la plus favorisée en ce qui concerne le séjour, les impositions, l'exercice des métiers et professions, de l'industrie, du commerce et de la navigation.

ARTICLE 3

La protection des intérêts des ressortissants syriens et libanais au Hedjaz, Nedj et dépendances et la protection des intérêts des ressortissants du Hedjaz, Nedj et dépendances en Syrie et au Liban seront respectivement assurées par les représentants ou consuls des hautes parties contractantes, régulièrement accrédités dans le pays de l'autre partie, étant entendu que les ressortissants des hautes parties contractantes ne soumettront en tous leurs actes aux lois du pays où ils résident.

ARTICLE 4

Le pèlerinage aux Lieux Saints hedjaziens de l'Islam sera libre pour tous les ressortissants syriens ou libanais de confession musulmane. Le Gouvernement du Hedjaz, Nedj et dépendances déclare que, pendant leur séjour au Hedjaz, ces pèlerins jouiront, en même temps que de la sécurité pour leur personne et leurs biens, du traitement et des droits accordés ou reconnus aux ressortissants de la nation la plus favorisée.

ARTICLE 5

Les biens laissés par les ressortissants syriens et libanais qui viendraient à décéder au Hedjaz, Nedj et dépendances, seront, après accomplissement des formalités et paiement des droits prescrits par la législation locale, remis, contre reçu, au représentant français à l'effet d'être transférés aux héritiers du défunt.

Réciproquement, les biens laissés par les ressortissants hedjaziens ou nedjiens qui viendraient à décéder en Syrie ou au Liban et qui n'auraient pas de représentants légaux dans ces pays, seront, après accomplissement des formalités et paiement des droits prescrits par la législation locale, remis, contre reçu, aux héritiers du défunt.

Chapitre II.—Dispositions concernant les Tribus.

ARTICLE 6

Les tribus des hautes parties contractantes ont le droit de se rendre, pour raison de pâturage, sur les territoires des autres hautes parties contractantes. Elles devront, seulement, avant la transhumance, en faire donner avis aux autorités de l'autre partie par les autorités de leur propre Gouvernement.

ARTICLE 7

Les chefs de tribu qui exercent un commandement officiel, et, à ce titre, sont porteurs d'étendards, ne doivent pas avoir leurs camps sur les territoires de l'autre partie.

ARTICLE 8

Toute tribu transhumant d'un territoire sur l'autre devra se soumettre, pendant son séjour sur le territoire, à toutes les lois et règlements en vigueur.

ARTICLE 9

Toute tribu relevant d'une des hautes parties contractantes qui commettra, pendant son séjour sur le territoire de l'autre partie, un attentat contre la personne ou les biens d'un ressortissant du Gouvernement sur le territoire duquel elle se trouve en transhumance, sera astreinte à la réparation

immédiate des dommages. Si cette réparation n'a pu être effectuée avant que la tribu ait repassé la frontière, le Gouvernement dont elle relève s'engage à prendre les mesures qui sont en son pouvoir pour faire obtenir la réparation due.

ARTICLE 10

Toute agression commise par les tribus relevant des Etats de Syrie et du Liban en territoire hedjazien ou nedjien et inversement, toute agression commise par les tribus hedjaziennes ou nedjiennes sur les territoires de Syrie et du Liban devra être examinée par l'Etat dont relève l'agresseur, si l'Etat sur le territoire duquel l'agression a eu lieu n'a pu l'examiner alors que les agresseurs étaient sur son territoire. L'Etat dont relève l'agresseur sera tenu pour responsable.

Pour chaque cas particulier, les hautes parties contractantes s'engagent à effectuer les enquêtes nécessaires en vue de découvrir les coupables ou les responsables, à exiger d'eux les réparations dues et à leur infliger des sanctions qu'ils méritent.

ARTICLE 11

Au cas où une tribu, ou fraction de tribu, relevant d'une des hautes parties contractantes serait passée sur le territoire de l'autre partie après s'être insoumise contre l'autorité dont elle relève, toutes mesures devront être prises pour empêcher cette tribu, ou fraction de tribu, de poursuivre ou de reprendre ses agressions contre son pays d'origine.

ARTICLE 12

Les hautes parties contractantes ne devront pas correspondre sur des sujets officiels ou politiques avec les chefs et cheikhs des tribus dépendant de l'autre partie.

ARTICLE 13

Les affaires de chasse et de pêche, et les questions de pâturage seront réglées conformément à la législation du pays où se sera élevé le d'abord.

Chapitre III.—Dispositions concernant le Commerce

ARTICLE 14

Les hautes parties contractantes s'engagent à poursuivre les négociations en vue de la conclusion d'un accord relatif aux questions douanières et économiques intéressant les deux pays.

ARTICLE 15

Les chefs de tribu n'ont pas le droit de percevoir, en vertu d'usages anciens, une taxe quelconque sur les caravanes et sur les marchandises.

ARTICLE 16

Les caravanes transportant des marchandises du Hedjaz, Nedj et dépendances à destination des territoires de Syrie et du Liban devront être munies d'un certificat d'origine donnant toutes indications sur les marchandises transportées et les animaux de transport.

A l'arrivée de la caravane sur les territoires de Syrie et du Liban, le certificat d'origine sera visé gratuitement au premier poste qu'elle rencontrera; après quoi, la caravane pourra continuer sa route sur le lieu de destination où les taxes douanières seront perçues.

Les armes détenues par les caravanes en passant sur les territoires de Syrie et du Liban seront déposées au premier poste rencontré, et, après avoir été révisées, seront restituées à leurs propriétaires au poste où elles auront été déposées.

Réciproquement, le même traitement sera appliqué aux caravanes venant des territoires des Etats de Syrie et du Liban à destination des territoires du Hedjaz, Nedj et dépendances.

Chapitre IV.—*Dispositions particulières.*

ARTICLE 17

La présente convention sera ratifiée par les hautes parties contractantes et les instruments de ratification seront échangés dans le plus bref délai. Elle entrera en vigueur à la date de l'échange des instruments de ratification et pour une durée de sept années à compter de cette date.

Au cas où aucune des hautes parties contractantes n'aurait notifié à l'autre, six mois avant l'expiration des sept années, son intention de dénoncer la convention, celle-ci restera en vigueur. Elle ne sera considérée comme dénoncée que six mois après la date à laquelle une des hautes parties contractantes aura notifié à l'autre sa dénonciation.

ARTICLE 18

La présente convention a été rédigée dans les deux langues française et arabe, les deux textes ayant même valeur officielle.

Fait à Djeddah, en quatre exemplaires, le 10 novembre 1931, correspondant au 20 Djoumada II 1350 de l'Hégire.

R. MAIGRET
FAYÇAL

A Son Altesse royale l'Emir Fayçal Ibn Abdel Aziz, Ministre des Affaires étrangères

Altesse,

Djeddah, le 10 novembre 1931

En me référant à l'article 16 de la convention signée à la date de ce jour entre les Etats de Syrie et du Liban et le Royaume du Hedjaz, Nedj et dépendances, j'ai l'honneur de faire connaître à votre Altesse qu'en Syrie et au Liban l'attestation d'origine doit être produite sous forme de factures authentiques revêtues du visa, délivré gratuitement, du représentant de la France auprès de Sa Majesté le Roi du Hedjaz, Nedj et dépendances et comportant à la fois certification de l'origine et la valeur exacte des marchandises. La facture doit porter la formule suivante, inscrite par le fabricant ou le vendeur : " Nous certifions que la présente facture est authentique et la seule émise par nous pour les marchandises qui y sont énoncées, qu'elle mentionne la valeur exacte de ces marchandises sans déduction d'aucun acompte et que l'origine est exclusivement nedjienne."

Pour les marchandises expédiées des régions éloignées du lieu de résidence de l'agent diplomatique, l'attestation d'origine, rédigée comme il est dit ci-dessus, pourra être certifiée par le Gouverneur de la région de départ et visée gratuitement au premier poste syrien rencontré par les caravanes.

Je prie, &c
Le Chargé d'Affaires de France
R. MAIGRET

A son Excellence M. Maigret, Chargé d'Affaires de France à Djeddah

20 Djoumada II 1350

(10 novembre 1931)

A son Excellence M. le Chargé d'Affaires,
En réponse à votre lettre d'aujourd'hui relative à l'article 16 de la convention conclue à la date de ce jour entre le Gouvernement royal et la Syrie et le Liban en ce qui concerne l'attestation d'origine des marchandises, j'ai l'honneur de vous faire connaître que j'ai pris les notes des indications touchant la forme du certificat d'origine.

Je vous prie, &c
FAYÇAL
Ministre des Affaires étrangères

A Son Altesse royale l'Emir Fayçal Ibn Abdel Aziz, Ministre des Affaires étrangères

Altesse,

Djeddah, le 10 novembre 1931

En me référant aux échanges de vues qui ont précédé la conclusion de la convention signée à la date de ce jour entre les Etats de Syrie et du Liban et le Gouvernement du Hedjaz, Nedj et dépendances, j'ai l'honneur de rappeler à votre Altesse que l'article 2 de ladite convention ne saurait ouvrir aux ressortissants du Hedjaz, Nedj et dépendances l'accès des juridictions mixtes en Syrie et au Liban.

Je serais reconnaissant à votre Altesse de vouloir bien me confirmer l'accord de son Gouvernement sur ce point.

Je prie, &c
Le Chargé d'Affaires de France,
R. MAIGRET

A son Excellence M. Maigret, Chargé d'Affaires de France à Djeddah

20 Djoumada II 1350

(10 novembre 1931)

A son Excellence M. le Chargé d'Affaires,

En réponse à votre lettre en date de ce jour concernant l'article 2 de la convention conclue à la date de ce jour entre le Gouvernement royal et la Syrie et le Liban et me faisant connaître que cet article ne saurait ouvrir aux ressortissants du Hedjaz, Nedj et dépendances l'accès des juridictions mixtes en Syrie et au Liban, j'ai l'honneur de vous informer de l'accord de mon Gouvernement sur ce point.

Je vous prie, &c
FAYÇAL
Ministre des Affaires étrangères

ARTICLE 2

Le Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères, est chargé de l'exécution du présent décret.

Fait à Paris, le 5 août 1932

ALBERT LEBRIU

Par le Président de la République

Le Président du Conseil,
Ministre des Affaires étrangères,
FOURARD HENRIOT

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No. 59

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received August 22)

(No. 165)
(Telegraphic)

Jedda, August 21, 1932

YOF R telegram No. 108

Following are my observations on paragraphs as shown.—

3 His Majesty's Government are clearly not accountable to Ibn Saud for their policy in Transjordan or their reasons for maintaining Amir. Latter is not the case the crux of the whole situation being (a) the persistent refusal to recognize Ibn Saud and (b) there can now be little doubt that his intimate advisers, if not he himself, have been up to the neck in conspiracy, of which Ibn Rifada affair was only one manifestation, to undermine King's position. When the King speaks of aggression he does not mean organized attack of the kind contemplated in paragraph 4 of your telegram No. 76. He means any

[8079]

... taking my leave of the State. I take it that he adhered to the policy of taking care that the Government of Arkansas was in general terms not exaggerated in any way. The State, he says, is not rich, but since the war it has taken pains to make the Arkansas people feel that the State is their own. He says that he has worked to persuade the people that we are really on the side of his enemies. He says that he has been friendly towards the old Abolitionists. He says that he has been trying to convince him we are really on the side of his enemies.

No. 60

August 27, 1932

My observations are as follows:

I have preserved good relations with Abdullah, but may not having seen him for the last two or three years. I propose to see him, within the next week.

As regards the points set out in your telegram No. 109—

- (1) I think it would be wrong to press Abdullah to such an extent as would endanger our future relations with him as Amir. But I shall apply all the pressure I can to get him to sign a treaty without reaching such a point. I am hopeful that he will agree to sign a treaty.
- 2 When proposal was first made that Faisal should intervene I did not think it right for me to object. Now that you ask my opinion, I think that Faisal's official intervention would be undesirable. I think that such intervention would be fruitless and I note that Jedda now thinks the same. I also think it preferable that it should be generally known that the Amir is in agreement with the Sultan in compliance with the wishes of His Majesty's Government, rather than owing to persuasion by his brother.

(Repeated to Jedda, No. 120)

Jedda, August 6, 1932.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 151 of to-day, I have the honour to enclose herewith translations of Sheikh Yusuf Yasin's "Secret and private" letter to me of the 5th August and the "personal and private" memorandum with one enclosure which accompanied the letter. The letter and memorandum were typed on the official paper of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and bore a

Foreign Affairs file number. I would ask you to excuse the sometimes peculiar English of the translations, as I wish to send them off as soon as possible and have preferred not to alter too much my translator's efforts at a literal rendering.

2. Sheikh Yusuf left Jedda for Taif on the 1st August and returned on the 5th August. In the interval, both he and Fuad Bey Hamza had written me letters dated the 3rd August announcing that the latter had taken over the work of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

3. When I received the translations of the documents on the evening of the 6th August, I was genuinely mystified as to their character. I at once wrote a private letter to Sheikh Yusuf pointing out that as it had been written two days after he had vacated the Ministry, but on the Ministry's paper, I was not sure whether I was to regard it and the enclosures as papers which had reached me through the Ministry and which I was free to discuss with the Acting Minister (i.e., Fuad Bey) or as having been addressed to me in such a special manner that I should consider them secret from anyone in this country except the King, Sheikh Yusuf, myself and the necessary members of my staff.

4. In the meantime Fuad Bey had also arrived in Jedda. On the evening of the 7th August I saw him and Sheikh Yusuf together at their invitation, Sheikh Yusuf not having yet answered my question.

5. It is hardly necessary to say that the King has sent Sheikh Yusuf secretly to Jedda, but that Fuad Bey was not aware of the contents of the documents. I had a secret conversation with him, but he did not say that he had had a more obscure motive) that Sheikh Yusuf knew more of what had proceeded and should therefore collaborate with Fuad Bey. They rather lost themselves in subtleties as to their personal rôles, but I established the main point, and pointed out to them the consequences of my telegram, under reference. I need add little to what I have stated in that telegram. I explained to them the gravity of the new turn which the King had given to the matter. I pointed out that his words implied every possible concession, and that in recent conversations I tried to get the question of King Feisal's intervention in the matter of the Hejaz, from its perspective, and that I had been able to get the King's opinion on the matter.

6. I pointed out to them that the King's intention was to effect a settlement with Transjordan, to whom it recalled the style of the late King Hussein. I gathered that what the King wanted was to induce His Majesty's Government to take a position on the basis of his two alternatives, which would involve risk at any further possibility of useful intervention by King Feisal, but that if pressed to accept the suggestion of the latter he would do so.

7. Fuad Bey and I conversed on this morning and we had some further conversation on the subject. We covered a good deal of the same ground as last evening, but I indicated more precisely my general views. I urged that it was a pity to destroy all that had been done, on lines previously agreeable to the Hejaz Government, to promote a general settlement between Hejaz-Nejd and Transjordan. Fuad Bey suggested that in one respect I was exaggerating the King's change of outlook and that His Majesty had never contemplated a settlement with Transjordan to which His Majesty's Government would not be in some way parties. I admitted that this point had never been cleared up, but that the question of the form of any settlement was one which presented difficulty for His Majesty's Government themselves. What really alarmed me, I said, was the King's assertion of invincible enmity and mistrust towards the Amir Abdullah and his insistence that nothing would satisfy him except formal guarantees by His Majesty's Government.

8. Fuad Bey told me that he had been present when the King of Iraq had spoken to the Amir about the possibility of his intervening and that he had himself expressed the view that his Government could not for the time being take advantage of King Feisal's suggestion, as they had sought the mediation of His Majesty's Government. I observed that I myself had foreseen this objection, but that it had been removed by my communication to Sheikh Yusuf Yasin on the 31st July regarding His Majesty's Government's approval of the proposal.

9. I need not reproduce the remainder of my conversation with Fuad Bey, which ranged round many subjects connected with the main issues. I am afraid that the one fact which emerges from all this talk and writing is that Ibn Saud's attitude towards the Amir Abdullah has hardened, not inexplicably, into a vindictiveness so extreme as to ruin any immediate hope of a settlement satisfactory to all parties and I doubt whether the idea of using King Feisal as a

deus ex machina can be usefully pursued for the moment. Writing, as I do, in a state of depression, I may be taking too gloomy a view.

10. In view of the nature of the King's communication I have felt bound to communicate it only to you, Sir, and leave you to decide whether to consult His Majesty's High Commissioner for Transjordan. I have left the letter with the enclosure in His Majesty's memorandum, as it has an immediate bearing on the investigations now proceeding in Jerusalem and Aden regarding the *Ad-Dabbagh* letter. I told Fuad Bey that I proposed to forward the letter to those two places, and any other British authorities who might be interested, of the contents of Taher Ad-Dabbagh's letter, unless he definitely asked me not to do so. He preferred not to express a view, probably because the letter had reached me from the King, so I adhered to my plan.

I have, &c.
ANDREW RYAN

Enclosure 1 in No. 61

(Translation) *Sheikh Yusuf Yasin to Sir A. Ryan.*
(Secret and Private)

Dear Sir Andrew Ryan,

Jedda, August 5, 1932

I INFORMED you in my conversation with you before I left Jedda on the 28th Safar, 1351 (*sic*, but corrected orally on the 7th August to 28th Rabi' al Awwal, 1351, i.e., the 1st August, 1932), that my Government, before deciding the question of His Majesty King Feisal's mediation in the matter of Transjordan, contemplated discussing the matter in all its aspects. Meanwhile, His Majesty my Lord the King has ordered me to send privately to your Excellency a personal memorandum from His Majesty to the British Government with a view to setting forth the position *vis-à-vis* of Transjordan. I shall be glad if this memorandum may be considered personal and private, so that it may enlighten discussions in future and explain the personal point of view of His Majesty in regard to that position.

With highest respects,

Yours sincerely,

YUSUF YASIN

Enclosure 2 in No. 61

Memorandum

(Translation)

WE wish to set forth hereby, in a personal and private manner, our position towards the Sharif Abdullah in Transjordan (only the *regarding* word) and we should like to set forth also the ways we think fit for the solution of the difficulty between us and Transjordan.

2. Since we came to the Hejaz, the Sharif Abdullah has been a source of frequent troubles and disturbances on the Hejaz and Transjordan there was his brother the Sharif Ali was fighting us there, and Transjordan was used for his (i.e., Ali's) sake as a basis for hostile actions against us.

3. The Sharif Abdullah did not spare any pains in causing disturbance and insurrections against us in the Hejaz and even in Nejd too. He used to urge the tribes in the name of Britain and Egypt, and declare that he acted in accordance with their advice and help as he used to induce the Bedouin to rebel against us.

4. He has gathered about him some of the people who work against our country and rule, like those of the sons of Ad Dabbagh, As-Sabbana and other Hejazis who have established for themselves a political centre at Amman with a view to committing hostile actions against us.

5. We send you herewith a copy of a letter, (*) addressed to the Sharif Shaker by Muhammad Yehia (*sic*, but corrected later to Taher) of Yemen

(*) Not printed.

showing the strength of those evil actions and the endeavours exerted to spite us and to harm our country.

6. He used to promise the Bedouin that he was ready to send out a force from his side so that they may assemble around it and make a revolt against our rule. We, on our part, used to disbelieve that rumour, believing that he could not do such a thing so long as the British Government were directing Transjordan, and the British Government are friendly with us and there are treaties of friendship between us and them. But on finding that those rumours had some truth, we communicated them to the British Government, but in the first instance they did not believe them. It was only after the incident had taken place and informed us of the occurrence of the incident. The suspicion we previously had concerning the actions of the Sharif Abdullah against us has become an established belief and an actual fact.

7. The British Government may say that these activities are not those of the Sharif Abdullah. If they have proofs of his innocence of these activities and will inform us of them, and if they can fix the accusation on another person, then we may be somewhat reassured as to the disposition of the Sharif Abdullah. It should be borne in mind, however, that a person like Ibn Rifada, who has not sufficient money to pay for the clothes he wears, cannot undertake such a movement nor gather round himself such a number of people.

8. It is also true that Ibn Rifada could not have obtained without the help of a capable and able person, very different from what he himself is. The British Government informed us that Ibn Rifada, when he first entered Aqaba, was able to purchase supplies and arms before they (His Majesty's Government) took measures to prevent his making purchases. It has also been proved that someone in Transjordan helped him in the matter of the dhow which was arrested by the British. There is also the question of Al Kabriti, of which we have already informed you. This is all that has been mentioned there is the matter of the dhow that went to Suez to bring supplies for him, but was prevented from doing so.

9. As to the matter of the dhow, it cannot be doubted, namely that Ibn Rifada, the fugitive, cannot have arranged these things and that the matter was planned and arranged by someone else.

10. It is evident from what we have mentioned, from his frequent statements published in newspapers as emanating from him, and also from the conversations exchanged between him and those people he received to the effect that he was being encouraged and aided by the British Government, and with his knowledge and encouragement. We do not blame the Sharif Abdullah because he is our enemy and there is no agreement or covenant between us. The agreements and covenants are between us and the British Government, for whose sake we have refrained much and overlooked more of what we feel in our heart against him.

11. This private memorandum has two objects:

- (1) A strong protest against the activities of Sharif Abdullah which are contrary to friendship and "bon voisinage" and the wishes of the British Government.
- (2) A statement of our position with regard to our souls and our country, and in which we may in future preserve our friendship with the British Government in regard to Transjordan.

12. We know for certain that the British Government are as anxious for the peace and stability of the region as we are. Although we have enquired in the second portion of the preceding paragraph as to what they (His Majesty's Government) think in this respect, our friendly established friendship and reciprocal interests cause us to express our opinion to them with complete frankness and freedom without circumlocution or flowery language. Our excuse for this is that we are speaking to a friendly Government, which we consider as our ally, and not to a Government with which we have international considerations. We say with complete confidence that if the British Government desire complete rest such as will ensure the maintenance of their interests in Transjordan without costing them anything and without disturbance

or trouble from us or from anyone else, and such as will ensure our being in agreement with Transjordan, they will not be able to find the true means for this so long as the Sharif Abdullah is in Transjordan.

13. Our opinion, as sincere friends of the British Government who are desirous of helping them and preserving the best and most friendly relations and understanding with them, is that one of two things should be done. First, it is more in the interests of England herself than it is in ours that the Sharif Abdullah should be removed, and that a trustworthy person, whether English or Arab or Transjordanian or another, having their (i.e., His Majesty's Government's) interests at heart, should be appointed by the British Government. Such a person

could be chosen from among the Bedouin or from among the Arabs or from among the Europeans. If the British Government are not willing to do this, then we propose a change we could give the British Government a promise to fulfil their wishes with regard to keeping peace on the frontier and to afford all possible assistance to the British Government in the matter of the dhow. This is a promise offered from a sincere friend to a sincere friend in the interests of the latter, especially if one considers the position and status of the Sharif Abdullah, not as being the lawful possessor of the country, but as one who, by force of circumstances, has been appointed like any other British official for the preservation of the interests of Britain itself and of Transjordan. Secondly if the British Government insist on the Sharif Abdullah remaining, we, while recognising that the appointment of the Sharif Abdullah, his confirmation therein or his disposal therefrom, is a matter for the British Government, and that we have no right to

interfere in it, we propose that the British Government should take steps to ensure that the Sharif Abdullah is not able to do anything which might harm the British Government or the interests of Transjordan. We propose that the British Government should take steps to ensure that the Sharif Abdullah is not able to do anything which might harm the British Government or the interests of Transjordan. We propose that the British Government should take steps to ensure that the Sharif Abdullah is not able to do anything which might harm the British Government or the interests of Transjordan.

14. In this memorandum we wish to state that the object of what we have mentioned is not to challenge the Sharif Abdullah nor the hope of gaining possession of Transjordan, nor to request the British Government to do something outside their power. The object is to safeguard our country, to prevent differences arising with the British Government and to fulfil the promises to them which we have given and will give.

15. With regard to the matter of the dhow, as intimated to us by the British Government, we look upon it as a serious act on the part of His Majesty intended for our welfare and that of the British Government and Transjordan. The mediation of His Majesty, however, cannot ensure to us our desiderata as he cannot be a guarantor for his brother, neither do we accept such a guarantee because he would then be unable to execute his guarantee and unable to bear its consequences. Now that we have explained our ideas to the British Government the decision in the matter depends on the attitude which they take up. So, if they see that the interest lies in any course let them take that course, and if they see that the interest requires the acceptance of the mediation of His Majesty King Feisal they know better than we in this respect.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs,
August 6, 1932

E 4402 76 25]

No. 62

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon — (Received August 30)

(No. 350.)

Sir,

Jedda, August 15, 1932

WITH reference to my telegram No. 159 of the 12th August, I have the honour to forward herewith a précis of the large number of articles, &c., published in the first number of the "Umm al-Qura," that of the 5th August. This despatch gives a better idea than anything I could myself write of the storm raised in this country by the Ibn Rifada affair not so much because of the importance of that affair as because it is the real enemy, and that it was he who launched the rebellion. You will note the insistence on the word "jihad," a familiar term to Europeans. Hardly less significance attaches to the recurrence of the word "munafiqun" or hypocrites, the name given by the prophet, as Hughes says, "to those residents of Al Madinah, who were not sincere in their faith." Their memory is execrated by all good Moslems.

2. The various telegrams addressed to the King mark doubtless the response to an impulse from the centre, but no one who knows the history of the Akhwan could be surprised at the fact that Ibn Saud has simply turned on a tap which he can as easily turn off. He and his advisers still hold by the theory that, when he made war on the Akhwan in 1929, he was choosing between two evils and elected to reduce his own subjects rather than to make a deal with the great Britain and Iraq. It is suggested and indeed it has been definitely stated to me by Fuad Bey Hamza, that the King, if confronted by a similar dilemma to-day, would not go against the Akhwan for the sake of Transjordan or the Amir Abdullah. It is fortunately recognised that the factor of Great Britain remains common to the two situations. I believe Ibn Saud to be sincerely anxious to avoid a conflict with His Majesty's Government. Hence the decision, which I recorded in my telegram No. 162 of the 12th August, that the Akhwan were to be pressed to report progress two months hence. I have reported in other telegrams that the King's view is that there can be no real peace unless the Amir Abdullah is eliminated.

3. I do not say that, if the Akhwan simmer down now, they will necessarily be a permanent factor in the situation. But it is clear that Ibn Saud will not accept any peace which does not give him a strong regard to the strength of the Akhwan. He will not be satisfied with the King's proposal to give him a strong regard to the strength of the Akhwan.

4. You will be aware that the 26th August started a day of interest equal to that of the special number of the 5th August. The following are the principal points:

- (a) A further telegram, again undated, from Ibn Aqil, a summary of which was given in my telegram No. 160 of the 13th August. I enclose a translation of this.⁽¹⁾
- (b) An article intended to elucidate some of the historical aspects of the Ibn Rifada affair. I enclose a brief summary of the principal facts alleged in this.⁽²⁾
- (c) An article on the aftermath of the Ibn Rifada affair which describes the still growing ferment in the interior, the receipt of further news from the Qahtan country, Abha, Jizan and Jauif, the continued insistence by the forces at Taif on their previous demands, the steps taken to complete the purging of the northern area as reported in Ibn Aqil's telegram, and the efforts to allay excitement and to arrive at a political settlement made by the King, who has never fought except in self-defence with the help of God.
- (d) The text of the loyal memorial of the townsmen, which had already appeared in the "Saut al Hejaz" and which is noted at the foot of the first enclosure in this despatch.

⁽¹⁾ Not printed

5. I may mention one other matter dealt with in the "Umm-al-Qura," which bears on the relations between the King and the Amir Abdullah. A short article headed "For Amusement" in the number of the 5th August referred ironically to a projected Arab conference, as being a thing for which the name Arab is too great. Its members would be fugitive hypocrites and brigands meeting by order of "the big devil" and under the supervision of his assistants. It would discuss the means of fomenting disturbance. Its decisions would be misleading, deceptions, &c. Its results would be to reveal still further to the Islamic and Arab worlds the evil intent of the participants. In the number of the 12th August there appears a caution to the effect that the reference was to a report in a Transjordan newspaper about an "Arab conference for Transjordan," which, according to the paper in question, was to be held at Amman. This is a reference to the report in the "Umm al-Qura" of the 5th August to be taken as applying to the projected pan-Arab Congress, which, so far as I am aware, has not as yet attracted much attention here.

6. I am sending copies of this despatch and the enclosures to His Majesty's High Commissioners at Jerusalem, Cairo and Bagdad.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN

E 4508 1241 25]

No. 63

High Commissioner for Transjordan to the Secretary of State for the Colonies —
(Received in Foreign Office, September 5.)

(No. 110.)

(Telegraphic.)

September 2, 1932

IN view of your [1 telegram] No. 107 of 30th August, in which you state that His Majesty's Government's policy is that relations between Ibn Saud and Abdullah should be brought to a point where a treaty can be reached by Minister at Jedda in his telegram No. 105 to Foreign Office that no progress can be made unless we can induce the Amir Abdullah to recognise Ibn Saud. I have been in touch with the Minister at Jedda since I arrived in the country to interview Abdullah without delay, as I considered moment had arrived for my doing so with best hope of good results.

At the same time, I realised that new proposal formulated by Ibn Saud renders it very difficult for [1 His Majesty's Government] to give any decision at present as regards Treaty of Friendship. I therefore decided, in my interview, to separate the two questions as far as possible. I will send you details of my interview by despatch.

I opened interview by saying that on 7th July I had stated that it was essential Abdullah should take measures to convince everyone that he was not acting in a manner hostile to Ibn Saud. I did not consider Abdullah had been successful in doing so and, in my opinion, the only method of doing so would be for him to recognise Ibn Saud. After some discussion, he gave me an absolutely definite promise that in deference to wishes of His Majesty's Government he is prepared to recognise Ibn Saud unconditionally if called on to do so.

At the same time he requested a most urgent visit to ask His Majesty's Government to assist him in his request. I said that I would give no pledge, except that I would inform His Majesty's Government of importance that Abdullah attached to his request and that I was confident that his promise to recognise Ibn Saud would create a very favourable impression on minds of His Majesty's Government.

Abdullah continued by saying that as he had given a pledge to recognise Ibn Saud he hoped that His Majesty's Government would arrange that a treaty of friendship should be formed with Ibn Saud by which Abdullah and Transjordan

would gain certain advantages in view of his assent to recognition. He emphasised fact that mutual recognition and a treaty of friendship which ensured fair dealing amongst tribesmen who normally graze both in Hejaz and Trans-jordan would have [corrupt group] more lasting and better effect than a mere recognition by him of Ibn Saud. I agree with this view, but I told Amir that I was not in a position at present to state views of His Majesty's Government as regards a treaty of friendship but that I would put forward Abdullah's suggestion to His Majesty's Government at an early date.

(Repeated to Jeddah, No. 124)

E 4821 1241 25]

No. 64

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon. — (Received September 22)

(No. 874)

Sir,

Jeddah, August 30, 1932

WITH reference to paragraph 6 of my telegram No. 185 of the 21st August, I have to inform you that I did not "take leave of the foreign representatives before proceeding to Nejd," as was the formula used. He received the representatives in a series of formal audiences in the forenoon. His graciousness, when my turn came, left nothing to be desired. I had not seen His Majesty for fourteen months and had in the interval heard very varying accounts of his physical state. On this occasion both Mr. W. and I were very much surprised to find him in such a state of good health, though Mr. W. thought he had put on a good deal of flesh in a part of his anatomy which I was not noticing. He was quite lively in the backchat of compliment.

2. I had not intended to seek a further audience as I felt that I could neither avoid nor usefully discuss the situation between Hejaz Nejd and Trans-jordan until you had considered it further. Fud Bey Hamza, however, was keen on my doing so, and I authorised him to say that, although I had nothing to lay before the King, I should be grateful if His Majesty would receive me in case he had anything to say before we left for Nejd and England respectively. The audience was granted for the 29th. At the time I presented to the King Commander A. R. Farquhar, of H.M.S. "Penzance," which, by an unintended coincidence, arrived at Jeddah on the same day as Ibn Saud.

3. After Commander Farquhar had retired, the King and I, with Fud Bey Hamza, discussed the situation. It was so very general that it would be useless to weary you with its details. The King reaffirmed all his familiar principles, his friendship for and belief in Great Britain, his desire to receive and to be guided by her advice, &c., and proclaimed his unshakable fidelity to them, subject only to the qualifications that she must safeguard his honour and his interests. I gave all the usual replies, with illustrations drawn from various sources, including the attitude observed by His Majesty's Government during the Ibn Rifada affair.

4. The fact is that both His Majesty and I were talking, and talked for an hour, platitudes with a purpose. That of the King was to prove that no gentleman, however reasonable, could feel safe with a person like the Amir Abdullah over his border, mine to instil the idea that to the practical British mind the Ibn Rifada affair appeared a matter which had been finished with, that permanent enmity was not a practical basis for the relations between rulers and that a fresh start should be made. We might have come to closer grips with the real subject of the conversation, if I had not had to make way for the Soviet Minister, who had already been kept waiting a quarter of an hour.

5. As it was neither of us put a name to the Amir Abdullah, who so filled our thoughts, but the King mentioned King Faisal as a most commendable monarch with whom, thanks to His Majesty's Government, he was on the best of terms. It is all the rage now in high Hejazi circles to represent the King of Iraq

as a good Arab, *un homme sérieux*, in contrast with his brother Abdullah, who is regarded as the incarnation of intrigue and untrustworthiness.

6. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioners at Jerusalem and Bagdad.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN

E 4845 1484 25]

No. 65

Chargé d'Affaires, Jeddah, to Sir John Simon. — (Received September 22)

(No. 180.)

(Telegraphic) R

Jeddah, September 22, 1932

MINISTRY for Foreign Affairs have to-day communicated (under circular memorandum) Royal decree signed Riyadh, 16th September, gist of which is as follows:

"Preamble.—After reliance on God, as result of telegrams received from all our subjects, in accordance with public wish and in order to unite sections of this Arab kingdom,

"We decree

1. Name of Kingdom of Hejaz-Nejd shall be changed to Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

2. Change to take effect from day of announcement.

3. It will not affect existing treaties, agreements, obligations or contracts.

4. All existing regulations, &c., remain in force.

5. Existing Government organisation to continue until new organisation is established.

6. Council of Ministers to prepare forthwith and submit to us Government.

7. Council may co-opt suitable members for this purpose.

8. The 22nd September, first day of equinox, chosen as date of announcement of unification."

See my immediately following telegram

E 4846 1484 25]

No. 66

Chargé d'Affaires, Jeddah, to Sir John Simon. — (Received September 22)

(No. 181)

(Telegraphic) R

Jeddah, September 22, 1932

MY immediately preceding telegram

Press of 16th September published numerous telegraphed petitions to Ibn Saud from Hejazi as well as Nejd sources to proclaim unity of Saudia Kingdom and establishment of succession to throne recent events having so clearly demonstrated intrinsic solidarity of the two kingdoms.

E 4900, 1484 25]

No. 67

Mr Hope Gill to Sir John Simon.—(Received September 24,

(No. 183)
(Telegraphic)

Jedda, September 24, 1932

MY telegram No. 182

Further study of move leads me to suppose its main objects are dynastic (to consolidate grip on Hejaz), financial (to cloak the use of Hejazi revenues), Imperial (to complete assimilation of Asir) and Constitution building (Fuad's objective). It may be timed to forestall pan Arab Conference at Bagdad

Viceroy visited Jedda on 23rd September to entertain foreign representative at "group undecypherable" day" fête

I merely asked him to convey personal respects to the King

E 4942 103 25]

No. 68

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received September 27)

(No. 379)
Sir,

Jedda, September 2, 1932

I HAVE the honour to submit herewith the usual annual report on the pilgrimage to the Holy Places of the Hejaz in 1932. It is on the same general plan as last year, except that I have devoted a new special section to the question of Pilgrimage Tariffs and Costs of Pilgrimage, which became a subject of acute controversy this year, and have attempted to deal in a separate section, however short, with each important British element in the pilgrimage. The section on the Afghan pilgrimage is retained owing to its special interest for the Government of India, but I have suppressed the Iraqi section as Iraq has now its own representative in Jedda. I have given special attention to the section on "Health," in view of its great international importance.

2. In most cases the sections dealing with British elements in the pilgrimage are necessarily meagre. I am, however, very glad to be able to refer to them from the British authorities in the countries of origin.

3. Although I have edited the material freely, the enclosed report is almost entirely based on what has been supplied by members of my staff. Owing to my absence from Jedda from the 2nd February to the 30th May, the general work of the office was conducted by Mr. Hope Gill, who, assisted by the Chancery staff, performed it efficiently and gained valuable experience. I need not repeat previous tributes to the Indian vice-consul and the medical officer in charge of the Government of India dispensary. Both worked with their usual zeal and efficiency. I am, however, very glad to be able to refer to them from the British authorities in the countries of origin. I am happy to give Khan Bahadur Hisanullah for the first time in a pilgrimage report the full credit which he deserves. For the Viceroy on the 1st January, a well merited recognition of his long service in connexion with the pilgrimage. The Malay pilgrimage officer had this year a task unworthy of his seniority and ability, but discharged it well. His assistant, Mr. B. W. Sayer who, as I have said, sustains an increasing burden, displayed the same qualities as I described in the despatch covering last year's report.

4. Owing to the difficulty of getting satisfactory results from the multiplicity of reports, I have, in every case, sent for I am, enclosing copies of this despatch and enclosure to the Governments of India (Foreign Department and Department of Education, Health and Lands) and the Straits Settlements only. I would suggest that the widest possible circulation to British authorities having any interest in the pilgrimage should be given to the report when printed, in consultation with the Colonial Office. I trust that any inconvenience from the delay in circulating the report generally in this way will be mitigated by the fact that it has been possible to complete it rather earlier than in recent previous years.

I have, &c

ANDREW RYAN

Enclosure in No. 68

REPORT ON THE PILGRIMAGE OF 1932 (A. H. 1350)

INDEX

	Paragraphs		Paragraphs
Introductory and general	1-33	(14) Somali pilgrimage	22-23
Statistics	34-36	(15) Sudanese pilgrimage	24-25
Quarantine	37-40	(16) Zanzibari and other pilgrimages	26-27
Health	50-59	(17) South African pilgrimage	28-29
Internal transport in the Hejaz	60-69	(18) Palestine and Transjordan pilgrims	30-31
(1) Customs	100-104	(19) Adenese pilgrimage	32-33
" " Policy	105-113	(20) Hadrami pilgrimage	34-35
" " In	114-121	(21) Muscati pil.	36-37
Pilgrimage tariffs and cost of pilgrimage	122-145	(22) Bahraini pilgrimage	38-39
Indian pilgrimage	146-195	(23) Kuwaiti pilgrimage	40-41
Afghan pilgrimage	196-200		

(1) Introductory and General

THE political setting of the 1932 pilgrimage was not dissimilar to that of the previous year. Although the internal situation in the Hejaz continued to be somewhat uneasy during the last three months of 1931 and the early part of this year there were no developments of such a nature as to widely disturb or discourage intending pilgrims. The most serious trouble in the autumn of 1931 was a threat of war between Ibn Saud and the Imam of the Yemen, who in August had proclaimed his independence. The Imam's forces had been defeated in a battle between Meda and Jizan. In September it looked as though a serious conflict was almost inevitable, but before the end of the month it was announced that Ibn Saud had made and the Imam accepted proposals for a conference of delegates to determine the frontier and adjust differences. Little more was heard until December, when it was announced that the delegates had reached a deadlock over Jebel Arwa, that the Imam had thereupon left it to Ibn Saud to arbitrate on this question and that the King had given judgment against himself. The delegates thereupon continued their work with such expedition that a treaty of friendship, "bon-voisinage" and extradition was signed at Abu Arish on the 15th December. The Imam, who had got his mountain, subsequently made very light of this treaty settlement. Ibn Saud, who had lost the mountain, found himself in a stronger position in Asir, where there had been concomitant movements of disaffection and earned the commendation of the world, including the Moslem world, for his statesmanship and readiness to avoid quarrelling with a brother Arab and Moslem ruler.

2. Peace prevailed on Ibn Saud's other frontiers. There was no serious trouble with Iraq, although a minor quarrel started early in 1932 over a watering place on the frontier. It did not, however, arise over the question whether the new Iraq frontier should be at Mecca or Jedda and the Hejaz Government were not immediately concerned with it. The Iraq Government were very anxious to reach a settlement with the Hejaz Government, which they had a very good reason for doing. Ibn Saud made it clear that he was not interested in the matter, but personal relations between him and the Iraq Government were not such as to prevent a settlement. Some minor frontier disputes were settled amicably, the King received with cordiality a visit paid him at Hofuf by the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf in January and the Sheikh of Kuwait paid a visit to Riyadh in March. Except for one important incident in September 1931, raiding the Transjordan frontier was reduced to insignificant proportions, and the pilgrimage was well over before the end of the year. The Hejaz was a rebel party of Hejazi exiles under one Hamed bin Rifada towards the end of May 1932 gave a new and acute turn to the perennial Transjordan frontier question.

3. No publicity, except that of local rumour in the Hejaz, was given to a stiff breeze between Ibn Saud and the British Government in February and March. It had its origin in the uncompromising attitude taken up by the latter over the

repatriation of a slave who had sought asylum in the British Legation and whom the King claimed as his personal property, but it developed on other lines. It was amicably settled early in April. While it was still pending, Ibn Saud had decided to consolidate his foreign relations by sending a mission headed by his son, the Amir Feisal, to London and several other capitals. This mission started from Jedda three days before Pilgrimage Day, a choice of date which caused some local comment.

4. The financial and economic situation in the Hejaz continued to deteriorate during the period between the 1931 and 1932 pilgrimages. In the autumn of 1931 an attempt was made to reorganise certain branches of the Administration and to place the finances on a sounder basis. The King, who had been in Mecca since the end of the year, returned to Medina in April 1932, adopted these reforms under pressure from the Hejaz, but they were introduced too late to be effective. Further efforts, made early in 1932 including the engagement of a Dutch financial adviser, did nothing to remedy the financial situation of the Government. The depressed conditions among the population generally are described in paragraph 10 below.

5. It had been foreseen in the latter part of 1931 that the number of overseas pilgrims in 1932 would fall below even the greatly reduced figure for the previous season. The Hejazi Government set themselves to counteract the depression by a series of measures. The first of these was a prospect of the reduction of certain items, notably the fees payable by Indian pilgrims to their mutawwifs. In the latter part of 1931 Ibn Saud departed from Medina the neglect of which had outraged the feelings of large sections of the Moslem world. The chief factor in this appeal was the publication in the autumn of a pamphlet which definitely promised that the 1932 pilgrimage would be held on Friday. It was calculated by astronomers that the new moon at the beginning of the month of pilgrimage would not merely take its place in the heavens, but would probably be seen on Friday nine days later. Many theologians consider it impious to anticipate such an event in any circumstances whatsoever. It was suggested in some quarters that Ibn Saud was sacrificing religious principle to lust for the money of the foreign Moslems: proof of the categorical announcement of a Friday Haj. It nevertheless produced a great effect in some countries, among which India was the most important.

6. Pilgrimage Day, the 9th Zul Hija, when all pilgrims congregate at Arafat, duly fell on Friday the 15th April.

7. The climatic conditions were again favourable throughout the pilgrimage time. There would appear to have been more cases of heat stroke than in 1931. The occurrence of, or suspicion of, plague or cholera. Mortality, although apparently rather greater relatively to the total number of pilgrims than in 1931, was again satisfactorily lower. As will be seen from the detailed statement in section 4 below, the Hejazi sanitary arrangements suffered from a certain diminution of personnel. The Dutch organisations worked on the usual lines. The Egyptian arrangements were on a reduced scale. Afghan medical assistance on a small scale was a new feature in 1932.

8. The total number of pilgrims from overseas showed a marked decrease, having fallen from 39,348 in 1931 to 29,065 in 1932. The decrease was spread very variably over the different national elements. It was most marked in the case of Java and Egypt, but certain countries of origin, among which were India, Afghanistan and Palestine, sent a greater number than last year. Detailed statistics are given in section 2 below.

9. The number of persons assembled at Arafat on Pilgrimage Day was swollen by large contingents of overland pilgrims from Arabia. The Yemenis were again numerous and may have numbered about 8,000. The Koweit caravan

alone numbered about 1,500 persons. It is impossible to estimate the grand total. This is evidently a fantastic figure. The Indian vice-consul reckons that there may have been from 50,000 to 60,000 souls from all sources overseas and overland.

10. The economic situation in the Hejaz was generally poor and was so largely devoted to satisfying the exigencies of the impoverished Hejazi Government that little margin was left for other expenditure, such as that on pious souvenirs and the like. The Hejazi merchants and retailers were even harder hit than in the preceding two years. The depression was a particularly heavy blow. Even the diminished quantities of goods imported by the merchants could not be marketed profitably and had to be sold in some cases at below cost price. Many retail shops in Jedda and Mecca were compelled to close down. The general depression was aggravated by poverty in the Hejaz itself, including that of Government employees. Their salaries were increased by a decision to treat all arrears previous to December 1931 as floating debt and by reduction of staff in various branches of the Administration. An arrangement made in the autumn of 1931 to pay off the floating debt gradually out of an assigned percentage of total revenue broke down and was replaced in June 1932 by an arrangement to commute claims into drafts on customs. Discontentment was rife, and for a time extended to the military and police, whom it was eventually arranged to pay in kind. The depression affected, in fact, every class of the community. A partial moratorium on debts was declared. There was widespread poverty, intensified by Government exactions of money for actual or alleged religious purposes. Starving pilgrims were seen on the roads along the road to that place. There was heavy mortality among them in Medina during the months preceding the pilgrimage.

11. Pilgrims from many countries were gravely affected by the effect on their national currencies of the monetary crisis. The effects of this were slow in manifesting themselves completely in the Hejaz. It had gone through a monetary crisis of its own in 1931, when the silver riyal broke away from its official parity with the English gold pound, which was then at a premium. The riyal, including a scheme to popularise its use in Nejd, were only partially successful. The crisis of the gold standard produced a practical situation which can best be illustrated by giving the approximate exchange rates ruling at the end of 1931 as follows:—

	Riyals
£ gold	= 17½
£ sterling	= 12½
£ Egyptian	= 13
19 rupees	= £ gold

12. Local prices in silver, which had reacted to the decline of the riyal in the autumn of 1931, were also affected by the monetary crisis. It might, indeed have been a sound policy for the Hejazi Government (though this is a daring speculation) to substitute sterling for English gold as the basis of currency. In the event they took no such step. They insisted that all charges, however stated in their tariffs, must be paid on a gold basis and that Hejazi silver, if tendered in payment, must be computed not at its official value, but at its actual gold value.

13. These decisions took definite shape too soon before the actual pilgrimage for them to be widely known. In India and Egypt, where special steps were taken to make them publicly known. In the case of India, where a certain estimate of the probable cost of the pilgrimage had been made public in the autumn, a considerable controversy arose owing to the attempts of the British authorities to make people realise that the cost of the pilgrimage was not so great as had been stated and counter-propaganda by the Hejazi Government and their friends. A detailed account of this matter is given in section 9 below.

14. There was little change in the condition of the pilgrim roads. There was a further deterioration in motor transport, the owners of which had no inducement and no means to improve the quantity or quality of their rolling stock. The financial condition of the pilgrims and the burden of Koshan, or road tax, caused an increased proportion of pilgrims of the class who usually use camels or pack animals to travel on camels or pack animals. The journey to Medina, which for every Muslim is as important from a devotional, if not from a legal point of view, as that to Mecca and Arafat. Pilgrims generally were for the first time allowed to use cars on the journey from Mecca to Arafat, but the fares and Government tax were very high. Conditions on the journey back from Mecca to Medina were also very difficult. A measure of relief was given by the Government in 1932, when it was decided that pilgrims returning from Mecca to Medina should be allowed to travel on camels or pack animals. This measure, which was in force for the return journey only, was taken at the suggestion of Khan Bahadur Ihsanullah. The road from Jedda to Medina continued to be very difficult, and to possess no conveniences except the coffee houses at the various camel stages.

15. Security again prevailed on the pilgrim routes. There was, however, an increase in pilferage at the centres where pilgrims congregate. Cases of theft were reported to have occurred not only at Muzdalifa and at Mecca, even in the holy precincts, but also at Mina and Arafat. In Jeddah, where for some reason this kind of thing had been rare, pilgrims were robbed while bathing in the sea. It is stated that the British Consul-General in Cairo has released mutawwifs and camelmen, and Monsieur Lemaitre Ghuznavi drew the attention of the King to the misconduct of the former in this respect. The Indian vice-consul reports that, notwithstanding this, the attitude of the Government of Mecca was unsatisfactory, and that he wishes to bring pressure to bear upon them to investigate complaints.

[illegible]

17 The Indian vice-consul was not invited, as he had been in previous years to the King a dinner, possibly owing to resentment at the attitude of the British Legation in the controversy over the cost of the pilgrimage. On the 7th May, however, Khan Bahadur Ihsanullah was given an opportunity of meeting His Majesty the King and expressing his views on various pilgrimage matters.

1A. Ibn Saud took the unusual course of receiving many influential pilgrims in audience. Among them were certain persons who had assisted at the Moslem Congress in Jerusalem in December 1931, a gathering which he had disliked and refrained from participating in but had not altogether discountenanced. He paid particular attention to Indians. He conducted long discussions with his visitors, impressing on them his desire to serve the whole Moslem world. Many of these persons had ~~one~~ ^{been} pilgrims to His Majesty and to the Sharif of Mecca. At the conclusion of the interview, a number of ~~state~~ ^{the} ~~left behind~~ ^{considered} ~~memorial dealing with various subjects of concern to pilgrims.~~ At one moment the King projected a reception for some forty Indian pilgrims of all shades of opinion to discuss matters affecting the welfare of pilgrims generally and his own

country. This was abandoned in favour of a meeting at the house of the Director-General of Finance, at which Moulana Hasrat Mahani severely criticised the Hejazi Government, and enquired as to the revenue from the pilgrimage and the manner of its disposal. A tendency is observable on the part of some leading foreign Moslems to suggest that the pilgrim is over-exploited for the benefit of Ibn Saud's temporal power and pomp. Unusual efforts were made to conciliate influential pilgrims by the distribution of presents in the form of gold watches and robes, some of which, as well as portions of the cover of the Kaaba and other mementoes of the Holy Land, were sent to persons of distinction in India, among them the Nawab of Hyderabad. The pilgrim season, which began on the 17th of October, 1922, and lasted till the 15th of January, 1923, was a very successful one. Ghumari, were renewed. Abdur-Rahman Malabari, the editor of a paper at Calcutta, who came on pilgrimage this year was awarded a cash present of £30 and an annual allowance of £80.

19. Although there is little progress to be recorded this year in the Hejazi arrangements for the pilgrimage, there are signs that the King's desire to improve them is genuine. He has taken steps to make the roads, the more readily, perhaps, because he is conscious of antagonism to his régime in the Hejaz, and because he realizes more and more the need for encouraging the flow of pilgrims to Mecca. His Director General of Transport has been instructed to make the roads more comfortable and to improve the service. This is referred to in paragraph 145 below.

20. The dispersal of the comparatively small number of overseas pilgrims was effected satisfactorily and an excellent idea of the same is given in the report of the Commissioner of the Port of Jeddah, Messrs. J. & M. Morrison and Company's agents on certain occasions to notify the time of arrival of ships in Jeddah except at very short notice. There is also a growing difficulty in connexion with the insufficiency of first and second class accommodation now that the only cargo vessels carrying pilgrims are of the better class. These causes add to the difficulty of solving another problem which has been ventilated in India, that of providing means whereby pilgrims of this class may be enabled to stay as long as possible in Mecca or Medina instead of having to leave to wait for ships. Other matters connected with the above to be dealt with in section 10 below.

21 There was no change in the Hejazi arrangements for dealing with the effects of deceased pilgrims (see paragraphs 187 and 216 below).

22. Destitution among British pilgrims was again a problem after the 1932 pilgrimage. On the whole it did not give so much trouble as in 1931, but it is possible that all repatriation cases have not been disposed of at the time of writing (August 1932). Details are given in the sections dealing with the different elements in the pilgrimage.

23. The number of people who came on pilgrimage in 1942 was again large. Among them are the following:

His Highness the Nawab of Loharu, her Highness the Begum of Patnaudi, Nawab Sir Shams Shah, the ex-Prime Minister of Kulat State, Nawab Sir Nazmat Jung Bahadur, late of the Hyderabad State Political Service, the Hon. Sardar Suleman Cassim Mitha, C I E., a member of the Council of State; the widow of the late Nawab Sir Nasrullah Khan of Bhopal, Nawab Fakhar Yar Jung of Hyderabad, Khan Bahadur Obeidullah of Afgarh, Sultan Saif Nawaz Jung Siddiqui of Quetta, Shaheed Ismail Ali Khan, C I E, Grand Master of the Order of the Royal Highnesses of the Amir of Afghanistan, certain members of the ruling family of Bahrain, and a number of respectable pilgrims from North African countries.

24. A large number of political agitators also came to perform the Haj this year. Moulana Haarat Mohani, Abdur Rahman Malabary, Ahmed Din, the president of the Punjab branch of the Young Men's Association, Professor Abdul Hafez Palti M.A. of Peshawar and Iqbal Masih from Lahore are specially notable among them. In this class must be included Moulana Iqbal Ghuznavi of Amritsar, but, while his anti British convictions are unchanged, he appears to be sincerely devoted to the interests of pilgrims, and in 1932 as in 1931 was helpful to the Indian vice-consul, who is on excellent terms with him. This general attitude is well illustrated by the letter quoted in paragraph 83 below.

26. H.M.S. "Hastings," commanded by Captain Sandford S.N.O., Red Sea Sloop, paid the usual Haj visit to Jeddah from the 12th to the 18th April, and took part in the traditional Haj Regatta, on the 17th April, for the officers and crews of pilgrim ships. It was not possible to arrange this year, as in 1930 and 1931 for Somali naval ratings to take the opportunity of going on Haj during the ship's stay.

[illegible][illegible]

29. No caravan arrived at between Hejaz Nejd and Egypt, and there was no Sacred Caravan from the latter country. The Egyptian consul in Jedon left in September 1931, and did not return until June 1932, when the pilgrimage was well over. It has just been announced, at the moment of writing (August 1932), that the Egyptian Government has contracted with the Mier Company for the transport of pilgrims from Egypt for twenty years, beginning in 1935.

30. The advent of an Afghan mission, which combined the making of the pilgrimage with diplomatic negotiations, brought Afghanistan into closer relations with Hejaz Nejd, and was accompanied or followed by measures affecting Afghan pilgrims, which are dealt with elsewhere (see paragraphs 87 and 198-200).

31 The Kiswah or cover for the Kaaba, which was formerly supplied by Egypt, and which has in recent years been manufactured at a special factory, with a mainly Indian staff, in Mecca, was this year ordered from Germany, the fabric prepared there being completed by stitching on the gold embroidered waist or huzam used last year. The silver embroidered door-curtain was also that of last year, suitably altered. Many Indian and other pilgrims resented the employment of infidels to prepare the cover and to handle the sacred texts inscribed on it. Certain leading Indians brought this complaint to the King's notice.

32. A law on Wakfs of great interest to foreign Moslems was published in September 1931. It authorised the registration of real property in the name of foreign subjects for the sole purpose of the simultaneous constitution of a Wakf, which must be for a religious purpose beneficial to persons in the Hejaz, not for the benefit of the founders' descendants. The law confirms by inference the rule that foreigners, irrespective of religion, may not acquire real property for ordinary purposes in the Hejaz, a restriction which in former times did not operate against Moslems. It is now generally enforced, although it is still relaxed, by what must be regarded as an overriding exercise of sovereign authority, in favour of certain foreign Moslems resident in the country.

33. Two cases which came to the notice of the Legation after the 1931 pilgrimage prove definitely that even nowadays the pilgrimage can be used as a cloak for small slavery transactions. In one case two Abyssinian boys were induced by another person in Abyssinia to make the pilgrimage, arrived in the spring of 1931 and were sold into slavery at Mecca after the Hajj. The other two were sent back to their country. The other case was that a Nigerian was sold to a European in Hejaz in 1930 or possibly 1931, was sold and taken to a slave market in Mecca. The case is still under investigation in Nigeria, but the essential facts are already established. It is only right to state that the Hejazi Government admitted on enquiry that the persons involved were wrongfully enslaved. The cases are, nevertheless, disquieting, because, for three persons coming to the notice of the Legation, there may be others more numerous who have no opportunity of seeking redress. In the specific cases, the two Abyssinians were repatriated at the expense of the Ethiopian Government by special arrangements, and the Nigerian was embarked for Port Sudan.

34. It is considered advisable to warn readers of this report that all pilgrimage statistics should be accepted with a good deal of reserve. Efforts are made to secure the best information available, but an examination of recent reports from various sources indicates that there is considerable variation in the figures reported. The pilgrims come from many different parts. Attention is drawn particularly to the fact that the majority of the pilgrims who disembark at Suakin are from the Sudanese Empire, the only authorized pilgrim port.

35 The resultant effect of the two opposing forces, viz., economic distress in the countries of origin and the propaganda mentioned in paragraph 5 above, was to produce great variations in the percentage of pilgrims from the principal overseas countries of origin, who went to make up the total of 29,066 in 1932, as compared with 39,346 in 1931. The most spectacular decline was in the number from the Dutch East Indies, which would normally provide from 30 to 40 per cent. of the total, but this year accounted for only 4,375 or less than a sixth of the whole. The reduction in the once important Malayan pilgrimage was proportionally even greater, the total for this year being only eighty. The Egyptian pilgrimage was less than half that of 1931, and there was a similar decline in the number of West Africans. On the other hand, the number of Indian pilgrims showed an increase from 7,276 in 1931 to 9,634 in 1932, while there were similar increases in the contingents from Afghanistan, Syria and Palestine as well as from certain African countries including Morocco, where the Haj-ul-Akbar is

36. The following tables give the usual detailed statistics in the same form as in the report for 1931, except that they are for two years only, the earlier figures being available in that report in the same order. In one respect it has been possible to ensure somewhat greater accuracy, as the now Director of Quarantine has been helpful in enabling the Khan Bahadur to determine the number of pilgrims of various nationalities who landed at Yambo.

TABLE (A)

NUMBER of Pilgrims arriving in the Hejaz by Sea, arranged by Nationality

Nationality.	1931.	1932
India and Far East—		
Indian ...	7,270	9,654
Malayan ...	506	...
Dutch East Indian ...	16,803	4,775
Chinese and other ...	926	151
Africa—		
North African ...	256	1,822
Egyptian ...	4,967	2,112
Sudanese ...	598	127
West African ...	1,558	750
South African ...	19	24
Zanzibari and East African ...	53	115
South African ...	51	62
Abyssinians		49
Unclassified		
Arab Countries—		
Syrian ...	1,050	2,154
Iraqi ...	117	324
Palestinian ...	447	1,352
Yemeni ...	184	515
Hadrami ...	445	475
Muscati ...	50	96
Hejazi ...	85	500
Nebi ...	48	
Adenese ...		97
Baharini ...		100
Unclassified	...	
Miscellaneous—		
Afghan ...	673	1,751
Bukharan ...	214	1,112
Persian ...	8	265
Russian
Turkish ...	63	188
Total ...	39,346	29,065

(1) Includes 11 Shomvi.

(2) Made up largely of Moroccans.

TABLE (B)

NUMBER of Pilgrims arriving in the Hejaz by Sea, arranged by Countries of Embarkation

Country of Embarkation.	1931	1932
India and the Far East—		
India ...	9,654	12,751
Malaya ...	1,807	...
Dutch East Indies ...	15,911	4,635
Africa—		
North Africa ...	91	1,875
Egypt ...	7,253	5,093
Sudan ...	2,120	1,313
East Africa ...	278	206
South Africa ...	113	62

(1) 425 according to Malaya pilgrimage officer

Country of Embarkation.	1931	1932
Arab ...		
Syria ...	1,005	2,648
Iraq
Yemen ...	428	...
Hadramaut ...	401	240
Miscellaneous—		
Persia ...	2	...
Russia
Europe ...	39	251
Total ...	39,346	29,065

(4) Made up of 24 from Antwerp and 1 from ...

TABLE (C)

NUMBER of voyages made by ships transporting Pilgrims to the Hejaz and Number of Pilgrims carried under each Flag.

Flag.	No. of Voyages.	No. of Pilgrims.	No. of Voyages.	No. of Pilgrims.
British ...	63	22,223	49	21,800
Dutch ...	24	11,400	19	3,719
French ...	7	5,178(1)	3	2,511
Italian ...	17	...	19	...
Soviet ...	2	...	5	403
German ...	2	...	3	73
Total ...	115	39,346	98	29,065

(1) The bulk of the Egyptian pilgrims were carried in French ships in this year.

(3) Quarantine.

37. The usual quarantine arrangements were instituted at Kamaran, Tor and Suakin for the 1932 pilgrimage

Kamaran

38. For the first time in recent history no pilgrim ship from India was obliged to land pilgrims at Kamaran. Thanks to the efforts made by the administrative and other authorities in India, all pilgrims had been not only vaccinated but also diagnosed as free from cholera, with the exception of a girl of 11 months old on board the "Akbar," who was vaccinated by the ship's doctor before reaching Kamaran. Although voluntary action had thus given excellent results, it is satisfactory to know that the Government of India have included in the Bill to amend the Indian Merchant Shipping Act mentioned in paragraph 28 provisions to make vaccination and medical examination compulsory.

39. In these circumstances, all ships from India as well as those from the Dutch East Indies and Malaya were attracted to meet in port at Kamaran. There was one case of cholera on board the "Akbar" but the patient had recovered before the ship reached Kamaran and no ship was delayed.

40. No cases of infectious disease were discovered on ships which had proceeded from Kamaran to Jeddah.

41. The Hejaz Government formally declared the pilgrimage clean on the 18th April. This declaration was confirmed by the opinion of the Indian medical officer, and in due course by the Permanent Commission of the Alexandria Quarantine Board, which on the 29th April also declared the pilgrimage clean in accordance with reports received from the board's delegate in the Hejaz and the medical authorities at Tor. In these circumstances, no south-bound ships returning to India and Malaya were required to call at Kamaran.

42. The question of the reported discovery of twenty cases of small-pox in the "Ruhmani" on her arrival in Bombay early in May is dealt with in the following section, as it was suggested that there had been an epidemic of the disease at Medina and that insufficient precautions had been taken at the time of embarkation.

43. The correspondence regarding the principles to be observed in deciding whether or not south-bound ships should be required to call at Kamaran in accordance with article 149 of the International Sanitary Convention of 1926 was completed early in 1932. The upshot can best be described by reproducing the following ~~letter~~ ~~and~~ ~~defined~~ by His Majesty's Minister at Aden the correspondence as a whole —

- (1) The diseases to be taken into consideration are limited to (a) cholera on any scale, however small, (b) plague on any scale, however small, (c) small-pox on epidemic scale.
- (2) His Majesty's representative will form his judgment with reference to (a) the reports of the local authorities, (b) the opinion of the medical officer of the Legation; (c) the opinion, if available easily and without delay, of the representative of the Alexandria Quarantine Board, (d) the results, if available, of any bacteriological examination in any particular case or cases of suspected cholera or plague, and (e) any other general elements of appreciation.
- (3) In forming his judgment His Majesty's representative will always consider (b) as well as (a), and will endeavour to make use of any other elements but will not in their absence normally delay his decision regarding south going ships ready to sail.
- (4) Should it be established that the occurrence of the diseases of cholera or plague will necessitate the same action provisionally, as if these diseases had occurred, but see paragraph 11 below.
- (5) His Majesty's representative will require ships to call at Kamaran if he has evidence of the occurrence of diseases as in paragraph 1 or suspicion as in paragraph 4.
- (6) If in doubt, His Majesty's representative will take the views of the Governments of India and the Government of the Straits Settlements.
- (7) It is assumed that the representative will be able to obtain reports of appearance of disease in the ports of call, and in the case of cholera or plague, the results of any bacteriological examination in any particular case or cases of suspected cholera or plague.
- (8) Any decision under paragraphs 5 and 7 may be modified subsequently in the light of further information received from the Alexandria Quarantine Board.
- (9) The decisions under paragraphs 5, 7 and 8 will be notified by telegram to India, the Straits Settlements and the Legation.
- (10) The Alexandria Quarantine Board will notify to the Legation by telegram all decisions in connexion with the sanitary state of the returning pilgrims.
- (11) A "suspicious" declaration by the Alexandria Quarantine Board will not of itself entail the necessity of requiring ships to call at Kamaran.
- (12) His Majesty's representative will correspond direct with Government of India on the one hand, and the Government of the Straits Settlements, on any question arising under the above.

44. Shortly after the pilgrimage, a British shipping company in Aden represented to the Resident that a rival Italian concern was evading the necessity for presenting pilgrims at Kamaran on the voyage to Hejaz by booking them to Massawa, transshipping them there and rebooking them on to Jedda. They enquired whether they could similarly book pilgrims to Hodeida and rebook them there in the same or another ship. They pointed out that the pilgrims carried by the Italian line travelled on passes issued at Aden, and suggested in effect either that steps should be taken to compel the holders of these passes to travel via Kamaran so as to comply with international sanitary regulations or that they themselves should be allowed to transship passengers in a way admitting their not calling at Kamaran and having to pay the dues there. The Resident at Aden ascertained that the Italian vessel had in fact carried a small number of pilgrims

as "native passengers" and had not infringed the regulations regarding such passengers. He arranged, however, that all travelling papers issued at Aden should be issued as if for a voyage to Kamaran. He also communicated to the Legation a suggestion of the Civil Administrator at Kamaran that the foreign representatives at Jedda should take action to prevent ships of their flags from landing at Jedda pilgrims from outside the Red Sea without presenting a Kamaran bill of health. The suggestion was not acted upon, as it was considered that it would interfere with the clearance of ships or the landing of passengers. The matter is still, however, the subject of correspondence.

Tor

45. The usual measures of observation were applied to pilgrims on board returning ships and all were subjected to the regulation seventy-two hours' detention. No grounds for suspicion were detected and, as stated elsewhere, the Permanent Commission of the Alexandria Quarantine Board formally declared the pilgrimage clean on the 29th April.

46. The Alexandria Board sent, as usual, a delegate to the Hejaz in the person of Dr Abdul Hamid Kassim, who had acted for the first time in the same capacity in 1931.

Snakin

47. All pilgrims returning to the Sudan and other African destinations underwent the regulation quarantine of five days at Snakin. Here also no grounds of suspicion were detected.

Jedda

48. No quarantine measures were applied to ships arriving at Jedda and no measures were taken to isolate pilgrims on shore. The position at the quarantine islands (see paragraph 34 of the report for 1931) remained unchanged. They still, like the hospital in the town, lack disinfecting apparatus.

49. The port medical service was again maintained by two officers. The former senior officer, Dr Suti, having resigned in January was succeeded by his junior, Dr Yahiya, also a Syrian, who enjoys a good reputation and stands well with the British Legation. The additional burden imposed on the quarantine doctors, owing to the lack of medical officers in the town, is described in the following section.

(4) Health

General

50. As stated in section (1), health conditions generally were good throughout the 1932 season. Pilgrims again benefited by the comparative coolness of the season in which the pilgrimage now falls, and the sanitary position as a whole was satisfactory.

Hejaz Medical Service.

51. Currency was given by Reuter early in January to a report, apparently from a Legation source, that discontent with the Hejaz service was spreading *en masse*. It was true that there had been much discontent, due to non-payment of salary and dissatisfaction with the general conditions of service, and that there had been some resignations. The reports of a complete disintegration of the service was, however, grossly exaggerated. The Legation estimated the total number of official doctors in the country at about eleven, exclusive of two Royal physicians, as compared with eighteen in 1932, and saw no ground for unusual measures being regarded as the only way of dealing with the situation. The assistance which could be placed on the medical assistance normally provided by foreign Powers, viz., the Government of India, the Netherlands and Egypt.

52. The shortage of official doctors was nevertheless severe. One of its more serious consequences was that no separate medical staff, apart from an Egyptian lady doctor, was available for the hospital in Jedda, previously served by two male doctors, who were also responsible for the dispensary work in the

Road from Mecca to Arafat

59. Nine sheds for first aid, with lighting, sign-boards, flags and ample provision of water. Three others not used in 1932, served as a whole by one doctor, with a dispenser and a servant. Ambulance car patrol

Road from Jeddah to Mecca

39. Part of a modern ~~house~~ ^{set} ~~as we~~ ^{as we} for use as a ~~temporary~~ ^{temporary} was in charge this year of a barber from Mecca and one servant. The accommodation includes twelve beds.

Asafot.

60 Medical assistance of any kind is of little avail in Africa, owing to the congestion and irregular arrangement of the temporary encampment, nor do pilgrims at a loss in their distress seek it except in extreme cases. The Government, however, provided six ambulances six first-aid kits and a motor cycle. Each car was provided with a moderate outfit of necessary medicines. Servants were available to deal with dead bodies in case of need.

Medina

61. One hospital working in 1932. An Egyptian doctor officially employed. There are in private practice two Indians, Dr. Muhammad Hussain, formerly British vice-consul in Jedda, now an old man, and a Hyderabadí homeopathic practitioner, who works under the auspices of the Hyderabad State and seems to have a large practice. There is also a Syrian chemist.

Yusuf

62. A small dispensary and one Egyptian doctor

LEIA

83. A dispensary was projected and a Turkish doctor was appointed, but resigned. It is apparently proposed to find a new man.

Tad

44. A small dispensary. One doctor, apart from any who may be in attendance on the King or the Amir Feisal when in residence there, like the Director-General of Public Health and the personal physicians.

65. The above is believed to be a reasonably correct account of the whole medical establishment in Hejaz Nejd at the time of the 1932 pilgrimage, except for doctors with dispensaries at two or three outlying places, which hardly concern pilgrims, like Abha and Hama. An Indian doctor has recently been appointed, it is understood, to Qatif, and provision on a moderate scale for other places, including Jeddah (vacant) and Wejh, has been under consideration. The ~~general account shows that the health of the pilgrims of 1932 did not differ~~ materially from those described in paragraphs 40 to 42 of the report for 1931, but were adversely affected by the reduction in the total number of doctors described in paragraph 51 and following paragraphs. There continues to be a great lack of competent specialists, and of arrangements for isolating infectious cases, even in Mecca. The defects in the organisation must be put down not only to administrative incapacity, but also, and in an increasing measure, to financial stringency. To give one example of the effects of the latter, the one well-equipped hospital in the country, viz., the central hospital at Mecca, is said to be unable to provide any food except bread for indoor patients.

66. The Indian medical officer has prepared the following statement of cases treated as deaths in Government hospitals during the period of the 1st August 1931 to the 31st July 1932 from the returns published in the local press. The statement may be compared with that for the first seven months of 1931, given in

27. A temporary hospital with about twenty-four beds was maintained during the first 4 days. It was attended by staff detached from the above establishment at Mecca, but was used only for emergency treatment, all serious cases being transferred to Mecca.

paragraph 24 of the report for 1931, but the comparison reveals contrasts so remarkable as to cast doubt on the value of any such returns.

Disease.	Number of cases.	Deaths.
Dysentery	1,353	106
Paratyphoid	21	17
Typhoid	25	22
Puerperal fever	56	51
Small pox	212	202
Measles	58	47
Meningitis	9	2
Leprosy		
Syphilis	468	1
Polio	4	3
Malignant fever		
Dengue	3	3
Consumption	117	77
Water-pox and chicken pox	10	1

Disease during the Pilgrimage Season.

67 There were no epidemics of contagious or infectious disease and no cases of suspicion of plague or cholera. Small pox, which is endemic in the Hejaz, came to the immediate notice of the Indian doctors, but not on any considerable scale, and there is no evidence to support the rumour which subsequently reached India that it was epidemic at Medina. On the other hand, it was more than usually prevalent, and a number of persons suffering from it were relanded after embarkation from returning ships, apparently owing to suspicion on the part of the ships' doctors that the symptoms might prove to be those of small pox. In spite of the favourable climatic conditions, cases of sunstroke were more frequent than in 1931, but without causing any marked mortality. Sporadic cases of typhoid and paratyphoid occurred on much the same scale as in 1931. Cases of dysentery and diarrhoea were much less numerous than last year.

68 The Legation was informed by the Government of India on the 17th June, that twenty cases of small pox had been discovered among pilgrims landed at Bombay from one returning ship, the steamship "Rahmani" which sailed from Jedda on the 25th April, with 1,774 pilgrims on board. The Government of India enquired as to the truth of the rumour mentioned above that there had been an epidemic at Medina, and of allegations by the ship's doctor and officers that a large number had been taken to Jedda to prevent the embarkation of infected cases. His Majesty's Minister telegraphed the following reply on the 26th June:

"Small pox is endemic in this country. There is no evidence of its having occurred in epidemic form or been unusually prevalent at Medina or elsewhere. It has been observed that small pox was more prevalent than usual this year, and there appears to have been some tendency on part of cautious ships' doctors to diagnose it as possible small pox.

"All passengers on "Rahmani" were pilgrims who came this year, and all were ordinary return ticket-holders, except three, who had come via Basra. In these circumstances it is assumed that all had been recently vaccinated at Jedda. This is only real satisfaction as Legation has no machinery for medical inspection of returning pilgrims, and any steps to cause Hejaz authorities to undertake such inspection would be vexatious interference without ensuring good results. Doctors of pilgrim ships normally look at pilgrims as they are embarked and examine any presenting palpable signs of infectious disease. This year they rejected several pilgrims whose cases were afterwards diagnosed on shore as chicken pox.

"May I have by despatch evidence of alleged negligence, information as to where cases in question first showed small-pox symptoms, and suggestions for future precautions within limits indicated above."

It may be observed in this connexion that, according to the printed proceedings of the Alexandria Quarantine Board the delegate of the Hejaz merely mentioned "cas sporadiques de variole," in his summary telegraphic report to the board after the festival.

Mortality

69 The mortality among pilgrims generally was estimated at about 2 per cent. The mortality among Jews was estimated at about 1 per cent and for Europeans at 1.72 per cent. Of three deaths reported from Arafat one was due to accident from falling, and two others were due to disease. Deaths at Medina were estimated at a maximum of four, two being due to accidents, a few to sunstroke, and others attributed to disease of local origin. No cases of plague were reported to the Legation, but see paragraph 243 as to the way back to Jedda.

General Sanitary Conditions

70 Conditions generally were similar to those described in paragraphs 48-50 of the report for 1931. The hygienic methods employed were of the same elementary description, water-sprinkling, moderate use of disinfectants and superficial food inspection. Heavy rains at intervals during the months preceding the pilgrimage and the lack of any measures to prevent accumulation of water in pools facilitated the extensive breeding of mosquitoes. The slaughtering place at Muna was in the same place as last year somewhat away from the main area of congestion, but there were fewer restrictions on the disposal of carcases, the poorer pilgrims being allowed to remove them freely to their quarters.

71 Foot-and-mouth disease occurred in the Hejaz in the spring of 1932.

Water Supply

72 Water was again plentiful at all the main centres and relatively cheap, but there was a serious lack of protection against contamination. The Am Zaytoon at Medina, which is a large well, was reported at the time of writing to be almost dry, to counterbalance the purchase of a small quantity of new material. Jedda continues to depend on its two condensers and various wells, the water from which is inferior but cheaper. These were well supplied this season owing to heavy rains early in the year. Following an extensive survey for water by an American engineer, Mr Twitchell, an attempt was made in the latter part of 1931 to make the well water at Waziriya, a place some 8 miles from Jedda, available as regular source of supply to the town. The water there is of reasonably good quantity, though opinions differ as to its excellence. It is said to be abundant enough to supply all the needs of Jedda, and it was proposed to recondition the old but long disused Turkish conduit leading to the town. An American windmill was duly erected over one well and some work was done on the conduit, but the scheme has so far been unsuccessful as far as the reconditioning of the latter is concerned.

Government of India Dispensaries

73 The dispensary at Jedda remained open as usual throughout the year following the 1931 pilgrimage season. The dispensary at Mecca was opened on the 20th February and closed on the 1st June. The staff was strengthened for the 1932 season by the addition of temporary personnel consisting of Sub-Assistant Surgeon Jamadar Abdul Aziz from India, one compounder and two orderlies employed at Mecca. At the actual time of the pilgrimage the staff consisted of permanent personnel was increased at Mecca to cope with the congestion of pilgrims there. A temporary dispensary was opened at Muna in the house rented for the festival by the Indian Vice-consul, Dr. A. H. H. at their own expense. It was provided with a sign, but did not attract many pilgrims, partly, it is said, because mutawwifs are not keen on directing pilgrims to it. The staff was, as usual, in attendance at Arafat, but little can be done there for the reasons given in paragraph 60 above.

74 The dispensary accommodation at Jedda still leaves much to be desired, and the unexpected influx of Indian pilgrims put a strain this year on the accommodation in the one house rented for pilgrimage purposes at Mecca. The Government of India have for financial reasons been unable to sanction proposals

made last year that a house separate from the general office building of the Legation should be rented at Jedda and that a second house should be taken at Mecca as an experimental measure. The difficulty is likely to be overcome in the near future. On the other hand, it is unfortunate that financial stringency should stand in the way of such small improvements in the existing accommodation as seem desirable from time to time, e.g., whitewashing and minor repairs. His Majesty's Minister feels very strongly that both dispensaries should be whitewashed, and that the water supply should be improved. It is estimated that this would cost £10 for each, and Dr. Abdul Hamid asks for £4 in addition for minor repairs at Mecca next year. These amounts would be additional to the contingency fund of £36 per annum which has already been sanctioned.

75. The permanent and temporary staff worked satisfactory. This commendation includes Sub-Assistant Surgeon Jamadar Abdul Aziz, but Dr Abdul Hamid suggests that in future a non-military surgeon, with experience in civil hospitals, would be more suited to the character of the pilgrim clientele.

Cases Treated

74. The total number of cases treated at the Jedda dispensary from the 30th June, 1931, to the 1st June, 1932, was 39,231 as compared with 26,456 in the previous year. Of these, 3,250, as compared with 3,203 in 1931, were treated during the period from the 1st January to the 1st June, 1932. The number of cases treated at Mecca from the 20th February to the 1st June, 1932, was 13,215 as compared with 12,125 in 1931. Two hundred and fifteen cases were treated at Muna.

77 Twenty four indoor cases were treated during the year, work on a large scale being precluded by the limited nature of the available accommodation and facilities.

79. Two hundred and fifty six and 452 minor operations were performed by the Indian medical officer at Jedda and Mecca during the year.

79. A large proportion of the cases treated at Jeddah throughout the year were non-British, owing to the popularity of the dispensary and the lack of other facilities, what with the reduction in the Hejazi medical personnel and the fact that the Dutch dispensary functions only in Mecca for a considerable time before and after pilgrimings day. The great majority of the patients treated in Mecca were British. The charges made at Jeddah for medicines supplied to non-British persons produced about £50. The income from this source at Mecca was negligible.

So, if $1 \leq i \leq n$, the observed proportion of cases among the cases treated in all the dispensaries —

Medical		Percentage
1	Malaria and its complications	2.0
2	Other fevers and infectious diseases	1.5
3	Urinary diseases, including gonorrhoea	16.5
4	Dysentery	14.51
5	Cholera and typhoid	1.4
6	Respiratory diseases	2.5
7	Nervous diseases	1.1
8	Dermatological and venereal diseases	0.4
9	Wounds and injuries	6.0
10	Other miscellaneous diseases	6.8
11	Immunisation and preventive measures	7.0
12	Other miscellaneous	0.09
Surgical		
13	Sinuses, fistulae, ulcers, &c. ...	8.0
14	Wounds and other contusions	7.2
15	Hydrocele and hernia	0.2
16	Cystitis, stone, &c. ...	0.2
	Margin of error(1) ...	1.0

100 0

(¹) Cannot be checked at the time of writing owing to Dr Abdul Hamid's absence.

Miscellaneous.

81 The Government of India have not yet given a ruling on the proposal made by His Majesty's Minister last year that the dispensary surgeons should be all-wednesday men, the case being that the dispensary surgeons outside the dispensaries doing the public duty were not being paid for their services but were being paid for their private work. It was suggested that the doctors should be all-wednesday men, and that the Government should pay them for their private work without any deduction for the public duty. The Government have not yet given a ruling on this proposal. The Government have also received a proposal from the Indian Medical Association that the Government should pay the dispensary surgeons for their private work without any deduction for the public duty. The Government have not yet given a ruling on this proposal.

82. Mr. Adams stated that he was a little on a nervous note owing to the possibility of the other projects of others who were present as to their intentions and asked that that project should be taken up at the Government Consulate at Mexico. At the outset he stated with respect to this sort of thing that he had not heard of it at London. He said a ready way of doing so was to allow the project to grow as the country professed interest in it is outside and provide the facilities for the same. He stated that he did not see the case of a steamship project as such as would be so reasonable. His Majesty's Minister at Mexico said that the project should be strongly discouraged.

was the well-known ~~and~~ Wathabi propagandist Ismail Ghazawi. The following letter of gratitude is worth reproducing in full :—

" (Beginning "In the name of God!")

"Dear Dr. Abdul Hamid Sahib,

Mexico, May 24, 1982.

"This is a known fact that I am strictly against any British influence or interference in the sacred Hejaz. This interference may be with a good intention or a bad one, I think it my bounden duty to oppose. But, I cannot deny the real facts that you have got a high name as a physician and surgeon in India and Mesopotamia. The I. H. M. S. is a very grateful to you and pray for the success of your efforts and appreciate the work of yours by which the people of the Hejaz are benefited. The results of the treatment of patients have made the people indebted to you. The stock of medicines and surgical instruments together with the treatment accorded there, is above praise. But the indoor arrangement is a little deficient and requires improvement. The surgical instruments are sufficient at present but there are no covers to be used in case of a patient of probably less accommodation for keeping the indoor patients."

"I record with great sorrow that you left the services of the Hetaz Government, which useful work you would have done from that side, and it would have been a pleasure to me, as well. But, still in the end I wish you every success.

1 am &c

⁴ ISMAIL GILZANAWI

84 More might perhaps, be done to acquaint pilgrims with the existence of the facilities afforded by the Government of India dispensaries (see paragraph 73 above as regards Muna). Some progress in this direction was made at the Hejaz end this year. There appears to have been a ~~small amount of~~ publicity in India. Dr. Abdul Hamid accompanied the Indian vice-consul on board all pilgrim ships arriving from India. In Jedda pilgrims coming to the Indian section of the Legation for registration are told where to find the dispensary. It is more difficult to ensure their understanding the arrangements at Muna, partly because the dispensary there is so distant from the Hariri. As regards publicity in India, see paragraph 101.

Other Foreign Medical Assistance.

85. The Egyptian arrangements were, as compared with those of previous years on a smaller scale proportioned to the greatly decreased number of Egyptian pilgrims. The main medical mission was sent as usual but it comprised two doctors and brought a smaller force with it and did not act in Jeddah, nor was the usual mission sent to Medina and Yembo. The Egyptian

Tekke, a Wakf institution, is a separate and permanent institution at Mecca, served by two doctors. It provides free treatment and medicines. There is no medical aide to the corresponding Tekke at Medina.

86. The Netherlands Government had arrangements similar to those described in paragraph 84 of the report for 1931.

87 The Afghan Government provided for the first time a small medical service consisting of one doctor, a Punjabi named M. Salih Haahmi, and one dispenser, who carried on dispensing work in one small room in a house close to the Haram. The doctor is said to have spent most of his time visiting his friends.

88. No other Government provides medical assistance specifically for pilgrims. The Russian, Professor Mozhkowsky, who was formerly attached to the Soviet Legation and was a bacteriologist of some distinction, used to render assistance on occasion to the Hejazi authorities, but he left Jedda with his wife in 1931. They were replaced in February by a married couple, both practitioners, the husband being a neurologist, the wife a bacteriologist and obstetrician. They are both of the Russian nationality, but their proficiency in Arabic seems to be poor. They are handicapped by apparently knowing only Russian, except that one of the two has a little French.

(b) Internal Transport in the Hexas

Motor Transport.

80 Khan Bahadar Ihsanullah introduces his report on this subject by a series of reflections on the frustration of many of the hopes that were founded on the potentialities of motor vehicles as a means of conveyance for pilgrims. He recalls the time when pilgrims started on the long adventure with so little certainty as to the amount of baggage they could take, and the scanty and unreliable equipment of each, and observes that, when Ibn Saud had established security on the road, it was expected that the once arduous journey from Jedda to Mecca and Medina could be effected rapidly and comfortably by car. Despite the comparative increase in speed which does undoubtedly result from the use of motor transport, this expectation was to a large extent defeated. "It seems," says the Khan Bahadur, "that nature has ordained that unmingled comforts and conveniences should not be the destiny of pilgrims and miseries and hardships would constitute an indispensable and inseparable function of the pilgrimage ceremony. The iron rule of Ibn Saud and the consequent prevalence of peace and security could not contradict nature's design, and the void was soon compensated by the rôle of the Motor Transport Service." He goes on to describe the disappointment of those Moslems of the easier classes, who have been attracted by the modern facilities to make the pilgrimage in greatly increased numbers, at finding how long it still takes to reach the Holy Cities and how many discomforts have to be endured, discomforts all the greater as, anticipating short runs such as they would make over similar distances in their countries of origin, they do not realize the necessity for taking the necessary precautions for the journey. The Khan Bahadur draws a picture of the pilgrims, many of whom are unaccustomed owing to the breakdown of their cars or lorries on sun-scorched roads and the efforts to which even persons of the highest degree are reduced to drag the vehicles out of the sand under the eyes of famished women and children.

60. The picture of the automobile industry in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a very different one. The King's Commission report quotes high personages from the remoter parts of India as comparing the Hejaz roads to the roads of their own countries. The roads to Mecca and Medina are well kept and the trouble arises from the arrangements for running the cars and the failure of the Government to ensure their being kept in good running order or efficiently driven. In 1932, the Naqaba system (see paragraphs 85 and 86 of the report for 1931) was again in force. If well administered it should give good results, but the administration is poor and the chances of its being improved are diminished by the existence, side by side with the private owners, of companies controlled and managed by the Directorate-General of Finance. In any case, the diminution of the pilgrimage deprives owners, in the absence of strict Government control, of any inducement to keep their rolling stock up to the mark or to replace worn-out cars. No new vehicles were purchased for the 1932 pilgrimage. The difficulties of the private owners were increased by the action of the influential financial interests behind them in arranging with the Naqaba to recover a larger proportion than usual of sums paid for motor hire, in settlement of old debts.

91 These facts account for the breakdowns to which the Indian vice-consul refers. He points out that even where relief cars are supposed to be available, as they are in certain cases under the Regulations, they are of often use owing to the failure of their drivers to keep time with others. In extreme cases, the journey from Jedda to Mecca has, this year, taken as long as thirty-six hours, and that from Jedda to Medina as long as eight days.

92 The subject of charges is on this occasion dealt with separately in section 9 below

93. Khan Bahadur Ihsanullah cites the following examples of difficulty during the 1932 season —

(a) A party of six Indian pilgrims, including ladies in bad health, hired a thirteen-seater motor car to take them to Medina. When they arrived at the first Koshan station on the return trip, the officer in charge ordered them to convey seven Nejd soldiers with their kit. After a wrangle of twelve hours with the arbitrary official the pilgrims were compelled to submit and to let the soldiers accompany them throughout the two days of the journey, the discomfort of which was aggravated by the gross conduct of the Nejd towards ladies accustomed to seclusion and the veil. The pilgrims were too greatly humiliated to disclose all the facts, which were, however, ascertained from the driver, or to make a formal complaint. In these circumstances, the Legation could not make official representations. The matter was brought to the notice of the Director-General of Finance, who promised to enquire into it but took no effective action.

(b) A party of eighteen important Malabari pilgrims enlisted the assistance of the Indian vice-consul to secure three four-seater and one six-seater touring cars for the journey to Medina. After they had paid their money and been kept waiting for days, an attempt was made to fob them off with Ford vans with hard seats. The Assistant Governor of Jeddah hesitated to intervene on discovering that the vans belonged to a Government company but was persuaded by the vice-consul to arrange for their replacement by touring cars owned by another company. Upon this the manager of the Government company quoted instructions received in the meantime from Mecca that, under the regulations, the vans were to be regarded as lorries and charged for as such. It was eventually agreed after much difficulty that, as a special concession, the vans should be provided with seat cushions and charged for at the rate for lorries.

Medina by lorry before Pilgrimage Day reported to the Legation from an intermediate station on the road that he and his party had been compelled to alight and the lorry diverted to other use, with the result that there was a risk of their not reaching Mecca in time. In this case the Legation was able to arrange for other transport.

Many pilgrims, including Nawab Fakhar Yar Jung Bahadur, of Hyderabad, were seriously delayed owing to shortage of petrol due to the operation of the regulation against filling tanks at Jedda with more than is required for the outward journey to Mecca. This regulation benefits the municipality and vendors in Mecca, but drivers are apt to start back with insufficient supplies, owing to the high price of petrol. Here a whole lot of pilgrims get stuck up in out-of-the-way places. Pilgrims were detained in this way for periods of from eight to thirty-six hours. The gentleman mentioned by name above waited eight hours and then only got on thanks to his being picked up by Khan Bahadur Durrani.

e) Many pilgrims objected to a regulation which requires that each lorry carrying pilgrims to Mecca should have a driver and a minimum of two assistants. This inconvenience was caused by the enforcement of this regulation, whether the lorry already had its full complement of passengers or not. The Legation drew the attention of the Hejazi Government to this, and suggested that it should be optional for pilgrims to take a salve with them or not, and that salvees accompanying pilgrims should either be included in the complement of passengers or referred to as a separate category of pilgrims which accompany the caravan to Medina.

(f) One case was not primarily a matter of transport except in so far as the post Koshian official on the way to Medina is responsible for the collection of a local tax of 11 piastres miri payable by visitors to that place. A retired officer of the Bahawalpur Police Service was delayed for six hours owing to the inability of the officials to compute the sum in local currency to be collected from a party of thirteen persons. "All the while," says Khan Bahadur Ihsanullah, "they

were quarrelling and quibbling with each other and arriving at different calculations, sometimes closing the office and going away to return a little later "The word," to quote the vice-consul again, "is now synonymous with foreboding evils and dangers for the pilgrims, and Khan Bahadur Lieutenant-Colonel Ziauddin (the officer concerned in the incident described) depicted it to be a word meant to frighten the urchins not to commit any mischief."

94. On the 25th March His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires brought to the official notice of the Hejazi Government difficulties experienced by pilgrims, including those under heads (b) and (d) above. It was understood that these representations had impressed the King and the Director-General of Finance. On the 19th April an official communiqué was published stating that, in consequence of complaints by pilgrims regarding delay due to the use of defective cars and lack of spare parts, mutawwifs and motor owners had been warned that only serviceable cars, certified as such by the proper authorities, must be used. It was also stated that owners who failed to provide necessary spare parts or by not providing necessary spare parts would be severely punished, and that the law would be strictly enforced. A reply was returned to Mr. Hope Gill a note, but on the 2nd August the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs informed Sir Andrew Ryan, in reply to a formal reminder, that the cases were still under consideration and promised to supply information as to the eventual result.

95. When the Indian vice-consul saw the King under the auspices of Isma'il Ghaznavi on the 7th May, 1932, His Majesty said that his attention had been drawn to complaints regarding the motor transport service, but that no one had suggested any effective means of improving it. Khan Bahadur Ihsanullah thereupon put forward a series of suggestions as to how conditions might, in his opinion, be ameliorated. He said that pilgrims were unduly detained at Jedda on their way to Medina for an inspection of vehicles conveying them, which had no real value. The system of inspection should be abolished and the companies responsible for the transport of pilgrims should be held responsible for the condition of the vehicles at the starting point, as well as at the intermediate stations. There should be a supervising body at the destination, who, on the arrival of the vehicles, would determine whether the driver had plying them at the normal speed, which should be fixed by the Government, and in case of any infraction the delinquent should be punished. This would put a check on irresponsible drivers, who sometimes caused the vehicles to be held up for long periods. Efforts should also be made to instal telephone stations on the Medina road, and the officials at each post should be provided with benzine, water, oil, &c., to be supplied free to any vehicles running short against a receipt by the driver, the amount shown on which should be recovered from the companies concerned. A note should be on the Medina road at least four large stations equipped with all the necessary spare parts for vehicles and served by an engineer well versed in the repair of motor cars. If a driver found that his vehicle had been incapacitated on the road, the engineer should at once proceed to the spot and carry out the necessary repairs, the cost of which would be subsequently recovered from the companies. The existing regulation, which requires the companies to provide at their expense one spare car to accompany each caravan of six cars, should be abolished. The adoption of the suggestions put forward would render this unnecessary, and the cost of maintaining the engineers could all the more justly be made a charge on the companies, recoverable by the Naqaba at the end of each season. Spare parts, benzine, &c., supplied on the road should be charged for at double the market rate in order to stimulate the sense of responsibility of the motor companies. The companies should be required to equip their vehicles properly. Should an engineer regard any vehicle on the road as unfit for traffic, he should be authorized to require it to be repaired and the company should be liable to a fine for providing such a car for the conveyance of pilgrims. Should the establishment of telephone stations on the Medina road be not considered feasible, a practical alternative would be to establish twenty four pilgrim stations on the Medina road and attach a coffee shop to each, which should cater for all the requirements of pilgrims. The Government should also appoint an engineer to inspect once a year all the vehicles on the Medina road, and the company concerned should be required to replace any vehicle found to be in an

unserviceable condition. It may be possible to recover the cost of keeping a large number of touring cars to cope with the growing demands of better class pilgrims.

96. Khan Bahadur Ihsanullah states that the King listened to these proposals, some of which seem to His Majesty's Minister rather drastic, "with rapt attention," and directed the Director-General of Finance to consider them. It remains to be seen whether they bear any fruit. Their adoption, even in a modified form, would undoubtedly be advantageous.

97. The general use of motor transport on the road between Mecca and Arafat was allowed for the first time in 1932, but the cost was very heavy, as will be seen in section 9 below.

Camels

98. There are no special remarks to make this year. No serious complaints reached the Legation, and Khan Bahadur Ihsanullah considers that pilgrims who used this form of transport were fortunate in being spared the troubles of those who rode in motor vehicles.

Arabas or Cabs

99. The prohibition against the use of motor cars in Mecca during the height of the pilgrimage season was maintained this year, but less, it would appear, because of congestion in so lean a pilgrimage year than as a concession to the pilgrims, many of whom were invalids and women, who were compelled to use the arabas or cabs. The Indian vice-consul saw in this a further hardship, imposed by the Government on pilgrims, many of whom, he says, especially invalids and women, were compelled to use the arabas or cabs. His Majesty's Minister confesses to some sympathy with the dying race of cabmen.

(6) Customs

100. The revision of the duties collected at the end of 1930 was described in section 45 of the report on last year's pilgrimage. They were still further increased in 1931, and the following table gives for convenience of reference the effect of the two successive increases as regards the commodities named—

Articles	Old Duty.	First Increase.	Second Increase.	New duty
Benzine	4 per cent.	5 pts. per tin	10 pts. per tin	15 pts. per tin
Oil	17 "	3 per cent. plus 1 pt. per tin	4 pt. per tin	17 per cent. plus 1 pt. per tin
Kerosene	16 "	3 per cent. plus 5 pts. per tin	6 pts. per tin	20 per cent. plus 11 pts. per tin
Tax	12 "	3 per cent. plus 2 pts. per tin	"	17 per cent. plus 2 pts. per tin
Tobacco and Cigarettes	36 pts. per kilog.	12 pts. per kilog.	12 pts. per kilog.	60 pts. per kilog.
Paper	"	15 per cent. plus 1 pt. per packet	1 pt. per packet	20 per cent. plus 1 pt. per packet

N.B.—1 pt. means mini piastres at the rate of 110 to a £ gold

101. The raising of the duties twice in rapid succession accentuated the distress among the pilgrims, and it was at the same time disadvantageous to the Treasury, &c., it stimulated the trade in contraband tobacco, with the result that that commodity could be obtained at a lower price than the duty. It did not benefit the employees of the Government, whose hopes of seeing their salaries paid more regularly were disappointed. The Government remained as dilatory as before in paying out money, and it was popularly supposed that any surplus revenue went to swell the King's personal treasury. The local financial administration in Jedda could not sanction the purchase

They devoted themselves to the earning of a few rupees to compensate their unpaid state, and in return for the tips they silently passed the bags and baggages of the pilgrims. This saved them (the pilgrims) the hardships of rigorous searches, involving not only several hours' tedious delay, but also loss of and damage to many articles."

104 In his recommendation to the King on the subject of pilgrimage to the Imam Ghaznavi drew attention to the deplorable state of the Citizens Administration, the officials of which confront pilgrims with the choice between taking advantage of their vulnerability, to the detriment of the Treasury, and being treated with unreasonable severity if they refuse to lend themselves to corrupt practices.

105 Mention was made in paragraph 94 of the last report of the renewed application of internal measures to enforce stricter compliance with religious principles and of the new statement of the Committee of Virtue in the town. The despatch to the north on military duty of one of the chief exponents of this policy produced a sneaking later in the year, and even on his return greater mildness continued both in Mecca and Jeddah. This is attributed to the penury of those charged with the enforcement of the regulations and their consequent readiness to mitigate their rigour in consideration of receiving tips, food supplies, &c., from members of the public. It is said that the president of the Jeddah Committee of Virtue arranged with certain vendors to get rations of food-stuff in exchange for toleration, and devoted himself to photography, even to the extent of posing with the ladies of his family. Nevertheless, an incident occurred early in 1932 when the inexistence of the Nejd soldiers employed by the Government on the attendance at a festival of 12 years old led to a clash between the said soldiers and the police, behind two of whom the boy took refuge. Other policemen rallied in some strength to his support or that of their colleagues. An armed conflict ensued, and the boy was killed. The incident had been reported

107. Pilgrims, however, suffered as a rule no general hardship of a serious kind owing to religious restrictions. The year ending from December 1896 to March 1897 was a particularly bad one for pilgrims. The Khed Bakhder had issued orders for the closing of the Hajj routes, which had been closed by the Wahabias, was broken open by certain

at Medina, all the principal of which, except two, had been repaired before the outbreak. The two which would be discontinued. Pilgrims were allowed to visit shrines freely in this place, though it was still necessary to bribe the Nejdî guards in order to be able to kiss the railing of the Prophet's Tomb. A less liberal policy was pursued at Mecca, where pilgrims had to refrain from visiting shrines, and were in some cases beaten and stopped on going to Hira and Jebel Sur. Their feelings are less very few, but the Tomb of Eva, at the former place, is still walled up, and the tomb

110. There was some trouble at Mount Arafat, where it is usual for Ibn Saud to stand on the mount surrounded by his Nejdia, while others cannot go up to it. Ignorance on the part of certain foreign pilgrims of this discrimination led to incidents in which an Egyptian was fogged and a few Indians were severely wounded.

112. Non-Wahhabi Moslems complain of the way in which Shari'a law is applied or misapplied by the courts, but, as the examples cited do not directly concern pilgrims as such, they are omitted from this report. Mention must, however, be made of a remarkable case, in which, some time after the pilgrimage, an Afghan pilgrim was condemned to death by a specially constituted tribunal for having stolen a piece of the Black Stone and a fragment of the cover of the Kaaba. The extreme sentence is understood to have been executed. The case caused much scandal among moderate men.

113. It may be deduced from the foregoing account that Ibn Saud's policy in these matters remains as strongly Wahhabi as is consistent with the economic and financial necessity of not choking off pilgrims, and that, in his efforts at compromise, he is sometimes hampered by religious opinions even more extreme than his own, especially that of the Ulema of Nejd, whom, however, he sometimes overrides. A striking instance of this is afforded by a recent tolerance of these ulema, in which they quote him, with obvious misgiving, but without open dissent, as having told them that the question of the Egyptian Mahmal was one of administration and policy, meaning that it was in his domain. For the rest, he naturally favours foreign Wahhabis, receiving in audience and bestowing gifts on such persons, even when they are otherwise of little account. Financial stringency continues to limit the scope for Wahhabi propaganda abroad, but it is not altogether neglected. Books and pamphlets are distributed among pilgrims of

127. The Indian vice-consul was stirred to indignation by a request from the Legation that a deceased pilgrim should be repaid by the Legation for the expenses incurred by his family in coming over to it. Khan Bahadur Ihsanullah saw in this an extension of the capacity of the mutawwifs to a region beyond the grave. It was perhaps a more legitimate objection that no documentary evidence was produced in support of the claim, and that it related to dues which, in the view of the Legation, could not have accrued, as the pilgrim had died in Medina before going to Mecca (compare paragraph 143 below). The Hejazi Government were informed that this would make it difficult to comply with the request, and their attention was drawn, moreover, to the doubtfulness of the claim on the two grounds stated above.

128. Khan Bahadur Ihsanullah holds no brief for mutawwifs. He nevertheless, draws attention to the fact that, while many pilgrims, e.g., the bulk of the Bengalis, fall entirely under their influence and will either lay complaints against them or refuse to confirm in their presence complaints made privately, some pilgrims of the easier class make extravagant demands. He cites the case of an Indian pilgrim of some eminence who came to the Hejaz in 1932 with a party of twenty. This gentleman, after putting his mutawwif to great expense, rewarded the man with his bare legal due for the services normally rendered and an abundance of complaint.

129. Incidentally, pilgrims of this fortunately rare description cause much trouble to the Legation in other ways. The gentleman just mentioned, for instance, on one occasion asked the Legation doctor to go to his house at a late hour. The visit was arranged with difficulty, owing to the doctor's being out of the town, which made it necessary for Khan Bahadur Ihsanullah to take the doctor to the pilgrim's quarters in his own car. It was ascertained after all this bother that the case was that of a servant suffering from a mild attack of fever, and, says the Khan Bahadur with just indignation, "It greatly annoyed the Indian vice-consul, who felt constrained to disapprove this action of this gentleman for creating a tempest in the teapot at the late hours of the night."

130. The vice-consul cites another case, not strictly relevant to this section, of a young gentleman occupying a minor clerical post in India. This lad was so puffed up at having a letter of recommendation from an influential relative, that he produced an eleven page complaint in Urdu about some trivial incident of placing in a car and threatened the Khan Bahadur with dire consequences if it were not attended to. The difference between him and his driver was composed only with great difficulty.

It is important to remember, however, that there are many things for which mutawwifs cannot justly be blamed, and that increased efficiency on the part of the Legation, whose duty it is to attend to the legitimate interests of all classes of pilgrims.

(2) Pilgrimage Tariff and Cost of Pilgrimage

132. As stated in paragraph 86 of the report for 1931 the tariff of charges authorized by the Hejazi Government for the pilgrimage was published at an early date. A list of transport charges were still to be fixed later, but, according to information obtained by the Indian vice-consul, it was not expected that these would be fixed until after the end of 1932. In the autumn of 1931 a tentative estimate of what it would cost an ordinary Indian pilgrim to make the Haj in 1932. This estimate, in which all expenditure was shown in rupees, was printed as an appendix to the pilgrimage report for 1931, and was also sent to India as an enclosure in a separate paper. In the pilgrimage report the final form of which was delayed, was put up, 150 of that report, was inserted drawing attention to the fact that the estimate had been prepared before the abandonment by Great Britain of the gold standard, an event which was bound to affect greatly the exchange rates which had been used in drawing it up.

133. Considerable publicity was given in India to the Legation estimate, and/or another adopted by the Government of Bengal which differed from it only in minor details. The danger of confusion as to the effect on it of the dislocation of the exchange rates was aggravated by another circumstance, namely, that the charges in the authorized tariff had been, as in previous years, stated in four different currencies, viz., Egyptian piastres for quarantine dues, pounds for the amount payable to mutawwifs by Javanese pilgrims, rupees for the amounts similarly payable to mutawwifs by Indians, and "piastres miri," i.e., official Hejazi piastres for all other items in the tariff. Moreover as the event showed, the use of the denomination "piastres miri" carried with it a further possibility of confusion. The Hejazi currency has in theory a double basis, the English gold pound (formerly indistinguishable from sterling) and the silver riyal, which had 110 piastres miri. But early in 1931 some months before and independently of the gold-sterling crisis, the riyal had broken away from its legal parity, with the result that the "piastres miri" was no longer a fixed fraction of a gold pound according to whether it meant the 1/110 fraction of a gold pound or the 1/11 fraction of a silver riyal. The exchange rates shown for the end of the year 1931 in paragraph 11 of this report were the resultant of the combined factors.

134. The full effect of the dislocation of exchanges occurring after its estimate of the cost of the pilgrimage had been circulated did not become apparent to the Legation until the first Indian pilgrim ship arrived in Jeddah at the end of December. Some of those stated in piastres miri, and although pilgrims from India could not expect to be paid in piastres miri, it was seen whether they could compensate their loss on the rupee by buying riyals with which to make the piastre miri payments. The mutawwifs' agents insisted on them being paid on a gold basis and claimed to have the authority of the Government to do so. It was a question whether the same principle could not be applied to payments stated in the tariff in rupees, and the Government had still not announced the authorized rates for transport. In order to elucidate the whole matter, the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 2nd January. He drew attention to four things which threatened to upset the calculations on which pilgrims had been working, viz.

- (a) The refusal of the mutawwifs' agents to accept Hejazi silver in payment of charges stated in piastres miri.
- (b) The imposition of four charges not included in the tariff.
- (c) Rumours that the charges for transport were to be heavily increased.
- (d) Rumours that mutawwifs could not accept payment in rupees of the charges stated in the tariff in that currency.

Sir Andrew Ryan enquired as to the position in regard to (a) and (b), urged the Ministry to communicate to him a list of all transport charges, and asked for confirmation of his assumption that rupees could be accepted in payment of charges stated in that currency.

135. Although the Minister impressed the importance of the matter orally on Foad Bey Hamza at least twice in the ensuing ten or twelve days, it was not until the 17th January that the latter replied officially. He then communicated a notice which had been published in the "Umm al-Qura" two days earlier, and added a denial that the pilgrims could be charged anything outside the tariff, "except the transport charge which is to be fixed in due course." This denial had to be read in the light of the sanction given in the notice for two of the charges referred to at (b) above, amounting together to 3 piastres miri. For the rest the effect of the notice was that all tariff charges, no matter in what currency stated, must be paid on a gold basis; that is to say, piastres miri on the basis of 110 piastres = one gold pound, amounts in Egyptian currency on the basis of the pre-sterling-crisis value of that currency; and rupees on the basis of a conventional rate of 13½ rupees = one gold pound, which the Hejazi Government had previously fixed. In the tariff for 1932 the mutawwif's personal charge for the majority of Indian pilgrims had been fixed at 40 rupees. It was reported with 54 rupees in 1931, a reduction intended to attract pilgrims. Under the decision of January 1932 this charge of 40 rupees could not be paid by tendering that amount in Indian

currency. At the conventional rate recognised by the Government it worked out at approximately £3 gold, and, if paid in rupees, it meant that the pilgrim would have to pay the equivalent of that amount of gold, say 57 rupees, or if the rupee depreciated as it was likely to do with the influx of pilgrims, about 80 rupees.

138. Assuming the correctness of the two original bases of the Legation's estimate of the probable cost of the pilgrimage, i.e., the tariff charges converted at the rates of exchange ruling in the summer of 1931, and the expectation that the still unfixed transport charges could not differ substantially as gold from those levied during the previous season, it became a mere question of arithmetic to determine the effect of the Hejazi Government's decision. It was clear that, and the possibility of some economy to meet the hardness of the times, the cost of the pilgrimage was bound to be greater than the amount of gold at disposal to that of re-embarking must be about 40 per cent greater than in 1931. Sir Andrew Ryan informed the Government of India by telegraph on the 15th January that he now reckoned the average Indian pilgrim's probable expenditure in the Hejaz at about 800 rupees. He also suggested that the Government of India should be prepared to meet the cost of the pilgrimage from the Indian Treasury. He informed Fuad Bey orally on the 20th January of the conclusion he had reached.

137. The Government of India published, on the 23rd January, a communiqué based on Sir Andrew Ryan's telegram of the 15th January, in which they deduced that the total cost of the pilgrimage would be about 1,100 rupees. In one respect the communiqué left room for an important misconception, as it suggested that the Hejazi Government were themselves the authors of Sir Andrew Ryan's revised estimate of 800 rupees for expenditure in the Hejaz. This may have helped to aggravate the controversy which presently arose, and the burden of which had to be sustained by Mr Hope Gill, as Sir Andrew Ryan was called away from Jedda on the 2nd February.

138. The Government of India. The Hejazi Minister in London complained that it was excessive. Iqbal Ghaznavi, the Hejazi Minister in London, he replied that he had been told by the Hejazi Minister in India that the pilgrim's expenditure would be 700 rupees in spite of everything. The President of the Haj Committee at Karachi, committed the grave mistake of assuming that the Hejazi Government were the authors of the estimate of 1,100 rupees, or that there was any increase in charges. The whole telegram inferred, though it did not state, that the estimate was exaggerated.

139. The Hejazi Government cannot be acquitted of bad faith. They would have been glad to see the pilgrim's expenditure lowered, but not increased. Stated in gold, they had neither been lowered nor materially increased, converted into rupees they were lowered by about 40 per cent. The Government of India, however, of the Hejazi Government were parties to the estimate of 1,100 rupees, or that there was any increase in charges. The whole telegram inferred, though it did not state, that the estimate was exaggerated.

140. It was not until the 2nd March that the Hejazi Government communicated to the Legation an official list of transport charges. They were given as rates which might be affected by the laws of supply and demand, but which were in any case maxima. Three days later Fuad Bey corrected two slight errors. It was found later that in certain cases higher rates were being actually charged. On the 22nd March the Minister for Foreign Affairs submitted that the motor companies had been allowed to exceed the maxima previously allowed

owing to increased duty on benzine and spare parts. Mr Hope Gill then drew up a table of what he understood to be the final rates, and, on the 24th March, asked the Minister to confirm it. He received no reply, despite various efforts to extract one.

141. It is difficult, for various reasons, to make an exact comparison between the inclusive fares finally charged in 1932 and those charged in 1931. Broadly speaking, the rates for motor transport as finally fixed for the height of the season would appear to have been from 10 to 20 per cent, higher in gold than those of the previous year, and those for camels much about the same. The principal inclusive figures deduced by Mr Hope Gill from the correspondence were as follows:—

Jedda to Mecca by motor lorry (same for return): 132 piastres miri
Jedda to Mecca by touring car (same for return): 187 piastres miri
Mecca to Medina and back by lorry: £12 plus 48½ piastres miri
Mecca to Medina and back by car: £15 plus 48½ piastres miri
Jedda to Mecca by camel: 70 piastres
Mecca to Jedda by camel: 100 piastres
Mecca to Medina and back by camel: £5½ plus 107 piastres
Mecca to Arafat by camel: £1½

These rates are all the charge per person. There was some confusion regarding the last item, as Mr Hope Gill was told by Fuad Bey on the 5th March that it was for a camel which might carry one, two or three persons, but eventually the amount was charged for each pilgrim. As stated elsewhere, general permission was given this year for pilgrims to make the journey to Arafat by car. The charges for this were not included in the list sent to the Legation on the 2nd March, and were apparently at a rate of £10 to £15 per lorry, plus a Government tax of £10 on each lorry and £5 on each touring car.

142. It must be remembered that a great proportion of the inclusive charges for transport represent Government taxation. This is normally the road-tax known as Kishan, but there has been growing tendency to slip a further 10 per cent. Thus, one of the extra tariff charges complained of at (b) in paragraph 134 above was a sum of 22 piastres miri for permission to proceed to Mecca. It was not one of those stated by the Minister for Foreign Affairs in January to have been sanctioned after the drawing up of the tariff, but it proved afterwards to have been included in the fare. It is certain that the Hejazi Government were determined to get as much as possible out of pilgrims, and were greatly upset when, after they had set the rates, it was suggested that the cost of the pilgrimage would be so high that it might be a deterrent. Their propaganda against the Legation estimate was definitely misleading. That estimate may possibly have been open to criticism in detail, but it was certainly fair, having regard to the necessity for taking account of all items, including sea transport, officially sanctioned charges of all kinds, and, an element which can by no means be ignored, expenditure on voluntary objects which appeal to nearly all pilgrims, such as the purchase of pious souvenirs, charity, journeys to outlying shrines, sacrifices of animals, special prayers, &c. Not all of these objects are approved by Wahabism, but for the majority of pilgrims they are of great value to the success of the pilgrimage. It came to the knowledge of the Legation that Iqbal Ghaznavi, while defending in public a total estimate of 750 rupees, advised certain pilgrims in private to set out with the 1,100 rupees recommended by the Government of India.

143. Pilgrims who came insufficiently provided with funds naturally suffered hardships. Some who might have used conveyances, walked. Some cut out the journey to Medina. Pilgrims of the better class had to content themselves with inferior accommodation in the insanitary conditions which characterise that class of accommodation both in Jedda and Mecca. Those who could afford to get further remittances from India were put to considerable expenditure on telegrams, charges for Hundis and the like.

144. Although the matter has been considered above, with reference mainly to Indian pilgrims, those of other nationalities coming from countries where currency had moved with sterling were similarly affected. The Egyptian Government published a warning in January. See also paragraph 206 below as

regards Malayan pilgrims, and paragraph 239 as regards the great run on deposits made by Palestinian pilgrims.

145. Good has come out of all this evil. The Hejazi Government were undoubtedly much impressed by what had happened. It was understood that the question of pilgrimage tariff was one of those referred to the Dutch financial adviser (see paragraph 4) for examination. Anyhow, the Government have just issued a new tariff which covers a much wider range of items than any preceding tariff, and includes details of transport charges. All charges are shown in piastres *miri* payable at gold rate. The new tariff has not yet been fully studied, and cannot be further dealt with at present. It is expected that the British authorities concerned, not later than October, the text of the tariff and an estimate of the probable cost of next year's pilgrimage based on it. The situation has been so changed by these developments that it is necessary to prolong this already long section by describing in detail certain minor grievances which engaged attention during the 1932 season in connexion with the computation of fares to Medina, excess charges for the return journey in the case of pilgrims who do not return to the place of collection of Mecca mutawwifs' dues in advance from persons who wish to go to Medina only, as some do in the off season and even during the Haj period, or who go to Medina before proceeding to Mecca.

(10) Indian Pilgrimage

Statistics

146. The first Indian pilgrim ship to arrive in 1932 was the "Khouru," which reached Bombay on the 10th December 1931. It carried with it the "Akbar" and the "Alavi" on the 11th April.

147. The following table shows the number of pilgrims from each province of India and Ceylon, classified according to ports of embarkation.

BRITISH SUBJECTS				
Province.	Bombay.	Karachi.	Calcutta.	Total.
Bengal and Assam	987	3	305	1,295
Punjab	79	1,960	—	2,039
Bombay	1,780	7	—	1,787
United Provinces	605	227	—	832
Madras	300	5	—	305
Sind	5	740	—	745
Bihar and Orissa	242	2	3	247
Central Provinces	538	101	—	639
Punjab States	18	273	—	291
N.W.F. Province	103	285	—	388
Hyderabad (Deccan)	431	1	—	432
Delhi	112	113	—	225
Burma	48	3	13	64
Ceylon	24	—	—	24
Andaman Islands	4	—	—	4
	5,552	3,780	371	9,503 ⁽¹⁾

(1) This total differs from the figure given in Table (A), paragraph 36, above for two reasons:—

(i) Certain Indian pilgrims arrived in the Hejaz from embarkation ports other than those in India (see paragraph 131 below).

(ii) The table, as well as the table given in paragraph 149 below, has been compiled from pilgrims' lists, whereas those given in paragraph 36 above have been compiled from information supplied by the Director of Quarantine and do not include children under a certain age.

148. The above table shows that the total number of pilgrims from British India, the Native States and Ceylon was 9,503, as against 7,292 last year. The difference was mainly due to the increase in the number of pilgrims from the

Punjab, Bombay, Sind and the Central Provinces, of whom there were 2,039, 1,787, 795 and 639 respectively, as compared with 1,551, 1,072, 340 and 318 last year. All other provinces also showed an increase, except the United Provinces and Madras, which sent respectively 922 and 311, as compared with 1,083 and 392 last year. The increase in the total number of Indian pilgrims was unexpected, in view of general depression prevailing in India. It may be attributed to the publicity given by the Hejazi Government to the promise of a Friday Haj, to other forms of propaganda, and to the prospect which was held out of reduced costs of pilgrimage. The 1932 Haj was even more remarkable than that of 1931 for the large number of well-to-do and distinguished pilgrims, who came from different parts of India.

149. The following list shows the number of non Indian pilgrims who travelled to the Hejaz via Indian ports:—

Nationality.	Bombay.	Karachi.	Calcutta.	Total
Chinese (Turkestan)	91	985	—	1,076
Afghans	115	1,518	—	1,633
South Africans	1	—	—	1
Russians (Turkestan)	12	13	—	25
Persians	12	45	—	57
Hejaz-Nejd subjects	200	118	14	332
Malayans	22	—	—	22
Miscellaneous	13	2	—	15
	466	2,681	14	3,161 ⁽¹⁾

(1) See note (1) (i) to paragraph 147 above.

150. Pilgrims in the above category were more numerous by 1,038 than last year, when their number was 2,123. Afghans and Chinese from Turkestan were mainly responsible for the increase, numbering 1,633 and 1,076 respectively, as compared with 597 and 789 of last year. The number of Russians from Turkestan rose from seventeen last year to twenty five. Although the total number of pilgrims from South Africa, most of whom are Indians resident there, showed an increase, only one came via India, as compared with forty in 1931. No Russians from Bokhara came via India.

151. Besides the pilgrims shown in the above table, there was also a small number of Indian pilgrims who came to the Hejaz via Iraq, Egypt, &c. According to information obtained this year from the mutawwifs the number of Indians coming in this way from other than Indian ports was as follows:—

Port.	Total.
Suez	128
Port Sudan	23
Beirouth	49
Massawa	42
Aden	18
East Africa	70
Total	340

It is estimated that, in addition to the above, about 200 Indians came overland on foot via Nejd, Yemen, Iraq and Palestine. Almost all of them were indigent and had to be eventually repatriated at the expense of the Government of India.

152. Only one line, the Mogul (Messrs. Turner, Morrison and Co.), was engaged in the traffic from and to India this year. Some difficulty arose over a small number of persons, still in the Hejaz, who had come with return tickets of the Nemazee line last year. The local agents of Messrs. Turner, Morrison and Co. again showed unwillingness to carry them, but an arrangement similar to that recorded in paragraph 122 of last year's report was eventually made.

153. The following table shows the movement of return traffic with details of the number of ships available on given dates for the repatriation of pilgrims,

the number of pilgrims awaiting repatriation and the number actually repatriated.—

RETURN TRAFFIC TO INDIA

	Number of ships in Port.	Pilgrims awaiting embarkation.	Pilgrims despatched.	Pilgrims remaining
24.4.32	4	5,517	1,503	3,514
25.4.32	8	4,109	1,774	2,335
26.4.32	2	2,795	1,157	1,638
27.4.32	1	2,810	1,153	1,657
28.4.32	1	1,516	1,776	142
29.4.32	1	1	1	1
30.4.32	1	1	1	1
1.5.32	1	1	1	1
2.5.32	1	1	1	1
3.5.32	1	1	1	1
4.5.32	1	1	1	1
5.5.32	1	1	1	1
6.5.32	1	1	1	1
7.5.32	1	1	1	1
8.5.32	1	1	1	1
9.5.32	1	1	1	1
10.5.32	1	1	1	1
11.5.32	1	1	1	1
12.5.32	1	1	1	1
13.5.32	1	1	1	1
14.5.32	1	1	1	1
15.5.32	1	1	1	1
16.5.32	1	1	1	1
17.5.32	1	1	1	1
18.5.32	1	1	1	1
19.5.32	1	1	1	1
20.5.32	1	1	1	1
21.5.32	1	1	1	1
22.5.32	1	1	1	1
23.5.32	1	1	1	1
24.5.32	1	1	1	1
25.5.32	1	1	1	1
26.5.32	1	1	1	1
27.5.32	1	1	1	1
28.5.32	1	1	1	1
29.5.32	1	1	1	1
30.5.32	1	1	1	1
31.5.32	1	1	1	1
1.6.32	1	1	1	1
2.6.32	1	1	1	1
3.6.32	1	1	1	1
4.6.32	1	1	1	1
5.6.32	1	1	1	1
6.6.32	1	1	1	1
7.6.32	1	1	1	1
8.6.32	1	1	1	1
9.6.32	1	1	1	1
10.6.32	1	1	1	1
11.6.32	1	1	1	1
12.6.32	1	1	1	1
13.6.32	1	1	1	1
14.6.32	1	1	1	1
15.6.32	1	1	1	1
16.6.32	1	1	1	1
17.6.32	1	1	1	1
18.6.32	1	1	1	1
19.6.32	1	1	1	1
20.6.32	1	1	1	1
21.6.32	1	1	1	1
22.6.32	1	1	1	1
23.6.32	1	1	1	1
24.6.32	1	1	1	1
25.6.32	1	1	1	1
26.6.32	1	1	1	1
27.6.32	1	1	1	1
28.6.32	1	1	1	1
29.6.32	1	1	1	1
30.6.32	1	1	1	1
1.7.32	1	1	1	1
2.7.32	1	1	1	1
3.7.32	1	1	1	1
4.7.32	1	1	1	1
5.7.32	1	1	1	1
6.7.32	1	1	1	1
7.7.32	1	1	1	1
8.7.32	1	1	1	1
9.7.32	1	1	1	1
10.7.32	1	1	1	1
11.7.32	1	1	1	1
12.7.32	1	1	1	1
13.7.32	1	1	1	1
14.7.32	1	1	1	1
15.7.32	1	1	1	1
16.7.32	1	1	1	1
17.7.32	1	1	1	1
18.7.32	1	1	1	1
19.7.32	1	1	1	1
20.7.32	1	1	1	1
21.7.32	1	1	1	1
22.7.32	1	1	1	1
23.7.32	1	1	1	1
24.7.32	1	1	1	1
25.7.32	1	1	1	1
26.7.32	1	1	1	1
27.7.32	1	1	1	1
28.7.32	1	1	1	1
29.7.32	1	1	1	1
30.7.32	1	1	1	1
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Mecca or Medina in order, at least, to spare them the disagreeableness of waiting in Jeddah, but they informed the authors of the Abdul Latif-Kadri memorial on the 26th May that they were exploring the means of achieving the object. They have been in communication with Messrs. Turner, Morrison and Co regarding a new general suggestion that special steamers with extra cabin accommodation should be run.

163. A still more general suggestion, the adoption of which would affect the Haj Enquiry Committee's report, which dealt with the defective accommodation for pilgrims in Jeddah. It was decided in India that, in present conditions, expenditure could not be incurred by the Government on any kind of *Munafirkhane* and that it would be undesirable to issue an appeal for funds. The Standing Committee of the Indian Legislature, however, raised the question whether congestion in Jeddah might not be reduced by increasing steamer services and by inducing pilgrims to stay at Mecca or Medina until shipping was more convenient. It was pointed out that this suggestion, while it might be desirable in principle, was in fact, to be impracticable for many reasons. As the letter from the Government of India was received only in July, a detailed examination must be reserved for a separate report to them.

164. Ships' officers generally complied loyally with an order issued by Messrs. Turner, Morrison and Co on the 14th November, 1931, prohibiting them from letting their cabins to first and second-class passengers for whom ordinary passenger accommodation was not available. It, however, came to notice that at least one *restaurant* on board ship was letting privately second-class cabin accommodation placed at his disposal. On this case being reported, the master of the ship at once recovered the money charged and refunded it to the company, a measure which produced a salutary effect. The masters also dealt effectively with some few petty complaints against crews in connexion with space on the upper deck. More serious trouble continues to arise from the fact that members of ships' crews rope off parts of the space in the poop reserved for their use and let them out to pilgrims. It would be a great advantage if this practice also was prohibited.

165. Everything possible is still done to avoid breaches in the system whereby return passengers are booked in rotation (see paragraph 130 of the report for 1931). On one occasion this year the Indian vice-consul had to resist a demand for preferential treatment for no less than twenty-eight Royal guests, a term which is apt to be extended to persons of no particular distinction who have enjoyed the King's consideration.

166. Khan Bahadur Ihsanullah mentions another small matter which gives trouble to the ships' agents and to himself, namely, the competition for a cabin on the navigation deck. On one occasion this year three Nawabs struggled for this cabin, each seeking to engage influence. The agent, nonplussed, left it to the Khan Bahadur, and the Khan Bahadur had to play the rôle of Paris.

167. Difficulty again arose this year owing to the belief of pilgrims that they could draw off the quarantine dues in Iraq. The difficulty is explained in paragraph 132 of the report for 1931.

168. Khan Bahadur Ihsanullah found himself at loggerheads this year with the head of the firm representing the Mogul line, who was also Governor of Jeddah. On the 24th May 1932, a steamer of the Mogul line was delayed at Jeddah, and the delay was caused by the fact that the ship, which sometimes seemed arbitrary. On one occasion in March he wished to insist on the immediate landing of a shipload of pilgrims, who arrived late in the afternoon, despite the confusion and discomfort that would have arisen owing to the lack of lighting on the quay. The difficulty was overcome and the pilgrims did not land until next morning. A more serious matter arose at the end of April owing to the appointment of the agents to supply information regarding the date of arrival of the "Rizwani" until the morning of her arrival. A subsidiary difficulty arose out of this owing to the competing considerations that a large number of deck pilgrims were ready for shipment, while there was a fair number of better-class pilgrims, who had been waiting at Mecca and Medina and who could not be notified in good time of the opportunity to sail.

The merits of this particular case are varied, but it is clearly desirable that notice should be given to all concerned as early as possible of the approximate date on which ships intended to embark pilgrims for India may be expected to reach Jeddah. It is hard to believe that at least a week's notice cannot be given, and it is hoped that some arrangement with this object will be made with Messrs. Turner, Morrison and Co.

169. The authorities in India are considering an arrangement by which a fixed charge to cover landing and re-embarkation at Jeddah should be collected with the fare by the shipping company, who would then be responsible for transport from deck to quay-side and vice versa on the return. It is an important desideratum in this connexion that the dhows should not board ships, and that the company should provide a sufficient number of coolies to handle luggage on board ship.

170. An unfortunate accident occurred on board the steamship "Khoaru," which sailed from Jeddah on the 14th May. Mr Rashid Uddin Hussein, an Indian pilgrim and a Government pensioner, later appointed to a post in the State of Hyderabad, was working on the ship's deck. He struck against a dhow and fell into the sea. He was subsequently brought on board, but did not survive. The accident was due to the fact that the ship's crane was in use for loading pilgrims' luggage and the side rails of the ship had been removed. The shipping agents have undertaken that all necessary precautions will be taken in future.

171. A very serious matter has arisen in connexion with the fact that pilgrims, both Indians and non-Indians, not infrequently returned to Indian ports without any sort of identity paper, arrangements were made this year, in consultation with the Government of India, to provide with special emergency passes all those proceeding to India by sea and not already in possession of a passport. The Government of India have also agreed to the requirements of the Hejazi authorities, who have tightened up their regulations, and insist that all pilgrims must have proper papers. The new arrangement applies more particularly to destitutes, who, as will be seen below, often came to the Hejaz overland and have never had or have lost their papers.

Representations by Pilgrims, &c

172. The Government of India returned on the 26th May a considered reply to the memorial by Messrs. Abdul Latif and Kadri, which has already been mentioned in connexion with the question of improved arrangements for first and second-class pilgrims. The reply was generally sympathetic, but was adverse or non-committal on most points. As regards inoculation against cholera, the reply related to the fact that the Government of India had decided to adopt the Indian Merchant Shipping Act proposed in the Bill, which was laid before the Legislature early this year. The memorialists were informed of an arrangement made by the Government of India this year, in consultation with the Legation, that the Government of India should be asked to be represented by the Haj Committees in India or the Legation in Jeddah, as the case may be, on ships carrying pilgrims to and from the Hejaz.

173. The pilgrims brought from Calcutta in the steamship "Rizwani" this year drew up a joint memorial addressed through the Legation to the Government of India. The memorialists stated that they had lands for sale but forwarded the memorial to the proper authorities in India. They related to various matters connected with accommodation, the alleged lack of attention to the special requirements of pilgrims; inadequate water supply; defects of sanitation, insecurity from luggage, &c., stacked on hatches; exposure to sun, rain and coal dust; lack of adequate medical supplies, compounder or nurse; lack of arrangements for the custody of valuables; and promiscuity in the arrangements for the sexes, entailing much hardship on women.

174. It is not unfair to say that many of the complaints made by pilgrims regarding the arrangements on board ships are exaggerated or trivial as might be expected where people have a varied work to do and conditions which must at best be uncomfortable. There is nevertheless still room for improvement in certain directions, especially in matters affecting health. The Indian medical officer

draws attention to the effects of overcrowding, due not so much to the number of pilgrims as to the general conditions and the heat, pilgrims of nervous temperament lost their reason. One such person had to be sent back to India soon after landing. One woman threw herself overboard and died. Another woman, who was suffering in this way, was taken in charge by the compounder of the Indian ship and took the Haj safely. Dr. Abdul Jaleel remarks that the latrines for deck passengers are apt not to be sufficiently cleaned and disinfected. He considers that the provision of ships' doctors is satisfactory, but that the stocks of medicine are inadequate for the large hospitals and dispensaries.

It is noted that the proposed amendments to the Merchant Shipping Act will improve conditions in several important respects on lines of pilgrims. The principal proposals directly interesting the Legation at Jeddah in the Bill as drafted early in 1932 related to the following matters:—

- (a) A tightening up of the return ticket and deposit system, with the special provision for pilgrims wishing to return to India.
- (b) New arrangements regarding refunds on return tickets and deposits and their reversion to Government of India if unclaimed.
- (c) Reduction from twenty-five to fifteen days of the allowed period of grace during which pilgrims may be made to wait in Jeddah for shipment back to India.

Other matters of considerable, though less direct, interest to the Legation were the following:—

- (d) Prohibition of cooking by pilgrims on board ship and arrangements for the compulsory supply of cooked food by shipping companies.
- (e) Compulsory immunisation of pilgrims against small-pox and cholera.
- (f) Fixation of the minimum space to be provided for each pilgrim in the between-decks.

The Bill dealt also with a number of other points to which the Legation has only a general interest, such as the carrying of arms on board ships, the carrying of dangerous goods, and the carrying of passengers by deck chairs and boats.

At a meeting of the proposed amendments to the Merchant Shipping Act, Mr. Jaleel was particularly interested in the proposals relating to the Haj. He was particularly interested in the proposals in so far as they related to matters concerning the Legation in Jeddah, subject to certain observations on those at (a), (b) and (c) above. The most important of these observations bore on the constant desire of the Legation to see the deposit system substituted generally for the return ticket system and certain doubts as to the suitability to conditions in the Hejaz of the proposals regarding refunds. Mr. Hope Gill, having consulted the Indian vice-consul, and read Sir Andrew Ryan's views, laying special stress on the desirability of generalising the system, the Government of India has decided that the system should be made obligatory without further legislation later on. He also recalled attention to a recommendation of the Haj Enquiry Committee, which had not been acted upon, that all clauses in the Merchant Shipping Act relating to pilgrims should be incorporated in a chapter entirely distinct from those relative to native passenger ships.

Registration, Return Tickets and Deposit System

177. The registration system continues to work satisfactorily. Considering its voluntary nature, it is gratifying to note that, out of 9,303 Indian pilgrims arriving by sea in 1932, 9,084 registered at the Legation. The unregistered balance is accounted for by single-ticket holders, certain pilgrims in the last two meetings of the Haj Enquiry Committee, and pilgrims who try to elude the mutawwif's agent in the hope of escaping fees. The fact that 95 per cent. of the pilgrims do register is largely due to the fact that the Indian vice-consul visits personally all incoming ships and impresses on the pilgrims the advantage of the system.

178. Forty-two unclaimed or unused return halves of tickets dating from 1930, which, if they had not been deposited at the Legation, might have got into the hands of impostors or otherwise gone astray, were forwarded this year to

the Government of India. The precautions against any illicit traffic in return halves of tickets were strictly enforced. A few cases occurred in which pilgrims lost their embarkation cards on the way to their ships. This is attributed to the smallness of the cards, and it is hoped that the introduction of a new set of cards will remedy this. A pilgrim passing through the quarantine station was deluded into giving up his embarkation card to a rogue representing himself as an official.

179. Five persons who had not deposited their return tickets lost them during the pilgrimage. The shipping agents were warned and arrangements were made for the replacement of the lost tickets. A few cases occurred in which pilgrims lost their embarkation cards on the way to their ships. This is attributed to the smallness of the cards, and it is hoped that the introduction of a new set of cards will remedy this. A pilgrim passing through the quarantine station was deluded into giving up his embarkation card to a rogue representing himself as an official.

180. The Indian vice-consul draws attention in his report to certain difficulties which arise in connexion with the special pilgrimage arrangements made by the State of Hyderabad. These are being reported separately to the Government of India.

Local Haj Committee

181. Some apprehension was felt this year last, as a result of the controversy over the pilgrimage tariff, &c., mutawwif's agents might be debarred from free intercourse with the Legation staff, and it should be difficult to constitute the Haj Committee for the usual purpose of controlling the distribution of return bookings. These fears proved groundless. The committee was constituted as usual, and the mutawwif's agents were given credit for having promoted the reconstitution of the committee, which shoulders responsibility for dealing with a problem that would otherwise, as he had learnt from experience, impose a great strain on himself in his capacity as shipping agent. Nevertheless, the committee must be regarded as a precarious institution, as the Government might at any time refuse to countenance its operations.

Destitutes

182. It may be noted that owing to the large number of poor pilgrims attracted by the prospect of a Friday Haj and miscalculation of the cost of the pilgrimage in the extraordinary circumstances described in section (D), the Legation would have to deal with a very large number of destitutes at the end of the season. It was largely due to the wisdom of the authorities in India in drastically reducing the number of pilgrims allowed to travel on single tickets that the number of destitutes was not increased. The total number of destitutes at the time of writing (and it is believed that it will not be materially increased) has been 258 as compared with 316 in 1931 and 387 in 1930. The analyses of the total number by provinces of origin and routes of access to the Hejaz is as follows:—

(a) Province of Origin—	No.
Sind	78
Bengal	57
Punjab	47
Baluchistan	20
Malabar	20
United Provinces	9
N.W.F. Province	8
Assam	4
Delhi	3
Bombay	2
Kashmir State	1
Behar and Orissa	1
Ceylon	1
	258

(b) Route of Access—

By overland on foot—

Via Yemen	115
Via Nejd	75
Via Iraq &c	17

207

By sea—

Single-ticket holders or stowaways	51
Return ticket holders who obtained refunds or lost embarkation cards	17

68

275

183. The Jeddah agents of Messrs. Turner, Morrison and Co. quoted a rate of 50 rupees per head for destitutes. The authorities in India were able to get a reduced quotation of 40 rupees per head, the same rate as was charged last year. In the view of the Legation it is unduly high, in view of the fact that the company have a monopoly of the trade of carrying pilgrims from India and are not compelled to run any special service for destitutes, who help to fill up ships otherwise not likely to carry a full complement of pilgrims. A sum of 220 rupees was collected from certain persons who seemed able to contribute to their passage money. The actual amount expended on behalf of the Government of India was 10 45 rupees 7 a.

184. The large proportion of overland pilgrims in the above total demonstrates anew the importance of devising measures to check the movement of pilgrims without adequate means and not travelling direct by sea, a question which is still engaging the attention of the Government of India. It is also desirable that pilgrims travelling by direct sea in the off season should be required to take return tickets. Twenty-five pilgrims who arrived in the steamship "Alavi" after the end of the 1931 pilgrimage declared themselves destitute on arrival in Jeddah, and all but two or three, who came from Karachi between the 1931 and 1932 pilgrimages, had return tickets but no longer had them. The study and fall destitute, after having obtained a refund of the value of the return ticket money at the end of the first two years, and (b) Indians, who, often without the aid of the Legation, are repatriated as destitutes.

being Hejazis with addresses in Mecca. It was hoped that the number of persons who had at one time had return tickets but no longer had them, which refunds would be allowed should be extended to four years, and that they should not be granted until the expiration of the full term, unless the Indian vice-consul was satisfied that the applicant was unlikely to become destitute. It is doubtful whether the proposed amendments to the Indian Merchant Shipping Act will be equally efficacious. As regards persons under (b), it is suggested that

without careful verification when the applicant purports to be a Hejazi. It is not always possible to refuse repatriation at Government expense to persons of this class simply on the ground that they have declared themselves to be foreign subjects, as they are frequently the innocent victims of imposture. Normally, any genuine Hejazi embarking in India should be in possession of a Hejazi passport.

185. There are always apt to be some stowaways who get to the Hejaz without a passport and apply for repatriation as destitutes. It was startling to find this year, however, that the seemingly respectable and educated editor of a Hyderabad paper had resorted to this means of coming to the Hejaz. He unfortunately got ashore owing to the charity of his fellow passengers, who subscribed towards his passage.

186. Similar precautions steps to those described in paragraph 143 of last year's report were taken to furnish the authorities in India with nominal lists of repatriated destitutes and to take from the latter undertakings to repay the money expended on their return. The practice now followed of requiring such undertakings in all cases has increased the difficulty of getting the applicants to furnish true home addresses. In some cases persons who originally arrived by sea, and are in possession of pilgrim passes, pretend to have come overland. The

pilgrimage staff of the Legation cross-questions the applicants as closely as possible in suspicious cases, and the authorities in India were again asked this year to use care in checking off the returning destitutes.

Deceased Pilgrims' Estates

187. The Indian vice-consul is still dissatisfied with the Hejazi arrangements for dealing with the estates of deceased Indian pilgrims and the unwillingness of the Government to afford redress in cases of misappropriation. He notes the fact that the case of the woman pilgrim mentioned in paragraph 110 of last year's report is still outstanding in spite of several reminders. Correspondence has passed during the last year between the Legation and the Hejazi authorities, but no improved arrangements for dealing with the effects, especially the bulky effects, of deceased pilgrims.

Forged Indian Currency Notes

188. There was no trouble locally this year (see paragraph 27 on the general question).

Publicity

189. The pilgrimage guide issued by the Government of India is of great utility. Its usefulness would be much increased if it included more information about the Hejaz end, but it is suggested that any revision with this object should be delayed until it is possible to judge the effect of the various schemes which have been proposed. The subject will form the subject of a separate report to the Government of India in due course.

190. In any case no attempt should be made to include the pilgrimage tariff in the guide, as it is still liable to variation from year to year. It is suggested that the tariff and the Legation's estimate of the cost of the pilgrimage, when available, should be printed separately in the principal Indian languages for distribution to intending pilgrims, and that a supply of each issue should be sent to the Legation to enable it to meet requests for information in Jeddah.

191. It is desirable that precise information regarding the medical facilities provided for pilgrims by the Government of India should be included in the pilgrim guide issued in India, and that any other possible steps should be taken to bring the knowledge of the facilities to the attention of pilgrims. It has also been suggested that the position of the Indian doctor would be stronger and better known to pilgrims of education and influence if his appointment were gazetted. His Majesty's Minister endorses this suggestion, subject to its compatibility with Government practices in India and to the importance of defining the position of the doctor as that of an officer attached to His Majesty's Legation as head of the Indian Medical Section rather than as a member of a supposed "Indian vice-consulate." The use of the latter term by certain Indian departments tends to obscure the fact that the Government of India establishment in Jeddah, although it is not a consulate, is the Legation's medical department.

192. It is suggested that the Legation should be kept informed of the progress of the Ministry of Health in the Hejaz, and that the Legation should be kept informed of the progress of the Ministry of Health in the Hejaz, and that the Legation should be kept informed of the progress of the Ministry of Health in the Hejaz.

Banking Facilities

193. As a result of the unfortunate experiences described in paragraph 142 of last year's report, the use of *Aundi* greatly diminished in 1932. There has, however, been no increase in modern banking facilities, Jeddah being the only centre at which they exist on any important scale. There has of late been much talk of schemes for an Arabian National Bank. These are bound up with schemes for economic development, but they are not yet definite. The Legation in 1931 was concerned with a similar project in King Hussein's time, has again discussed the matter with the Hejazi authorities, and has associated with the name of the ex-Khadiwe. Nothing came of a suggestion made by Ibn Saud in

Indian Section of the Legation.

Pilgrimage Tariff and Cost of Pilgrimage

(11) *Afghan Pilgrimage*

197 In November 1931 the old arrangement was renewed whereby the
 Inland Legal & Taxation Dept. (160 of last
 year's report), but the charge is understood to weigh lightly

could come to Jeddah to receive the British Ambassador. As the ship was not greeted unassisted by its sacred character for diplomatic ceremonies. The audience took place on the 5th May.

200 Mention is made in paragraph 87 of the newly established Afghan medical mission. The Indian vice-consul, despite what is said in that paragraph testified to the "care and tenderness" shown by the Punjabi doctor and his Afghan compounder. He adds, however, that the general impression was that there was much propaganda about the white flag and that the invocation of blessings on the King of Afghanistan, Nadir Shah was so much a part of every treatment that it became the custom of Indian pilgrims to greet the doctor on all occasions with the cry "Tahit Baht Ghazi Bar Qidar". This phrase meaning "May the Throne and the Fortune of the Ghazi abide for ever," was one recited in chorus with the Afghan pilgrims by the members of the Afghan medical mission.

201 The following paragraphs are adapted from the book "The Making of the American Nation" by Howard Chandler Christy, Jr., which has been selected as the textbook of the State of New York.

202. The first pilgrim ship was the steamship "Polyphenus" which left Suez on the 7th November 1931 arriving at Mecca on the 11th. It carried 100 pilgrims. A second ship, the "Albatross", arrived on the 26th February, 1932. All were of the type built by the British Admiralty for the Royal Navy. The third ship, the "Albatross", arrived on the 14th May. As the pilgrims were no more than could be carried in one ship this liberal provision of shipping was not required.

203. The total number of pilgrims embarked at Malayan ports was 425 of whom 100 were from the Straits Settlements, 111 from the Federated Malay States, 111 from the Dutch East Indies, and 103 from other parts of the Malay Peninsula. The number of eighty Malayan pilgrims is shown by places of origin as follows:—

Straits Settlements—	
Singapore	17
Penang and Province Wellesley	3
Malacca	6
Labuan	0
Federal Malay States—	
Perak	13
Selangor	17
Negeri Sembilan	1
Pahang	5
Unfederated Malay States—	
Johore	8
Kedah	4
Perlis	0
Kelantan	3
Trengganu	0
Brunei	0

The tremendous decline in the number of Malaya pilgrims in spite of the prospect of a 10 per cent increase in the number of pilgrims is attributed to extremely depressed economic conditions in Malaya.

204. Haji Abdul Majid states that as a result of press criticism last year the Government has been obliged to increase the quantity of foodstuffs supplied to the ships, but he considers that there is still room for improvement. He says that the Government has not yet decided whether to increase the quantity of foodstuffs supplied to the ships, but he observes that unless the food is issued in accordance with the recommendations contained therein, the carry ingredients, &c., supplied to the ships can only go to waste.—

"(1) It should be noted that a Malay or a Javanese eats his rice with 'knah' and not 'ver' (either of which gives him the 'gravy' or 'knah' to help him to swallow the dry rice. Rice without 'knah' to a Malay, as now supplied to the prisoners is worse than useless food.

"(2) Curry or 'gulai,' as it is called in Malay, is prepared by cooking either mutton or beef (or even sea-weed) with curry powder (rempah), turmeric and coconut milk, etc.

"(3) The Malay or Javanese way of preparing 'sayor' is to boil it in coconut milk (santan). Any Malay cook knows how to prepare 'sayor' but the ships' cooks apparently are not inclined to get the 'santan' out of the

205. Since the date of the pilgrimage officer's report, the Government of the Straits Settlements have informed His Majesty's Minister, in a letter dated the 14th July, 1932, of their intention to ask the Singapore agents of the Blue Funnel to find a remedy for the defects criticised by Haji Abdul Majid.

Sheikhs' or Mulawifs' Charges.

206. Haji Abdul Majid, in his report, says that he has to say on this subject. He works out the Malay pilgrims' expenditure on the charges enumerated in paragraph 170 of last year's report at a little more in Hejazi currency than the amount for 1931. Reducing the amounts to Straits currency, he obtains the following approximate estimates —

Total charges in 1931, £28, plus 31½ riyals = roughly 270 dollars

207. Haji Abdul Majid, in his report, says that he has to say on this subject. He works out the Malay pilgrims' expenditure on the charges enumerated in paragraph 170 of last year's report at a little more in Hejazi currency than the amount for 1931. Reducing the amounts to Straits currency, he obtains the following approximate estimates —

General Conditions during the Pilgrimage Season

207. Apart from the comments summarised above on regulation, Hajj Abdul Majid mentions that the conditions in the Hejaz are generally good. He speaks of the peace and security, which have prevailed in the Hejaz since the beginning of the present régime as having been maintained, adding that "casual thefts like everywhere else of course occurred" (cf. paragraph 15 above). He considers that the Hejazi authorities took all possible measures "as before" to safeguard the pilgrims.

208. Haji Abdul Majid again draws attention to the hardships still imposed on pilgrims by the regulation mentioned in paragraph 175 of last year's report, that pilgrims remaining in the Hejaz for more than one season must find a guarantor for possible liabilities to local traders before being allowed to leave the country. A recent Hejazi regulation on passports published on the 1st July, 1932, reinforces rather than abates the restrictions.

209. Haji Abdul Majid intervened successfully in such matters as the delay in the issue of passports, and in the case of the Blue Funnel Line, was considerable delay, owing, he says, to the apparent inability of the Hejazi authorities to expedite matters of this kind, especially during the actual season.

Assistance to Pilgrims

210. It was necessary this year to ask the Government of the Straits Settlements to increase the grant for the purpose of repatriating destitutes to £200, of which £100 10s was actually expended. Many of the cases were those of pilgrims who had remained in the Hejaz for more than one season, and who, owing to the slump there, nor fall back, as in the past, on the generosity of their sheikhs, now themselves in straitened circumstances.

211. Although, as stated in paragraph 202, the Blue Funnel Line made a request that reduced fares should be quoted for poor persons,

Suggestions for the Prevention of Destitution

212. Haji Abdul Majid reverts to the suggestion made in 1930 by Dato Perdana Menteri of Kelantan (see paragraph 178 of the last report) that necessary payments to sheikhs should be covered in advance by a deposit in Malaya

213. Haji Abdul Majid suggests an alternative scheme, namely, that intending pilgrims should be required to satisfy the authorities in Malaya of

in Jedda, to an amount, per pilgrim, of not less than 450 dollars or £40. The Government of the Straits Settlements, having considered this on receipt of a copy of his report from the pilgrimage officer, have already notified His Majesty's

in possession of a minimum sum. They explain that intending pilgrims are that a form quoting the tariff of dues payable is widely circulated, and is brought to the notice of all pilgrims.

Conditions governing the Issue of Steamship Tickets and Refunds.

213. As a result of a further exchange of views between the official authorities and shipping interests concerned, a new set of "Guiding Rules," to replace those described in paragraph 180 of last year's report, were agreed to early this year between the Government of the Straits Settlements and the Blue Funnel Line. The following is a summary of the principal provisions of these new rules, the text of which was communicated to the Legation under cover of a despatch from the Governor of Singapore on the 5th April —

- (a) The conditions in which single tickets may be issued in Malaya are laid down closely and in a suitable restrictive sense.
 - (b) Return ticket holders wishing to remain in the Hejaz up to five years, may, on the recommendation of the proper British authority in Jedda, obtain an extension of the normal two years' validity of their tickets up to a total validity of five years, provided that they apply within six months of the expiration of the original validity.
 - (c) Holders of named return tickets may, in recommended cases, and provided that they are still in the Hejaz, obtain a refund of 33½ per cent., less charges, of the whole value of the ticket on the expiration of the original validity, or within six months of such expiration. A refund of 30 per cent. may be claimed, when the validity has been extended, at any time during the period of extended validity or within six months of its expiration.
- A refund of 30 per cent. may be made to the next of kin of the deceased holder of a valid ticket, whether during the period of original validity or of properly authorised extension of validity, if claimed within six months of death. A refund of 30 per cent. may be made in respect of such a ticket, if the claim be made more than six months after the death, but not more than two years after death, provided that death has occurred within five years of the date of issue. A similar refund may be made even though the validity has not been extended, provided the claim is made not more than five years after the date of issue.

214. The new rules regarding refunds apply to tickets issued in and after 1930. They go far to meet the desiderata expressed by the Legation in the course of the correspondence, and the liberal spirit shown by the Blue Funnel Line in accepting them is much appreciated.

Mortality

215. Only two of the eighty pilgrims who arrived during the season were reported to have died.

Deceased Pilgrims' Effects

216. The usual arrangements were in operation whereby the effects of pilgrims who had died during the previous season without accompanying relatives

were received at the Legation and handed over to the Malay pilgrimage officer. The bodies of deceased pilgrims accompanied by relatives were handed over to the latter by the Beyt-al-Mal.

Malay Pilgrimage Staff

217. Owing to the smallness of the pilgrimages, the pilgrimage officer, Haji Abdul Majid, did not arrive in Jedda until the 25th February, some two months later than usual, and he was able to leave in the second, and last, return pilgrimage ship on the 14th May. He was again assisted by Haji Mohammad Jamil, who served as clerk for the third season running and took up his duties on the 27th December, 1931.

(13) West African Pilgrimage

218. According to the figures obtained from the local quarantine authorities, 780 British West African pilgrims made the Haj in 1932, as compared with 1,558 last year. These figures comprise only pilgrims arriving at Jedda. No certain estimate can be made of the number of those arriving by dhow from Massawa, but it has been put conjecturally at something over 400.

219. Final agreement was reached in the autumn of 1931 among the various parties concerned regarding the proposed scheme for a better regulation of the pilgrimage from Nigeria (see paragraph 158 of last year's report). The scheme, in its final form, provides for the issue of a standard form of Nigerian pilgrim pass at Maidaguri and the payment of a deposit there to finance the pilgrims' expenses, including return ticket to Jedda, at Suakin with a margin of £1 for ultimate assistance at Jedda. The other rules laid down need not be reproduced in detail. They provide, *inter alia*, for the transmission to the Legation of copies of all future pilgrim passes issued to pilgrims included in the scheme, whether at Maidaguri or at Suakin, together with the return halves of their steamer tickets. This will enable the Legation to identify the pilgrims and to put them on their homeward way.

220. It is generally recognised that no measures to regulate this pilgrimage can be induced to fulfil more effectively than they have hitherto done. In 1924, a report was submitted to the Legation by the British Consul at Massawa, in which it was stated that the depressed condition of this traffic, owing principally to the fact that the depressed conditions in the Hejaz threw on the hands of the Legation many "undesirable" candidates for repatriation to Africa. The Sudan, depressed, at first declined to accept any but those who had arrived from that country, of whom there proved to be 108, but in March further batches totalling 223 were sent to Sudan with the consent of the Sudan Government. In the interval 581 had been shipped to Massawa. This mass repatriation of Tahrunis necessitated close investigation of individual cases, which was held in collaboration with the Italian Consulate at Jedda. It gave the following results as regards the ports by which the persons examined had reached the Hejaz at various times since 1924:

Port of arrival in Hejaz—	Number
Qahma (Asir)	749
Red Sea	40
Qahma	27
Idku	3
	789

221. The Italian authorities in Jedda and Eritrea were most helpful in facilitating the repatriation of the persons sent via Massawa at a very cheap rate. The fact remains that, so long as the pilgrims are sent as destitutes in the face of stress, the dhow traffic must have been on a great scale during the years

indicated. It is clear from a Khartoum despatch sent to Cairo on the 2nd August 1931, that the Sudan Government, in order to prevent the spread of the plague, had decided to enforce the promised restrictions in accordance with the International Sanitary Convention, but only, it would appear, in the case of avowed pilgrims. They contend that they cannot be held responsible, if persons purporting to have other objects in Arabia change their minds and go on pilgrimage. His Majesty's Minister has pointed out the absurdity of supposing that West Africans can proceed to such places as those named in the preceding paragraph with any object other than that of visiting Mecca, however much they may tarry on the way, as is their habit. He considers that all British West Africans seeking embarkation at Massawa for any port in the Hejaz or Asir must be presumed to be intending pilgrims.

222. The repatriations referred to above affected a great clearance, which was completed by the end of the year. It is probable that further cases will arise as the year wears on, but it is not anticipated that they will be numerous, unless there is a serious further deterioration in conditions in the Hejaz.

(14) Somali Pilgrimage

223. According to the Hejazi quarantine statistics, 115 "Somalis" arrived in Jedda by sea this year as compared with 506 last year, of whom 103 were shown as coming from British Somaliland. On this occasion the distribution by nationality has not been given. It is therefore impossible to give a separate figure for pilgrims arriving from British Somaliland in 1932. Captain Senger doubts whether the number can have exceeded forty.

224. In any case, those arriving direct from Somaliland form only one element in the total number of British Somalis who reach the Hejaz by devious routes of the kind described in paragraphs 190-193 of last year's report, who in very many cases have no sort of identity papers, and who, even before starting on these long Arabian treks may have left the Protectorate at a considerably earlier time. Correspondence is in progress between the Legation and the Government of British Somaliland on the whole subject. Up to the time of writing the conclusions which appear to emerge from it are—

- That pilgrims who leave Somaliland direct for the Hejaz are normally comparatively well-to-do people.
- That it is difficult to impose any sort of control on Somalis leaving Africa, as they easily can, by ports other than those in the Protectorate, or those who, having fetched up somehow or other on the Arabian coast, make their way to the Hejaz in any other way than by sea passage from Aden.

As regards (a), it is hoped that the Protectorate Government may adopt the uniform system of issuing pilgrim passes, which would require a deposit of 50 rupees from each Somali pilgrim taking out a pass and to forward monthly lists of such pilgrims to the Legation. This marks an advance, which would be a great help in the investigation of cases of persons who, after embarking at the Protectorate ports, could be traced to the Hejaz in any way as, e.g., in India and the Sudan.

225. The main difficulty which confronts the Legation in present conditions, however, is that of dealing with persons under head (b) when they come to its notice as destitutes seeking repatriation. In the absence of the above identity papers careful enquiry is necessary to determine whether they have any claim to be regarded as British. If so, they must be repatriated to the Protectorate, wherever they may have come from, except in cases where they have been repatriated to the Sudan.

226. The problem is of small dimensions, but it is increasingly troublesome. The Legation much appreciates the readiness of the Protectorate Government to accept the repatriation of persons who are destitute, but it is at present impossible, but of reducing it to proportions as manageable as may be.

227. At the end of the year 1932 there were twenty-two British Somali candidates for repatriation. The number was reduced by several deaths, and eventually came to eighteen, including some later applicants. Of these, twelve

were repatriated to British Somaliland and six to Aden. All were sent by steamer, as an experimental measure, instead of by dhow as formerly. The new method, although more expensive, is more satisfactory, as it is possible to keep track of the pilgrims until they reach their destination, and there is, therefore, a better prospect of recovering from them the cost of repatriation in due course. It is, however, more difficult to arrange owing to the paucity and irregularity of steamships' services. This year no less than four attempts had to be made to make use of prospective opportunities before the party was actually embarked. The three defeated attempts, spread over nineteen days, added materially to the total expenditure.

(15) Sudan Pilgrimage

228. The Hejazi quarantine figures show 527 Sudanese pilgrims this year as compared with 588 in 1931. All these arrived by Khedivial steamers from Suakin. Doubt is thrown on the value of the figures quoted by the very startling discrepancies between the statistics obtained in Jedda and those given in a recent report by the Sudan Medical Service for the years 1928 to 1931. To take only one example, that report shows 981 Sudanese pilgrims as having embarked at Suakin in 1931, whereas the Hejazi figure is 588.

229. The demands this year on the small fleet of the Khedivial Mail Line, which also carried pilgrims not only from Suez, but from Syria, Palestine and Iraq, were such that many pilgrims, unable to secure accommodation in outgoing ships, had to wait from six to eighteen days for the next following opportunity. Numerous appeals were made to the Legation to arrange for an increased supply of ships or to assist pilgrims whose funds had run out. The Legation could do nothing to increase shipping, but in cases of real need some pecuniary assistance was given out of the Sudan Repatriation Fund.

230. One of the delayed pilgrims was Sheikh Ismail al-Azhari, C.B.E., the Grand Mufti of the Sudan, a fine old gentleman of over 80. He fell ill with fever during his detention, and at one moment there were fears for his life, but he happily recovered.

231. Apart from certain pilgrims who had returned to their homes to be temporarily assisted, a large number of Sudanese, who had been temporarily resident in the Hejaz, were enabled to return to their homes owing to the prevailing depression. A fair number of these were destitute and had to be repatriated at the expense of the Sudan Repatriation Fund.

232. Following a correspondence with His Majesty's Legation at Jedda, it was agreed that, if possible, return tickets should be made compulsory at Suakin all the year round and that the terms of validity should be extended, the Sudan Government made an important communication to the Legation on the 14th January, 1932. It was to the effect that arrangements had been made with the Khedivial Company to issue only return tickets to pilgrims all the year round, subject to an understanding that the medical authorities in the Sudan should not subject to quarantine ships carrying back odd pilgrims after the end of the pilgrimage, and that single tickets might be issued to *bona fide* non-pilgrims. These arrangements are of great value, as the previous system, whereby return tickets were only compulsory during the period preceding the pilgrimage season, was a serious cause of loss to the Sudan Government. The Sudan Government have adopted an improved form of pilgrim pass in consultation with the Legation at Jedda.

(16) Zanzibari and East African Pilgrimage

234. According to the Hejazi quarantine authorities, 102 pilgrims from Zanzibar and East Africa reached Jedda this year as compared with thirty-three in 1931. Most of the pilgrims from Zanzibar and Kenya travelled with regular papers, either British passports or permits.

235. A pilgrim from Zanzibar, but of Hadhramaut origin, named Ahmed Rajab was killed by a lorry belonging to one of the Government-controlled companies, while walking along the road from Mecca to Jedda a few days after Pilgrimage Day. There is reason to believe that the car, which was driven by an Indian chauffeur, was seriously defective. The Indian was arrested, and the deceased had no property or heirs in Zanzibar, but was believed to have left a widow and minor children in the Hadhramaut. The correspondence is still proceeding.

236. A woman named Mai Rahma, who was in possession of a regular Nairobi passport, sought the assistance of the Legation just before the departure of the last ship for Mombasa on the ground that she had exhausted her funds. As there was no time to refer to the Government of Kenya, the Legation assumed the responsibility of advancing £5 gold to make up the sum required, the ship's agents having on their side undertaken to contribute a similar amount, if the Legation would do the rest.

(17) South African Pilgrimage

237. The Hejazi quarantine figures show 102 pilgrims from South Africa arrived in Jedda from South Africa in 1932 as compared with fifty one in 1931. The majority had South African passports. These pilgrims are normally people of substance and present no difficulty to the Legation.

(18) Palestine and Transjordan Pilgrimage

238. According to the Hejazi quarantine returns, no less than 1,352 pilgrims came this year from Palestine and Transjordan as compared with only 447 in 1931. The figure given for this year agrees pretty closely with the total number notified by the authorities in Jerusalem as having taken out permits, the High Commissioner having informed the Legation by letter of the 30th April, 1932, that 1,299 permits had been issued for pilgrims to the Holy Places, and twenty four to Transjordanians. The great majority travelled via Kantara and arrived in Jedda and Yambo by Khedivial steamer from Suez.

239. These pilgrims were evidently much affected by the increased cost of the pilgrimage in currencies based on sterling. The feature of the return season was a remarkable rush on the deposits of £4 required to be made in Palestine before the pilgrim starts. Within three weeks of Pilgrimage Day it was necessary for the Legation to advance the very abnormal sum of £2,141 to 536 pilgrims.

240. The Legation was also much affected by the increased cost of the pilgrimage in currencies based on sterling. The feature of the return season was a remarkable rush on the deposits of £4 required to be made in Palestine before the pilgrim starts. Within three weeks of Pilgrimage Day it was necessary for the Legation to advance the very abnormal sum of £2,141 to 536 pilgrims.

241. According to the information from the quarantine authorities, ninety-seven Adenese pilgrims reached Jedda by sea in 1932. There is no corresponding figure for last year. The figure is understood to comprise all pilgrims from the Protectorate, other than Hadhramis, embarking at Aden for Jedda. They were not, however, all pilgrims, but many persons from Aden and the Protectorate, including Somalis.

(19) Adenese Pilgrimage

settled at Aden, came overland, and, as usual, a number of these applied for help. Such persons commonly have no identity papers, and much labour is involved in the attempt to discriminate between persons entitled to British protection and others, e.g., Yemenis from Aden and the Protectorate, who have no claim. There would appear to be no practical means, however, of ensuring that such overland pilgrims from Aden and the hinterland as are in fact persons entitled to British protection should take out papers.

(20) Hadrami Pilgrimage

242. The Hejazi quarantine returns show 465 Hadrami pilgrims as having arrived at Jeddah by sea this year, as compared with 445 last year. Captain Seager is inclined to think the figure for 1931 somewhat exaggerated, but it cannot be disproved. These pilgrims embark mostly at Makalla in Jeddah-bound ships, but some make use of British or Dutch ships returning to India or the Far East (cf. paragraph 156).

243. The semi-settled Hadrami occupies a peculiar position in the life of the Hejaz, where he is apt to remain for a period of years, say, two to six, and engages in many avocations, mostly of a commercial nature. It is a feature of the period following each pilgrimage that, apart from pilgrims coming and going during the season, many of these return to the Hadramaut. The prevailing depression tends to accentuate this movement. In many cases it is necessary to provide them with emergency travel documents. There were this year over 400 applications for such documents, and it is estimated that some 450 other persons, already in possession of documents issued at Makalla, may have also gone back.

(21) Muscati Pilgrimage

244. The Hejazi quarantine returns show that 50 Muscati pilgrims as having arrived at Jeddah by sea in 1932, as compared with fifty in 1931. It is a small number, but the Muscati pilgrims are not numerous. In most years a small number of Muscatis appeal to the Legation for assistance, but in 1932 there were no requests for relief or repatriation.

(22) Bahreini Pilgrimage

245. A Bahreini pilgrim returned with 100 pilgrims from Bahrein this year. There is no corresponding figure for last year. Other pilgrims from Bahrein doubtless come overland. There were no applications to the Legation for relief or repatriation.

(23) Koweiti Pilgrimage

246. Although this is in the main a direct overland pilgrimage, reports from the Political Agent at Kuwait make it possible to give some account of it. The main camel caravan left Kuwait on the 18th February, and consisted of some 1,000 persons, headed by a number of the sheikhs, who, after the pilgrimage, gave great umbrage by leaving the pilgrims and returning very early to Kuwait. The caravan arrived at Jeddah on the 25th May. One event recorded in connexion with it is that Ibn Saud, in a letter addressed to the Sheikh of Kuwait on the 20th February, accused Nejd and others in the caravan of extensive smuggling. There does not appear to have been any solid foundation for this charge. In any case, by the time it reached the sheikhs the pilgrims were well on their way to the Hejaz, and the sheikh was able to sidetrack the complaint in a polite reply.

247. Certain richer pilgrims from Kuwait made the Haj by car, notably one party who included a lady and who accomplished the whole journey there and back without a hitch in three Ford cars. The Sheikh of Kuwait himself organised this experiment, which is interesting as a proof of the possibilities of motor transport for long-distance overland pilgrimages. Another striking example of its successful use, is that of a lad of 15, who is creditably reported to

have motored a mixed party of pilgrims back from Mecca to Dabai last year in a Chevrolet lorry. Apparently he took a very circuitous route, but he got to Dabai all right in sixty-two days.

(24) Sarawak Pilgrimage

248. Sarawak, alone among British dependencies, maintains a pilgrimage organisation independent of the Legation, run by Messrs. Gelatly, Hankey and Co. This pilgrimage, otherwise hardly distinguishable from that from Malaya, still, therefore, deserves its little separate niche. This year there were three pilgrims. They came and went in perfectly good order.

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No. 69

Mr. Hope Gill to Sir John Simon.—(Received October 4)

(No. 384)

Sir,

Jedda, September 8, 1932

1. I HAVE the honour to report that Hajji Abdullah Ah Riza, the octogenarian Governor of Jedda, died at Taif on the 24th August after an illness of about two months.

2. His death caused some emotion in Hejazi circles, for he was a well known and popular figure, and had enjoyed, at various times, considerable influence in the Hejaz. He had been a close friend of the late Governor of the Hejaz, King Hussein's regent, and was confirmed in the post by Ibn Saud, when the latter entered Jedda at the end of 1925.

3. Of Persian origin, he came to the Hejaz as a young man and with his brothers built up an important trade with India and the Persian Gulf. He died a wealthy, wise and witty old man, hard of hearing but very bright of eye, a personality head and shoulders above the sorry, stunted humanity of the Hejaz. His relations with successive British representatives were uniformly good.

4. The late Governor was the last holder of the old Turkish title of *Kaimmakam*. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs, in a letter of the 10th August to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs that a Royal decree had been issued for the title of Governor of Jedda to be changed to that of Amir, thus bringing Jedda into line with all the other towns of importance in the kingdom. Hajji Abdullah's successor, Nejd, was a young man of good Nejd stock, his grandfather being, I believe, Governor of Riyadh in the days of the Rashidi rule.

5. The change in title has no great significance. The change in the person of Governor, however, may well prove to have a far-reaching effect. The appointment of a Nejd to the post is a step towards the centralisation of power. Nejd, of Nejd origin, had succeeded in identifying himself with the Hejaz and its interests has caused misgiving in Jedda. For one thing, it accentuates the Nejd domination of the Hejaz. For another, the new Amir, though well spoken of in certain circles, is an official pure and simple, and it is to be expected that he will be much more amenable to the influence of Mecca and Riyadh than was Hajji Abdullah, who was known frequently to have opposed the central authority in the interests of Jedda. He had been a close friend of Ibn Saud himself.

6. The new Amir is nevertheless welcomed by the European shipping agencies in Jedda, for he has no personal interest in shipping and is unlikely therefore to use his official position to further private interests as a shipping agent, to the detriment of rival firms, as was the frequent practice of the late and sagacious Hajji Abdullah.

7. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Senior Naval Officer in Red Sea sloops and the Acting Commissioner at Port Sudan.

I have, &c

C G HOPE GILL.

(No. 387)

15.

Jeddo, September 8, 1932

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the Jeddah report for July and August. The bulk of the report was drafted by His Majesty's Minister before he embarked in H.M.S. "Penzance" on the 2nd September.

2. The above-mentioned authors point to the fact that the Great Danube is
 a very important waterway for the Danube basin. It is a very important
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 It is a very important waterway for the Danube basin. It is a very important
 waterway for the Danube basin. It is a very important waterway for the Danube basin.

C. G. HOPE GULL.

Enclosure in No. 70

Jedda Report for July and August 1952

INDEX	
Chapter I— <i>Internal Affairs.</i>	
The Bond	220
Ministry for Foreign Affairs	220
Finance	221 223
War	221
Justice	221
General internal situation	221
Death of Khaimbakh of Jeddah	221
Printer Questions	221 223
Taxes	223
Rural and Urban	223
Agriculture	227
General Hajj and Mecca	228
Great Britain—	
General	228
Haramayn Waqf	228
Lands	228
" "	228 229
Chapter III— <i>Foreign Relations (cont.).</i>	
Russia	228
Turkey	228
Egypt	228
" "	228 229
Chapter V— <i>Military Matters.</i>	
General	228
Chapter VII— <i>Pilgrimage.</i>	
Pilgrimage report	228
1905 (A. H. 1321) pilgrimage	228
Chapter VIII— <i>Slavery.</i>	
Manumissions	228
Chapter IX— <i>Miscellaneous.</i>	

$$\{1, 4, 9, 16, 25, 36, 49, 64, 81, 100\}$$
Chapter I—*Internal Affairs.*

John Sand

220 The King remained at Taif except for short outings in the neighbourhood, from the 1st July to the 20th August, when he left for Jeddah in order, it was explained, to take leave of the foreign representatives before proceeding to Riyadh. In the ordinary course he would have gone to Nejd much earlier, but he was prevented from doing so by the Ibn Rifada affair and the general situation which required the British and American representatives to hold successive formal audiences in the forenoon. Later in the day he again received His Majesty's Minister, who presented Commander Farquhar of H.M.S. "Penzance" and then discussed the general situation with His Majesty, but on

Ministry for Foreign Affairs

230. Sheikh Yusuf Yasin continued to act as Minister until the 3rd August, when he and Fuaid Bey Hamza, who had arrived at Taif from Koweit via Riyadh on the 24th July, announced that the one had handed over and the other taken on the business of foreign affairs. When the Amir Faisal, who had stayed behind at Riyadh, got back on the 7th August, no further move was made. The position appears to be that the Amir has slid back into his post as Minister for Foreign Affairs, but that Fuaid Bey is more than ever the practical head of the Ministry.

this but its nature is obscure. It may be merely the game of Fuad who affects in any case the title of "Deputy Minister," or there may be some truth in the opinion made in some quarters that the Amir is dissatisfied with the confidence reposed by the King in Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman and is unwilling to tolerate that gentleman's retention. If so, the Prince has had no uncertain answer from his father, as will be seen below.

France

231. There have been no public developments in the financial situation. It is a common belief that the Government is suffering from the effects of the depletion of the Treasury or of poverty among the public generally, and none at all of financial stringency interfering with measures to suppress the Ibn Rifada revolt, to subduing the Akhwah, &c. The Government as such is doubtless as poor as ever. Unpaid officials, merchants, &c., are probably too sunken in depression to make much noise. The apparent abundance of money for military and quasi military purposes leads support to the idea that the King has long been saving up for a rainy day.

232. The Dutch financial adviser, M. van Leeuwen, left for three months on the 20th July, for reasons of health. These were genuine and he showed no signs of not intending to return, nor any sign whatsoever of intending to stay on in the Hejaz once his contract expires next year. Little is known as to what he has done or been allowed to attempt.

233. On the 22nd August it was announced that, by Iradei Sonié (the old Turkish expression for an Imperial decree, seldom heard under the Sa'udian regime, though apparently not unprecedented), the Wakalat of Finance had been raised to the status of a Wazarat or full Ministry, with Sheikh Abdullah Sulaiman as Minister and his brother Hamad as Wakil, i.e., Under-Secretary unless Fuad Bey Hamza's version, "Deputy Minister," be preferred. Previously there had been only two Ministers called Wazarat, or possibly three including that of Military Affairs, but all were combined with the presidency of the council in the person of the Amir Faisal.

Economic Affairs

[illegible]

its clearing house for the pilgrims of all nations. Mr. Gluck seems to think that Islam needs pep.

W. News

235. It was announced on the 15th July that the new wireless stations had been completed at Mecca (6 kilowatt), Qatif, Jubail, Hassa (Hufuf), and Qair and that they were available for ordinary telegraphic correspondence. The wireless station at Qaf was completed late in August. The charges for internal wireless telegrams was reduced about the same time from 3 piastres miri to 2 piastres miri, and for external telegrams from 5 piastres miri to 4 piastres miri. The cost of a piastre miri per word.

Legislation.

236. A new law on passports was published on the 1st July. It does nothing to mitigate the hardship imposed on departing travellers, other than single season tickets, by the requirement that they should be accompanied by a local official. A law on coastal fisheries, &c., is in course of publication by instalments. Regulations governing postal packets were published on the 22nd July.

A law on coastal fisheries, &c., is in course of publication by instalments. Regulations governing postal packets were published on the 22nd July.

General

237. This measure, the announcement concerning which was mentioned in the report for May and June (paragraph 174), was completed during the month of July. Two questions arose in connexion with it, viz.:

- Whether it could be claimed that forms to be filled up by the Legation staff should be officially furnished to the Legation by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and
- Whether, in the possible event of the measure being a prelude to the eviction from the Hejaz of certain categories of foreigners, His Majesty's Government could claim right of residence for British subjects and British protected persons.

His Majesty's Minister telegraphed to the Foreign Office on the 5th July requesting a reply to these questions. On the 10th July, before the Foreign Office's reply had been received, the town crier announced to the inhabitants of Jeddah that anyone who failed to return his census form by the 16th July would be imprisoned. Sir Andrew Ryan thereupon wrote a personal letter to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs enquiring whether it was intended that the staff of the Legation were to be included in the measure, and stating that, if so, he would be willing to see that the staff completed the forms, provided that the latter were officially sent to him for distribution.

238. On the 16th July a reply was received from the Foreign Office confirming the Minister's presumption at (a), and stating that there would be no ground for official protest against the deportation of individual British subjects. It indicated, however, that semi-official representations could be made in certain cases and that objection could be taken to any wholesale expulsion of persons by classes. On the 19th July the Ministry for Foreign Affairs' reply was received stating that the census forms were duly received, completed and returned. It was thought when the census was announced that it would lead to a rush of applications for passports by British subjects and British protected persons, and a circular was accordingly circulated to the British authorities most closely concerned giving a short résumé of the situation, so that they would be in a position to deal expeditiously with any applications for passports that might be received from them by the Legation. In the event, however, the anticipated rush did not materialise. The result of the census has not yet been published.

General Internal Situation

239. The Ibn Rifada affair, which was dealt with in the last report under the heading "Transjordan," became in July and August the dominant feature of the internal situation, and can best be dealt with here in conjunction with two

connected matters, viz., the Akhwan movement and the repercussions in the Hejaz of the Ad Dabbagh plot.

240. The Ibn Rifada adventure itself came to an inglorious end on the 30th July, except for the carnage in detail which followed. There is still much obscurity as to the movements and number of the rebels. It is probable that the whole of Ibn Rifada's forces, including tribal elements who joined him in the Hejaz, never exceeded 1,000 men, inadequately armed and mounted and suffering from shortage of food, owing to the measures taken by the authorities in Transjordan, Palestine and Egypt to prevent supplies from reaching them by land or sea. The rebels had tarried long at or near Haql, but in July they moved south-eastward from the southern end of the Gulf of Aqaba. There was some prospect of their attacking Muweyia or even Dhaba, where Ibn Saud had garrisons, and they were reported at one moment to be threatening the road between the two.

241. The principal forces intended to be used were the Akhwan levies which had been summoned to assemble at Al Ula. It is not known how many gathered there. Estimates varied from 1,500 to 10,000, a Hejazi figure and probably much exaggerated. Whatever the number at Al Ula, it was sufficient to enable an important contingent under Ibn Aqil to be moved to Dhaba, whence the Akhwan, working in with other Government forces, including camelry under

body of the latter, apparently some 400 men, at Jebel Shar, a position inland from the road between Dhaba and Muweyia. The battle, or battles, took place on the 30th July. According to the official reports, 370 rebels were killed on the field, a remnant, including twenty men of the Beni Atiya, escaped, and the losses on the Government side were only nine. Ibn Saud gave orders that in the subsequent round up all persons who had joined the rebels should be killed. Reports published subsequently rewarded the slaughter of various parties of rebels in the area between Muweyia, Haql and Alagan, a place some distance inland from Haql.

242. News from Transjordan in the course of August indicated a possibility of a rally of rebel fragments, Imran tribesmen and Beni Atiya, notably those left over from the party which entered the Hejaz on the night of the 26th June (see paragraph 174). Much less is known, however, as to what had happened up to the end of August between Alagan and the Hejaz Railway. The position at the end of the month appeared to be that the majority of Ibn Aqil's Akhwan had been sent back to Dhaba, but that there might be a further movement of Government forces from Tebuk to clean up any disaffected area east of Alagan. The Beni Atiya party under Ibn Farhan mentioned above seems to have done some successful raiding and to have recrossed the frontier with loaded camels, but to have doubled back again into Hejaz Nejd and to have left some of the loot at Alagan before dispersing.

243. During the period following the defeat of Ibn Rifada a fair number of stragglers made good their escape into Transjordan. According to a telegram from Transjordan, dated the 31st August, there were, including women, 103 at Aqaba and forty-seven at Maan.

244. It has been said that the Akhwan were the principal element in the forces called up to cope with the rebellion. At first mention was made only of a concentration at Al Ula, to consist of some 5,000 or 6,000 from the nearer parts of Nejd. It is not certain how many actually assembled. It looked in July as if there might have been some lack of response to the call to arms. This in its turn

led to Government publications after the Battle of Jebel Shar and miscellaneous sources of information, there was, in fact, no serious manifestation of disloyalty. On the contrary, the Akhwan spirit was roused all over the country to an extent embarrassing to the King. Large numbers of them came at his summons to Taif partly to receive their regular gifts of money, &c., partly no doubt to be ready in case of emergency elsewhere, more especially in Asir. Sheikh Yusuf Yasin put less than 4,000 early in August, largely Ateyba, whose presence was a far from effective retaliation of previous rumours of disaffection in the region round Taif.

255 The authorities in the Persian Gulf have adduced strong reasons for denouncing the old agreement that transit dues should not be charged on goods for Nejd unloaded over the ship's side into dhows. The question is still under consideration.

256 Ibn Saud sent special messages of sympathy to His Majesty's Government and Lady Biscoe on the occasion of the death of Sir Hugh Biscoe on the 19th July.

Asir and Yemen.

257 There have been no developments in this direction, apart from the activities of the parties to the Ad Dabbagh conspiracy, which do not appear to have produced any actual effect of importance in Asir, but contributed to the perturbation of Ibn Saud over the general situation described earlier.

Chapter III—Foreign Relations

General

Hejazi Mission

258 The Amir Feisal's mission did not get on to Persia as quickly as was thought when paragraph 194 of the last report was written. They apparently left Jeddah on the 28th June, and embarked in a special steamer for Resht. They reached Tebran on the 1st July and left for Khamquin on the 5th July arriving there on the 7th July. They travelled by special train to Bagdad and got there next day. They left Bagdad on the 11th July and arrived at Khamquin on the 11th July. The mission was composed of the Amir Feisal, his son Prince Faysal, and a number of other officials. They were accompanied by a large number of British officials, including Sir A. Ryan, who was the British representative. The mission was the first of its kind since the establishment of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It was a significant event in the history of the region, as it marked the first time that the Amir Feisal had visited Persia. The mission was well received by the Persian authorities, and it was hoped that it would lead to improved relations between the two countries.

Great Britain

General

259 The general relations between His Majesty's Government and Hejaz-Nedj remained very friendly during July and August. They were completely dominated by the Ibn Rifada affair, which was the subject of further correspondence and of innumerable conversations between Sir A. Ryan and first Sir A. Ryan and then Sir A. Ryan. The mission was the first of its kind since the establishment of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It was a significant event in the history of the region, as it marked the first time that the Amir Feisal had visited Persia. The mission was well received by the Persian authorities, and it was hoped that it would lead to improved relations between the two countries.

Haramayn Waqfs.

260 Some further correspondence has passed on this subject, but there has been no important development.

Claims

261 No progress has been made towards a settlement of the money questions outstanding between His Majesty's Government and Ibn Saud. Sir A. Ryan took an opportunity of bringing them all up to date in conversation with Sheikh Yusuf Yasin at the end of July, but he got no money paid. There was a meeting in August of a direct committee between Sir A. Ryan and the Amir Feisal. The committee was composed of Sir A. Ryan, the Amir Feisal, and a number of other officials. They discussed the money questions and the general situation. The committee was well received by the Amir Feisal, and it was hoped that it would lead to improved relations between the two countries.

Persia

262 Mme. Maigret, the aged mother of the French Chargé d'Affaires, died in Jeddah on the night of the 8th August, and was temporarily interred in the other-than-Moslem cemetery.

263 M. Maigret, accompanied by a Syrian Christian member of his staff, went to Taif on the 13th August for a twenty-four hours change. This visit, which was the first of its kind since the death of the Amir Feisal, was well received by the Saudi authorities. M. Maigret was accompanied by a Syrian Christian member of his staff, and they were well received by the Saudi authorities. M. Maigret was accompanied by a Syrian Christian member of his staff, and they were well received by the Saudi authorities.

Italy

264 The Italo-Hejaz Nejd Treaty of Friendship and Commercial Treaty of the 10th February last (see paragraph 59), which were ratified at Rome on the 22nd April, were given the force of law in Italy as from the 3rd June, the law being published on the 4th August. For evidence of Hejazi interest in Sidky Pasha's conversations in Rome see paragraph 267.

Soviet Russia.

265 The Soviet Minister held aloof from Sir A. Ryan throughout July and August, possibly from some obscure political motive, as their relations have always been strained. M. Tamm was in Jeddah on the 1st August, and he was well received by the Saudi authorities. M. Tamm was accompanied by a Soviet official, and they were well received by the Saudi authorities. M. Tamm was accompanied by a Soviet official, and they were well received by the Saudi authorities.

Turkey

266 The Turkish Chargé d'Affaires, Lutfullah Bey, returned from leave on the 1st August. He was well received by the Saudi authorities. Lutfullah Bey was accompanied by a Turkish official, and they were well received by the Saudi authorities. Lutfullah Bey was accompanied by a Turkish official, and they were well received by the Saudi authorities.

Egypt.

267 On the 31st August Fuad Bey wrote privately and confidentially to Sir A. Ryan to draw his attention to a report in the Cairo "Akram" to the effect that recent events in the Hejaz had been discussed on the occasion of Sidky Pasha's visit to Rome. He asked him to seek His Majesty's Government's views on the matter. Sir Andrew rode him off by suggesting, in a final conversation before his departure on leave, that whereas Egypt had a natural interest in Hejazi affairs, she had not, as at present governed, any such interest as would lead her into an Arabian adventure. He added the view that, as regards Italy, she was nowadays keenly interested in all foreign affairs but was not interested in the Hejaz in any such way as need cause anxiety. Fuad Bey left it at that but betrayed continued suspicion of the Egyptian representative at Jeddah (see paragraph 268).

Iraq

268 The visit of the Amir Feisal's mission to Bagdad early in July produced an amelioration of the relations between Iraq and the Hejaz-Nedj. The question of the location of the Iraqi Legation was discussed, and an agreement reached whereby it is to be at Jeddah, but the Iraqi representative will have access to Mecca and will be allowed to have an unofficial residence there. Shortly afterwards the Iraqi Government decided to replace Dr. Naji al Asil by a new Chargé d'Affaires, Colonel Rashid Bey, Iraqi consul-general at Beirut. Their Legation at Jeddah is temporarily in charge of Abdel Kadir Bey al Gaylani, a vice-consul from Cairo, who arrived on the 25th August, and calls himself Chargé d'Affaires. Dr. Naji's first secretary, who also has Hashimite associations, has been transferred.

269. It is now the fashion in high Hejazi circles to acclaim King Feisal as a great hero, a great leader, a great man, and a great friend of the Arabs, with ex King Ali, who is mistrusted, and the Amir Abdullah, who is much more mistrusted and detested as well.

Chapter IV.—Air Matters

Hejazi Air Force.

270. As a result of the study given in London to the renewed suggestion that the Hejazi Government should have an air force, the Hejazi Government did so in conversation with Fuad Bey Hamza on the 11th August, handing over to him a memorandum dealing with personnel, language, and other matters. Indications were sought as to whether the Hejazis wanted to build up a fighting air force capable of ultimate expansion, or whether they were only interested in communication purposes, using a simple type of aircraft. This memorandum Fuad Bey took away to study at leisure.

Aerial Trespass.

271. See paragraph 250 (Transjordan frontier)

Chapter V.—Military Matters

General

272. See paragraphs 230 to 247 (internal situation)

Chapter VI.—Naval Matters

British

273. H.M.S. "Hastings" (Captain C. S. Sandford, R.N.) left northern waters for the Mediterranean on the 1st August. A.R. Farquhar, R.N., remained in northern waters for some time after the actual defeat of Ibn Rifada, in case of further developments, which failed, however, to materialise, then proceeded via Koweik to Jeddah, arriving on the 30th August.

Foreign

274. Nil

Chapter VII.—Pilgrimage

Indian.

275. As a normal aftermath of pilgrimage 258 Indian destitutes were repatriated on the 28th July at a cost to the Government of India of £775. They were, however, fewer in number than last year, and formed a lower percentage of the total Indian pilgrimage.

Pilgrimage Report

276. His Majesty's Minister's comprehensive survey of the 1932 (A.H. 1350) pilgrimage was completed for despatch on the 1st September.

1933 (A.H. 1351) Pilgrimage

277. As a result of last season's unpleasant experiences (see paragraphs 91 to 94) the Hejazi Government have apparently taken their lessons to heart, at least in theory, and have promulgated an early and much improved pilgrimage tariff for next season, including transport charges. This was communicated to the Legation on the 9th August, it is being attentively studied and will be circulated in due course to the interested Governments of the Empire.

Chapter VIII.—Slavery

Manumissions

278. Two female slaves were in hand at the beginning of July. Two others (male) took refuge in the Legation during July and August. The two women were manumitted during this period and were repatriated to Africa. There was no Hejazi opposition.

Chapter IX.—Miscellaneous

Staff

279. Mr. Hope Gill returned from leave of absence on the 31st August. Mr. Seager went on leave on the 3rd August. Mr. Hamilton-Bell joined the staff as archivist on the 3rd August, in place of the late Mr. Jones. Dr. Abdul Hamid went on leave on the 28th July. Hajji Mohammed Sherif left for India on termination of contract as clerk on the 28th July. Syed Ghulam Reza arrived on the 16th August to take up his appointment as second Indian clerk.

B 5076 1241 25]

No. 71

Secretary of State for the Colonies to the High Commissioner for Transjordan—
(Received in Foreign Office, October 2.)

(No. 127)

(Telegram)

MY telegram No. 118 of 17th September. Future relations with Amir Abdulla.

His Majesty's Government have now considered position and, subject to your views, have reached following conclusions—

- (1) Request of Ibn Saud for removal of Abdulla cannot be entertained.
- (2) As a first and independent step attempt should be made to bring about mutual recognition between Ibn Saud and Amir. This would be a definite step forward. It could also probably be achieved quickly, whereas a treaty settlement might require prolonged negotiation.
- (3) This would be followed by bilateral treaty settlement, His Majesty's Government taking guarantees from Abdulla and informing Ibn Saud accordingly, but not giving latter any direct guarantee themselves. If Ibn Saud will give the same guarantee from His Majesty's Government, and in that case position will have to be considered further.
- (4) In the opinion of His Majesty's Government, the best method of bringing about mutual recognition will be by letters to be addressed to His Majesty's Government, in the case of Amir, through High Commissioner and, in the case of Ibn Saud, through His Majesty's Minister at Jeddah. It is suggested that the letters of the two rulers should write first to the other. It is thought that a suitable formula for recognition of Amir by Ibn Saud would be "Recognises His Highness the Amir Abdulla as Ruler of the State of Transjordan." This phrase would accord with terms of Transjordan Agreement, 1923, and would provide for recognition by Ibn Saud of Amir's status.

My immediately following telegram contains text of reply which it is proposed to send to Ibn Saud's memorandum of the 6th August. Please inform me as soon as possible whether you concur. Ibn Saud proposes to meet Akhwan Nejd in middle of October to explain present position of questions at issue with Transjordan. It is therefore most important that official reply should be communicated to him as early in October as possible.

With reference to immediately following telegram, I would explain that Saudi Arabia is new comprehensive title recently adopted by Ibn Saud to describe the territories over which he rules.

Repeated to Jeddah, No. 124.)

E 5076 1241 25]

No 72

Secretary of State for the Colonies to the High Commissioner for Transjordan.—
(Received in Foreign Office, October 2.)

(No. 124)

(Telegraphic)

Colonial Office, September 30, 1932

FOLLOWING is text referred to in my immediately preceding telegram—

"His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, who have consistently pursued the policy of promoting good relations between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, towards which they entertain sentiments of

special position, have given the most careful consideration to the proposals for bringing about an improvement in the present unhappy relations between the two countries, which were put forward in the memorandum of the 9th August from His Majesty King Abdul Aziz.

His Majesty's Government desire to make it clear at the outset that they are unable to contemplate any change in the present situation as regards the person of the ruler of Transjordan.

They consider that many of the difficulties which have arisen in the past are due to the fact that the rulers of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and of Transjordan have not hitherto recognised each other's status. His Majesty's Government are now happy to state that the Amir Abdullah is prepared to recognise the position of His Majesty King Abdul Aziz as King of Saudi Arabia, subject to similar recognition by His Majesty of the Amir's own position as Ruler of Transjordan.

His Majesty's Government suggest, therefore, that, as the first step in the process of bringing about an improvement in the relations between the two countries, the question of mutual recognition should be settled as soon as possible, independently of any other question affecting the relations between Saudi Arabia and Transjordan, but on the definite understanding that negotiations will thereafter be undertaken with the least possible delay with a view to the establishment of treaty relations between the two States. They consider that such a treaty should be concluded direct between the rulers of the two Arab States concerned. Nevertheless, mindful of the success of the *Lupat* meeting they are prepared, having regard to their own special position, to take part in the negotiations with a view to promoting

interests of both the countries immediately concerned. They consider that they can in this way best contribute to the fulfilment of the wish so often expressed by His Majesty King Abdul Aziz and his Government, that the relations between Saudi Arabia and Transjordan should form the subject of a settlement similar to that so happily achieved last year in the case of Saudi Arabia and Iraq. If the proposed treaty is concluded, His Majesty's Government will use their best endeavours to secure the loyal execution of its terms in accordance with their desire that the treaty should be a factor of stability in Arabia, and a means whereby disputes, which have unhappily arisen in the past, more especially in regard to questions arising on the common frontier between the two States, may be obviated in the future."

(Repeated to Jeddah, No 25)

E 5076 1241 25]

No 73

Sir John Simon to Mr Hope Gill (Jedda)

(No. 124)

(Telegraphic)

Foreign Office, October 5, 1932

HIGH Commissioner for Transjordan concurs in proposed reply to 1. and, repeated to you in telegram No 125 of 30th September. You should therefore, communicate reply under cover of personal and secret letter to Fuad Bey Hamza.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 130)

E 4868 1484 25]

No 74

Sir John Simon to Mr Hope Gill (Jedda)

(No. 935)

Sir,

Foreign Office, October 6, 1932.

WITH reference to your telegram No 180 of the 22nd September, I enclose at to you the accompanying copy of a note from Sir John Simon to the High Commissioner for Transjordan, dated the 22nd September to the effect that the description of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, as used in the note, is the new name decided upon after considerable consultation between the Minister and my Department, and I request that you please will use it as the official English translation of the new name.

I am, &c.

JOHN SIMON

Enclosure in No 74

Sheikh Hafiz Wahba to Sir John Simon

Sir,

Hejaz and Nejd Legation, September 22, 1932

I HAVE the honour to intimate that in accordance with the wishes of his subjects His Majesty King Abdul Aziz has graciously consented that his kingdom be called the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, instead of the Kingdom of the Hejaz and Nejd and its Dependencies. This new name is to operate from this day.

I have, &c.

HAFAZ WAHBA,

Minister of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

E 5236 1133 25]

No 75

Sir John Simon to Sir G. Clerk (Angora)

(No. 395)

Sir,

Foreign Office, October 10, 1932

THE Turkish Ambassador having expressed a wish to see me, called this afternoon. He stated that it would no doubt be within my recollection that his predecessor, Ferit Bey, had raised early this year the desirability of our Government making a proposal to the Turkish Government, which might reach either Government. (This proposal was recorded in my despatch No 82 of the 1st March to Mr Morgan.)

2. Munir Bey was accordingly authorised to inform me that the Emir Feisal of the Hejaz-Nejd, when he visited Angora in June last, had placed an order for 100 rifles of Turkish make and two mitrailleuses, which were to be delivered to his father, King Abdul Aziz (Ibn Saud), by two Turkish officers, who were about to proceed to the Hejaz. I enquired of Munir Bey, whether there was any question of the supply of ammunition, his Excellency replied in the negative.

3. Munir Bey then said that on the 9th May last a Turk, called Mesout, whose name appears on the list of 150 people whose entry into Turkey is forbidden, had made opprobrious remarks about the Ghazi in one of the restaurants at Nicosia in Cyprus. Representations which had been made to the Turkish consul to the local authorities had met with no success. His Excellency therefore appealed to me to take such steps as might be possible. I explained to him the inherent difficulties in a case of this nature, and added that if he would field out little or no hope of being able to give his Government satisfaction in this particular matter.

I am, &c.

JOHN SIMON

E 5267 2614 25]

No. 76

Mr Hope Gill to Sir John Simon. — (Received October 12)

(No. 399.)

Sir,

Jedda, September 23, 1932

IBN SAUD has been more given to deeds than words during the three or four months which have elapsed since his parting speech at Mecca which was reported in Sir A. Ryan's despatch No. 250 of the 17th June. He has no doubt the more readily granted, if he did not command, an interview with the rising young "Saut al Hijaz." This was published in its issue of the 12th September.

2. Leading question and rambling answer is the form adopted, thus. *Question.* "What, your Majesty, is the military situation on the northern frontiers since the annihilation of Ibn Rifada and his party and the purification of that district?" *Answer.* "You are aware that those who encouraged Ibn Rifada have injured themselves and exposed him and poor Bedoun to death, so that they have become an example to everyone who may take warning therefrom. Our position on the northern frontiers is that peace exists everywhere there and that our frontier guards and forces are ready to punish anyone who may think to move his lips for the disturbing of peace. You are also aware that I have

and even in the deserts, so that no property may be lost, and if anything is lost, I issue orders for making accurate search till I catch the offender and punish him in accordance with the Shari'a laws. This fact is in my consideration the first principle to which I incline even if it causes loss of much time and of things dear to me." *Question.* "What is your Majesty's position towards neighbouring Governments?" *Answer.* "All people who know me are aware that I endeavour to keep peace and prefer it so long as it is for the safety of the lives, honour and

grant me success in the future. You will therefore see that I am in the evident position of peace and friendship with the Governments neighbouring on the Hejaz Nejd and its dependencies."

3. The third question refers to the Arab Conference at Jerusalem and to another which is expected to be held shortly (presumably that at Bagdad), and asks what His Majesty thinks of them, in view of the fact that his country comprises the greater part of the Arabian Peninsula, and that its geographical, religious, historical, linguistic and political qualifications entitle its inhabitants

to a preponderant voice in any such conference. The answer is that the Arab Conference at Jerusalem, which was held some months ago, was a failure, and that the Arab Conference at Bagdad, which is expected to be held shortly, will be a success.

4. Asked finally what the chances of success of the next Arab Conference are and whether, if invited to join an Arab Alliance, he would accept, Ibn Saud is as discreet as he is pious. The future is in God's hands, he replies, but if, he repeats, the decisions of that conference were to be free from taint of personal and material interests and were directed solely towards "the advantage of the Arabs," then no Arab would hesitate to co-operate. "Although I am weak," he concludes, "and there is neither might nor power save in God alone, yet if

wishes of its members will be united and free from the personal and material interests which have hitherto prevented Arabs from co-operating and uniting."

4. Asked finally what the chances of success of the next Arab Conference are and whether, if invited to join an Arab Alliance, he would accept, Ibn Saud is as discreet as he is pious. The future is in God's hands, he replies, but if, he repeats, the decisions of that conference were to be free from taint of personal and material interests and were directed solely towards "the advantage of the Arabs," then no Arab would hesitate to co-operate. "Although I am weak," he concludes, "and there is neither might nor power save in God alone, yet if and unity of the Arabs, I will be as an individual man of the Arab nation, caring

neither for rank nor position, which foster conceit, but affording every possible assistance to that end."

5. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioners at Bagdad and Jerusalem.

I have, &c.

C G HOPE GILL

E 5269 1494 25]

No. 77

Mr Hope Gill to Sir John Simon. — (Received October 12)

(No. 401.)

Sir,

Jedda, September 25, 1932

WITH reference to my telegrams Nos. 150, 181 and 182 of the 22nd September announcing the formal adoption of a new style and title by Ibn Saud for himself and his country I have the honour to transmit herewith translations of—

(1) A circular memorandum from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the foreign representatives, dated the 21st September,⁽¹⁾ and covering

(2) A circular memorandum from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, dated the 21st September, which makes the change effective as from the 22nd September and charges the Council of Ministers with the elaboration and submission to His Majesty of a new Constitution, a rule of succession to the throne, an

(3) A circular memorandum from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, dated the 16th September,⁽¹⁾ which describes as a popular movement the change of style and title of Ibn Saud, and the text of the four

2. The first of the four telegrams, dated the 22nd September, contains the text of the circular memorandum from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, dated the 21st September, which makes the change effective as from the 22nd September and charges the Council of Ministers with the elaboration and submission to His Majesty of a new Constitution, a rule of succession to the throne, an

3. The second of the four telegrams, dated the 22nd September, contains the text of the circular memorandum from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, dated the 21st September, which describes as a popular movement the change of style and title of Ibn Saud, and the text of the four

4. The third of the four telegrams, dated the 22nd September, contains the text of the circular memorandum from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, dated the 21st September, which describes as a popular movement the change of style and title of Ibn Saud, and the text of the four

5. The fourth of the four telegrams, dated the 22nd September, contains the text of the circular memorandum from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, dated the 21st September, which describes as a popular movement the change of style and title of Ibn Saud, and the text of the four

3. It is of particular interest to note that, according to the "Umm al Qura" of the 23rd September, the sequence of events was as follows: First, a general conviction was come to throughout the country that the Hejaz and Nejd so united in the face of recent events, were brothers; then, the sixteen signatories of Fund Hamza's petition met at Taif and elaborated its details, they thereupon telegraphed to their friends and colleagues throughout the country, requesting their support, result, "the news spread like lightning, the whole nation arose in support of the petition, and telegrams were sent to His Majesty the King imploring him . . . "—to grant, in short, the requests formulated by those sixteen.

4. In spite of its widespread nature, the secret of this move was well kept, and it came as a surprise to the foreign residents and representatives. It can safely be stated that it was no popular movement, born of impulse, but one managed either by the King and his officials, or by Fund Hamza and some of his followers. However, when the telegrams were sent, it was generally realised that the answers had already been decided upon. Only that concerning the succession to the throne gave rise to speculation

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

appreciable approach of the Hejazi view-point to our own, and should serve to further to simplify this Legation's practical task in repatriating slaves who seek refuge. Such cases will nevertheless take delayed effect when the Treaty of Jedda is reviewed by Ibn Saud a little before the 17th March, 1934, less than a year and a half hence.

E 5364 1241/257

No. 79

Mr. Hope to Sir John Simon — (Received October 14)

(No. 188)

(Telegraphic)

Sedalia October 14 1932

YOUR telegram No 126

I communicated memorandum as directed on 8th October and have received memorandum in reply under secret and personal letter dated 13th October. Full text is as follows:—

1. We believe in peace between us and Transjordan. We have already expressed views as to necessary course of action. Our suggestions were based on results of recent incidents instigated by Transjordan. Their consequence was indignation and disturbances from end to end of our territory. We are every endeavour to overcome internal difficulties in order to safeguard friendly relations with Britain, and are striving to silence external Arab and Moslem propaganda against Transjordan.

2. Having confidence in the British Government, trusting in the honouring of their promise and believing that they will earnestly strive to establish that justice, we have no objection to accepting views of British Government, relying not on God then on them. We consent to exchange of recognition as ruler of Transjordan and as King of Saudi Arabian kingdom consisting of Hejaz-Nejd and its dependencies.

3. We shall be prepared to enter into treaty negotiations with Transjordan on lines of treaty with Iraq, subject to condition that British Government shall accept and shall be bound to accept the terms of the treaty as proposed by the Government of Transjordan. We accept this solution only to meet British Government's wish, trusting in honouring their promise and their guaranteeing result.

Text follows by bag due London, 5th November or 12th November
(Repeated to Jerusalem, No. 246)

E 5492 5492 913

No. 90

Memorandum respecting the Hadramut: Its Extent and Relations with His Majesty's Government

WITH MAP

Extent

It seems extremely unlikely that there has at any time been a satisfactory definition of the territory to which the name "Hadramut" has been applied. The name itself is preserved from the most ancient times, it appears in the Book of Genesis as Hadoram, son of Joktan and Adramytia is mentioned in early Greek geography as the place from which frankincense was obtained. Within comparatively recent times there are three separate senses in which the name has been used. Early maps of the last two centuries show the Hadramut (under various spellings of the name) as extending along practically the whole of the south coast of Arabia, from the Red Sea to the Gulf of Oman. At the other extreme, the modern Arab, to quote L. W. C. van den Berg (*Hadramhaut et les Colonies arabes*, 1886), understands as the Hadramut no more than that part of the southern coast of Arabia which lies between the fishing villages of Ain Bama'bad and Sihout, with its hinterland as far as the Arabian desert (i.e., between longitude 48° and 51° 20' E.). This would limit the application of the name to those districts under the control of the Sultan of Shehr and Mokalla.

This difficult question the King has temporarily shelved for study by the Council of Ministers. Its outcome is entirely problematical.

5. As far as I can at present surmise, the main reasons for this unification—the word “tauhid” is somewhat significantly used, which also epitomises the prime Wahhabi tenet of the “oneness” of God—are (1) dynastic, to consolidate the Hijaz as a Saudi possession, to the final discouragement of Hashimite or Republican aspirations, (2) financial, to cover the absorption of the resources of the Hejaz in those of Nejd and perhaps to facilitate the publication of a single Saudi budget of a kind that may create confidence in the money markets, (3) imperial, to assimilate Asir yet more closely to the Saudi rule, and (4), to some extent, constitutional, to enable juristic minds like Fund Hamza's to clear away at a blow the tangled undergrowth of the dual Kingdom and set about building a tidier and more critic-proof edifice of State.

Q. "Union Day"—"Id at-Tauhid"—as it is already called—was celebrated on the 22nd September with parades of yelling schoolboys and a reception by the Amir of Jedda of the foreign representatives. At Mecca the Viceroy publicly thanked the population for their zeal and sincerity and he came the next day to Jedda, where the foreign representatives and local notables were invited to meet him at tea. I confined myself to requesting him to convey my personal respects to His Majesty.

I have, &c
C. G. HOPE GILL.

E 6278 314 251

No. 79

Mr. Hope Gill to Sir John Simon.—(Received October 12.)

(No 404)

511.

Jedda, September 26, 1932

IN my telegrams Nos. 175 and 176 of the 12th September, I reported that the Hajazi authorities had requested me to return to them a slave who had taken refuge in this Legation from the household of the King's brother, the Amir Muhammad. I have the honour to transmit herewith a translation of a note relating to said slave, conveying the message received from Kaza to which it refers.

[illegible]

3. Having heard nothing further, I caused the sheikh to be reminded on the 20th September that I was expecting to be able to embark the man on the 25th September. On the 21st September Sheikh Ali Taha himself rang me up to say that there was no objection to his embarkation. This he confirmed orally to Mr. Wikeley, who took the slave on board the steamship "Talodi" on the 25th September, after receiving a further assurance from Ali Taha that the port authorities had received the necessary instructions to allow him to pass. Another slave who had taken refuge on the 18th September was embarked at the same time.

4. I am not yet in a position to say what passed behind the scenes in regard to the Mejazi note of the 1st January last and of Fuad Hejaz Inter to How Fuad Hejaz saw what in the note was straight from the horse's mouth. If the former, the Under-Secretary must have exerted himself with Riyadh on behalf of almost as restrictive an interpretation of the "Clayton undertaking" as we might ourselves be supposed to hold. If the latter, Ibn Saud must have impressed just such a restrictive interpretation on his brother Muhammad. Whatever the process, the result betrays an

2. Confirmation of this limited application among the Arabs themselves is contained in the 1918 agreement between the Kaiti and Kathiri Sultans (see later paragraph 10) where in article 1 "the Kaiti Sultan . . . and the Sultans of the . . . of Vol Province Hadramut shall be one province." The assistant resident at Aden in 1908, in a revised edition of speaks of the province called Hadramut "to the east of the Wahidi tribe." In Aitchison, however, the Wahidi are definitely referred to as a tribe of the Hadramut.

3. In the wider and now more generally accepted sense, the territory known as the Hadramut is understood to extend eastwards along the southern coast of Arabia to include that part inhabited by the Mahri tribes, almost as far as the Kura'at, i.e. to the *Wadi al-Fud'ayl* in the British colony of Aden, as the town of Mirbat (longitude 53° E.).

4. This definition appears to accord with the view which has obtained in the Foreign Office. Mr. A. Parker's memorandum of the 24th July, 1914, which, as we have seen, was the subject of a letter from the Foreign Office to the Admiralty of 10th August 1914, contains the following observations on the memoranda of 1913 and 1914, regarding affairs of Turkey and the Persian Gulf:—“(a) the Kaiti, under the Sultan of Shohr and Mokalla, and (b) the Mahri, under the Sultan of Socotra and Kishn. There are, he adds, others such as the Wahidi, nearer to Aden, all of whom have long been under British protection, while the leading sheikhs are stipendiaries of the British Government.”

5. According to a map printed by the Government of India in 1901, the territory of the Wahidi adjoins, except for a small triangle near the coast, that of the Anjasi, which is one of the territories within the so-called Aden Protectorate.

6. The eastern extremity of the Hadramut presumably marches with the western extremity of the Chalukya who therefore fix their views as shown in the maps available in the Foreign Office.

7 While many of them show the western limits of Oman as far to the east of the town Mirdas and others as far to the west as the port Sidi Saïd in 1891 and *Atlas universel* (Hachette), 1900, show the boundary as from 50 to 90 miles west of that town.

8. Another and now more generally accepted view is that the boundary between Oman and the Mahri tribes is at a point on the coast known as Ras Darbat Ali, a cape to the west of the Dhofar district. The town of Salalah, in the Dhofar area, from which Mr. Bertram Thomas commenced his journey across the Rub al Khali, is described by him in his *Arabia Felix* as being in the territory of Muscat and Oman. Moreover, from a despatch from Lieutenant Colonel Brereme to the Government of India of the 24th February, 1930 it is clear that the local authorities in the Mahri district of the Sultan of Sokatra's territory regard Ras Darbat Ali as their eastern limit (').

A sketch map showing roughly the territories of the various tribes is annexed.

Treaty Relations

9. For treaty purposes the coast of the Hadramut can conveniently be divided into three main sections —

- 1) The Wahidi
- 2) Shehr and Mokalla
- (3) Kiahn

4. If the said W. J. and J. each year to be elected, we will two or more persons of the same rank, and the said W. J. respectively. W. J. and J. each year to be elected, and each of them receives a stipend from His Majesty's Government.

11 In the second section the Katti tribes control most of the coastal area, and a protectorate treaty was concluded with the Katti Sultan of Shehr and Mokalla in 1898. The Kathiri tribes' territory lies to the north and east of that of the Katti, and by an agreement of 1918 the Kathiri Sultan acknowledged the suzerainty of the Katti Sultan and agreed to abide by the terms of the 1858 agreement with H. M. G. The Sultan of Shehr and Mokalla receives a stipend from the British Government.

(1) In correspondence between the Foreign Office and Colonial Office of May-June 1923, Eao Darbat Au has been accepted as the eastern limit of the Aden Protectorate.

12. The attitude of these tribes towards the extent of British protection implied by the protectorate treaties is indicated at the end of article 1 of the 1918 agreement, where the Sultans agree that the "province (Hidramut) shall be an appanage of the British Empire under the Sultan of Shehr and Mokalla," and later in article 11, where it is agreed that "the British Government shall endeavour to settle all differences which may arise between the two Sultans and their tribes."

13. A protectorate treaty was, in 1886, concluded with the Sultan of Socotra and Kishn in respect of Socotra and its dependencies, and in 1888 a further treaty was concluded with him as head of the Mahri tribes in respect of Kishn and its dependencies. The Sultan of Socotra and Kishn is also a stipendiary of the British Government.

14 The small triangle of land referred to in paragraph 5, where the territory of the Wahidi does not join the territory of those tribes considered as within the Protectorate, is shown in the Government of India's map under the

been examined, nor is it mentioned in Aitchison. It contains, however, the two towns or villages of Irka and Lower Hauru, with the sheikhs of each of which protectorate treaties were concluded in 1888 and 1902, and both sheikhs receive a stipend from the British Government. These tribes do not appear to be regarded as of the Hadramut.

15. The term "Protectorate of Aden" is one which has been very loosely used. There has been no formal establishment of such a protectorate or any official declaration or notification. Major Morewether (*Tribes in the Vicinity of Aden*), states that the zone within which British influence is more immediately felt may be said to be comprised within a semi-circle having a radius of 80 miles, with the Peninsula of Aden for its centre. Beyond this to the eastward Great Britain is, he says, looked on as a kind of paramount Power, which, while recognising independence in regard to internal government, yet is ready to prevent alienation of territory to foreign nations, or inter-tribal disputes which are carried on to the detriment of public peace or commercial interests.

16. He points out that by 1880 the number of tribes regarded as under British protection had increased to fifteen. He also points out that the British Government had been forced to extend British intercourse with the tribes in certain directions so that by 1880 the number of tribes in direct treaty relations amounted to fifteen. The list he gave shows that the fifteen tribes consisted of the nine tribes of the Protectorate, together with those referred to in this memorandum.

17 The terms of the protectorate treaties with the tribes of the Hadramut are identical with those of the treaties with tribes in the Aden Protectorate area, and the sheikhs of all of them in like manner are stipendiaries of the British Government.

[illegible]

18. There is no obvious reason why the same measure of protection should not, in fact, be accorded in respect of the whole of the southern coast of Arabia, as far as the eastern limits of the Mahri tribe, as is now accorded to the area in the immediate vicinity of Aden.

H. JONES

Foreign Office, November 11, 1932

Mr. Hope Gill to Sir John Simon — (Received November 21)

(No. 427)

Sir,

Jedda, October 19, 1932

I HAD some conversation on the 15th October with Fuad Bey Hamza on the subject of the task devolving on the Council of Ministers by virtue of the Royal decree of the 18th September. We did not touch upon the actual change of the country's title to "Saudi Arabia," but Fuad Bey offered a few remarks on the future Constitution.

2. He thought that the council had two years' work ahead of it to draw up a new Constitution and to replace all the old legislation with modern laws. He was going to advocate a kind of "States-General," to be summoned annually by the King, to discuss the country's needs, to decide on the general lines of its experience and future policy, this body would annually leave an Executive Committee to carry on the work of legislation and government. He considered that the post of Viceroy should be replaced by that of Prime Minister. The Shari'a would be maintained as the common law of the country. *Plus ça change.*

3. As regards succession to the throne, Fuad Bey declared that the King of Ministers would simply give formal and constitutional shape to this decision.

I have 84

C. G. HOPE GULL

E 6086 165 (25)

No. 82

Mr Hope Gill to Sir John Simon.—(Received November 25.)

(No. 425.)

515.

Soda, October 19, 1932

THE manager of the local "Dutch Bank," a branch of the Handel Maatschappij of Amsterdam, has imparted the following items of financial interest:—

[illegible]

they show that there was evidently still plenty of money in private hands; at the same time they betray an implicit faith in the size of the next pilgrimage, which seems only too likely to have been misplaced. A couple of months ago the bazaar gossip placed the coming Javanese pilgrimage with confidence at 40,000. Last season it was 4,500. Next season, according to the shipping company, which has reason to know best it will be 1,500. Stocks are now heavy, and unless other countries send unsuspected quantities of pilgrims, it will be very difficult to get rid of the accumulation.

4. Mr Jacobs was very despondent about Saudi Government finance. During next month, he said, Government commitments mature to the tune of £40,000 gold. He will have to handle these debts, but sees no hope of obtaining payment. On the contrary he foresees trouble and complications arising from the

fact that the greater portion of them has been discounted and re-discounted in Europe. This, I understand, to be the case with £15,000 owing to the Standard Oil Company through Messrs. Sharqieh (Limited), and £10,000 to German firms represented by M. de Haas, the German consul, these are Mr Jacobs's figures. The other £15,000 are owing to the Marooni Company, also through Messrs. Sharqieh. Apart from these, Mr Jacobs is aware of £5,000 gold owing to his own firm, £15,000 to the Shell Company, through Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co., £25,000 to the Qusaitia, and £30,000 to the Soviets for oil—a total external indebtedness, according to Mr Jacobs, of £115,000 gold. To this figure we can add £30,000 owing to the Government of India, £2,500 to the Eastern Telegraph Company, and £1,700 to His Majesty's Government—a minimum grand total of some £125,000 gold.

5. Mr Jacobs is convinced that there is no money left in the Treasury, the recent rebellion having cost Ibn Saud at least £40,000, he thinks, and used up his reserves. The Saudi Government have nevertheless recently scraped together the following sums for export: £1,500 and £1,300 for an Isotta-Fraschini car apiece for the King and the Viceroy, and a few hundred pounds to induce Mr. A. P. ... to return from his sick leave to his post as ... of finance.

6. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Department of Overseas Trade

I have, &c

C. G. HOPE GILL

E 6208 76 251

No 84

Chargé d'Affaires, Jedda, to Sir John Simon. (Received November 25)

No. 2143

(Telegraphic)

Asilic

Jeddo, November 25, 1932

I learn confidentially from local source which has recently proved unusually reliable that—

- 1 General counter-attack was made 23rd November by rebels under Idris on Jizan Sabya and other places regained by Saudi reinforcement, but that it was mostly repulsed after all day fighting
- 2 Idris has withdrawn into Yemen, where Imam's son Ahmed has concentrated considerable forces on frontier
- 3 Saudi Government have to-day received long telegram from Imam, contents not yet known
- 4 Some 5,000 tribal reinforcements under Khalid bin Luwey due at Abha to-day
- 5 Similar forces leaving Riyadh for Asir under Ibn Saud's nephew Khalid bin Mohammed
- 6 King's Privy Purse is well stocked

More important is information from the same source that—

7. When Saudis recaptured Jizan Sabhya 17th November they took mail-bag containing letters from Amir Abdullah himself to Ali Dabbagh, said to be now in Asir (see Aden secret memorandum, paragraph 41); and
8. This proof has decided Ibn Saud to muster large Akhwan forces near Transjordan and then demand Abdullah's dismissal by His Majesty's Government.

I cannot check any of this, but report it for what it may be worth. One circumstantial feature is Fund's unwonted silence about progress of events.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 274, and Aden, No. 275)

E 6204/76/25]

No. 84.

Chargé d'Affaires, Jedda, to Sir John Simon.—(Received November 27)

(No. 215.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, November 27, 1932

MY telegram No. 214.

Saudi Government have communicated memorandum with request for transmission to you and early reply lest evil consequences befall. Gist as follows.—

- 1 News received from Transjordan indicates unusual activity on the part of Sharif Abdullah
- 2 It has already been established that Sharifs and their assistants participated in activities of Ibn Rifada and at the same time tried to raise insurrection in the south. When Idrisi became active one of the Dabbagha, whose relations with Amman have been proved to us, joined him.
- 3 Saudi Government are not afraid but ready to suppress insurrection, but they draw attention to the effects of Transjordan intrigues on the people of the Nejd and the latter's previous excitement against instigators of Rifada and Government difficulties in preventing them from taking action inimical to relations with His Majesty's Government
- 4 In view of firm existing friendship and fear that disregard of activity attributed to Amir Abdullah and his associates may now again raise equally difficult situation, since Nejd excitement was only calmed with difficulty. Saudi Government wish to draw His Majesty's Government's attention to happenings that may befall if they on their side do not bestir themselves to take decisive action in Transjordan to destroy intrigues of conspirators against Saudi Arabia

I am not replying. Text by bag

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 276.)

[E 6221/6221/91]

No. 85.

Mr P. Loraine to Sir John Simon.—(Received November 28)

(No. 1030 Confidential.)

Sir,

Cairo, November 18, 1932

I HAVE the honour to inform you that Dr Kadri, the Iraq consul-general, called on the oriental secretary on the 14th instant to ask his advice on a suggestion which he (Kadri) was thinking of making to King Faisal.

2. Dr Kadri stated that he had been with King Faisal during His Majesty's recent trip to Transjordan. The King had given him a sort of private watching-brief for Syria and Western Arabia. Dr Kadri regarded the situation in the Yemen as disquieting. The Imam was exposed to two undesirable influences, namely, of the Soviets and of Italy. To both he was showing himself very susceptible, to that of the Soviets, mainly because he obtained supplies from them at uneconomic prices, to that of Italy because he was attracted by the prospect of a large loan. The latter Italy was probably the Asir revolt which might or might not be supported by Imam Yehia. The entry of the Soviets and Italy into Arabia was a danger to British interests. There could be no doubt about Iraq's interest in excluding Soviet influence. As regards Italy, the Arabs had seen too clearly how she had behaved in Tripoli to have the slightest wish that she should enter the Arabian field. It was true that Italy was anti Ibn Saud, but Iraq preferred that Ibn Saud should remain in control of the Hejaz for the present. Iraq would gradually grow stronger,

and would eventually be in a position to help the suffering tribes of the Hejaz.

3. In the above circumstances, Iraq's interest was that the Imam Yehia should not succumb to Soviet or Italian blandishments. In Dr Kadri's opinion, Iraq, by diplomatic representation in the Yemen, could influence the Imam and not only withdraw him from Soviet and Italian toils, but also make him realise the folly of his attitude towards Aden. Dr Kadri concluded by saying that he did not wish to suggest to King Faisal that he should bring His Majesty into opposition with the British. That was why he would appreciate our advice on the opportunity of such a suggestion.

4. In reply Mr Smart said that the Yemen was outside his competence and that he would refer the matter to the Secretary of State. He was of the opinion that the situation in the Yemen was very serious and that it was necessary to take prompt action. He would refer the matter to the Secretary of State.

5. Dr Kadri was not satisfied with the results of the Hejaz campaign. He was of the opinion that the situation in the Hejaz was very serious and that it was necessary to take prompt action. He would refer the matter to the Secretary of State.

6. Dr Kadri was not satisfied with the results of the Hejaz campaign. He was of the opinion that the situation in the Hejaz was very serious and that it was necessary to take prompt action. He would refer the matter to the Secretary of State.

7. Dr Kadri is perhaps inclined to attach too much importance to himself, and he may have exaggerated in suggesting that King Faisal had given him a watching-brief in Syria and Arabia. However his brother is the King's Master of Ceremonies, and the family seems to have been always in friendly relations with His Majesty.

8. It would be inadvisable that mention should be made of Dr Kadri's visit and his statements. I judge him to be a light weight, but it would, I think, be as well not to discourage him from airing his views to the Residency, especially at a time when we are trying to keep track of any anti Ibn Saud machinations of Arabs in Egypt.

9. I have forwarded copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad and to His Majesty's Minister at Jedda.

I have, &c

PERCY LORAINÉ

High Commissioner

[E 6260/76/25]

No. 86

Chargé d'Affaires, Jedda, to Sir John Simon.—(Received November 29)

(No. 216.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, November 29, 1932.

MY telegram No. 215

Memorandum summarised in my telegram No. 206 was probably Fuad's and entered as caveat against probable Dabbagh complicity, directly the Idrisi show signs of may be regarded as timely reaction against action on old evidence.

[5079]

L 2

Latest memorandum, however, shows definite signs of having come from H. It claims to be based on evidence from three sources, namely, persons in Transjordan, reports from frontier and events in Asir. No mention is made of any capture of recent correspondence with Amman, but possibility of this cannot be discarded, for it is clear that something sufficiently serious has transpired to make Ibn Saud threaten His Majesty's Government with uncontrollability of his Ikhwan.

I take it to be simultaneous effect of bad news from the south (e.g., widespread nature of revolt itself, backing in arms and money from conspirators, and Dumeik Nuri Shalan combination) combined with His Majesty's Government's apparent unconcern. In Ibn Saud's own view, as I see it, he is faced with Abdullah's second vicarious aggression in progress and third in prospect, while consideration for his (to him) complete frankness and truthful exposition of 5th August, in reply they have upheld Abdullah and shown no disposition to control him or his agents any more effectively than in the past. Ibn Saud probably sees history repeating itself and is determined to forestall and pursue afterwards that they got out of hand and I told you so.

(My latest local information in this connexion is that Ibn Musaad of Hail has been placed in command.)

If Ibn Saud has really begun to concentrate Ikhwan northward I doubt whether anything we can now say will suffice to restore his confidence to the extent necessary to check it. Only radical action on our part would take effect. This would naturally have to be undertaken before threat to frontier peace actually developed, thereafter we should be committed to uttering grave warnings and strengthening frontier defence without any serious prospect of preventing "uncontrolled" incursions and bloodshed. Endless recrimination would follow. Relations and major policy would suffer (see my immediately following telegram).

E 8261/76 25,

No. 67

Chargé d'Affaires, Jeddah, to Sir John Simon. (Received November 29)

(No. 217)

(Telegraphic)

Jeddah, November 29, 1932

NY telegram No. 216

Abdullah is the root of the problem. If his utility to His Majesty's Government in Palestine still overrides his incense to peace and confidence of relations with the Saudi Government, I submit that minimum radical action might take form of immediate official enquiry into his activities, starting with his handling of Hedouin Control Board. This might have a salutary effect all round—for a time.

In the long run, however, I am convinced we must choose between Abdullah and Ibn Saud. British officials in Transjordan are clearly unable either to trust or to control the former, whom almost every inference shows to have nullified the foreign relations provisions of his agreement with His Majesty. For my part I foresee complete estrangement between the Saudi Government and us as the inevitable price of our maintenance of Abdullah. There is no community of interest to bring them together, and I do not believe diplomacy can overcome the lifelong enmity which will exist as only practical basis of relations between them. Both have suffered too much and are too close and antipathetic to forgive. We shall suffer proportionately at least in Arabia.

E 8304.76 25,

No. 86

Colonial Office to High Commissioner for Transjordan (Jerusalem).

(No. 105)

JEDDA telegram No. 215 to Foreign Office of 27th November. Transjordan

Saudi relations, repeated to you as No. 276.

His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Jeddah reports to the following effect:

"Saudi Government's latest memorandum shows definite signs of being inspired by King Ibn Saud personally, and although no reference is made to captured correspondence between Abdullah and rebels (see paragraph 7 of Jeddah telegram No. 214 of 25th November to Foreign Office), it may well be based upon such correspondence, since it is clear that evidence is sufficiently serious to make Ibn Saud feel justified in hinting at possible action by Abdullah. Abdullah's spread of news from north (e.g., possible combination of Dumeik Nuri Shalan and Ibn Saud) appears to have convinced Ibn Saud that Ikhwan in Transjordan are again active and that Abdullah is planning yet another vicarious aggression. Ibn Saud, who is already exasperated by apparent inability of His Majesty's Government to control these intrigues, now seems likely to try to forestall any further incursion by having Akhwan ready to hand. Latest local information is that Ibn Musaad of Hail has now been placed in command of Akhwan concentrations."

2. Present situation, in which Akhwan may, with or without Ibn Saud's tacit approval, take the law into their own hands by attacking Transjordan, is most dangerous. Continued existence of plots in which Ibn Saud's Government cannot deny accusation of hostile activities which King Ibn Saud has made against the Amir Abdullah and his associates in Transjordan, is embarrassing and ignominious. In any case, unless radical steps are taken to remedy situation in near future, relations between His Majesty's Government and Ibn Saud are likely to become so difficult as not only to lead to increasingly serious friction on Transjordan frontier, but to prejudice British interests throughout Middle East.

3. In these circumstances I shall be glad if you will consider the possibility of making really strong representations to Amir, drawing his attention to rumours of his alleged complicity in Asir rising, and urging upon him with all force at your command necessity for complete cessation of any communications which he or his associates may still be holding with persons involved in rebellious activities against King Ibn Saud.

4. It also seems desirable that immediate drastic action should be taken against those in Transjordan in the case of whom there is definite evidence of complicity in the plots against Ibn Saud, more especially if possible, those in the immediate vicinity of the Amir, and in particular the Amir Shakir. Such action, if suitably worded, would prevent the Saudi Government from being able to set up a case to incite further action in Jeddah telegram No. 215 of 27th November to Foreign Office, and might prevent situation from becoming even more dangerous.

5. Assuming that you are able to take action in accordance with the above suggestions, His Majesty's Government contemplate reply to Saudi Government on following lines: (a) They will hold Saudi Government responsible for consequences of any hostile activities against Transjordan by Akhwan, and will use available means to repel them; (b) Saudi Government will be informed of action taken by you on paragraphs 3 and 4 above; (c) any suitable information on other specific measures which you may have taken in Transjordan to prevent assistance to rebellious forces, e.g. in case of Beni Atiya, could also be communicated, together with details of measures already taken at Aden.

(Repeated to Jeddah, No. 151)

Mr Hope Gill to Sir John Simon.—(Received December 6.)

(No. 443)

Sir,

Jedda, November 7, 1932

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the Jedda report for September and October 1932

2. Copies are being sent, as usual, to Cairo, Jerusalem, Beirut, Damascus, Baghdad, Addis Ababa, Lagos, Khartum, Port Sudan, the Senior Naval Officer in Red Sea Sloops and the Royal Air Force Officer Commanding in Palestine and Transjordan.

I have, &c

G HOPE GILL.

Enclosure in No. 89

Jedda Report for September and October 1932

(Confidential)

INDEX

I—INTERNAL AFFAIRS		II—FOREIGN QUESTIONS	
Ibn Saud	281	Transjordan—	
Chiefs	282	Raiding	297
New Constitution	283	Aftermath of rebellion	298
Ministry for Foreign Affairs	288	Mutual recognition	299
Finance	289-290	Hani Ahiya	299
Economics	290	Hadith	
Wireless	291-292	Iraq	
Law	292	Koweit and Bahrain	
Committee of Virtues	293	Asir and the Yemen	
Locusts	293		
		III—GENERAL AFFAIRS	
		General—	
		Great Britain—	
		Minister	294
		General	295
		Cause	299
		IV—MILITARY MATTERS	
		Minister	295
		General	295
		V—NAVAL MATTERS	
		British	301
		Foreign	302
		VI—AIR MATTERS	
		British	302
		Foreign	302
		VII—PILGRIMAGE	
		Minister	302
		General	302
		Enslavement of pilgrims	302
		VIII—MISCELLANEOUS	
		Staff	303

I—Internal Affairs.

Ibn Saud.

281. King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud returned to Nejd in the beginning of September, having spent just five busy and critical months in the Hejaz—the first two devoted to pilgrimage and civil affairs, the last three to quelling rebellion. He left Taif, the summer resort of his western capital, on the 6th September and arrived at his eastern capital, Riyadh, on the 8th September. He was accompanied by his three surviving brothers, sons numbers 4, 7, 9, 13, 15 and 16, a couple of nephews, and the usual ex-enemy Rashidi young. Sons 1 and 3, the

Amir Saud and Muhammad, met him at Riyadh, son 2, the Amir Feisal, remained in the Hejaz as his Viceroy and apparently in charge of his seven other little brothers. The family returned this year seems to have been less pompous and to have been attended by much less pomp and expenditure than in 1931 (vide July report, paragraph 1). Nor did it receive the same press attention.

281. It seems that before leaving Taif, Ibn Saud convened a family conference to discuss succession to the throne. He presented to the eldest son as heir apparent. His elder brother Muhammad apparently agreed, thus belying or abandoning the stubborn claim to the succession which he was believed to have upheld for so long. The King's second and younger brother, Abdullah, appears to have been more interested in making sure that the family allowances would continue to be paid. His second son, Feisal, is said to have raised no objection to Saud's inheritance of the throne. And so it was agreed, according to hearsay, which may in fact be no more than intelligent guesswork. But the information given in paragraph 287 below confirms the result, if not the steps by which it was reached.

282. It is further said that the King has now made over his political "diwan" to the Amir Saud, watching his methods, guiding his actions and retaining for himself only a reduced Royal "diwan" headed by Sheikh Yusuf Yasin and manned by a few clerks. It is too soon to be able to state whether this is strictly true or not, but it is not altogether improbable, although even the enlightened Philip of Macedon did not go quite so far in the kingly education of Alexander the Great.

283. Ibn Saud was more given to deeds than words during the months which passed after his Meccan oration of May (vide paragraph 155). He granted the more readily, no doubt, if he did not actually command, an interview with the rising Mecca newspaper, *Saut al Hijaz*, or *Voice of the Hejaz*, which was published just after His Majesty left for Riyadh. It contained much rambling, indecisive comment on the Hejaz, Arabia and Arab unity repeated in Legation despatch No. 399 of the 23rd September.

Change of Title.

284. As from the 22nd September the title of "the Hejaz and Nejd and its Dependencies" was changed by Royal decree to that of "Saudi Arabia". There is sometimes much in a name. Here is Ptolemy's 2nd century "Arabia Deserta"—that geographic, nomadic interval between provincial "Arabia Petrea" in the north and the Arabian desert proper, through which Arabia Felix was taking 20th century form and individuality as "Arabia Saudia". Between whites, this same space produced one of the great brotherhood religions of the world, which divided the world at large and failed to unite even its own faithful. It has since thrown up military chieftains of its own and suffered invasions and partial occupation by others, but none have left their mark. Recently, it has bred a king who for the last two years has gathered together his own military force and political activity, to impose himself and effective unity on its inhabitants, and finally to mark its map with his name.

285. Time has begun its test. The first reaction has been vainglorious. The Government press has tried to make believe that the change of title was made in response to an Arabian war appeal which was long ago made by the heartfelt conviction that Hejazis and Nejdians are brothers. There is every reason on the contrary to believe that the response was levered upon them. The appeal was engineered. It was then launched simultaneously, telegraphically and by wireless, from all over the country on the word from Mecca. The press has also been claiming for Saudi Arabia the premier position in the pan-Arabia to be. This attitude is, no doubt, calculated to impress the politicians of Baghdad, news of whose preparation for a pan-Arab conference this winter, coupled with evidence of King Feisal's persistent reluctance to undertake such a task, has not been welcome to some of their Arab brothers further south. So the Mecca press has been lauding the past glories of Arabia Deserta and only hinted when necessary at the boasting of the present unity and strength of Arabia Saudia, affirming that Allah ordained the peninsula as the centre of all Arab union, a country geographically apart and militarily secure, so that he who holds it must needs be strong and able to protect his neighbours. It looks as though Ibn Saud is now setting himself to win hegemony.

280. Throughout October a new "Regulation respecting the Ministry of Finance" has been given piecemeal to the public in the press and is still appearing in serial form. It comes in reading as the most important of the decrees issued by the King, but the paper matter further on the "Law" will show that the present is a stop-gap and it may not be the thing so much, but it may do for this while. But there is also a further side to what we may call a royal remedy. We are told by those in the know that the King will let two hundred companies take the shape of the hitherto "Revenue Fund and Debts" (it is in the budget of 1914 (see November December report paragraph 4) and now filled with gold and silver) and so the same are still by means in effect except the "Debt" part, which has managed to get some money from the foreign creditors, who whistle through dry (meaning the same) who started when gold and silver fell to nothing and have been helped by local creditors who are now being paid in silver at 50 per cent. The result is that the market value of the gold coins to the pound is as against the other two is still 10 (thus involving the original holders of drafts given for gold debt in a final loss of about 80 per cent), and, even more noteworthy, the Finance Minister has had to raise a private loan of £1,100 in order to humour the Amir Feisal and take out his £200 deposit for a new Isotto-Fraschini, delivered strictly for cash against receipt. The new Isotto-Fraschini, however, is producing £1,500 similarly required for the King's Isotto. Nor is it thought that the Finance Minister fails to draw the 12,000 riyals or some £875 a month, to which he is stated on good authority to be entitled from the privy purse, or reservoir. All of which goes to show where the money goes and where it does not, how the Finance Minister is the King's man and no one else's, but how also he will avoid bad blood and heart-burns if at all possible with that type of task. He probably has as little compunction, however, in keeping the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs short of money as he evidently has in keeping spies to watch him. But then "it's all fair pulling." Meanwhile he is building himself a country seat near Jedda.

290 As a result of a former attempt by Sir Arthur Kenn made in conversation with Haidi (Khanza) on the 1st September to get some sort of communication in the South to ascertain by the use of a relay of porters and swains a communication was prepared in the Legation in a simple form the kind of which had been used in the past and was sent in October to have distributed. A year was a further promise to turn the Legation with a reports received from the interior. The Nephew being grounds are believed to be of importance.

Трансформация

297 No raids either way were reported as having taken place during September and October. When the old matter of liquidating the raid of the 28th September, 1931, and thereby other raids of the past, was resuscitated, the victims, the Atun section of the Fluweytat were their subjects and should have come to them for justice.

298. British military forces were withdrawn from the Aqaba area on the 2nd September, the Arab Legion taking it over. The Transjordan authorities reported on the 3rd September that the economic blockade of the disaffected area had been raised. By the middle of the month between 200 and 300 refugees had been disarmed and dispersed in Transjordan and into Sinai. Only a part of the Beni Atiya rebel contingent under Ibn Farhan remained unaccounted for in the Hisma country south of the border. All property in the Hejaz of rebels and their sympathisers was confiscated by a decree of the 2nd September.

290. On the 1st September His Majesty's High Commissioner for Transjordan drew from the Amir Abdullah the promise that in deference to His Majesty's Government he would accept the recognition of Ibn Saud unconditionally as King of the Hejaz and Nejd. He begged that recognition should be mutual. On the 11th September King Faisal visited Amman and the Arabic press soon afterwards announced that he had persuaded his brother to recognise Ibn Saud. His Majesty's Government's views as to the establishment of a State of Iraq were stated in The Sun on the 14th October. On the 13th October announced his readiness to recognise the Amir Abdullah as ruler of Transjordan and to enter treaty negotiations under certain conditions.

300. Half-way through October the Acting High Commissioner for Transjordan decided as a disciplinary measure to remove certain sections of the Beni Atiya, who were still camped at Kerak, back into the Hejaz. At his urgent request His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires informed the Saudi Arab Government of the decision. Although they agreed to the move, it was delayed pending a full discussion between the Transjordan authorities and His Majesty's Government of a number of points of principle as well as detail.

301. This place (vide paragraphs 249 and 250) was found in October to be on the Nejd side of the frontier. So a formula was prepared in which this information was conveyed to the Saudi Government in such a way as not to commit His Majesty's Government irrevocably.

302. News was received in September that a little frontier friction caused by an over-zealous Iraqi official in July had been satisfactorily removed and the man punished. A somewhat similar case which had also arisen in July, but from the Nejd side, does not seem to have been settled, nor has anything more been heard of the Juhdat al Arar dispute (vide paragraph 252).

"Blockade" of Korea.

303. Although the practical difficulties raised by Ibn Sand to the dutying of his subjects' imports over the Koweit frontier do not seem to affect their very

similar trade across the Iraq frontier, as one might be led to expect, discussion of the blockade, in which this argument might have been used, has not been renewed at Jeddah. But it is now clear that argument will take as little effect on the Saudis as it appears to have done on the Iraqis. The Saudis are bent on reducing Kuwait, by hook or by crook, to a state of dependence on himself, an attitude which it will take some more material lever to correct.

304. Dues recently levied on goods from India delivered overside at Bahrain in transshipment to the Nejd mainland having been paid by Ibn Sand's agents without demur, it was decided that it was unnecessary formally to denounce the old concession of 1926 (*vide* paragraphs 48, 191 and 255).

305. There has been no disturbance apparent in the one nor impairment of relations with the other.

General

300. Two Saudi Arab delegates sailed on the 9th September to attend the Paris October meetings for the first time, one a Syrian doctor with a murderous reputation, the other a Syrian jack of all trades, who has hitherto been employed in buying arms.

His Majesty's Minister

307. Sir Andrew Ryan left Jorda in H. M. S. *Penzance* on the 2nd September for three and a half months' leave of absence. Mr. Hope Gill assumed the duties of Chargé d'Affaires.

308. There was a welcome relaxation in relations from the close contacts of the previous three months necessitated by the rebellion. The progress made in matters affecting Transjordan, pilgrimage, and slavery is reported in chapters II, VII and VIII.

309. No progress was made, in spite of considerable haggling between the Ministry of Finance and the Shell Company's agents, supported by the Legation, for the settlement of the benzene debt of a year back.

310 The French Chargé d'Affaires, M. Maigret, went on short leave on the 14th September leaving the French consulate in the charge of a Syrian clerk.

311. Commandatore Ottavio de Peppo, first Italian Minister to this country, reached Jeddah on the 25th September and presented himself to the British two days later. He is accompanied by a diplomatic secretary, M. Tonci, who has served in Morocco and Tunis and knows some Arabic.

312. On his passage down the Red Sea to Eritrea in October, the King of Italy exchanged wireless greetings with the Emperor.

313 Some minor recent anti-Italian propaganda in Arabic was received during September in the Legation, and no doubt a few more by post from Syria. (vide July-August report 1931, paragraph 57).

Soviet Russia.

314. In spite of a series of conversations held in Jedda in October between the Soviet Minister and the Saudi Minister of Finance supported by Fuad Bey Hamza, no substantial progress seems to have been achieved towards a settlement of the Soviet claim. It is reported that M. Tarnowski has been made to press more insistently than he would have liked for payment for the Soviet benzine supplied in 1931.

Turkey.

315. The Saudi Arab Government are arranging to send a mission to Turkey to receive military and aeronautical instruction and a press notice issued on the 16th September called for volunteers. On the 10th October the Turkish Ambassador in London informed the Secretary of State that his Government were on the point of sending two Turkish officers to Ibn Saud with 100 rifles and two mitrailleuses, ordered by the Amir Feisal when at Angora last June, but no ammunition. They would also inspect and repair some cannon dating from the Ottoman occupation. Ferit Bey apparently made no mention of the mission (cf. paragraph 305).

Iraq.

316. Frontier relations are mentioned in paragraph 302.

317. On the occasion of Iraq's entry into the League of Nations Ibn Saud telegraphed to King Feisal that he shared his brother's and the Iraq nation's delight and pleasure. An equally warm response was wirelessed back.

318. The Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires elect seems unready to come to Jedda. One of the first questions which he will have to tackle is an apparent usurpation by the Saudi Government of the revenues of all Hashimite properties in the Hejaz.

IV—Air Matters

Saudi Arab Air Force

319. The Saudi Arab Air Force was established on the 11th August (vide paragraph 270), but, as described in paragraph 315, preparations are being made to send a Saudi Arab mission to Turkey for instruction.

Emergency Landing Grounds

320. Imperial Airways began on the 1st October to use the Arabian instead of the Persian Coast for their eastern airway. No arrangements had by then been made for emergency landing grounds in the Arabian. The only landing ground in the Arabian which has been received at the Legation by the end of October.

321. His Majesty's High Commissioner for Iraq telegraphed to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires on the 28th September the information that on the 10th September a Royal Air Force biplane, on its way to Iraq, had engine trouble, but that spares had been flown to it the following day, enabling it to proceed to Bahrain. Owing to the lapse of time the Saudi Government were not informed, nor have they remarked on the matter.

V—Military Matters

Military Mission.

322. The proposed despatch of a military mission to Turkey for instructions and the exportation of two Turkish officers with arms for Ibn Saud have been noted in paragraph 315.

General

323. The aftermath of the rebellion is reported in paragraph 298. By October all the Akhwan levies collected in the Northern Hejaz and at Taif to deal with Ibn Rida and any other rebels seem to have dispersed to Nejd. Tribal levies are said to have gathered at Riyadh in some numbers to meet Ibn Saud after his return to Nejd and draw on his bounty. Nothing is known of

what, if anything, transpired between them and the King in regard to his future relations with the Saudi Government. It is reported that the progress of his negotiations with His Majesty's Government vis-à-vis Transjordan.

VI—Naval Matters

British

324. H M S *Pennance* (Commander A. R. Farquhar, R.N.) arrived at Jedda on the 30th August and embarked His Majesty's Minister and sailed for Port Sudan on the 2nd September.

325. H M S *Hastings* (Captain C. S. Sandford, R.N.) altered programme somewhat in order to lie at Port Sudan from the 22nd to the 26th September, in case naval assistance should be required at Jedda for the embarkation of a slave manumitted by the Legation (vide chapter VIII).

Foreign

326. The new Persian fleet, consisting of six small, diesel-driven coastal units of under 1,000 tons, visited Jedda from the 5th to the 7th October, on their way from Italy to the Gulf. They made a good impression.

VII—Pilgrimage

Indian.

327. A large number of questions affecting the Indian pilgrimage has been referred to the Legation. The Legation's pilgrimage reports for 1930 and 1931. The Government proposed to facilitate the work of all engaged in the Indian pilgrimage organisation. On the 8th October the Legation forwarded to the Government of India a tentative estimate of the cost in rupees of the 1933 (1931) pilgrimage. This was made out in detail for three grades of traveller, first class steamer and by car, second-class steamer and by bus, and deck passage and by camel. The totals came to (1) 1,700 rupees, or about £130, (2) 1,225 rupees, or about £90, and (3) 670 rupees, or about £45, the expenses being reckoned from home to home.

Japanese

328. The prospect of the coming Japanese pilgrimage has been discussed and generally the most numerous of all, are extremely bad. A sum equivalent to 29,000 rupees, or something over £2,000, has been subscribed in Java to enable some of the large numbers of pilgrims of former years, now destitute in Mecca, to return home. The Saudi Arab Government, however, are endeavouring to defer anything like a mass repatriation until after the pilgrimage, from fear of its adverse effect on would-be pilgrims.

Propaganda

329. The Saudi Arab Government are maintaining agents and subsidising newspapers in India, Java and elsewhere to advertise the pilgrimage. This propaganda is likely to be more marked than last year. An enlarged edition of the pilgrimage propaganda pamphlet has been distributed wholesale in various languages.

VIII—Slavery

Manumissions

330. The two male slaves who had taken refuge in the Legation in August were manumitted. The other, a female slave, was taken to the Assistant Governor of Jedda, the other to a leading merchant, and efforts were made by the authorities to detain both by charging them with theft, but these were successfully set aside. Another Abyssinian took refuge and was repatriated in October. Local emancipation was secured for a female Abyssinian, who took refuge in September and was willing to return to her master as a free woman, her Sharia document of freedom being filed in the Legation.

331 Four Sudanis also took refuge. Two were got away to Port Sudan without difficulty. One, who had escaped from the King's elder brother, the Amir Muhammad, was claimed by the Saudi Arab Government, on the ground that he was a Royal slave. It looked as though it might be even more difficult to get him away than it proved to embark Bakhit (vide paragraphs 100 to 105), and steps were taken to have a sloop in readiness at Port Sudan to visit Jedda if necessary. But the Saudi Arabs responded to no more than reason, and the man was allowed to embark without incident, accompanied by a senior member of the Legation. The fourth Sudanis slave is still in hand.

Enslavement of Pilgrims

332 A case of the alleged selling of his wife into slavery at Medina by a Nigerian pilgrim was brought to the notice of the Saudi Arab Government by the Legation. The pilgrim was asked to return to his country for the release of the woman and punishment of the man, if proved.

IX—Miscellaneous

Staff

333. Sir Andrew Ryan went on three and a half months' leave on the 2nd September.

Mr. Hope Gill took over from the Minister as Chargé d'Affaires.

Captain Lewis left Jedda on the 28th September, on resignation after twenty-one months' service as second archivist.

Mr. R. V. Hall joined the staff as second archivist on the 9th October.

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No. 90

Mr. Hope Gill to Sir John Simon.—(Received December 7)

(N. 456.)

Sir,

Jedda, November 17, 1932

WITH reference to my telegram No. 204 of to-day regarding the situation in Asir, I have the honour to inform you that a memorandum of a nature in which the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs handed yesterday to me and, I think, to my Italian colleague, and possibly to other colleagues also. It will no doubt be published in the Mecca press.

2. It recalls the steps by which the entire administration of Asir was eventually handed over by the Idrisi to Ibn Saud in 1930, affirms that since then peace and prosperity have reigned, but admits that friction has recently been caused between the Idrisi and Ibn Saud's Amir or Governor. The friction is stated to be purely personal, however, but so intense as to have caused the Idrisi to appeal to Ibn Saud, with protests of loyalty, to change his Amir. The memorandum concludes with the information that a committee of enquiry has been ordered, and by expressing the hope that there will be no need for military operations.

3. If neither the Imam Yahya nor armed and moneyed Hejazi conspirators of the Dabagh gang are behind the Idrisi, these hopes may well be justified, for strong Saudi reinforcements have been despatched by sea and from the interior. The former are standing by at Qunfida by Ibn Saud's orders, the latter, under Khalid bin-Luway, are further inland, while the committee of investigation comprising Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman's brother Hamid and the Tripolitan Khalid al-Qarqani, are approaching Jizan. The garrison of this place, under Ibn Saud's Amir, is thought to have now surrendered to the Idrisi after being besieged, waterless, in the old Turkish fort which overlooks the town, but their wireless station has apparently been damaged and the Government have no certain news of them.

4. I am sending copies of this despatch and enclosure to the Chief Commissioner at Aden and the Acting Commissioner at Port Sudan.

I have, &c

C. G. HOPE GILL.

Enclosure in No. 90

Memorandum

(Translation)

IT is known that in accordance with correspondence, decisions and discussions exchanged in the month of Jumad ath-Thani, 1349, between Sayyid al-Hasan al-Idrisi and the Government of His Majesty the King on the one side, and the Government of His Majesty the King on the other, Sayyid Hasan and his Legislative Assembly ceded the administration of the country as was recorded in the Treaty of Protection concluded at Mecca on the 14th Rabi-ath-Thani, 1345 (the 21st October, 1926). His Majesty accepted this cession in accordance with the gracious Royal decree issued on the 29th Jumad-ath-Thani, 1349 (the 21st November, 1930) in which the nature of the administration, duties and authority of Sayyid al-Hasan, the Legislative Assembly, the Amir of the territory and the director of its finance are defined. The new arrangement started to function as from that date.

2. It is known that since the new arrangement came into effect, all have enjoyed the prosperity, peace and good arrangement that took the place of the old anarchy. No complaint was made against the dispositions of the Amir and officials who, in accordance with the Royal instructions, have had all possible regard for the position and honour of Sayyid al-Hasan. It appears that personal friction has come between Sayyid al-Hasan and the present Amir, Fahd bin-Zunair, caused, according to the allegations of the former, by the fact that the latter thinks little of him, and does not appear before him with due respect nor dutiful to his person and position.

3. It seems that some who have selfish objects and wish to fish in troubled waters took occasion of this personal friction to intrigue between Sayyid al-Hasan and the Amir, that both of them, according to the documents which it has been possible to obtain, have been very angry with each other, and that the Amir has tried to interfere with Sayyid al-Hasan in matters not mentioned in the text of his instructions. The Sayyid has protested and complained of the Amir's ill will towards him in the following matters:—

First.—That the Amir does not show the respect due to his position, and that he does not speak politely to him.

Second.—That the Amir delays the payment of Sayyid al-Hasan's allowances, and that he does not help him when he complains.

Third.—That the Amir opposes his meeting certain tribesmen who belong to him.

Fourth.—That the Amir forbade mention of the name of Sayyid al-Hasan in the Friday prayer.

Fifth.—That the Amir prevents the Sayyid from flying his private flag.

Sixth.—That he refuses to consider the question of reducing customs dues in the port of Jizan in response to the general financial crisis.

4. The Government of His Majesty the King being desirous to put things right before harm is spread and before rogues blow the fire of insurrection have thought it best to be ready for emergency, and to place at the disposal of the authorities in that locality the military forces required to keep peace and restore order if necessary, pending the completion of close enquiries into the complaints referred to above. It now seems to them that they need not be worried, and that the matter is much simpler than they first thought.

5. Sayyid al-Hasan al-Idrisi telegraphed to His Majesty the King on Friday last to confirm his loyalty and that of all inhabitants of his territory and to say that the matter is only a personal one with the Amir and his attitude, that none has ever dreamt or thought of making a disloyal movement or rebelling against the present jurisdiction or separating from the body of this kingdom. He requested His Majesty to appoint a new Amir, whose appointment everything would be restored to order. Orders have been issued for a reliable body to investigate the matter thoroughly. The Government of His Majesty the King hope that there will be not the slightest need for military operations or the like.

Rajab 16, 1351 (November 15, 1932)

High Commissioner for Transjordan to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Received in Foreign Office, December 7)

(No. 169)

(Telegraphic)

December 5, 1932

YOC R telegram No. 164. I suggest that it would be desirable to support general assurance by following instances of support given by Amir to the policy of His Majesty's Government.—

(a) During Ibn Rafada's revolt: (1) He issued orders at the end of May prohibiting participation in Ibn Rafada's movement. (2) He assented to a law prohibiting the export of food stuffs in June. (3) He signed proclamation in July establishing prohibited zone on frontier. (4) He issued orders to Arab Legion in latter part of July expressing "our desire that no person or party should give assistance to Ibn Rafada and those with him and that we are against those who have such an idea." The declaration of prohibited zone and other measures informally effectively stopped traffic of supplies to the rebels and prevented tribes-

(b) Since Ibn Rafada's defeat: (1) On 6th October he gave me definite assurance that he would do nothing to assist any risings against Ibn Saud that might occur. (2) With concurrence of Ibn Saud, owing to conduct of Beni Atiya having been unsatisfactory, bulk of tribe was not allowed to remain in Transjordan in view of possibility that they might attempt hostile action, using territory of Transjordan as a base. (3) Mohammad bin Farhan is undergoing one year's imprisonment.

2. With regard to your telegram No. 163 and my reply No. 169: (a) Salim Abu Domeik is in Transjordan, having lived at Kerak District for over five years past. On 29th November Amir informed British Resident that at time the Beni Atiya were being moved into Hejaz he told Abu Domeik that he and his tribesmen must disregard any instructions to rise against Ibn Saud, whoever might give them, and that it was Amir's conviction that any action against Ibn Saud would be harmful to himself and Beni Atiya, because it was contrary to wishes of His Majesty's Government. Possibility of putting Abu Domeik under police supervision or of removing him to Palestine is being considered. Combination between him and Nuri Shalan is not considered likely. (b) Mahmud bin Farhan, brother of Mohammad, has not yet complied with order to leave Transjordan. If still in Transjordan after to-day he will be brought before Bedouin Control Board. (c) There are no other important members of tribe in close touch with Amir.

3. With regard to your telegram No. 165 and my reply No. 169: (a) Abdul Raouf Sultan has been dismissed by Amir on 14th November. (b) I am unable to produce concrete evidence on which Amir might be required to dismiss Amir Shaker and Hamid Kabiruti from country. (c) There are no proofs on which action could be taken against Shanqiti or Obeid Kabiruti, who are Transjordanians. Hamid Kabiruti might be removed from post as Mayor of Akaba, but I do not recommend this, as he is sometimes of use.

Reference your telegram No. 165. I have arranged to see Amir on 7th December and I will telegraph again after interview.

(Repeated to Jeddah, No. 179)

High Commissioner for Transjordan to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Received in Foreign Office, December 9)

(No. 170)

(Telegraphic)

December 6, 1932

MY telegram No. 169.

I interviewed Amir Abdullah this morning in presence of Colonel Cox, Mr A. L. Kirkbride acting as interpreter.

2. I said that last summer Abdullah had said, in his opinion, Ibn Rafada would be utterly defeated, but even so he thought that trouble would later on arise in Southern Hejaz. I was grateful that first of his two prophecies had proved

serious? Amir replied that he would be always ready to give me information, but on this subject he had very little knowledge. I replied, I do not think that troubles this year were very serious. I then said that I fully accepted and I relied on promise that Amir had given to me, that he would give no support in any form

None the less I would make a definite request to Abdullah that he would hold no communication for the present with people in Hejaz. Abdullah said that he had written no letters for a long time to the Hejaz and he would not write any while disturbances were going on.

3. I said that a report had reached me that a letter from Abdullah had been found at Jizan on 17th November addressed to Ali Dabbagh. Abdullah said again that he had written no letter for a long time, that he knew no man of that name, but that he knew members of that family.

4. I said that Beni Atiya had caused certain troubles during last few months, and I recognised that Abdullah had given every assistance to the British Resident in removing bulk of Beni Atiya from Transjordan to the Hejaz. I however, considered that Sheikh Selim Abu Domeik, paramount sheikh of Beni Atiya, was one who possibly might foment trouble, and I therefore considered Abu Domeik should leave Transjordan for the present and live in Beerahaba district until [corrupt group] are quiet in Hejaz. I also considered Karayin bin Atiya, who, I am now informed, is another sheikh hostile to Ibn Saud, and in close touch with Amir, should also leave Transjordan and reside in Palestine.

5. Amir replied that he had always agreed to carry out any wishes of His Majesty's Government which I had put to him. Although he personally saw no reason to mistrust Abu Domeik or Karayin, he would be quite ready to give orders that they should live in Palestine for the present. The British Resident and Captain Glubb would see that his orders were carried out.

6. I then said there were rumours that Amir Shaker was in touch with disturbers of the peace in Hejaz, and I requested Abdullah to tell Shaker that he must be most careful to show that he would give no support to any such people. The Amir said that the family of Shaker would not do anything unwise, as that would only lead to his family getting into trouble.

7. I asked Abdullah for his views on present situation in Saudi Arabia. He said his views remained unchanged, namely, that Ibn Saud was unpopular, that Sheikh of Koweit, the family of Ibn Rashid and people of Asir were all anxious to achieve overthrow of Ibn Saud, that it was natural for Ibn Saud in this difficult time to believe that some of the intrigues were due to Abdullah, and that it was even possible for enemies of Ibn Saud, in order to strengthen their position, to say that Abdullah was working for them, but that this was untrue. He knew his interests lay with the British Government, he had given his promise not to work against Ibn Saud and he would keep that promise. It was true that Ibn Saud had behaved very badly to his family, but people of Saudi Arabia had not asked him to go into that country and he had no inclination to mix himself in their politics. He had, in fact, agreed to recognise Ibn Saud. I said that I was sure that he would realise the serious nature of our conversation, and I would inform my Government that I fully accepted his promise of good faith.

8. The British Resident told me yesterday that the Executive and Legislative Councils wished the Amir to demand considerable changes in the agreement of 1923. Realising the seriousness of the subject which we had been discussing the Amir put forward no request regarding the agreement. I consider the time unsuitable for making any material changes in the agreement.

9. I agreed with the Amir that the possibility of large body of Akhwan crossing the Transjordan frontier to be extremely serious. I agreed with Amir that we shall be able to drive them back with little difficulty. His Majesty's Government need have little apprehension on this score.

(Repeated to Jeddah, No. 180)

Mr. Hope Gill to Sir John Simon.—(Received December 13.)

(No. 467)

Sir,

Jedda, November 30, 1932.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a translation of a general memorandum on Government indebtedness which the Saudi Arab Government has circulated to various commercial firms here, and which the Minister for Foreign Affairs has communicated to me under the following brief covering note:—

"I have the honour to forward to you herewith a memorandum in respect of the debts due to your Government by the Government of His Majesty the King, and to request that you will be good enough to transmit it to the authorities concerned."

I have not replied.

2. The discourtesy implicit in this off hand manner of treating with His Majesty the King's Government occupying a special position, is only equalled by the unsatisfactory nature of the memorandum itself. It is an obscure and probably dishonest document, which states, in effect, that it has only been found possible in the closing financial year to pay off some 14 million piastres worth—on customs, and to provide for a payment of 5 per cent. interest on the rest.

promulgated last November a translation of which was transmitted to you in my letter No. 444. The memorandum is divided into four parts, the first of which is divided under four heads, one of them the redemption of debt, and that of the equal treatment of all creditors. Reference is made in the present memorandum to the first principle, the second is conveniently ignored.

concerning failure. Article 2 explains away, without admitting it, the principle of equality of treatment.

3. The Arabic of article 4 has proved extremely difficult to translate; now that it is accurately translated it is well nigh unintelligible. I take it to mean roughly that the Government have issued drafts on customs to a value of some 14 million piastres, whether silver or gold I know not—probably a mixture of both, and that this amount accounts for the greater part of the income from revenue apportioned to debt redemption, a small balance being left with which to meet the interest at 5 per cent. on other debts announced in article 8. I cannot understand the import of the reference to the fall in silver values in this connexion.

the lunar year ending to-day from 17½ to the gold pound to nearly 20 to the gold pound). If it is intended to convey the impression that, owing to the fall in silver the Government have had to redeem debt at higher rates than they had estimated,

of issuing drafts on customs in the early part of the year in payment of silver (i.e., internal) debt, they had issued them at the end of the year, they would have saved money and made it go further; as who should plead in bankruptcy in France that, if only he had paid his sterling creditors at the end of 1931 instead of as and when he received their third and final applications (threatening legal proceedings), he would not be where he is.

6. I cannot extract any other reasonable meaning from article 4, which does not conflict with the known facts that all Government revenue is collected on a gold basis, that the external debt is mostly redeemable in gold and the internal mostly in silver, and that the budget estimate of 16½ million piastres has a gold figure equalling £150,000 (see Fuad Bey Hamza's statement, reported in paragraph 1 of Sir Andrew Ryan's letter, No. 38 of the 21st January last).

Large numbers of these are extant, and those which have been issued to Government employees in lieu of arrears of salary (see Sir Andrew Ryan's despatch No. 298 of the 12th July in new form) have at 50 per cent. of their face value. A month ago they stood on the market at 34 per cent.

8. The whole financial position is so unsatisfactory, and any explanation of obscurities, where all is obscure, would be of so little avail, even if it were forthcoming, that I have not thought it worth while to question the Saudi Arab Government on these and other points. The moment, moreover, is not propitious, with the rebellion in Asia and the new situation in America. I have not already have your instructions as to the treatment of these questions of Government indebtedness when he returns next month, I have the honour to enquire what action you would wish taken, in view of the enclosed memorandum, in regard to both the capital sums outstanding and the interest now offered.

9. I should add that the Dutch financial adviser returned to Jedda on the 6th November. He was not consulted in any particular regarding this memorandum which was sent him a few days before his departure. It has not yet been communicated to him by the Finance Ministry.

10. I am sending a copy of this despatch and enclosure to his Excellency the Viceroy of India.

I have, &c.

C. G. HOPE GILL.

Enclosure in No. 93.

Memorandum

(Translation)

THE Government of His Majesty the King have taken great care concerning the debts due by them, and His Majesty the King and his Government have paid special attention to the question of these debts in a manner which meets both the ability of the Treasury to pay and the confidence of creditors. As a result of careful search made last year, His Majesty the King was pleased to issue orders for a precise arrangement to be made in regard to the Government Treasury causing the estimated income to be divided into different parts, of which one part was assigned for the reimbursement and settlement of these debts.

2. It is not unknown that the fact which caused the Government to adopt this procedure was the financial crisis which has afflicted the world and the shortage of revenue of all Governments, caused by the irresistible crisis which entangled economic affairs and confused and paralysed financial matters. There is no need to give proof of what the Governments of the world have suffered in general as a result of this crisis. It is known to all. When the Government made their decision last year, namely, to postpone the settlement of debts for one year, ending the 10th of the month of November 1932, they took the most hopeful view of the matter and felt optimistic that the beginning of the end of the crisis was near, that the Government by a prudent management of their annual budget might be realized in full and the Government would thus be able to settle all claims due by their Treasury, but unfortunately the situation did not improve during last year and Governments and nations continued to suffer from the strain, anxiety and confusion in financial and economic affairs. It has become the duty of the Treasury in every kingdom to take new effective measures for fighting the crisis and parrying its dangers on the one hand, and for meeting the claims of creditors on the other.

3. The Treasury, in dealing with creditors, has followed a course in which the necessities of the economic situation were taken into consideration. It was based on helping any creditors who might choose to have the debt due to them liquidated by means of deductions to be allowed from the original amounts of duties payable on goods imported into the country. At first we tried this method and it was found to be applicable in all cases of creditors, but the Government found it inevitable to follow this method. It was eventually established that the method was not a bad one, and that it helped not a small number of creditors to have the whole or part of their debts reimbursed.

4. When the final account was made up after eleven months of the arrangement introduced by Royal order regarding the division of the estimated Treasury revenues, it was found that most of the item debts chest mentioned therein (as deriving) from the capital value of the estimated revenues, had been discharged in meeting the drafts on customs which had been given to creditors. That item slightly exceeded 14 million mari piastres, and in view of the falling values of

silver coin the net gold value of the item debts diminished by 50 per cent of its value. The Government was therefore bound to advise creditors before the time fixed for payment of the fact that it was unable to pay the amounts which were expected to be paid out of revenue, and in view of this fact they wish to explain the matter to those whom it concerns, showing meanwhile, the precautions which were taken to avoid this state of affairs, but which have failed.

It is hoped that the Government will succeed during next year in settling the whole, or the greater part, of these debts, subject, as mentioned above, to the state of the revenues improving generally.

In conclusion, the Government of His Majesty wish to express their regret for being obliged to follow this course, which they would have preferred to avoid, and to assure them of their true desire to do so.

(Seal) Ministry for Foreign Affairs

E 6844/76 251

No. 94

Secretary of State for the Colonies to the High Commissioner for Transjordan
(Received in Foreign Office, December 24)

(No. 167)

(Telegraphic)

Colonial Office December 23, 1932

His Majesty's Government have been considering the situation which would

place and large scale incursions into the Government would in view of the fact that the fighting forces of the Government are small and that the breach of article 2 of the Mandate would be a serious matter for the Government from their

immediate vicinity of the frontier to which pursuit might reasonably be expected to lead. It is noted that which Saudi forces were able to travel during remaining months of the year. Despatch follows.

E 6844/76 251

No. 95

Secretary of State for the Colonies to the High Commissioner for Transjordan—
(Received in Foreign Office, December 27)

Colonial Office December 24, 1932

No. 167, dated 23rd December. A rumour has been spread that Akhwan forces at Hail. I have also received a report that Akhwan forces with standards and arms are moving towards the frontier, which emanates from a source which has not yet been investigated. While any

remonstrance to the Government of Saudi Arabia would at the moment be unjustified in view of the insufficient evidence of the reliability of the information, I should, nevertheless, be glad if representations of a friendly nature could be made in the manner your telegram suggests. Further, a meeting at an early date between Glubb and Ibn Zaid at Bair or Asrag would allay suspicions and fears on both sides. Ibn Zaid has not replied to Glubb's written request, sent at the commencement of the present month, for an interview. A request should, I suggest, be addressed to the Government of Saudi Arabia asking it to issue instructions accordingly to Ibn Zaid.

It is, in my opinion, unlikely that an incursion of Akhwan will take place. Further, if it did, its repulse could be effected, I consider, without difficulty. Nevertheless, I am in agreement with the view which Glubb has expressed that it is possible that the Akhwan may occupy Wady Sirhan, and that in the event of such occupation considerable unrest among certain Transjordan tribes will certainly be caused thereby.

E 6892/76 25

No. 96

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon—(Received December 28)

(No. 225)

(Telegraphic)

Jedda, December 28, 1932

IT DDA telegram No. 220

Following is summary of information supplied by Fund on 26th December—

1. Khalid bin Luwey's force has reached Sahya after exhausting Njua tribe, but Khalid died of illness during march from Adha. Ibn Musaid is at Adha and is to be Governor-General of whole area. Authority of Government has been restored as far as line extending inland from Madhaya, which is small port about 25 kilom. south of Jizan. Further operation will be necessary between that line and Yemen frontier, owing to dubious attitude of Maawila and other tribes. Hasan Idriat is with Maawila.

2. Fuad had instructions of the King to inform me of proceedings of Italian sloop which visited Jizan without notice on 21st December. It withdrew next day in deference to remonstrance, but again entered territorial waters at Farsan and visited Madhaya twice on 23rd December. Saudi Government take strongest objection to breach of international practice involved. Italian Minister has referred matter to his Government, who are not known to have sanctioned proceedings of sloop. I promised to convey this information to you but declined to comment on it.

3. Fuad minimised importance of revolt in itself but spoke at length of machinations of outside promoters. He mentioned, amongst others, Marghani, Abdurrauf Sabhan (who had attended meeting of principal conspirators at Asmara last May). His remarks coloured by strong suspicion of Italian authorities, although he did not expressly accuse them of complicity in plot hatched by persons whose activities in Eritrea they tolerated.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 287, Aden, No. 288, senior naval officer, No. 289)

E 6893/76 251

No. 97

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon—(Received December 28)

(No. 226)

(Telegraphic)

Jedda, December 28, 1932

MY immediately preceding telegram and your telegram No. 150

I do not consider it urgent to reply officially to Saudi memoranda of 15th and 26th November, provided I can discuss contents with reasonable freedom with Fuad. He will return to Jedda any day after 1st January. If I do not speak for the Ministry of the Colonies, I shall be unable to do so at least of waiting on events in Asir, possibly in collusion with Italians.

[8079]

3

CHAPTER II.—SYRIA

E 3368 171.691

No. 100

General Note to Sir John Simon.—(Received July 5)

(No. 47. Confidential.)

Damascus, June 18, 1932

2. When the Parliament reassembled on the 11th June, the territorial question was sharply in evidence. There were three candidates for the presidency of the republic—Souhbi Barakat, Aleppo, Moderate; Hashem el Atassi, Damascus, Nationalist, and Hakkî el-Azm, Damascus, Moderate, the last was the French nominee. The North Syrian bloc of thirty Deputies had shown clearly at the first sitting that it would support no candidate other than Hashem el Atassi, regardless of any other consideration, and the smaller groups of Hakkî el-Azm and Hashem el Atassi were equally resolved not to yield. On the 10th the Nationalists in the Chamber of Deputies had declared that they would support no candidate for any reason, but in fact because their candidate had no hope of success.

8. The High Commissioner thus found himself confronted with a certain victory for Souhbi Barakat, originally his own nominee but now fallen from grace. He took Ali-el-Abed (who had meanwhile been completely discarded), the Nationalists and escorted to the presidential quarters a collection of the

4. A salute of seventeen guns was fired and the new Syrian flag, white and red, Fatimid and Umayyad dynasties, respectively, with three red stars across the white, the motive of which eludes me.

[illegible][illegible]

The closest cooperation was provided exclusively by northern Deputies. It was in the ... and to protests against the Aleppo question. A ... of the ... Nationalists ... of leaving them ... of a wing ... seemed ... and ... Deputies ... with Zerkov ... reason ...

monthly wage of 2,000 fr. with an annual bonus of 6,000 fr.

8. The new Cabinet has been formed by Hakkî-el Azm, who will also be Minister of the Interior. It will include Jamâl Mardam, Minister of Finance and Agriculture; Mustafa R. Nâsiri, Minister of Justice and Education; and Selim Jambart, Moderate, of Aleppo, as Minister of Public Works. The new Prime Minister, about the said formation, has apportioned the plums to the satisfaction of the greatest number, and it is understood that during the recess the Ministry will be chiefly concerned with economic questions.

[6079]

14

E 2 2 251

No. 85

Sir A. Rugg to Sir John Simon.—(Received December 31)

(No. 232)

(Telegraphische)

MY telegram No. 223

Jeddo, December 31, 1952

Official communiqué published on 30th December states majority of tribes have submitted within the period allowed. Only tribes which have not done so are Mawatira and part of Beni Shubayl, to whom Idriis and his people have gone. Force concentrated at Sabya will undertake punitive operations under Saad, who has been appointed to succeed his father, Khalid-bin-Luwey, as commander and as Amir of Khurma.

Communiqué commends attitude of Imam, with whom the King is conducting friendly and satisfactory correspondence.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 287; Aden, No. 208, senior naval officer
No. 290)

E 6892 6839 25†

No. 94

Sir John Simon to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda)

(No 162)

7. 10. 1942

OUR telegram No. 226 of 26th December - Relations between Transjordan and Saudi Arabia

Possibility of taking further measures (including action against Amir Shaker and Hamid al Wadi) to deal with anti-Saudi intrigues in Transjordan is still being considered.

As it may thus still prove possible to make complete and fairly satisfactory arrangements with Akhwan, and that all necessary measures would be taken to repel such incursions, you may think it preferable to delay action until the situation has been fully ascertained. The measures taken in Transjordan and Aden. But, if not, you are authorised to make the most of this information orally with Fud Hamza as you propose.

(Repeated to Transjordan, No. 172)

10. I am sending a copy of this despatch direct to His Majesty's High Commissioner in Beirut and Aleppo. His Majesty's consular officers at Beirut and Aleppo.

I have, &c
E. C. HOLE

E 3622 171 89]

No. 101

Acting Vice-Consul Urquhart to Sir John Simon.—(Received July 20)

(No. 61.)

Sir,

Beirut, July 5, 1932

I HAVE the honour to report that M. Ponsot, the French High Commissioner, sailed from Beirut for France on the 30th June. He was accompanied by M. Tétreau, Secretary General, by the Commander-in-chief of the military forces, by the Chef du Cabinet militaire, and other officials. No notice having been given, the departure was informal, and there was only a handful of local notables and officials to shake hands with M. Ponsot as he embarked. M. Chauvel, French Consul at Angora, followed him on his way to France.

2. M. Ponsot appears to have decided to return to France at very short notice. There was certainly no knowledge of his impending departure in the High Commission three days before, when I had occasion to go there on business. It was then thought that he would leave soon after the middle of July. M. Chauvel, apologising because certain matters concerning this consulate-general had been left unattended to by the High Commissioner, explained to me at the quayside that M. Ponsot was now anxious to arrive in France as early as possible, in order to meet M. Herriot and to consult with officials in Paris before they went on leave in July.

3. M. Ponsot cannot, as regards politics, claim to have steered his ship of State to a safe harbour, nor even to a temporary anchorage. On the contrary, it remains in rather rough water, and he leaves the bridge with the controls set to full speed ahead in Syria on the one hand, and full speed astern in the Lebanon on the other, the one busily acquiring the paraphernalia of representative government, the other resolutely discarding it. One thing which may be said in favour of this disturbing manœuvre is that it gives the mixed crew something to do for a space, and may, while they are doing it, keep them from something worse. Meanwhile, M. Ponsot may, in the course of his leave in France, think of some better way of handling his refractory controls, or possibly someone else may be found to take them over.

4. As regards economics, the horizon is overcast, and it is on account of the economic situation in the Lebanese Republic that M. Ponsot is returning to France. In the Lebanon, the experiment of representative government is regarded as having failed, and a vigorous policy of retrenchment and reform has been pursued by President Debbas, with the support or at the instigation of M. Ponsot, since the Constitution was suspended on the 9th May. Carrying the power of the State in his person, M. Debbas has already overturned many comfortable office chairs and piled into many curtained corners. In two months he has issued twenty-two economy decrees, eighteen ordering reductions of official salaries, two the reduction of establishments, and two the modification of the pensions' laws, so as to reduce the charge on the State for account of pensions. It was estimated that up to the 30th June, he had effected a saving of some £S 700,000.

That is not yet enough, this year, owing to the decline in revenue, M. Debbas has little hope that the Lebanon will receive its usual share of £S 800,000 in the customs-house takings, while the general trade depression has seriously curtailed other sources of income.

5. While these mandated territories are primarily agricultural, there, nevertheless, do exist local industries of sufficient importance, especially in Syria, to cause the authorities to endeavour, while satisfying their need for more revenue,

to provide at the same time protection for local manufactures in face of the flood of cheap goods now flowing in from abroad. Merchants in the Lebanon, who live largely on the import and passage of goods through this territory to the interior, are protesting energetically, but vainly. Fresh Customs duties are unavoidable so long as the total yield continues to fall, and the authorities are clearly resolved that these new duties shall have it said in their favour that they foster local industries. The latest increase was announced on the 29th June, when the duty on foreign cements was increased by more than 100 per cent. A few days later the French High Commissioner met the protests of the merchants by claiming credit for the more effective protection now afforded to the local industry, and got credit accordingly from the press. Another side to the question is that the Chekka cement works, in the Lebanon, founded and to a large extent owned by the Maronite Patriarch, cannot possibly supply the needs of the country during the building season, now in full swing, while the new works at Damascus are still unfinished. A good deal of cement must inevitably be imported from abroad for some time to come, thus ensuring revenue for the Customs, high prices for the local product, and a correspondingly good return for the francophile patriarch. There cannot, however, be many such opportunities to secure revenue, influential friends and credit with the public at one and the same time.

6. M. Ponsot will, however, be able to tell M. Herriot that these mandated territories are for the time being calm and orderly, that the new toy in Syria, and the new broom in the Lebanon will for some time allay the discontent which is inevitably bred by hard times and divert criticism from the mandatory authority. It is true that the disunited politicians here are endeavouring to stir up trouble by pointing to the comparatively high salaries paid to French officials while the local Lebanese are having their smaller salaries reduced but M. Ponsot himself practically forestalled that line of criticism by publishing a financial statement showing how much France sends annually as pay for the army and the High Commissioner's staff. M. Ponsot is in a strong position at present and that M. Herriot may address himself to his European problems with the assurance that nothing much, apart from the unexpected, is likely to happen here for some little time.

I have, &c

R. W. URQUHART

E 5786 171, 89]

No. 102

Lord Tyrrell to Sir John Simon.—(Received November 4.)

(No. 1476.)

Sir,

Paris, November 3, 1932.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 2150 of the 20th October, I have the honour to inform you that the *Echo de Paris* of a few days ago contained the following statement—

"It is believed that a treaty will shortly be signed between the French Government and the Government in Damascus, bringing to an end the French mandate over the State of Syria and replacing it by a treaty similar to that concluded between Great Britain and Iraq."

"The French mandate will continue over the Republic of Lebanon. The State of the Almonites will naturally maintain its own Constitution, but the exact conditions do not seem to be quite definite."

2. The *Action française* of the 1st instant went further, and published a statement to the effect that the treaty had been signed.

3. In view of these rumours, which seemed to me highly fanciful, I took a recent opportunity of enquiring at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs whether there was any foundation for them. I was informed that the French Government were not in a position to say whether or not such a treaty had been signed, but that it was impossible to say how long the process would take. It was necessary first and foremost that there should be a Government in Syria with which the French Government could profitably deal. At present there was no

kind of union and much trouble was being created by the extremists, a further factor in the delay. Altogether, it might well be two or three years before the time was ripe for Syria's admission to the League of Nations.

I have, &c.
TYRRELL

E 5807 171, 89]

No. 103.

Acting Consul-General Urquhart to Sir John Simon.—(Received November 5.)

(No. 83.)

Sir,

Beirut, October 26, 1932

I HAVE the honour to report that M. Ponsot, the French High Commissioner, arrived from Europe on the 21st instant, having broken his journey in Turkey. He did not come to Beirut. After a talk with M. Debbas, President of the Lebanese Republic, at Rayak, he proceeded direct to Damascus. He has summoned thither his secretary general and the political Cabinet from Beirut, and clearly intends to concentrate on Syrian affairs.

1. I suggest that M. Ponsot has brought back with him proposals for a solution of the Syrian political situation. The case of Iraq is a precedent. The High Commissioner has an obligation to offer something approximating the satisfactory status now attained by that country. The inspired press does not evade this implication, but it stresses the comparative docility of the nationalists in Iraq and makes reserve for the intractability of Syrian Nationalists. France is represented as ready to treat Syria handsomely provided the Nationalists behave themselves. A meeting of these Nationalists at Sofar in the Lebanon about ten days ago discussed the situation which would arise on the High Commissioner's return and there were some who suspected that France had no intention of treating Syria handsomely. They considered my suggestion that the High Commissioner should bring back some proposal quite unacceptable to patriots like themselves (who have not been so far from the world at large, and the League of Nations in particular, and declare that Syria was still unfit to rise from her present position. The meeting decided to await the High Commissioner's proposals in a mood of some suspicion and in readiness to resume obstructive tactics if they proved unsatisfactory.

3. Negotiations are now proceeding, and progress will doubtless be reported to you in due course. The High Commissioner has begun at a great pace, if he can keep it up he may reach his objective, but if he finds that he must stop and bargain with all the niggling and contradictory interests in Syria he will again arrive at an impasse. Feeling is, however, optimistic here for the time being.

4. In these circumstances, the Lebanon is, for the time being, in a political backwater. The public, as a whole, appear to be perfectly satisfied with present political conditions, there is no demand for the restoration of a system of government which has become entirely discredited because it cost so much and did so little, and, as a result, as a result of the Ministry of Public Works, it was extremely dishonest whenever opportunity offered. That Ministry naturally offered the best opportunities for the making of fortunes made in a few years were investigated, after the suspension of the Constitution, and by degrees suspicion was kept higher on the level of official until it is approaching the Minister himself, some say that it ought to go beyond him to certain French officials, but there is perhaps a too great readiness to seek sensation by implicating the supreme authority.

5. Though tranquil politically, the economic situation of the Lebanon is still difficult. The programme of higher tariffs and protection for all local industries in the territories under French mandate is not altogether welcomed here, where so many live by handling imports from abroad. There is a good deal of distress among the common people which tends from time to time to express itself, for lack of other means, by violence. A determined attempt was made in the course of the summer to blow up the oil tanks of the Shell and Standard Oil companies, happily without success. It is unfortunate that the police have been

unable to find the culprits. The fact is that what might be called the "depressed" thousands might have adopted that method of protest. Nevertheless, discontent with economic conditions is still under the surface and M. Debbas will in all probability be kept at Rayak on the 21st instant, of keeping the Lebanon quiet while the High Commissioner devotes its main energies to the Syrian problem.

I have, &c.
R W URQUHART

E 5167 15 89]

No. 104

Sixty-eighth Session of the Council League of Nations. Extract from Final Minutes of the Fourth Meeting, Public, held on October 2, Geneva.—(Received in Foreign Office, November 8, 1932.)

3130. Mandates Frontier between Iraq and Syria. Report of the Commission of Enquiry set up by the Council on December 9, 1931.

COLONEL ISELIN, chairman of the Commission of Enquiry, came to the Council table.

M YEVTITCH presented the following report and draft resolution:—(")

"At its meeting held at Paris on the 9th December, 1931, the Council, according to a joint request by the British and French Governments, agreed in principle to examine all aspects of the difficulties raised by the delimitation of the frontier between Iraq and Syria. In particular it undertook to form its conclusions as to the intentions of article 1 of the Franco-British Convention of the 23rd December, 1920, and to indicate a frontier between Iraq and Syria based on that convention, but modified as required by the difficulties to which the two mandatory Powers concerned had drawn attention.

"Adopting the suggestions of the British and French Governments, the Council decided to send a Commission of Enquiry to the spot and to make such suggestions as might assist the Council in framing its decision.

"Further, the Council stated that its decision on this question would be final.

My colleagues have doubtless also read the letter dated the 2nd November 1932, from the Government of Iraq, in which the Government of Iraq confirmed its Government's acceptance of the principle of such frontier as the Council might indicate as representing the final solution of the question.

I am sure that the Council will be able to find a way to the solution of this question, and I am sure that the Council will be able to find a way to the solution of this question.

For one purpose, the Council has decided to send a Commission of Enquiry to the spot and to make such suggestions as might assist the Council in framing its decision.

" In the final chapter of its report, the commission indicates the line which it recommends. This line is shown on the maps appended to the report. Except where the frontier follows a watercourse, it is formed by a series of straight lines connecting points which are defined both on the map and on the ground. The commission considers that these points should constitute the fixed points of the frontier. The actual line between those points would still have to be determined by a Boundary Commission with sufficiently wide powers to take into account local needs and the possible inaccuracy of the maps on which the commission has drawn the suggested line.

" I have been able to discuss the matter with the representatives of the two Governments. It would have some objections to offer on strategic and administrative grounds to the northern sector of the frontier line recommended by the commission. The French Government expresses its preference for the arguments adduced by the minority in support of its view on the Jebel Sinjar area.

" None the less, the two Governments, appreciating the spirit in which the Commission of Enquiry has worked, are confident that the Council will formulate an equitable decision.

" In those circumstances, I would propose that the Council adopt the line unanimously suggested by the Commission of Enquiry, and, in the Jebel Sinjar area, the line indicated by the majority of the commission, it being the opinion of the Permanent Mandates Committee.

" The Commission of Enquiry regarding the necessity of special agreements being concluded between the States concerned to settle in accordance with local custom, the frontier régime and the problems of seasonal migration, which are of particular importance in those regions.

" Should the Council endorse what I have said, I would propose that it adopt the following resolution:

The Council,

" Approving the present report submitted by the representative of Yugoslavia,

" Declares itself disposed to adopt, as a final settlement of the question of the frontier between Iraq and Syria, the line unanimously suggested by the Commission of Enquiry, and in the Jebel Sinjar area the line indicated by the majority of the commission.

" Requests, however, the Permanent Mandates Commission to state as soon as possible its opinion on the line so indicated from the point of view of the interests of the territories affected.

" Recommends, in accordance with the suggestion of the commission, the conclusion of agreements between the parties concerned for the purpose of settling in accordance with local custom the frontier régime and questions connected with seasonal migration;

" Accordingly requests the Secretary General to communicate the report of the Commission of Enquiry to the Permanent Mandates Commission, together with the minutes of the present meeting of the Council.

M PAGANON said that his Government accepted, for its part, the rapporteur's proposals, and would not mingle any expression of regret with its satisfaction. He said that the United Kingdom Government and itself of a question which was brought before the Council by the two Governments jointly at the meeting held on the 9th December, 1931. As the report of the Commission of Enquiry had been received, the Mandates Committee had expressed its opinion.

" The Council would have had the merit of having decided the question of the frontier between Iraq and Syria before the committee appointed by the Council to study on the spot the line of the frontier had performed its delicate task.

While thanking Colonel Iselin, M. de Maradès, M. Petersen and their collaborators on their work, he was anxious to associate with their names the memory of Colonel de Reynier, who was the first chairman of the committee. For twelve years past Colonel de Reynier had accomplished difficult missions with exceptional authority and unwearied devotion; and it might be said that no one had a better title than he to the League's gratitude.

A cruel fate had willed that death should come to him in the process of accomplishing a new task, undertaken in the service of the League, before the agreement on the preparation of which he was engaged had been achieved. The Council, in taking note of this agreement, could not but recall and pay tribute to the memory of one who did good work to bring it about.

SIR JOHN SIMON associated himself and his Government most warmly with what had just been said by the representative of France, and with the latter's expression of thanks to the chairman and members of the Commission of Enquiry for their work in regard to the settlement of this frontier question. In particular, he desired to join with his French colleague in expressing the very deep regret of the British Government at the death of Colonel de Reynier, of whom he would merely say that he was a great servant in the cause of the League and of peace.

He added that a statement had already been initiated, on behalf of the parties, detailing the points to be covered by the Neighbourly Relations Agreement recommended in the report.

He thought the Council was entitled to take satisfaction in, and to call the attention of the world to, the fact that once again the organs of the League had successfully discharged their mission of mediation and conciliation. He took the opportunity of paying another tribute to the valuable contribution made to the settlement of the problem by the rapporteur.

M PAGANON said that his Government accepted, for its part, the rapporteur's proposals. As one of the mandatory Powers, France had had many occasions to express its appreciation of the work done by the representative of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. He was particularly anxious to thank him for his services at a time when a rule allowing of no exceptions was compelling him, to the great regret of his colleagues, to give up the place on the Council which he had filled with so much distinction and with such a high appreciation of international responsibilities.

COLONEL ISELIN expressed the thanks of the committee, of which he had been chairman, for the marks of appreciation which its work had received.

While accepting this tribute in the name of his colleague and collaborators, he once again expressed his appreciation of the willing and obliging manner in which the high authorities and agents of the parties, and in particular the assessors, had throughout acted in their relations with the committee, and of all the efforts they had made to facilitate the latter's accomplishment of its task.

(The draft resolution was adopted.)

SIR JOHN SIMON said there was one matter he would ask permission to bring to the notice of the Council in connexion with the report on the Syria-Iraq frontier.

Reference was made in that report to the necessity of constituting—for the purpose of laying down the frontier on the ground—a Demarcation Commission possessed of sufficiently wide powers to take into account local needs and the possible inaccuracy of maps upon which the Commission of Enquiry had drawn the suggested line. The Council had decided that this Demarcation Commission should have a neutral chairman—that was to say, a national of some State not directly concerned with the question—and that this neutral chairman should be invested with arbitral authority.

He suggested that the President of the Council should be given the necessary powers to select a national of some State not directly concerned with the question to preside over the contemplated Demarcation Commission. He understood that the representative of Yugoslavia, with whom the matter had already been discussed, had prepared for the Council's consideration a draft resolution to give effect to the suggestion he had just put forward.

therefore, the two Governments could, if need be, call together the long-slumbering general meeting and obtain legal sanction for their proposals.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador in Paris.

I have, &c.
(For the Ambassador),
JAMES MORGAN

E 6043/5774 89) No. 108

Sir G. Clerk to Sir John Simon.—(Received November 16.)

(No. 372)

Sir, Angora, November 12 1932
 WITH reference to my despatch No. 306 of to-day's date, in which I recorded the hesitation of my French colleague to supply me with a copy of the Franco-Turkish agreement regarding the future of the portion of the Bagdad Railway lying between Bozanti and Nisibin I have the honour to transmit to you the accompanying copy of the agreement, for which I am indebted to the spontaneous courtesy of Cavut Bey, head of the First Department of the Turkish Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

2. I am sending a copy of this despatch and of its enclosure to His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris.

I have an
(For the Ambassador)
JAMES MORGAN

Enclosure 10 No 1088

*Franco-Turkish Agreement respecting the Bagdad Railway between Bonatti
and Yussuf*

PROCES-VERBAL(1) de signatures de la déclaration commune en date du 27 octobre 1932 relative aux chemins de fer

Sans préjudice à des [sic] dispositions du préambule de la déclaration commune, les signataires s'accordent pour reconnaître que le délai d'un an maximum stipulé en l'article 1er des paragraphes 1er, 2e, 3e et 4e de cette déclaration, délai au delà duquel chacune des hautes parties contractantes pourra reprendre sa liberté d'action.

Dr. TEVFIK ROSTO
CHARLES DE CHAMBRUN

Ankara, le 27 octobre 1932

Déclaration commune

LE Gouvernement turc et le Gouvernement français, animés du désir de resserrer les liens d'une amicale collaboration sur la frontière turco-syrienne, et reconnaissant qu'il est de leur commun intérêt de définir, dans l'esprit de l'article 10 de l'accord d'Ankara du 20 octobre 1921, les conditions de fonctionnement normal de la section du "Chemin de Fer de Bagdad" comprise entre Alexandrette et les au-delà de Nisibin, et d'assurer le prolongement de ce chemin de fer vers l'est, déclarent leur intention d'apporter tous leurs soins à la valorisation du réseau et de favoriser à cette fin par une collaboration des deux parties, la conclusion d'un accord au sein de la Société concessionnaire des Chemins de Fer de Bagdad, en vue d'établir un régime rationnel conforme aux intérêts du trafic entre la Turquie et la Syrie.

2) Note.—This *pro-verbis* was not originally communicated to Sir G. Clerk, but was subsequently published in the Turkish press.

Pour assurer la réalisation de ces intentions les hautes parties contractantes conviennent :

- De procéder à la liquidation de l'exploitation actuelle, dans le délai maximum d'un an,
- D'assurer de concert, en attendant l'établissement d'un régime définitif le fonctionnement normal du réseau et la continuité du trafic sur l'ensemble de ce réseau
- De rechercher à cette fin, au cours du délai d'un an susvisé, un accord relatif à une exploitation provisoire, soit par l'entremise de compagnies constituées conformément aux dispositions du protocole ci annexé, soit, si l'application de ce protocole se heurte à des difficultés insurmontables, par tout autre mode de gestion directe ou indirecte répondant au but poursuivi.

Jusqu'à l'expiration du délai maximum d'un an nécessaire à la liquidation de l'exploitation actuelle et à l'établissement d'un nouveau régime provisoire, l'état de choses présent ne sera pas modifié. Toutefois, le secteur Adana-Fevzi Pacha sera remis au Gouvernement turc six mois après la signature du présent accord.

Dr. T. ROSTO
CHARLES DE CHAMBRUN

Ankara, le 27 octobre 1932

Protocole relatif à l'Établissement d'un nouveau Régime et à la Liquidation de l'Exploitation actuelle

ARTICLE 1^{er}

Le Gouvernement turc assurera l'exploitation de la section Bozanti-Adana-Fevzi Pacha.

L'exploitation des sections Payas-Toprak Kalé, Fevzi Pacha-Meldan Ekbat et Tchoban Bey-Nissabîn, sises en territoire turc, sera confiée à une société à capitaux français, constituée sous le régime des lois turques, et dans laquelle une participation pourra être réservée à des capitaux turcs. Ladite société s'entendra avec le Gouvernement turc pour déterminer les conditions de cette exploitation.

L'exploitation des sections Alexandrette-Payas, Meldan Ekbat-Tchoban Bey et prolongement en territoire syrien au delà de Nissabîn, sises en territoire syrien sera confiée à une société constituée sous le régime des lois françaises.

ARTICLE 2

Un accord interviendra entre les chemins de fer de l'Etat turc, la société turque et la société française pour régler les conditions du trafic. Cet accord portera notamment :

- Sur le droit de passage moyennant péage des convois de la société turque exploitée par les chemins de fer de l'Etat turc
- Sur les conditions de fixation des tarifs de transport pour cette section qui intéresse les trois exploitations.

Aucun différentiel ne pourra être établi en principe sur cette section.

Dans des conditions arrêtées par le présent accord, à dater du 30 mai 1932 la Turquie aura le droit de faire ses transports militaires par chemin de fer de Meldan Ekbat à Tchoban Bey à travers le territoire syrien et la Syrie aura le droit de faire ses transports militaires par chemin de fer de Tchoban Bey à Nissabîn à travers le territoire turc.

ARTICLE 3

La répartition du matériel et des approvisionnements sera effectuée d'un commun accord entre les intéressés.

En cas de désaccord sur cette répartition, il sera fait appel à un arbitre désigné par l'Etat turc et les représentants de la République française.

ARTICLE 4

Le Gouvernement turc renonce, en son nom propre, à toute réclamation sur les produits de l'exploitation de la section Bozanti-Adana-Fevzi Pacha jusqu'à la date de sa remise au Gouvernement turc, et donne pour la part lui revenant quitus définitif des comptes afférents à cette exploitation.

ARTICLE 5

Pour une durée de quinze années, à compter de la date de la signature du présent protocole et à moins qu'un accord n'intervienne au cours de cette période pour fixer le régime définitif de ce chemin de fer, la Turquie et la Syrie ne feront pas usage de leur droit de rachat, sans s'être préalablement mis d'accord.

Toutefois, le Gouvernement turc se réserve la faculté de faire usage de son droit de rachat, pour les sections Payas-Toprak Kalé et Fevzi Pacha-Meldan Ekbat, à partir de la quatrième année de la prise en charge de l'exploitation de ces sections par la société turque, moyennant préavis de trois mois à cette dernière.

De même, la société turque exploitant la section Tchoban Bey-Nissabîn aura le droit de rachat de cette section, moyennant préavis de trois mois, à dater de l'exploitation de cette section, de renoncer à cette exploitation moyennant préavis de trois mois.

ARTICLE 6

Les droits conférés par le présent protocole à la société exploitant les sections sises en territoire turc ne seront en aucun cas transférables à une autre société, sauf accord préalable avec le Gouvernement turc.

Fait en double exemplaire à Ankara le 27 octobre 1932

Dr. TEVFIK ROSTO
CHARLES DE CHAMBRUN

Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs to French Ambassador.

M l'Ambassadeur,

Ankara, le 27 octobre 1932.

ME référant au protocole que nous avons signé en date de ce jour, il me paraît utile de préciser que la société française exploitant la section Bozanti-Adana-Fevzi Pacha, dont la constitution est prévue à l'article 1^{er}, paragraphe 2, de ce protocole, sera analogue à celle de la Compagnie des Chemins de Fer Izmir-Kasaba, cette société aura toute liberté pour faire une entente avec la société française exploitant en Syrie, en vue d'assurer l'unité de direction et de fonctionnement nécessaire à l'exploitation.

Je vous prie, &c.

Dr. TEVFIK ROSTO

Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs to French Ambassador.

M l'Ambassadeur,

Ankara, le 27 octobre 1932

ME référant au protocole que nous avons signé en date de ce jour, j'ai l'honneur de faire connaître à votre Excellence qu'en cas de licenciement du personnel actuellement employé sur la section Bozanti-Adana-Fevzi Pacha par la République turque dans un délai de six mois à dater de la signature du présent protocole, il sera procédé suivant la règle observée pour le licenciement du personnel de la ligne Mersin-Adana.

Je vous prie, &c.

Dr. TEVFIK ROSTO.

French Ambassador to Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs

M. le Ministre.

Ankara, le 21 octobre 1932

J'AI l'honneur d'accuser réception des deux lettres que votre Excellence a bien voulu m'adresser pour être annexées au protocole que nous venons de signer à la date de ce jour.

En prenant acte de ces documents, je vous renouvelle, etc.

CHARLES DE CHAMBRUN

[E 6246 171 89]

No. 107

Vice Consul Napier to Sir John Simon (Received November 20)

No. 71

London, November 2, 1932

I HAVE the honour to refer to Mr. Hule's despatch No. 47 of the 16th June in which he reported the close of the first session of the first Syrian Parliament, and to inform you that, on the 29th ultimo, it reassembled for the October session, in the presence of the High Commissioner's staff.

2. In accordance with a manifesto published a few hours before the hour the session was due to open, the members of the Nationalist party, with the exception of the two Ministers, abstained from attending.

3. The first day, as prescribed by the terms of the Constitution, was devoted to the election of officials; and, in the absence of the Nationalists, Souhbi Bey Barakat was re-elected to the office of President of the Chamber, with only one vote against him. It should be noted, as a commentary on parliamentary procedure in these countries, that all parties appear to attach considerable importance to this office, on the assumption that, by a judicious exercise of his prerogative, the "Speaker" can manoeuvre the proceedings of the assembly to the advantage of his own party. Whether Souhbi Bey is capable of these seemingly machinations I am not prepared to say. He was described in these despatches, in 1925, as a "rather pitiful nonentity," and "deficient in intelligence," but, as recently as August 1932, a "strong personality, quite capable of forming and maintaining an independent opinion." I suspect that his opinion is guided, like that of most "men of property," by the identification of his own interests with the principles of law, order and security, whilst, as his past record would indicate, he is not entirely devoid of a sense of patriotism and a sense of proportion.

4. On the second day of the session (the 31st October), the stage was set, as Souhbi Bey himself informed me late the previous evening, for the Government to submit, according to the Constitution, to a vote of confidence. In order to assess the full importance (such as it is) of the events which succeeded the return of M. Ponsot, and the outcome of the second day of the session, it should be borne in mind that the Government, composed of two Nationalists, and in spite of a divergence of opinion in the ranks of the moderates, was assured of a majority. The proceedings, however, opened (two hours behind schedule) by the Minister of Justice, one of the two Nationalist Ministers, calling on behalf of the Government for an adjournment, in order that they might submit a more definite programme than was possible for the moment.

5. The Minister of Justice, who was actually a firebrand and an agitator, at variance with the majority of his purely personal grounds. It was seconded, however, by Maître Faiz Bey Khouri, who appeared as the only renegade from his own (Nationalist) party.

6. The Minister of Finance (the other Nationalist Minister) expressed the hope that the period of adjournment would enable the Government to insert as the main item in their programme a definition of the terms of the proposed treaty, which would conciliate the interests of all parties.

7. Such are the facts incidental upon the opening of a Parliament, which is to be devoted primarily to matters of public finance, was regarded by popular opinion as destined to lay the foundations of the independence of the country under the auspices of a treaty with the mandatory Power.

6. The Nationalists, at their meeting at Sofar, reported by Mr. Urquhart in his despatch No. 3 of the 2nd October 1932, expressed that M. Ponsot was anxious to serve up to the Mandates Commission at Geneva, where he is due on the 20th November, a report which would include something definite in the nature of a draft treaty with Syria. His losing no time in coming to Damascus, and his almost feverish haste in getting into touch, through the medium of the President of the Republic, with the leaders of public thought, not only confirmed these suspicions but caused him to be regarded by the Nationalists in the light of a postulant. The time at his disposal was extremely limited. The occasion, therefore, for the Nationalists to exert a form of blackmail was too good to be missed.

7. Their first move was to abstain from attending Parliament. Secondly—and this is much more important—they succeeded in extorting from M. Ponsot a letter in which he agreed to the proposed terms of a declaration to be made by the Government in regard to the treaty at the vote of confidence. The terms of this declaration were so explicit that they practically bound M. Ponsot to accept as a basis of the treaty conditions at least as favourable as those accorded to Iraq. The Nationalists, having by this time gained solid ground for their belief that their immediate action with the Government was a matter of supreme importance to M. Ponsot, became even more arrogant in their demands, and again refused to take their seats in Parliament on the second day of the session. The High Commissioner, who had realised that he had made an error of judgment and persuaded the Government to withhold the declaration which he had previously approved pending further negotiations.

8. Thus, it would appear that M. Ponsot, by his somewhat obvious preference for the Nationalists, has deflected the object of his two previous activities, and has succeeded in antagonising his nominal supporters, the "moderates." The latter, who cannot be expected to have those finer political perceptions observed only rarely in countries which have passed through a long evolution of parliamentary history, are naturally enquiring why, when they are asked to support a Government of which two members out of the four are Nationalists, and be prevented, by the fractious hickings of a small minority from carrying out the business for which they were elected.

9. Whether M. Ponsot was actuated by motives of personal ambition, in the hope that, in achieving some definite result, he would be rewarded forthwith with a post as Minister of the Interior, or whether he was inspired by a desire of his to avoid the ordeal at Geneva and possibly escape the question of a more definite treaty, it would seem to be at present impossible to say.

10. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Beirut, His Majesty's Consul-General at Aleppo, and His Majesty's Consul-General at Latakia, and His Majesty's Consul-General at Hama and Antioch.

I have, &c.

A. N. W. NAPIER

[E 6301, 15, 89]

No. 108

Sixty Ninth Session of the Council of the League of Nations. Extract from Final Minutes of the Ninth Meeting Public Debate, held on November 25, at Geneva.—(Received in Foreign Office December 1, 1932.)

3188. *Mandates: Frontier between Iraq and Syria: Report of the Permanent Mandates Commission.*

NOURY PASHA SAID, representative of Iraq, and the Marquis de Noailles, chairman of the Permanent Mandates Commission, came to the Council table.

M. Bruns presented the following report and draft resolution(1):—

My colleagues will remember that, at its meeting on the 3rd October last, the Council examined the report of the Commission set up in accordance with its resolution of the 9th December, 1931, to study the question of the frontier between Iraq and Syria.

(1) Document G.732.1432.VI.

"After noting the statements of the Government of the United Kingdom, which at that time was invested with the mandate for Iraq, and of the French Government, the mandatory Power for Syria, the Council adopted the conclusions submitted to it by my predecessor, the representative of Yugoslavia, *rapporteur*

settlement of the question of the frontier between Iraq and Syria the line unanimously suggested by the above-mentioned Commission of Enquiry, and, in the Sinjar area, the line indicated by the majority of the commission

"The Council, however, requested the Permanent Mandates Commission to state as soon as possible its opinion on the line so indicated from the point of view of the interests of the territories affected. The Secretary-General was accordingly requested to communicate the report of the Commission of Enquiry to the Permanent Mandates Commission, together with the minutes of the Council meeting of the 3rd October 1932

"The Mandates Commission, which is at present sitting at Geneva, communicated to the Council on the 9th November, 1932 (?) the conclusions at which it had arrived after studying this question. The commission stated that 'the report of the Commission of Enquiry—the only material it has had on which to form a judgment—does not appear to it to contain any information which would justify it in asserting that the line of the proposed frontier is not in the interests of the territories affected.'

"The condition stipulated by the Council for its approval of the line of the proposed frontier having thus been fulfilled, this approval now takes the form of a final decision

"I have accordingly the honour to submit to the Council the following draft resolution—

The Council,

Noting the opinion expressed by the Permanent Mandates Commission, from the point of view of the interests of the territories affected, on the line contemplated in the Council resolution of the 3rd October, 1932, relating to the frontier between Iraq and Syria

Finally adopts for the settlement of the question of the frontier between Iraq and Syria the line indicated by the Commission of Enquiry set up by the Council resolution of the 9th December, 1931, and in the Sinjar area the line indicated by the majority of the commission

Requests the Governments concerned to be good enough to communicate to it the protocol for the demarcation of that frontier when this has been drawn up."

M. Paul Boncour speaking as representative of the mandatory Power of one of the parties concerned, said that he accepted the conclusions of the report.

Baron Alois willingly agreed to the draft resolution submitted by the *rapporteur*. The Permanent Mandates Commission had done everything in its power to give an enlightening opinion concerning the line suggested by the Commission of Enquiry, it could not be expected to express a definite opinion in the circumstances. The Commission of Enquiry, which had had the benefit of access to direct sources of information.

Baron Alois considered this declaration entirely legitimate, and he took the opportunity to draw the Council's attention to the necessity in similar cases of a definite opinion, since only so could it fulfil the objects for which it had been set up by the Covenant.

The draft resolution was adopted

(Noury Pasha Said and the Marquis Theodoli withdrew)

(*) Document C.765.1232.VI (C.P.M.1316).

Annex

EXPLANATIONS

History

Frontier between Syria and Iraq—Report of the Permanent Mandates Commission

COMMISSION

Geneva, November 9, 1932

THE Permanent Mandates Commission has considered the Council resolution, dated the 3rd October, 1932, (*) instructing it to inform the Council

on the question of the frontier between Iraq and Syria, the line indicated by the majority of the commission

The Permanent Mandates Commission, although it had before it the report of the Commission of Enquiry, which was unable to submit unanimous conclusions, revealed by the report does not arise out of conflicting

All that it is in a position to say on the basis of the documents supplied to it is that the conclusions of the Commission of Enquiry are incompatible with the interests of the territories affected. As regards the only point on which the Commission of Enquiry was unable to submit unanimous conclusions, revealed by the report does not arise out of conflicting territories affected, but concerns a question of method in estimating the scope of the

The Permanent Mandates Commission has the honour to inform the Council that the report of the Commission of Enquiry (?)—the only material it has had on which to form a judgment—does not appear to it to contain any information which would justify it in asserting that the line of the proposed frontier is not in the interests of the territories affected

(*) 65th Session of the Council, P.V. 6 (1).

(*) C. 574 M. 243.1932.VI

[E 6347 171 89]

No. 109

(Consul-General Sir H. Sator to Sir John Simon.—(Received December 8.)

(No. 57)

Sir,

Beirut, November 23, 1932

WITH reference to Mr. Uquhart's despatch No. 83 of the 20th October relative to the return of the French High Commissioner, I have the honour to inform you that the Permanent Mandates Commission has received the report of the Commission of Enquiry on the frontier between Iraq and Syria for the year 1931 but as the commission did not this year meet in June it will not be able to submit its conclusions until the end of the year. On the occasion of his departure, M. Ponsot, who is expected to be absent for a month or six weeks at the most, will take the opportunity to make known to the Council the conclusions of the Commission of Enquiry, which since the vote of confidence of the 5th November, is now constitutionally responsible. He will also attempt to forecast as to the political evolution of Syria and the terms on which a treaty with the Syrian Government can be made.

2. I saw M. Ponsot on the 21st, when I introduced to him Mr. Ogilvie, the Consul-General of H. M. S. at Beirut, who arrived that morning and left later in the day for Damascus. M. Ponsot seemed to be in good health and spirits. He remarked that it was, on the principle that "absence makes the heart grow fonder," a good thing to leave his Nationalist friends at

[8079]

N 3

6. The revival of such rights would clearly be incompatible with the provisions of article 12 of the Iraqi declaration, and in these circumstances the Council has decided to recommend that the Iraqi Government should not take any steps to revive such rights.

"Recommends that the Powers concerned, whose nationals enjoyed capitulation rights in the former Ottoman Empire, renounce, before the admission of Iraq to the League of Nations, the maintenance of these former jurisdictional privileges in favour of their nationals in future;

I understand that a communication on the lines foreshadowed in the Council's resolution has already been addressed by the Secretary-General of the League of Nations to the Government to which you are accredited.

I shall be glad if you will now approach the French Government and explain the position to them, emphasising the fact that the retention of a system of justice which they have already approved is guaranteed under the terms of the League of Nations. In these circumstances, you should express the earnest hope of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom that the French Government will, in accordance with the recommendation of the Council of the League, declare their willingness to renounce, before the admission of Iraq to the League of Nations, the maintenance in Iraq in favour of their nationals of the capitulatory rights enjoyed by the latter in the former Ottoman Empire.

8. The matter is urgent and the result of your representations should be reported to me as soon as possible.

9. Similar instructions are being sent to His Majesty's representatives at Vienna, Brussels, Copenhagen, Athens, Budapest, etc. The Hungarian Government, however, is being addressed to His Majesty's Minister at London, and the United States Government is being consulted in the matter in connexion with the Anglo-United States-Iraqi Convention of the 9th January, 1930.

I am, &c
JOHN SIMON

E 3332 2436 931

No. 111

Sir John Simon to Mr. Hoare (Tehran)

(No 870, Confidential.)

518

Foreign Office, July 4, 1932

On 27th September, 1924, certain undertakings given by His Majesty's Government in the Treaty of Alliance between His Britannic Majesty and His Majesty the King of Iraq, signed at Bagdad on the 10th October, 1922, were accepted by the Council of the League of Nations, as giving effect to the provisions of article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, and as being in accordance with the principles which the League of Nations has adopted as a basis for its action. It has been designed to secure. In the operative part of the said resolution the Council decided "that the privileges and immunities, including the benefits of consular jurisdiction and protection, formerly enjoyed by capitulation or usage in the Ottoman Empire, will not be required for the protection of foreigners in Iraq so

long as the Treaty of Alliance" (i.e., the treaty of the 10th October, 1922) "is in force." Article 9 of that treaty provided that, in consequence of the non-application of the immunities enjoyed by them under capitulation or usage, the interests of foreigners in judicial matters should be safeguarded in a separate agreement, and such an agreement was eventually concluded at Bagdad on the 25th March, 1924. In this manner the capitulatory rights possessed by certain Powers in Iraq were transferred to the British Mandate, and the régime provided for by the Council's resolution and the said treaty of 1922.

2. The nationals to whom the benefits of the Judicial Agreement of 1924 were to be accorded were defined as the "nationals of any European or American State which formerly benefitted by Capitulations in Turkey and did not renounce the same by an agreement signed before the 24th July, 1923, and of any Asiatic State which is now permanently represented on the Council of the League of Nations." This definition excluded Persian nationals from the benefits of the agreement, and it was largely with a view to meeting the desire of the Persian Government to see this disability removed that in 1930 His Majesty's Government took steps to replace the agreement of 1924, with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations (expressed in a resolution dated the 22nd January, 1931) by a new agreement, signed on the 4th March, 1931, which established a uniform system of justice applicable to Iraqis and all foreigners alike.

of the 27th September, 1924, and the Treaty of Alliance of 1922), when that State should have entered into certain undertakings. The necessary undertakings have since been embodied in a declaration, the terms of which were approved by the Council at its meeting on the 19th May last. Since then the declaration has been signed by the Iraqi Prime Minister and ratified by His Majesty the King of Iraq and it has just been communicated to the Council of the League.

4. Article 12 of the above-mentioned declaration made by Iraq reads as follows:—

A uniform system of justice shall be applicable to all, Iraqis and foreigners alike. It shall be such as effectively to ensure the protection and full exercise of their rights both to foreigners and to nationals.

The judicial system at present in force, and based on articles 2, 3 and 4 of the agreement between the Mandatory Power and Iraq, signed on the 4th March, 1931, shall be maintained for a period of ten years from the date of the admission of Iraq to membership of the League of Nations.

* Appointments to the posts reserved for foreign jurists by article 2 of the said agreement shall be made by the Iraqi Government. Their holders shall be foreigners, but selected without distinction of nationality, they must be fully qualified."

5. The judicial system set up by the Anglo-Iraqi Judicial Agreement of the 4th March, 1921, was thus maintained for a further period of ten years after Iraq's entry into the League of Nations. The agreement of the 10th March, 1931, will itself cease to have effect when Iraq enters the League, and the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of the 10th October, 1922, will lapse simultaneously. The termination of the mandatory régime in Iraq will therefore put an end to the suspension of the ~~provisions of the~~ ~~rights in Iraq of these Powers~~ ~~and~~ ~~the~~ ~~former~~ ~~possessors~~ ~~of~~ ~~them~~ under the Ottoman régime and would apparently have the juridical effect of reviving them in the absence of their specific renunciation by the Powers concerned. The revival of such rights would clearly be incompatible with the provisions of article 12 of the Iraqi declaration and, in these circumstances, the Council of the League, at its meeting on the 19th May last, adopted the following resolution:—

Table 4. (continued)

It requests that the Powers concerned, whose nationals enjoyed Capitulation rights in the former Ottoman Empire, renounce, before the admission of Iraq to the League of Nations, the maintenance of these former jurisdictional privileges in favour of their nationals in future; requests the Secretary General to communicate this resolution to the Governments of the States which the British Government, in accordance with the present resolution will approach with a view to the proposed renunciation."

{'} Not printed

I am, &c.
JOHN SIMON

THE Government of the United States appreciates the offer of the British Government to furnish it with copies of the assurances which Iraq is to furnish to the Council of the League of Nations as a preliminary to the termination of the mandatory régime and entrance into the League of Nations. From information which it has already received from other sources the American Government is satisfied that these assurances, to the benefits of which American nationals will be entitled under the provisions of article 7 of the Tripartite Convention of the 9th January, 1930, will afford adequate protection to legitimate American interests in Iraq upon the termination of the existing special relations. Accordingly, this Government considers that no useful purpose would be served by continuing the discussions which the Embassy at London has undertaken with the British authorities concerning the right of the United States to be consulted with regard to the conditions under which Iraq is to be administered upon the termination of the mandatory relationship. At the same time, the American Government desires to place on record the declaration that it cannot fully accept the interpretation of the position of the United States towards Iraq as set forth in Mr. Rendel's letter of the 1st April, 1932. Thus, while the American Government concedes that by the terms of the Tripartite Convention it waived its right to consultation with respect to the actual termination of the mandate, it considers that the right was retained to be consulted with respect to the conditions under which Iraq is to be administered upon such termination. This Government is therefore of the opinion that, in addition to the most-favoured-nation treatment

which may arise in the future, to make clear that its action in refraining from insisting upon a fulfilment of its rights in the case of Iraq is not to be construed as a renunciation of its rights. The United States is essential to the validity of any determination which may be reached regarding mandated territories.

United States Embassy London
July 8, 1932

E 3708 894/99)

No. 113

Papers communicated by the Colonial Office, July 20, 1932

Sir F. Humphrys to Ja'far Pasha

(Secret.)

My dear Ja'far Pasha,

Bagdad, April 28, 1932.

I SHOULD like to refer to the correspondence ending with his Excellency Nuri Pasha's letter, dated the 2nd December, 1931, regarding the accommodation provided at Hinaidi for the Royal Iraqi Air Force. As the Iraqi Government is not in a position to make any statement in respect of the area involved. The Air Officer Commanding feels, however, and I agree with him, that it would be well to have on record the precise nature of the conditions which the Air Officer Commanding considers essential. It seems it, is that, whereas the Royal Air Force is entitled under the second paragraph of article 1 of the note dated the 19th August, 1930, to undisturbed occupation of the Hinaidi Cantonment for five years from the entry into force of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930, occupation of certain parts of the Cantonment by the Royal Iraqi Air Force will be welcomed subject to certain conditions necessary to secure its general safety, and on the understanding that such occupation does not imply the abandonment by the Royal Air Force of their right to re-enter at will the area now occupied by the Royal Iraqi Air Force, the Air Officer Commanding is prepared to give an undertaking that such right will be exercised only on the conditions, namely, that the Iraqi Government should undertake to ensure that any instructions issued under the authority of the Air Officer Commanding for the proper conduct of the Cantonment, which he considers should be observed by the Royal Iraqi Air Force, would include orders covering such subjects as defence, discipline, sanitation, flying regulations and traffic control. In addition there are, I understand, details to be gone into regarding upkeep, payment for services rendered, &c., but these I consider could best be settled departmentally.

I should be glad to hear from your Excellency in due course whether the Iraqi Government are prepared to accept the statement of the position set out above in which case I suggest that this letter and your Excellency's reply might be regarded as a formal statement and acknowledgment of the conditions governing the Iraqi Government's occupation.

Yours sincerely
F. H. HUMPHRYS

Ja'far Pasha to Sir F. Humphrys

(Confidential)

Dear Sir Francis,

Bagdad, June 9, 1932.

REFERENCE your Excellency's letter, dated the 24th April, 1932, on the subject of the accommodation provided at Hinaidi for the Royal Iraqi Air Force.

The Iraqi Government agree to the statements set forth in your Excellency's letter and regard your Excellency's letter in question and this my letter as an agreement to the conditions governing the Iraqi Government's occupations.

Yours sincerely
JA'FAR AL 'ASKARI

E 3644/408 93)

No. 114

Sir John Simon to Mr. Atherton

Sir

Foreign Office, July 22, 1932.

IN a recent official letter of the 1st April, 1932, to Mr. C. G. of the United States Embassy, on the question of the impending release of Iraq from the mandatory regime, it was stated that His Majesty's Government would be glad to communicate to the United States Government for their information, as soon as it was possible to do so, copies of the documents to be given by Iraq to the Council of the League of Nations, prior to the termination of the mandatory régime, in connection with the protection of the rights of the minorities in Iraq. I have now pleasure in enclosing a copy of this declaration which I shall be glad if you will communicate to the United States Government. I have also enclosed a copy of the Declaration of Guarantees which I shall be glad if you will communicate to the United States Government.

2. You will observe that article 12 of the Declaration of Guarantees has been in force for ten years, from the date of the admission of Iraq to the League of Nations régime instituted by the Anglo-Iraqi Judicial Agreement of the 19th June, 1931. You will recollect that, in your note of the 19th June, 1931, you informed Mr. Arthur Henderson that the United States Government, under the terms of article 6 of the Tripartite Convention of the 9th January, 1930, consented to the substitution of that agreement for the previous Anglo-Iraqi Judicial Agreement of the 2nd March, 1924, and to the application of the new agreement to nationals of the United States in Iraq, upon its entry into force and in accordance with the provisions of the new agreement. I have now pleasure in enclosing a copy of the Declaration of Guarantees which I shall be glad if you will communicate to the United States Government.

I also enclose (1) for the information of the United States Government a copy of the draft of a Declaration of Guarantees which I shall be glad if you will communicate to the United States Government. In recommending the Council to approve the text of the draft Declaration of Guarantees, the committee pointed out with particular reference to article 2 of the Declaration that the rights possessed in the former Ottoman Empire by certain States would automatically revive in Iraq on the termination of the mandatory régime. So far as concerns States members of the League, those rights, as the United States

(1) Not printed.

Government are aware were secured in the following manner. By the provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the 27th September 1924 certain rights were granted to the United Kingdom in Iraq. These rights were confirmed by the League of Nations in its resolution of the 22nd January 1932. The British Government have been desirous to secure in the present circumstances that the rights of the United Kingdom in Iraq should be maintained. The British Government have been desirous to secure in the present circumstances that the rights of the United Kingdom in Iraq should be maintained. The British Government have been desirous to secure in the present circumstances that the rights of the United Kingdom in Iraq should be maintained.

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I have, &c
JOHN SIMON

(*) Not printed

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No. 115.

Foreign Office to Secretary-General, League of Nations (Geneva).

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 26, 1932.

BY their resolution of the 28th January, 1932, the Council of the League of Nations declared their intention to make the termination of the mandatory régime in Iraq subject to two conditions, one of which was the admission of that country to the League of Nations. In a report in connexion with this question submitted to the Council on the 19th May, the Council's rapporteur drew attention to the above-mentioned resolution, and pointed out that the termination of the mandatory régime in Iraq would not be effected until, *inter alia*, Iraq had been admitted to the League of Nations. The Council's resolution of the 28th January, 1932, was approved by the Council in their resolution of the same day.

2. I am now directed by His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to transmit to you herewith in original a letter from the Prime Minister of Iraq, requesting that the Kingdom of Iraq may be admitted as a member of the League of Nations, in accordance with the terms of article 1 paragraph 2, of the Covenant of the League of Nations, together with an explanatory memorandum which forms the enclosure in that letter and a copy of the Declaration of Guarantees^(*) furnished to the Council, which is an enclosure to the memorandum. The original of the Declaration of Guarantees was sent to you in Foreign Office letter of the 27th June.

3. Sir John Simon will be grateful to you if the request of the Iraqi Prime Minister to be admitted to the League of Nations may, in the meantime, be brought to the notice of the States members of the League of Nations in accordance with Noury Pasha's request.

I am, &c

O W RINDFI.

(*) Not printed

Enclosure 1 in No. 115

Prime Minister of Iraq to Secretary-General, League of Nations.

Sir,

Bagdad, July 12, 1932

I HAVE the honour to request that the Kingdom of Iraq may be admitted as a member of the League of Nations, in accordance with the terms of article 1, paragraph 2, of the Covenant of the League of Nations, and that the request be placed on the agenda of the next meeting of the Assembly of the League.

The Government of Iraq will send representatives empowered to give all necessary explanations to the Assembly. In the meantime I have the honour to enclose a memorandum giving information on the points which are usually considered by the Assembly in connexion with the admission of new members to the League.

It is requested that this application may be brought without delay to the knowledge of all States members of the League.

I have, &c

NOURY SAID.

Prime Minister of Iraq.

Enclosure 2 in No. 115

Memorandum

IRAQ was one of the territories described in article 22 of the Covenant as having reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations could be permanently recognised subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a mandatory until such time as they were able to stand alone.

The mandate for Iraq was entrusted to His Britannic Majesty by the principal Allied Powers in April 1920, but the normal conception of a mandate proved to be incompatible with the Iraqi situation. The Iraqi State had been inconsistent with the large measure of independence which the Iraqi State had even then acquired. The Council of the League of Nations and Iraq were accordingly placed upon a treaty basis in 1922, and that basis was approved by the Council of the League of Nations by their decision of the 27th September, 1924, as giving effect to the provisions of article 22 of the Covenant.

2. Subject only to the limitations imposed by the Anglo-Iraq Treaty of 1922 Iraq was organised as a fully self governing kingdom, with the powers and attributes of an independent sovereign State. The guiding principle which inspired the treaty of 1922 and subsequent treaties between the United Kingdom and Iraq, and the aim which the two Governments have from the first set before themselves, have been the establishment at the earliest possible date of a fully independent State, animated by the spirit of the Covenant, and fit to assume not only the privileges but also the responsibilities involved in admission to the League of Nations.

3. With this end in view external mandatory control was progressively reduced and the Iraqi Government assumed year by year an increasing measure of responsibility, until the position was reached that Iraq was virtually governing itself and the Government of the United Kingdom were satisfied that the country had no further need for the advice and assistance of a mandatory and, in the words of article 22 of the Covenant, was "able to stand alone".

4. Their view that Iraq was fit for emancipation was duly communicated by the Government of the United Kingdom to the Council of the League of Nations. At their meeting in September 1931, the Council, however, decided that before the mandatory régime in Iraq could be terminated that country must be shown to satisfy certain *de facto* conditions, of which the first three were —

- (a) It must have a settled Government and an Administration capable of maintaining the regular operation of essential Government services.
- (b) It must be capable of maintaining its territorial integrity and political independence.
- (c) It must be able to maintain the public peace throughout the whole territory.

5. The question whether these conditions, among others stipulated by the Council, were fulfilled in the case of Iraq, was subsequently made the subject of a searching examination by the Permanent Mandates Commission, and in the light of the favourable report submitted by that body, the Council, on the 28th January, 1932, declared itself prepared in principle to pronounce the termination of the mandatory régime upon the admission of Iraq to the League of Nations, provided that Iraq should in the meantime have entered into undertakings before the Council, the nature of which was specified in the Council's decision.

6. These undertakings have been assumed by Iraq in a declaration the text of which was approved by the Council in its resolution of the 19th May, 1932, and which has been signed and ratified by Iraq and deposited with the Secretary-General. The text of this declaration⁽¹⁾ is annexed to the present memorandum.

7. Upon the admission of Iraq to membership of the League of Nations, the Treaty of Alliance between Iraq and the United Kingdom, dated the 30th June, 1930, will enter into operation. At the request of the League Council, the Permanent Mandates Commission also examined this instrument, and reported that the obligations entered into thereunder by Iraq towards the United Kingdom would not infringe the independence of the new State. The Council duly took note of this opinion at its meeting on the 28th January, 1932.

(1) Not printed

8. It follows from the foregoing information that upon the admission of Iraq to membership of the League article 22 of the Covenant will automatically be rendered inoperative, and Iraq will be fully self governing.

9. The Kingdom of Iraq has already been formally recognised by the following Governments, who have either diplomatic or consular representatives in Iraq:

Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Persia, Poland, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America.

The Kingdom of Iraq has also concluded on its own behalf several treaties of settlement with the neighbouring States, and acceded to the Pact of Paris for the Reduction of Armaments.

10. The form of government established in Iraq is a Constitutional Monarchy with Ministers responsible to a Chamber of Deputies, a Parliamentary Council, and a High Court of Cassation, which has been in existence in Iraq since November 1925.

11. Iraq possesses well-defined frontiers with all limitrophe States, and its frontiers are marked by pillars and posts, and are subject to the same control as the frontiers of the Kingdom of Iraq and Syria, it was agreed to refer the question of the frontiers of the Kingdom of Iraq to the Council of the League of Nations.

12. The declaration referred to in paragraph 6 above declares the full independence of Iraq, and the full responsibility of the Iraqi Government for the maintenance of law and order, and the security of the frontiers of Iraq.

13. The Kingdom of Iraq possesses a strong and efficient Army, and a strong and efficient Navy, and is fully equipped for the defence of its frontiers, and for the maintenance of law and order, and the security of the frontiers of Iraq.

The Kingdom of Iraq is pledged by its adherence to the Pact of Paris never to resort to war as an instrument of national policy.

It is the intention of the Iraqi Government to accede as soon as possible to the League of Nations, and to the Pact of Paris, and to the other treaties and conventions of the League of Nations, and at the same time to assume in respect of Iraqi territory the same undertakings as those set forth in the first paragraph of article 28 of that convention.

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No. 136

By P. and H. to Sir H. Humphreys. (Communicated by Colonial Office July 28.)

Secret.

Sir,

Downing Street, July 28, 1932

I HAVE the honour to inform you that His Majesty's Government have given careful consideration to the recommendations made in your despatch of the 10th May 1932, regarding the conditions which should govern the issue of the Treaty of Alliance between Iraq and the United Kingdom, dated the 30th June, 1930, and they have decided to adopt for this purpose the general principles set out in paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 6 of your despatch, subject to certain modifications of detail to which reference is made below. As you point out in your despatch these principles are not intended to cover the possibility of military intervention by the United Kingdom in the event of a civil war in Iraq.

2. His Majesty's Government are in agreement with the view advanced in paragraph 4 of your despatch that having regard to the provisions of article 3 of the Anglo-Iraq Treaty 1930, which places the whole responsibility for the maintenance of law and order in Iraq upon the Iraqi Government, the Royal Air Force should not be employed for the suppression of disorder in cases where there is no immediate danger to British or foreign lives or interests, except upon a request in writing from the Iraqi Government to His Majesty's Ambassador. Some doubt was felt, however, whether intervention by the Royal Air Force to suppress

I have &
(For the Secretary of State)
R W HAMILTON

Proceedings of the Board of Management of the Royal Air Force in Iraq on the coming into Force of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930

- a) Repelling raiders from across the frontier
- b) Restoring internal order
- c) Protection of British subjects and British commercial interests.
- d) Protection of other foreign subjects and commercial interests.
- e) Protection of Imperial air communications and self defence

Before considering these heads in detail it is desirable to consider the question of the channel through which His Majesty's Government will communicate their decisions as to the employment of the Royal Air Force.

(d) *Protection of other Foreign Subjects and Commercial Interests.*—The Royal Air Force was found to be the most efficient and most reliable of the forces in the present order of things, and it was suggested that British subjects, and they should only be employed for the former purpose at the request of the Iraqi Government, and the principle of the Ambassador of the event of a foreign representative appealing direct to the Ambassador for action to be taken in case of extreme urgency, either because the Iraqi Government

necessary funds. The land chosen for the settlement of the Assyrians should be registered on their names as their own property.

This does not mean that it will be necessary to evict certain Kurds from their villages, as we are certain that sufficient land can be found for us in the above-named area without doing that.

(c) That Iraq Government should give the priority to Assyrians in the selection of officials for the administrative duties of the sub-liwa, with the exception of the mutassarif and technical officials, for whom we may not be able to find men. The official language of the sub-liwa, used along with Arabic, should be Syriac.

This claim does not, however, prevent inhabitant Kurds of the "Assyrian sub-liwa" to take administrative appointments.

4. That the temporal and ecclesiastical leadership of his Beatitude Mar Shimun the Patriarch over the Assyrian "millet" be officially recognised by the Government. In order that this recognition be established, the Mar Shimun should receive from His Majesty the King of Iraq a decoration of honour for the distinguished service which his people have rendered to this country, and also an annual subsidy for the maintenance of the Patriarchate similar to those enjoyed by him from the Sultan of Ottoman Empire.

That the power of Mar Shimun the Patriarch in administering his "millet" temporally and spiritually according to laws and customs descended to us should be officially recognised by the Government.

5. That we should have a member in the House of Deputies, to be nominated by the people and the Patriarch.

6. That the Government should establish schools at the places to be decided by the Government. The teachers being appointed for this purpose by the Director of Education and the Patriarch.

7. As regards the property of the Assyrians of their churches, monasteries, and other religious buildings, which were confiscated by the Government in 1914, we request that they should be restored to the Assyrians. The property of the Assyrians of their churches, monasteries, and other religious buildings, which were confiscated by the Government in 1914, we request that they should be restored to the Assyrians. The property of the Assyrians of their churches, monasteries, and other religious buildings, which were confiscated by the Government in 1914, we request that they should be restored to the Assyrians.

8. A civil hospital be established in the headquarters of the sub-liwa, and necessary dispensaries at the places prescribed within the sub-liwa.

9. The arms which have been stored by the Assyrians by their levies, the levies should not be confiscated at any time, but they should remain with the owners subject to compliance with the rules and regulations re licences for carrying firearms.

10. If our above claims be considered, accepted and approved by the signature of your Excellency as representative of the British Government, and despatched so as to reach our Patriarch the Mar Shimun at Sar Amedia by the 24th June, 1932 the Assyrian levies will withdraw their resignation and continue to serve under your orders.

The next action to be taken with regard to these our claims after they have been approved as above should be the following:—

That they should be adopted by the Council of League of Nations and scheduled as guarantees and undertakings from the Iraq Government for the safeguarding and protection of the racial, religious and linguistic rights and interests of the Assyrian "millet" in Iraq. The claims then after be approved by Royal Iradah of His Majesty the King of Iraq and remain a part of fundamental rules of Iraq Constitution. For this act of humanity and generosity we then not only will continue the service in Iraq levies, police, &c., but we will

honourably promise that our "millet" will most devotedly, loyally and submissively serve the British Government and the Crown of our most Gracious King Faisal the First and his Government for ever. But with regard to our future military service, we should like to bring forth the following two terms:—

- We are prepared to find men for all the Air Defence Force according to Government's programme, at the same time pointing out that the climate of Shaiha and Basra is unfit for our men.
- To provide one battalion or more if we can exclusively manned and officered by Assyrians under command of an Iraqi Arab officer and any other number of British officers as inspecting officers. In connexion with this we would ask that Rab Khaila David Mar Shimun is appointed as liaison officer for both forces, and his place be with Iraq Defence Headquarters, Bagdad.

At last, we most emphatically beg to state that, if our claims are not considered and accepted by the British and Iraq Governments, the resignation of the Iraq Assyrian Levies will not be withdrawn and the national movement will still more increase.

We have, &c.
(Levy Representatives.) (Assyrian Leaders.)

Copy to the chairman of the Permanent Mandates Commission, League of Nations, Geneva, through his Excellency the High Commissioner for Iraq, Bagdad.

Translation of Signatures

ESHAI SHIMUN, by the Grace of God,
Catholicos Patriarch of the East
YOSSEPH KHNANISHU, Metropolitan
ZIA SARGIS, by the Grace, Bishop
MALIK SHAMIZDIN of Lower Tyari
KHORHABA M. YOREPS of Lower Tyari
MALIK ISMAIL of Upper Tyari
MALIK NIMROD of Jelu
MALIK MAROGLE of Jelu
MALIK KHNANT of Tkboomis
MALIK KHAMMO of Baz
MALIK WANDA of Diz
MALIK SILIM of Barwar Dkutshanis
KARHA SANDA D'LEWON
MALIK SHERKHO of Dizen
MALIK MAROGLE of Wan
MALIK GULLU of Sarra
RAYES KHIRU of Drinayoh
RAYES DANBA of Marbishin
RAYES TALYA of Gawar

Translation of the Names of the Representatives of the Levies

DAVID D MAR SHIMUN,
DANIEL M. ISMAIL, Rab Treema
YACOB M. ISMAIL, Rab Treema
MALIK HORMIZD, Rab Emma
KHOSHABA POLUS, Rab Emma
SHAHIN GIWARGIS, Rab Emma

Enclosure 2 in No 117

Observations of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom on the Petition submitted by the Patriarch and Leaders of the Assyrians in Iraq dated June 17, 1932, to the High Commissioner for Iraq, with a Copy to the Chairman of the Permanent Mandates Commission

Preliminary Remarks.

IN order that this petition may be fully understood, it is necessary to explain the circumstances in which it was put forward.

On the 1st June, 1932, a manifesto was presented to the brigadier commanding the Assyrian levies in Iraq stating that as the British Government had failed adequately to ensure the future of the Assyrian nation all the officers and men had resolved to cease serving from the 1st July. This manifesto was signed by the Patriarch and the Levies. A copy of the full text is given as Appendix I to these observations.

After receiving this manifesto the brigadier commanding the levies discussed the matter with his Assyrian officers, and ascertained that they and the maliks, or Assyrian tribal leaders, had apparently entered into a secret pact to act together to effect their ends. The levies officers wished therefore to leave their service in order to be free to take part in whatever national movement might be ordered by the leaders. They had no complaints to make as to their conditions in the levies, and their wish to cease serving was, they explained, inspired solely by the desire to throw in their lot with the rest of the Assyrian people. It was also ascertained that there was to be a meeting of leaders at the Patriarch's summer camp at Ser Amadiyah⁽¹⁾ on the 15th June.

On the 13th June, the High Commissioner summoned a meeting of representative Assyrian officers at the Residency in Bagdad. The officers could not be persuaded to withdraw their manifesto, as they stated that they could take no action without the concurrence of the Patriarch and all the other leaders. The High Commissioner accordingly agreed to await a final reply until it had been discussed at the Ser Amadiyah meeting on the 15th June.

At the same time, he despatched a letter to the Mar Shimun urging him to use his personal influence as Patriarch to turn the levies from their foolish and dangerous decision, and in a second letter he pointed out the serious financial loss that the Assyrians would sustain if they recklessly abandoned their empire.

A copy of the first letter is attached as Appendix II. The Patriarch's reply to these letters, a copy of which is given as Appendix III, forwarded the petition of the leaders dated the 17th June, which is the subject of these observations. A copy of the petition was addressed to the chairman of the Permanent Mandates Commission.

Further correspondence between the High Commissioner and the Mar Shimun followed, which resulted in the latter's summoning another meeting of the Assyrian leaders on the 5th July at which it was decided to accept the High Commissioner's advice, that the levies should continue serving until the petition of the 17th June had been submitted to the League and a reply obtained.

The demands of the petition of the 17th June were communicated by the High Commissioner to the Iraqi Prime Minister on the 7th July, and the Prime Minister replied on the 2nd August commenting on these demands. Copies of this correspondence are given in Appendices V and VI to this document.

The Petition

The signatories, headed by the Patriarch, may be said to represent the majority of those Assyrians now in Iraq, whose original homes lie to the north of the Iraq frontier. The others, numbering about 3,000 persons, who are still in their original villages, which lie within the borders of Iraq, are not represented among the signatories of the petition and have taken practically no part in the present agitation.

(1) A grassy hill crest to the north of the Amadiyah town.

The following list shows the status and tribe of each of the signatories to the petition —

ESHAI SHIMUN. Mar Shimun, the Patriarch.
YOSSEPH KHANANISHU. Metropolitan, or Matran, of Shamadinan, now living in Harir. Next in importance to Mar Shimun. The Matran's sister is the mother of Mar Shimun.
ZIA SARGIS. The Bishop of Jilu.
MALIK SHAMIZDIN. The Malik of Lower Tiari.
KHOSHABA M. YOSSEPH. Of Lower Tiari. Called Malik. A courtesy title only.
MALIK ISMAIL. Malik of Upper Tiari. The premier Malik.
MALIK NIMRUD. The present Malik of Jilu.
MALIK MAROGLE. An ex-Malik of Jilu.
MALIK KHANANU. The present Malik of Tkhuma.
MALIK KHAMU. The present Malik of Baz.
MALIK WARDI. The present Malik of Diz.
MALIK SILIM. Head of the group of villages near Julamerik.
KASHA SAJIDA. A priest of a district east of Tiari.
MALIK SHEFKHO. Dizen and Diz are identical.
MALIK MAROGLE. Head of a group of villages around Lake Archag.
MALIK GULLU. Of Serai Mahmudiya, east of Van, near the Shikak Kurds.
RAIS KHIRU. Of Iyal, a large village near the Persian frontier, Mar Bishu district.
RAIS DANBA. Of Mar Bishu.
RAIS TALYA. Of Gagoran, near Diza Gawar.
DAVID D. MAR SHIMUN. Father of the Patriarch. The Rab Khala of the Levies.
DANIEL ISMAIL. Second son of Malik Ismail of Upper Tiari. Rab Tremma of the 2nd Battalion.
YAGAN ISMAIL. Third son of Malik Ismail. Rab Tremma of the 1st Battalion.
MALIK HORMIZD. 2nd Battalion. Former Malik of Tkhuma.
KHOSHABA POLUB. Of Tkhuma.
SHAHIN GEWORGIS. Of Baz.

The Tiari Maliks are hereditary and hold office for life. The other Maliks are chosen from selected families by Mar Shimun and change office almost every other year.

The first paragraph of the petition is merely a preamble and calls for no action.

The second paragraph voices the disappointment of the Assyrian people that their hopes of obtaining the realisation of this hope in whatever way they can. His Majesty's Government feel that it is necessary to point out that they and their representatives have always stated without equivocation that the Assyrians could not be settled in a homogeneous group with limited local autonomy except in their old home lands in the Hakkari district of Turkey.

The League Commission set up in 1924 to examine the question of the frontier between Turkey and Iraq made the following statement on p. 83 of their report:—

"The British authorities also informed the commission that the future treatment of the Assyrians would depend entirely on the decision taken with regard to the frontier. If the territory occupied by the Assyrians is not assigned to Iraq they cannot be granted any local autonomy, because in that case they would not be settled in homogeneous communities. If the frontier were to follow the line of the former Assyrian territory, it would be impossible to find land for the Assyrians in Iraq. The plan for settling the Assyrians depends on the acceptance of the frontier proposed by the British Government. Even if lands could be found, the Assyrians could not live in the plains owing to climatic conditions. Other difficulties would be produced by the difference of customs between the Arabs and the Assyrians, which would strain the relations between them, whereas Assyrian and Kurdish customs are much more similar."

Mr Amery, speaking at the thirty-fifth session of the Council on the 3rd September, 1925, said

"His Majesty's Government has caused careful and exhaustive enquiry to be made into the possibility of settling the Assyrian population within the 'Brussels line.' It is informed that it would be quite impossible to find in Iraq suitable territories for the settlement of the Assyrians as a compact and organised community. It is true that they might be dispersed gradually among the Assyrian and Chaldean villages south of the line. This would, however, result in finally destroying the hopes which are justifiably entertained by the Assyrians for a separate and independent existence in their native home."

A reference is also invited to pp. 269-72 of the special report on Iraq for the period 1920-31, where this point is dealt with in detail.

The Assyrians have, however, persistently refused to face the facts of this position, and their determined clinging to the hope of ultimate settlement in a compact body and their consequent reluctance to take up the scattered unoccupied lands available for rehabilitation has been one of the big obstacles to their settlement.

The third paragraph refers to a petition submitted to the chairman of the Permanent Mandates Commission in October 1931. This petition declared that it would be impossible for the Assyrian people to live in Iraq after the termination of the British mandate, and implored the League to arrange for their migration to a country under the rule of a Western nation. His Majesty's Government's observations on this petition were forwarded to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations on the 11th March, 1932.

To turn now to the demand,

No. 1.—It is difficult to understand precisely what is intended by this demand. In the Ottoman Empire the word "millet" was used to describe any group of people united by a common religion or race, and it seems doubtful whether it can be held to bear the special national, as distinct from racial or religious, significance which the petitioners seem to attribute to it. Nevertheless it may be assumed that what the petitioners have in mind is the grant to them of some form of special national status distinct from that which they enjoy at present as Iraqi citizens. It is, indeed, stated that mere recognition of the Assyrians as a religious community—with the special safeguards for the preservation of their ancient customs in matters of personal status which this implies—is not sufficient. His Majesty's Government feel bound in this connexion to point out that the treatment of the Assyrians cannot be regarded as an isolated problem. There are, as the League are well aware, many different racial, religious and linguistic communities in Iraq, the Kurds, the Yezidis, the Shi'ahs of the Euphrates and even the Basmawis (the people of Basra) have all at ~~times~~ during the last ten years put forward demands for some form of special and privileged status. Nothing of this kind could be given to the Assyrians without reviving demands for similar treatment from other communities, and national unity would then be endangered, and with it all the work of the last decade in Iraq.

But apart from this important consideration, there is the determining factor that unoccupied land does not exist in Iraq whereon the Assyrians could be settled as a single homogeneous community, and without compact settlement local administrative autonomy is clearly impracticable.

It will be recollected that a previous request for the establishment of an autonomous enclave, made in 1931, was rejected by the League Council on the recommendation of the Permanent Mandates Commission.

No 2.—The return of the Assyrians to their old homes in the Hakkari mountains would still undoubtedly be the best solution of their worst difficulties if this could be arranged. When the question of the frontier between Turkey and Iraq was before the Council of the League for settlement in December 1925, His Majesty's Government pressed strongly the claims of the Assyrians to part of their old home lands, but under the resolution of the Council of the 16th December, 1925, the bulk of the territory formerly inhabited by the Assyrians was allotted to Turkey. The Turkish Government have so far refused to permit the Assyrians to return to their old villages and pastures, but His Majesty's

Government are not aware whether the Turkish Government would now be
 be worth recalling that the League Commission set up in 1924 to examine the
 in their report to the League Council (p. 88, League Document No. C. 400, 1925,
 VII): "The Commission is led to conclude that the most satisfactory solution
 would be for the Assyrians to accept the offer, made by the Turkish delegate at
 the Constantinople Conference, that they should be allowed to return to their
 former homes."

No. 3.—This demand is a corollary of No. 1. The ambiguities of the word "millet" have been discussed above, and the difficulties in the way of creating what the petitioners evidently picture as a sort of "national home" are discussed below, a word here is necessary touching the demand that the door must be opened to admit all ex-Ottoman Assyrians who are living outside Iraq and wish to return. His Majesty's Government have no means of ascertaining accurately how many Assyrians are scattered throughout the world, or how many of these wish to come to live with the Assyrians in Iraq, it is understood, however, that in particular that the petitioners had in mind when putting forward this demand. Estimates that there are more Assyrian refugees in the territories of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics than there are in Iraq. A few have already been admitted to Iraq (see p. 30 of annual report on Iraq for 1930) but knowing the difficulties with which the Iraqi Government are faced in finding sufficient land on which to settle the Assyrians already on their hands, His Majesty's Government would not feel justified in pressing the Iraqi Government to permit the immigration of large numbers of them. The effect of this demand would not only add enormously to the already heavy responsibilities and obligations of the Iraqi Government, but it would also inevitably bring much increased hardship on the Assyrians themselves.

[illegible]

The last stipulation of the proposed law is that the British adviser for the Assyrian sub-law. As the proposed law is impracticable, this question does not arise.

[illegible]

It will be seen that the committee estimates that, after certain minor integrating works which have now been arranged on the land concerned, approximately 1000 to 1200 persons will be posted to the Assiut and Dobuk qadhas, and possibly an additional 130 families, if two major

irritation projects, the practicability of which has not yet been established, can be carried out.

But even if it proved possible thus to settle 300 families in this region—and it should be mentioned that much of the land in question has in the past been offered to the Assyrians and rejected by them—the Assyrians would still constitute a small minority only of the inhabitants of the area, the population of which would continue to be predominantly Kurdish.

Moreover, apart from the many thousands of Assyrians outside Iraq, there would still remain some thousand families for whom land or employment would need to be found. It will thus be seen that the statement that sufficient land can be found in the area specified, without evicting Kurds from their villages, not only is contrary to the facts, but is also contrary to the facts for all those scattered about the world is contrary to the facts. It must also be remembered that, if the area were overcrowded beyond its capacity, there would be a danger of serious conflict between Assyrians and Kurds.

As regards the registration of title, it must be explained that the Iraqi Government recently invited Sir Ernest Dowson, a land settlement expert, to report on the whole question of land title in Iraq. A comprehensive scheme of land settlement has been drawn up in accordance with his recommendations, and the work is to begin next autumn under the supervision of British advisers. It will necessarily be a long and meticulous task to complete settlement throughout the country, but means are being explored to begin as early as possible in the north in order that the question of giving title to all persons cultivating Government land may be examined. More than this it would be difficult to do, since the grant of title to Assyrian refugees on preferential terms would very naturally provoke resentment among the large number of land occupiers who are cultivating the same land that their ancestors tilled for generations before them, but who even now have no secure title to it.

As regards the question of the rights of the Assyrians in the mountains, it should be mentioned that His Majesty's Government have been quite anxious to give effect to the demands made by the Assyrians in this regard. The Government have been anxious to give effect to the demands made by the Assyrians in this regard. The Government have been anxious to give effect to the demands made by the Assyrians in this regard.

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What further authority the petitioners desire should be vested in their Patriarch is not certain, but clearly no temporal authority could be granted to the Mar Shimun which would prevent the application of the laws of the country to Assyrians in the same manner as they are applied to all other subjects of the Iraqi State.

Decorations of honour are awarded solely at the will of the Crown, and His Majesty's Government consider it singularly inopportune that a claim for an award of this kind should have been put forward with these demands.

No. 5.—The Iraqi Electoral Law provides that two Christian Deputies shall be returned to the Chamber from the Mosul Liwa. Up to the present time no Assyrian has been elected, nor could the Iraqi Government undertake that one of the two Christian Deputies would be an Assyrian. It would be contrary to the law, and would be a discrimination which would certainly be greatly resented by the other Christian communities, who are more numerous than the Assyrians. Attention is, however, invited to the comments of the Prime Minister on this demand, in his letter of the 2nd August.

No. 6.—Provisions for safeguarding the educational rights of minority

communities have already been made in article 8 of the Iraqi Government's declaration before the Council of the League, and His Majesty's Government would not feel justified in recommending any departure from these provisions in the case of the Assyrians.

The Iraqi Government are, however, enquiring into the amount of State aid which might be given to the Assyrians under the head of the possibility of increasing grants under this head. This is largely a matter of ways and means. The Ministry of Education has been giving financial assistance for some years to an Assyrian school in Mosul, and the State school at Simel and Kam Masi both employ Assyrian teachers who teach in Syriac. In this connexion attention is again invited to the Prime Minister's comments in his letter of the 2nd August to the High Commissioner.

No. 7.—If the money asked for can be obtained from League funds or from any other outside source, the gift will no doubt be greatly appreciated. His Majesty's Government do not consider, however, that the grant of such a large sum of money can justly be demanded from the Iraqi Government, whose resources are already taxed to their utmost. Moreover, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, a sum of 5,000,000 rupees, if obtainable, could in the interests of the Assyrians be better applied to the building of residences for the Patriarch and the bishops and other ecclesiastical edifices. It is perhaps worthy of mention that, in addition to housing and feeding the Assyrians for more than three years, His Majesty's Government have contributed 1,212,000 rupees, or 1,212,000 million sterling from public funds for Assyrian relief and settlement, and in addition, large sums have been contributed for this purpose from charitable sources in this country and in the United States.

No. 8.—An appreciation of the benefits of modern medical science widens and deepens, demands for more hospitals and dispensaries increase on every side, and the Government has not the means to give satisfaction to them all. At present there are dispensaries with a few beds at Amadiyah and Dohuk, and three more dispensaries for the Amadiyah qadha have been included in the Health Service estimates for the current year. A motor road has recently been built from Mosul to Amadiyah, which traverses the heart of the country, where most of the Assyrian villages are situated. This makes it less difficult than before for the Assyrians to reach the medical aid which they need. A reference is invited to Section IV of the Appendix to the Prime Minister's letter of the 2nd August to the High Commissioner.

No. 9.—There has been no suggestion that the rifles presented to the men who served in the levies should be taken from them. These were originally given to the Assyrians for their self protection at a time when civil administration had not been established in the mountainous districts. His Majesty's Government do not consider that it would be reasonable to demand that the Iraqi Government should in this matter go beyond the assurance given by the Prime Minister in his letter of the 2nd August to the High Commissioner, in which he states that—

"Provided the Assyrians conform to the law and do not misuse the arms which are in their possession, they will in these as in all other matters receive the same treatment as the other inhabitants of the different areas in which they live."

It is noteworthy that recent amendments to the Arms Regulations have been made by the Government of Iraq. Formerly such rifles could not legally be owned by civilians.

No. 10.—The tenth demand was that all the preceding demands should be met within ten days, as the condition of the withdrawal of the levy manifesto of the 1st June, to which reference has been made above. The British High Commissioner in Iraq to whom the petition under note was addressed in the first instance, was, however, able to persuade the signatories of the absurdity of such a condition, and they agreed that the levy manifesto should be withdrawn and that the men should go on serving until the League gave a reply to their petition.

The next paragraph of the petition refers to the demands for the return of the Assyrians to the Iraqi Government's declaration to the League of stipulations guaranteeing the acceptance of all the demands presented in the petition.

It is unnecessary for His Majesty's Government to recall to the Council the very careful manner in which the Iraqi Government's declaration concerning minorities was discussed at the Council's 87th session in May last. The different articles of this declaration were most carefully elaborated to safeguard in every respect the rights of minority communities, they have been accepted by the Iraqi Parliament, and the Iraqi Government have formally pledged their word to observe them. His Majesty's Government have only a few months after a final decision had been given by the Council of the League concerning it.

The petition ends with some stipulations concerning the future service of Assyrians in the armed forces of Iraq. The value of certain classes of the Assyrians as fighting men is recognised by the Iraqi Government, but the Iraqi Government is by no means dependent on the Assyrians for recruits either for the army or police. It is a great advantage to the Assyrians that these services should be offered to them, but the Iraqi Government should be offered enlistment on preferential conditions.

From the foregoing observations on the Assyrians' petition, His Majesty's Government do not wish it to be assumed that the problem of the future of the Assyrians has been substantially solved. That, unfortunately, is not the case, and, indeed, in the considered opinion of His Majesty's Government, no solution of the problem has yet been found.

More than 2,000 Assyrian families have been allotted land in Iraq, but many of these allotments are so small and so isolated that they would present the greatest difficulty, and especially so since it is understood that the Assyrians are still without land, are now unwilling to settle in the Baradost area—one of the few remaining high lands in Iraq where unoccupied Government land of any extent is to be found.

Even the 2,000 families who have been settled are necessarily scattered over a wide area, and in the great majority of cases the settlers are the tenants of Kurdish landowners, with no security of tenure other than that afforded by leases drawn up under the supervision of a British officer. These leases are of short duration, and the Assyrians are not prepared to bind themselves for a longer term. The Assyrians do not wish to be settled on Government land, but when vacant Government land is offered to them, they refuse it, either because it is too isolated, or because it is not so healthy, or not so fertile as the land to which they were accustomed in Hakkari. Naturally, the best of the Government land in the mountains of Iraq is already occupied by the Kurds, and was in their occupation many years before the Assyrians were expelled from Hakkari and came as refugees into Iraq.

The Assyrians ask that they should be settled as a single homogeneous community in a single area. They ask that they should be given the same rights as the Kurds, and that they should be given the same treatment as the Kurds. They ask that they should be given the same rights as the Kurds, and that they should be given the same treatment as the Kurds.

The Assyrians are a people who have been suffering for many years. They have been expelled from their homes, and they have been scattered over a wide area. They have been given land, but the land is so small and so isolated that they cannot live on it. They have been given leases, but the leases are of short duration, and they are not prepared to bind themselves for a longer term. They have been given land, but the land is so small and so isolated that they cannot live on it. They have been given leases, but the leases are of short duration, and they are not prepared to bind themselves for a longer term.

It is a great advantage to the Assyrians that these services should be offered to them, but the Iraqi Government should be offered enlistment on preferential conditions. The Assyrians ask that they should be settled as a single homogeneous community in a single area. They ask that they should be given the same rights as the Kurds, and that they should be given the same treatment as the Kurds.

LIST OF APPENDICES

I.—Levy Manifesto of June 1, 1932	207
II.—High Commissioner's letter to Mar Shimon of June 16, 1932	208
III.—Mar Shimon's letter to the High Commissioner forwarding petition of June 17	209
IV.—Racial Statistics	210
V.—High Commissioner's letter to the Prime Minister (with enclosure)	211
VI.—The Prime Minister's reply (with enclosure)	212
VII.—Letter from Acting Prime Minister of August 17-18	212

Appendix I.

Levy Manifesto of June 1, 1932.

To Levy Headquarters,
Hamadi

Sir,

We, the undersigned Assyrian officers of the levy force, beg leave to bring this to your notice.

Our intention is to bring to the notice of those who thought that our military service was to obtain a small amount of money, as an ordinary work, only, and not for the other purposes. Truly speaking, it is not this at all. On the beginning of the war which concerned every nation, we threw in our lot with the Allies, and we fought for them. When British forces were approaching our place, we sheltered ourselves under their wings. We have lost three-quarters of our nation during the war and left our property to our enemies, because we were awaiting the British Government. It has historically been proved that British Government have been supporters of the rights of the small nations which have fallen under their protection and which have, therefore, attained their rights.

In 1918, when we left Urmia and had sought the protection of British forces at Hamadan, our half way to an unknown destination, and also ignorant of our future, we were requested by the British authorities at that place to organise a force. This force was organised and used for their own interests. This force was transferred to Sapna, 1919-20, when the enemy was active, and the result of their service was proved to be a successful one. In 1921 we were again requested to form another force, consisting of three battalions, one pack battery &c.

Ever since we have joined the levy force we have proved ourselves to the British Government, as well as to the British officers who have been with us in the same force, that we have served honestly and faithfully in carrying out our duties in a very satisfactory manner.

We have endeavoured with all our power to carry out the orders entrusted to us by the British Government. We have been quite peaceful with various tribes and have preserved the honour and morality of the British Government, and always on alert to keep the Iraq frontiers from intrigues and succeeded to keep quiet many fortified and dangerous places, which, without us, it would have been necessary for the British Government to keep a pure British force with a great incur of expenses in order to attain this object.

Throughout the period of our services, we, the Assyrian levies, believed that we would have been considered the children of the Great Britain and thought that an arrangement would have been made for us, as well as for our nation, before the termination of the mandate over Iraq, the arrangement of giving us our rights. We have never thought that you would have left us in such a severe condition, which leads us to a despair for gathering of our nation together.

During our services we were convinced by certain British officers that Great Britain had thought to do a very good arrangement for our future, but it is evidently that we have been allured. The result of these allurements have sometimes been a loss to the nation, as well as reduction of the levy force, about which we have paid no attention. We have lost many opportunities which would

have been very interesting for our poor and desperate nation. This is due to our belief and confidence in the Great Britain.

We have now come to a real understanding that all the services done by our nation during the war and those of the levies after the war have been obliterated, and there has been not a bit of good future nor a good arrangement for our nation. Owing to the important services and also our self devotion for the British Government, we have understood that our love and belief towards the aforesaid Government have been obliterated. We have understood that we are not needed any further for the reason that Iraq is getting its independency. Therefore, it seems quite evident that there is neither a good future nor a good result for our nation.

It has been generally realised that we have committed many mistakes in the past, and therefore, we do not wish to commit further mistakes in order to be faced with worst future than now. Therefore, we are officially informing you, the British Government, that we are hereby giving you one month notice from the undermentioned date, that we, including all the force, will leave our military services, and after which date we are no more responsible for a military service, because we know perfectly well that a number of us is to be discharged within this year and the remainder which is to be kept for a short period to act as aerodrome guards only.

No, but our love for the British Government has made us to face such a bad time as now although many politicians of the Great Britain have failed to open the door for us that we should have gathered together in order to live in peace and comfort.

Will you please make necessary arrangements as we are giving you sufficient time as above mentioned.

We are awaiting for an official reply

Hindiai, January 6, 1932

1st Battalion—

R T Yacoub M. Esmail
R E Khoshaba P. L. S.
R K Yoseph Youkhana
R K Eshu Yonun
R K Werda Eshu
R K Shimon Shwo
R E Maxut Neekho
R K Gawo Shwo
R K Lazer Oshana
R K Baijo Reehana
R K Aprim Shaul
R K Nimrod Khummo
R K Odisho M. Natan
R K Odisho Hornus
R K Yacub Khoshaba
R K Eshu Yonun
R K Eshu Yonun
R E S. M. I.
R K Z. V. S.
R K Lazer Abraham
David de Mar Shimon.

2nd Battalion—

R T Daniel M. Esmail
R E Shahan Guergis
R E Zia Boza
R E Malik Khanno
R E Malik Hormiz
R K Odisho Lawando
R K Shimon Yoseph
R K Orahm d'let Mar Sargis
R K Tamateous Barkho
R K Jendo Lawando
R K Stephen Neeson
R K Yakhana Hassado
R K Qaso Jetto
R K Yakhana Enwia
R K Orahm Desho
R K Barkho Hormiz
R K Yusep Werda
R K Zain Gewergis
R K Loco Shimon
R K Eshu Saper
R K William Shimon
Rab Khaila

Appendix II

High Commissioner's Letter to Mar Shimon

(No. S O 812.)

Beatitude

Bagdad, June 14, 1932

I VERY much regret that your Beatitude was not able to come and see me in Bagdad, especially as I know the cause was your ill health. I trust that you will soon recover your full strength.

I wanted to talk to you about the action which the Assyrian officers in the levies have recently taken. As you know, they have all signed a manifesto stating

that they and all the men will cease serving on the 1st July. I have seen a number of the officers and they have all signed a manifesto stating that they are going to mutiny, and that, if they persist on the course on which they have embarked, they cannot hope that the Assyrian people will any longer continue to enjoy the benefits of the British Government. I have added, however, that the British Government, in view of the past good service of the levies, do not wish to take a strictly legal view of their conduct and that provided the officers withdraw their manifesto and give formal undertakings to serve loyally in the future, the British Government will overlook this extraordinary breach of discipline and permit them to serve on. Moreover, I have promised that if they follow my advice and withdraw their manifesto, no more discharges would be made for six months. The officers to whom I gave a formal reply said that they had consulted your Beatitude and the other leaders at the meeting to be held at Ser Amadiyah on the 15th June. I understand that the Levy Officers have been acting largely under your Beatitude's guidance and that you have called upon them to give up their service in order to join a concentration of the Assyrian people somewhere in the Mosul liwa.

I do not certainly know the purpose of this concentration, but there is not the least doubt that a concentration of this kind will create an atmosphere of tension and excitement, which will be fraught with the gravest danger for the Assyrians themselves. Great suffering will result from the overcrowding of your villages, and your people will sustain heavy losses from abandoning their homes and employment to answer your call. Moreover, if the Levy Officers refuse to withdraw their manifesto, the British Government will have of necessity to revise the generous scheme for the employment of Assyrians in the Air Defence Force, which they have at present in mind.

I therefore sincerely beg your Beatitude to consider these things most carefully, and I must warn you that the British Government will hold you and the other leaders personally responsible for the deplorable consequences, which will inevitably result from the action which you are preparing to take.

Let me urge you in the first place to advise the levy officers to withdraw their manifesto and to accept the offer which I have made to them, and, in the second, to abandon this project of a concentration which I warn your Beatitude most solemnly can only result in the most terrible suffering for your people.

I request that a reply may be sent to me by the 18th June (or earlier) to Captain Holt, who will explain to your Beatitude anything further that you may wish to know.

I remain,

Your sincere friend

F H HUMPHRYS

Appendix III

Mar Shimon's Letter to the High Commissioner

Excellency,

Ser Amadia, June 17, 1932

YOUR letter dated the 17th June, 1932, was received by me late this evening, the conference having already broken up. I therefore very much regret that I am unable to render further assistance in this matter for the moment. So I have to forward to your Excellency the reply of the conference to your Excellency's first letter to me sent by Senior Leader Reel and Captain Holt as previously arranged.

The final decision of the levies is contained in the reply of the conference in so far as their manifesto is concerned. But if your Excellency still desires that the contents of your last letter be communicated to Assyrian levy officers, the best urgent way would appear to be through Rab Khaila David de Mar Shimon.

I am,

Your sincere friend,

ENHAI SHIMUN,

By the Grace of God,

Catholicos Patriarch of the East

Question	Answer	Correct	Wrong	Total
1. The first step in the process of creating a new product is to identify a market need.	True	1	0	1
2. A product that is unique and has no close substitutes is said to have a high degree of differentiation.	True	1	0	1
3. The process of creating a new product is a linear one, with each step leading directly to the next.	False	0	1	1
4. A product that is unique and has no close substitutes is said to have a high degree of differentiation.	True	1	0	1
5. The process of creating a new product is a linear one, with each step leading directly to the next.	False	0	1	1
6. A product that is unique and has no close substitutes is said to have a high degree of differentiation.	True	1	0	1
7. The process of creating a new product is a linear one, with each step leading directly to the next.	False	0	1	1
8. A product that is unique and has no close substitutes is said to have a high degree of differentiation.	True	1	0	1
9. The process of creating a new product is a linear one, with each step leading directly to the next.	False	0	1	1
10. A product that is unique and has no close substitutes is said to have a high degree of differentiation.	True	1	0	1
Total		10	0	10

(1) "Loss" refers to Irish Christians of all denominations, the word having been used to distinguish them from Foreigners, Americans and other foreigners.

Question	Answer	Mark	Total
1. The function $f(x) = x^2 + 3x - 4$ is a parabola opening upwards. Find the x-intercepts.	$x = -4$ and $x = 1$	2	2
2. Simplify the expression $\frac{x^2 - 9}{x^2 + 6x + 9}$.	$\frac{x-3}{x+3}$	2	4
3. A right triangle has legs of length 3 and 4. Find the hypotenuse.	5	2	6
4. The area of a rectangle is 24 square units. If the length is 6 units, find the width.	4 units	2	8
5. Solve the system of equations: $x + y = 5$ and $x - y = 1$.	$x = 3$, $y = 2$	2	10
6. The perimeter of a square is 20 units. Find the side length.	5 units	2	12
7. A car travels 120 miles in 2 hours. Find the average speed.	60 miles per hour	2	14
8. The sum of two numbers is 10. If one number is 3, find the other number.	7	2	16
9. A circle has a radius of 5 units. Find the circumference.	10π units	2	18
10. The area of a circle is 25π square units. Find the radius.	5 units	2	20

(9) Of these 10 questions are answered.

(9) If there is a β , then β is a β .

High Commissioner's Letter to the Prime Minister

(No. P O. 108, Confidential)

My ear is for M...

$$f(t) = R^k \times v(t) \in B^k \quad t \in [0, 1] \quad (10.52)$$

I ENCLOSE herewith a copy of an extract from a petition which I have received from a number of representative Assyrian leaders. A copy of this petition has also been sent to me for onward transmission to the League of Nations. In accordance with the usual procedure, it will be necessary for His Majesty's Government to offer observations on the petition when forwarding it to the League. I should be glad to know, therefore, whether the Iraqi Government desire to make any comments on the demands put forward by the Assyrians.

Yours sincerely

F H HUMPHRYS

*Copy of Extract from a Petition, dated June 17, 1932, to the High Commissioner
from certain Assyrian Leaders*

constituted procedure submitting their claims to your Excellency, which are as follows:-

1. That the Assyrians be recognized as a "millet" (nation) domiciled in Iraq, and not merely as a racial or a religious community
2. That our former homes now in the Turkish territory which before the war were under the administration of the British Empire, and the boundaries of Iraq extended so as to include them. Numerous petitions were presented to the League of Nations, and the Turkish frontier by the commission of the League of Nations, and we cannot understate why even the place which is the inheritance of our forefathers should have been seized from us
3. If it is impossible to fulfil our request and claim, as in (2) above, we then from necessity must ask and demand that a home be found for us as a "millet," and that this new home be open to all Assyrians who are scattered in Iraq. That the door of Iraq be open to admit any of those Assyrians who are ex-Ottomans and who are living all over the world if they will like to come and dwell with their co-nationalists

This new home to be arranged as follows —

(a) To include from the districts of Zakho, Dohuk and Agra parts which are adjacent to Amadia district and the whole of Amadia district. The area so selected be politically and administratively created an Assyrian district and designated as a sub-liwa under Mosul liwa with its headquarters at Dohuk, under an Arab mutasarrif and a British adviser.

Our object in selecting this area is no other than that which is based on the climatic and economic conditions.

(b) That the present Assyrian settlement be wholly investigated by an authoritative commission with a view to renewing and improving it with necessary funds. The land chosen for the settlement of the Assyrians should be registered on their names as their own property.

This does not mean that it will be necessary to evict certain Kurds from their villages, as we are certain that sufficient land can be found for us in the above-named area without doing that.

(c) That Iraq Government should give the priority to Assyrians in the selection of officials for the administrative duties of the sub-liwa, with the exception of the mutasarrif and technical officials for whom we may not be able to find men. The official language of the sub-liwa used along with Arabic should be Syriac.

This claim does not, however, prevent inhabitant Kurds of the "Assyrian sub-jiwa" to take administrative appointments.

4. That the temporal and ecclesiastical leadership of his Beatitude Mar Shimun the Patriarch over the Assyrian "millet" be officially recognised by

the Government. In order that this recognition be established the Mar Shimun should receive from His Majesty the King of Iraq a decoration of honour for the distinguished service which his people have rendered to this country, and also an annual subsidy for the maintenance of the Patriarchate similar to those enjoyed by him from the Sultan of Ottoman Empire.

That the power of Mar Shimun the Patriarch in administering his "millet" temporally and spiritually according to laws and customs descended to us should be officially recognised by the Government.

5. That we should have a member in the House of Deputies to be nominated by the Assyrians.

6. That the Government should take steps to protect the rights of the Assyrians upon by the District Councils and the National Council. The Assyrians are not to be treated as a minority in the same way as the Arabs, and the Government should take steps to protect the interests of the Assyrians.

7. A law should be enacted which should give the Assyrians in their local districts the same rights as the other communities. The Assyrians are not to be treated as a minority in the same way as the Arabs, and the Government should take steps to protect the interests of the Assyrians.

8. A law should be enacted which should give the Assyrians in their local districts the same rights as the other communities. The Assyrians are not to be treated as a minority in the same way as the Arabs, and the Government should take steps to protect the interests of the Assyrians.

9. A law should be enacted which should give the Assyrians in their local districts the same rights as the other communities. The Assyrians are not to be treated as a minority in the same way as the Arabs, and the Government should take steps to protect the interests of the Assyrians.

Appendix No. VI

Translation of Letter from His Excellency Nuri Pasha Al Said, Prime Minister of Iraq, to His Excellency Sir Francis Humphreys, H. B. Consul-General for Iraq, Baghdad, dated August 2, 1932, No. 3023.

REFERENCE your Excellency's letter dated the 7th July, 1932.

The Iraqi Government have received your letter of the 17th June, 1932, from certain Assyrians, and desire to offer the following comments thereon—

The Iraqi Government are somewhat surprised by these demands, since they feel that the policy of sympathy which they have adopted towards the Assyrians should have been an encouragement to them as Iraqis to approach the Government.

The Assyrians in Iraq are one of the elements of which the Iraqi nation is composed and they enjoy equal rights and duties with all other Iraqis. Their special situation, however, arising from the fact that a great number of them emigrated from Turkey into Iraq and settled in this country has called for particular attention and sympathy. Land has been allotted to them and assistance has been given to them in many other ways. It is to be regretted that the Assyrians should have become a pretext for making demands, most of which are unreasonable, such as the demands under notice, which have been prepared at the meetings and conferences which they have held.

The Iraqi Government consider that it is in the interests of the Assyrians themselves that they should be satisfied with the rights which they have as Iraqi subjects, and that they should confirm their loyalty to their country, Iraq. The Government should not be embarrassed by the Iraqi Government or arouse the jealousy of other elements of the Iraqi nation.

As regards the demands themselves it appears to the Iraqi Government that they are not the result of a national movement in Iraq for the Assyrians.

The Government are unable in any circumstances to consider any scheme of this kind. Similarly, they are unable to consider any demand which conflicts with the Organic Law of Iraq or with the undertakings given to the League concerning minorities regarding which agreement was recently reached. While therefore maintaining a general reservation based on these principles, the Iraqi Government beg to offer the following observations on the demands contained in the petition—

Demand No. 1.—The Iraqi Government cannot consent to grant to the Assyrians any special privileges other than those safeguarded to all communities under articles 16, 75, 78, 79 and 112 of the Organic Law, and under articles 1 to 10 of the Iraqi Declaration to the Council of the League.

Demand No. 2. It is for the Iraqi Government to consider the demands of the Assyrians in the same way as the demands of the other communities.

The Assyrians claim should be made into an Assyrian district is inhabited by 5,022 Christians, of whom about 9,000 are Assyrians, compared with 61,302 persons of other races and religions. Of the latter, 51,000 are Kurds. The Iraqi Government therefore consider this demand to be unreasonable. They wish to point out that the districts of Zakho, Dohuk, Aqra and Amadiyah is predominantly Kurdish, these districts fall within the scope of article 9 of the Iraqi declaration to the Council of the League.

The Iraqi Government are unable to consider the demand of the Assyrians that they should be treated as a minority in the same way as the other communities.

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Demand No. 4.—The Iraqi Government are prepared to enact a law for the Assyrian community similar to those already enacted for the Jewish and Armenian Orthodox communities. Such a law would legalise the authority of the Patriarch in the same way as the authority of the other communities.

Demand No. 5.—Article 4 (2) of the Iraqi declaration to the Council of the League deals with the political representation of minorities in Iraq. The electoral law at present provides for two Christian Deputies to be returned from the Mosul District. The total number of Christians in the Iraq is 73,000, on the basis of one in two this equals approximately 36,500 males. Article 38 of the Constitution provides for the election of Deputies on the basis of one Deputy for every 20,000 males. On this basis the Christians of Mosul are already more than adequately represented. The Assyrians are not the only Christian sect in the Mosul District, in fact they number about a quarter of the Christian population. There are also Chaldean, Armenian, Syrian

Orthodox and Syrian Catholic Christians. In Bagdad and elsewhere there are also other sects. The practice is generally for the Government party in power unofficially to nominate candidates in turn from the different sects. Mosul is at present represented by a Chaldean and a Syrian Catholic, and Bagdad by an Assyrian. The last time an Assyrian was elected to the Chamber was a Syrian Catholic. Up to the present no Assyrian has sat in the Chamber.

There is nothing, however, to prevent the election in the future of an Assyrian Deputy in turn with Deputies from the other Christian communities.

Demand No. 6—The Iraqi Government approve of article 8 of their declaration to the Council of the League of Nations, in which the immediate future are set out in detail in the appendix^(*) to this letter.

Demand No. 7 This demand the Iraqi Government consider must be regarded as being addressed primarily to the League of Nations. They feel certain that those who presented the petition under comment must know full well that it is impossible for the Iraqi Government to make the large gift demanded for the purpose defined.

The Iraqi Government also desire to express their sympathy for the Assyrians and to express their readiness to afford them all possible assistance in their undertakings to the League of Nations in order that they may live in peace with their brother Iraqis of different races. The Government and the Government are confident that the League of Nations will find nothing in this petition to justify a revision of the undertakings regarding the protection of the Assyrians in Iraq which have been given to the Assyrians.

Demand No. 8 The Iraqi Government desire to reaffirm their sympathy for the Assyrians and to express their readiness to afford them all possible assistance in their undertakings to the League of Nations in order that they may live in peace with their brother Iraqis of different races. The Government and the Government are confident that the League of Nations will find nothing in this petition to justify a revision of the undertakings regarding the protection of the Assyrians in Iraq which have been given to the Assyrians.

I enclose herewith a report on the special assistance which the Iraqi Government have already given to the Assyrians in this country, and I should be glad if you would bring the facts contained therein to the notice of the League of Nations.

NURI SAID

Appendix to Prime Minister's Letter of August 2

Census of the Assyrians and Manner of Their Settlement in Iraq

1.—Estimated Strength and Distribution of Assyrians.

Although it is impossible to obtain accurate statistics at such short notice, the estimated strength of the Assyrians in Iraq at the present time is as follows:—

	Families.
1. Assyrians whose pre-war homes were in areas now within the Kingdom of Iraq	409
2. Refugees—	
(a) Persian Assyrians, 500 families	4,000
(b) Ex-Ottoman subjects, 3,500 families	
Total	4,409

i.e. 4,409 families at the usual average of five souls to a family = 22,045 souls.

(*) Section VIII.

(b) Section IV.

NOTE.—The Mar Shimun stated in 1920 to his Excellency the High Commissioner that there were then approximately 15,000 ex-Ottoman^(*) Assyrian refugees in Russia, and this figure was confirmed about the same time by the Norwegian Legation in Moscow.

Although these Assyrians do not come within the scope of this report, this fact has been quoted as a matter of interest.

Detailed statistics of Assyrians in Iraq are as follows:—

1. The Assyrians whose pre-war homes were in areas now within the Kingdom of Iraq and who did not leave their villages during the Great War, are as follows:—

The latest statistics received at the beginning of this month from the Mosul District are as follows:—

Barwari Bala Nahiya	305 families in 24 villages
Nerwa Rakan Nahiya	104 families in 7 villages
Total	409 families in 31 villages

2. *Refugees.*—These can be divided into two main groups:—

(a) Persian Assyrians mostly from the Urmia area. A few families have obtained land in the Iraqi Government Settlements in Northern Iraq, but the majority are living in towns in this country and hope to return some day to their pre-war homes in Persia. In most cases they have refused to participate in any settlement scheme in Iraq.

A rough estimate of their strength and distribution in this country is as follows:—

	Families
1 Bagdad—	
(i) Gilani Camp	350 (Urmian)
(ii) Bagdad East Camp	25 (Urmian)
2 Other towns of Iraq	75 (Urmian)
3 In Government settlements (Urmian, Torga-war, Mergawar and Barndost sections)	50

Total of Persian Assyrians 500

(b) Ex-Ottoman Assyrians whose pre-war homes were in areas now situated in Turkish territory.

A rough estimate of ex-Ottoman Assyrians who are refugees in Iraq appears to be as follows:—

	Sub-Sections (with number of families)
1 Bagdad—	
(i) Gilani Camp	350 (Urmian)
(ii) Bagdad East Camp	25 (Urmian)
2 Other towns of Iraq	75 (Urmian)
3 In Government settlements (Urmian, Torga-war, Mergawar and Barndost sections)	50
Total of Persian Assyrians	500
(b) Ex-Ottoman Assyrians whose pre-war homes were in areas now situated in Turkish territory.	
(i) Mosul District	1,000
(ii) Kirkuk District	1,000
(iii) Erbil District	1,000
(iv) Sulaymaniyah District	1,000
(v) Tikrit District	1,000
(vi) Samarra District	1,000
(vii) Baghdad District	1,000
(viii) Basra District	1,000
(ix) Karbala District	1,000
(x) Najaf District	1,000
(xi) Hilla District	1,000
(xii) Kut District	1,000
(xiii) Samarra District	1,000
(xiv) Tikrit District	1,000
(xv) Sulaymaniyah District	1,000
(xvi) Erbil District	1,000
(xvii) Kirkuk District	1,000
(xviii) Mosul District	1,000
(xix) Total	14,000

Of these 3,500 families, it is estimated that 2,266 families (11,330 souls) have been allotted land in Iraq, leaving a balance of 1,234 families of ex-Ottoman Assyrian refugees who have not been settled, the following being an approximate estimate of this balance:

Levy families	600	
Families of Assyrians serving in the Iraq army	50	
Families of Assyrian policemen	211	
In Bagdad camps—		
Railway camp	87	
Gilani camp	1,000	
Bagdad east camp	1,000	
Families of refugees who have obtained other employment in towns of Iraq	161	
	<hr/>	593
		<hr/>
		1,234

II.—Assyrian Settlements.

Although the actual numbers of families in each village are liable to vary slightly whenever statistics are demanded, the following are as reliable as possible:—

	Villages in which Assyrians have been settled.	Number of Families.	Number of Families.	Number of Families.
<i>Mosul Liwa.</i>				
Assyrian settlements	8	434	1	23
Assyrian settlements	6	38	6	5
Assyrian settlements	24	1	5	24
Assyrian settlements	46	68	1	26
Total in Mosul Liwa		543	11	58
<i>Arbil Liwa.</i>				
Assyrian settlements	0	361	6	6
Assyrian settlements	7	1	7	7
Assyrian settlements		10	1	1
Total in Arbil Liwa	11	372	14	14
Total in Iraq	40	915	41	72

(*) Includes a few families of Targawar and Mergawar sects.

Settlement and Repatriation Schemes.

Since the closing of the Miudan Refugee Camp in the summer of 1921, several attempts have been made by the Iraq Government to solve the Assyrian settlement problem.

1921

When the refugee camp was closed, 501 ex-Ottoman Assyrian families whose pre-war homes were in undisputed Turkish territory were settled in twenty-seven villages in the Dohuk and Aqra Qadhas of the Mosul liwa, and it is understood that the majority of the original settlers are still living in these villages, but a number were resettled, at their own request, under later settlement schemes.

1921-22

Meanwhile a repatriation scheme was being carried out under the direction of a British official for those Assyrians whose pre-war homes were in "disputed

territory," and the following is given as a rough distribution of the Assyrians in the autumn of 1921:—

	Souls
Settled and repatriated north of Amadia ..	6,950
Settled in Amadia district	1,100
Settled in Dohuk, Zakho and Aqra districts ..	7,450
Total ..	<hr/>
	15,500

Repatriation was continued in the spring of 1922, when the whole of the Upper and Lower Tiari proceeded to their pre-war homes. The Tkhuma, Baz and Jilu followed.

1922-24

For two years, from the summer of 1922 until the autumn of 1924, the Assyrian settlement problem appeared to have been solved, as, with the return of the Mosul and Arbil liwas for the settlement of the remainder

Autumn 1924

As a result of the British occupation of the Mosul and Arbil liwas and the Turkish Vah of Julamerik, who was on a revenue-collecting tour in August 1924, the Turks retaliated towards the end of the following month (September 1924) by sending large military forces into territory then under the administration of the Iraq Government. These forces were sent to the districts of Amadia to which Assyrian refugees had been repatriated.

Tiari, Tkhuma, Baz and Jilu tribesmen came pouring back to Amadia, the following being an approximate estimate of their strength:—

	Families.	Souls (at 5 for family).
Upper Tiari	400	2,000
Lower Tiari	1,000	5,000
Tkhuma	200	1,000
Baz	250	1,250
Jilu	400	2,000
Total	<hr/>	<hr/>
	2,250	11,250

The Iraq Government was again faced with the Assyrian settlement problem. As a result of the Turkish occupation of the Mosul and Arbil liwas, the Assyrians were driven to the Desht-i Harir and around Batas in the Arbil liwa. Others scattered to the towns of Iraq.

1925

The refugees remained in the areas allotted to them, but were not definitely settled as the Government had no territory to which they could be driven by Turkish troops in the previous autumn, would be included in the Kingdom of Iraq.

In December 1925 the resolution adopted by the Council of the League of Nations gave the bulk of the territory formerly inhabited by ex-Ottoman Assyrians to Turkey, and all hopes of repatriating them were finally dispelled.

1926

During 1926 various areas in Northern Iraq were suggested as probably being suitable for the settlement of the Assyrians in the Mosul and Arbil liwas, the Rania district (Arbil liwa), the Salazar Plain (Sulaymaniyah liwa) and the Barazgard Valley in the Baradost Nahiya of the Arbil liwa.

Baradost Settlement

Nothing the size of the area required was available unless the Kurdish inhabitants of those districts were to be dispossessed of property owned by them for generations and then resettled in other parts of Iraq, but it was thought that accommodation might be found for several hundred families in the Barazgard

Valley, which was reported to have been deserted by its former inhabitants owing to famine and military invasion during the Great War.

A commission was therefore sent up to that area in September 1926 to make investigations on the spot. This commission was composed of a British administrative inspector, the Kaimakam of Rowanduz, an agricultural expert of the Iraq Government and three Assyrian representatives of the Tiari, Jilu and Shemadnan sections.

After a very thorough enquiry, it was ascertained that, even with a considerable amount of pioneering, the Barazgird Valley could only provide accommodation for 473 families (2,363 souls).

It appeared also that the Assyrian representatives themselves did not appear to be enthusiastic about this settlement scheme.

1927

Preparations nevertheless continued during the same year to establish a settlement in this area. The land was surveyed by the Tapu Department, and the area was photographed in sections by the Royal Air Force, at the expense of the Iraq Government, as preliminary measures to the registration in the name of Government of twelve "muhlul" villages in the Barazgird Valley.

Detailed enquiries were also made by the local administrative authorities to ensure that these lands did not belong to Kurdish tribesmen so that no claims should be made to the land by Kurdish tribesmen after Assyrians had been settled there.

The Assyrians continued to show reluctance and raise objections to this scheme on the grounds that the area was too isolated and too near the Iraq-Turkey frontier, and that it was too close to the Kurdish tribesmen, who were possibly to interfere by Turks, and in November they announced that they did not wish to proceed to this area at this season, and asked for a postponement until the next spring.

Other Settlement Schemes (1927)

Meanwhile, efforts were also made to settle Assyrians in suitable areas in the Mosul Liwa, in accordance with the following resolution of the Council of Ministers, which was passed on the 8th March, 1927:—

- (a) That the refugees should be informed that the Government was prepared to grant special exemption to every individual who would develop and till land and comply with the advice and orders of the Government in accordance with law.
- (b) That the settlement of refugees in localities where their settlement might be objected to by neighbouring Governments, or by the original inhabitants on account of Haq al Qarar or any other legitimate reason should be avoided.

In pursuance of this resolution the necessary orders were then issued to the Kaimakam Amadia through the Mutesarrif of Mosul. The kaimakam summoned the Assyrians concerned and proposed the following settlement:—

- 1,000 Upper Tiari in Barwari Zair
- 1,500 Upper Tiari in Nahla (Aqra).
- 1,000 Upper Tiari in Government villages, and dependents in Dask
- 4,000 Lower Tiari in Barwari Zair
- Halman and Geramus Assyrians in Chamsus

The Upper and Lower Tiari announced that they would not make a decision until the following year, and the Geramus Assyrians decided to remain in Chalki.

On the 11th September 1927, a madhhata signed by M. T. I. and of the Upper Tiari, and forty-six signatures of chiefs of the Upper and Lower Tiari, the Tkhuma, the Halman Jaraya, and the Daiza sections, was presented to Government. In this madhhata it was stated that the Government had offered to settle them in empty villages with very little water and a bad climate, and that, as they saw no possibility of being able to return to their pre-war homes, they had no intention of living in Iraq even if the Government offered them settlement in better villages. A letter on 1 July 1927 a British officer was appointed Assyrian

Settlement Officer, and, with the concurrence of the Iraq Government, under the direct orders of his Excellency the High Commissioner.

This officer (Lieutenant Fowraker) had served for several years with the Assyrian levies and had acquired an extensive knowledge of the different Assyrian tribes, and spoke their language fluently.

The settlement officer encountered difficulties from the start. In the autumn of 1926 there had been a proposal to establish settlements in Ismail Beg Rowanduz villages and in Batas and Dashti Harir, but the Assyrians concerned had asked for a postponement until the spring of 1927. In April 1927 they agreed to move in August, but when the time came they asked for a further postponement until the following spring on the grounds that they had been given insufficient notice—an excuse which obviously had no justification.

1928

The settlement officer continued his enormous task through the remainder of the year, interviewing Government officials and local landlords, drawing up leases for the settlers, and, with the funds at his disposal, assisting families to move into new and more suitable settlement areas.

The difficulties were immense, but, by degrees, the settlement officer was able to effect redistributions, with the object of grouping the settlers as far as possible in suitable areas.

During 1928 the settlement officer continued his efforts to induce Assyrians to settle in the Baradost area.

In May he accompanied Malik Ismail and sons, and ten representatives of the Upper Tiari, to the Baradost area, but he could not obtain any definite promise from them that they would move up immediately, owing to the fact that they appeared to be satisfied with existing conditions in the villages in which they had been settled in the Mosul Liwa.

In October 1928 the settlement officer reported that sixty families had agreed to settle in the Baradost area, but that the majority of them had not yet moved. He left Iraq on the 15th November, 1928.

Progress up to November 1928

On the 14th November, 1928, the Administrative Inspector, Mosul, assumed the duties of the settlement officer. He found that there were still many families remaining to be settled. Some of these could not be settled as they were malcontents of various kinds, who either wished to return to Turkey or were naturally wanderers. About 250 of them wished to settle in the Baradost. The Administrative Inspector reported that the majority of the Assyrians was non-existent, and that they were, in fact, more numerous than the Kurdish, Christian and Yezidi neighbours.

A report of the settlement officer was presented to the Mutesarrif and Administrative Inspector, expressing the wish to deal with the Iraq Government, and to deal with the Assyrians, and to refer to the Mutesarrif.

1929

During the year 1929 over 100 families were settled, and in February 1930 the Administrative Inspector, Mosul, reported that presumably between 350 and 400 still remained to be settled. Assyrian cultivators proceeded to the Baradost area in the autumn to prepare the land for occupation during the following year.

1930. Baradost Scheme

In April 1930 it was decided to abandon the Baradost scheme for the time being, and to settle the Assyrians in the neighbouring area of Barzan, and forty-two families, who were to have gone up to the Barazgird valley, were distributed among villages near Rowanduz by private agreement between those families and Kurdish landlords.

Scheme for Final Settlement of remaining 300 odd Families in Mosul Liwa.

The Administrative Inspector, Mosul, was then requested to submit definite proposals for the settlement of the remaining 300 odd families of Ashutis who were settled, and of whom a great number were reported to be Ashutis. He replied that—

"There was no suitable area in the Mosul liwa where the Ashutis could be settled all together.

"It had been hoped that the Baradost Settlement would produce a considerable exodus of the Upper Tiaris from the Mosul liwa, thereby leaving room for the settlement of Ashutis or others in their place. The postponement of the Baradost scheme prevented this.

"There were still half a dozen empty Government villages in the Barwari Zhair, but it was probable that the bulk of these would be accepted by Assyrians of the Bani Gippa section, who were to leave villages in Zakho where they had failed to agree with Kurdish partners.

"Mubammed Najafi, a leading Mosul landowner, was prepared to take some 200 families of Assyrians at Cham Pashai and other villages in the Shavani Nahiyah.

These villages were at that time unoccupied and possessed in addition to ample cultivable land, good winter and summer grazing grounds, and were also situated close to the Tigris.

Although he tried to induce any Assyrians to accept this offer the fact that these were not full villages deterred them, and he thought that it was extremely unlikely that the Ashutis could be compelled to accept what others had refused.

"In connexion with the Ashutis, he suggested that administrative officials in the Mosul liwa should receive instructions to do their best to settle them in any available villages."

1931

A further attempt was made to establish a settlement in Baradost, and in August a force of Levies was despatched to Harana to facilitate the settlement. Conditions, however, were not favourable owing to the dislocation caused by the raids which were carried out from the neighbouring district of Barzan by the followers of Sheikh Ahmed of Barzan, and the plan was accordingly postponed.

1932

With the defeat of Sheikh Ahmed of Barzan, and as a result of the recent military operations against him and with the setting up of regular administration in the Mosul liwa, it was now open for settlement in the Baradost Nahiyah if the Assyrians desire it.

III.—Remission of Taxation granted by the Iraq Government to Assyrian Settlers

It was decided by the Council of Ministers at their meeting on the 6th January, 1927, to remit the sum of 8,000-8 rupees on Koda demands for the year 1924 in the case of Assyrian settlers in the Mosul liwa.

On the 17th April, 1927, the Council of Ministers decided to grant remissions on the 1928 Koda demands up to the sum of 14,602-5 rupees.

On the 4th February, 1928, the Council of Ministers agreed to the remission of the Koda demands for the year 1927 and 1928 in the case of Assyrian settlers.

With the increasing prosperity of the older settlements in the Mosul Province, however, many settlers and some of the older villages have complained of taxation, and during 1928 sheep tax was collected from the majority of the settlers.

The Assyrian Settlement Officer had stated that, in the majority of cases, there would be no hardship experienced by the settlers in the Mosul liwa as a result of the collection of these taxes.

No complaints on this account were received from the settlers, and the Mosul liwa authorities gave careful and sympathetic consideration to deserving applications for remission of taxation.

During 1929 the Council of Ministers passed resolutions at various times regarding the settlement of the Assyrians in the Mosul liwa.

On the 30th September, 1931, after examining the report of the Ministry of the Interior, the Council of Ministers decided to grant remissions of taxation to the Assyrian settlers in the Mosul liwa.

Up to the end of 1931 the following remissions of taxation had been granted by the Iraq Government to the Assyrian settlers:

Area	Year	Amount	Year	Amount	Date of Council of Ministers Decision.
Baradost	1927	8,000-8	1928	14,602-5	1927
Baradost	1928	14,602-5	1929	14,602-5	1928
Baradost	1929	14,602-5	1930	14,602-5	1929
Baradost	1930	14,602-5	1931	14,602-5	1930
Baradost	1931	14,602-5	1932	14,602-5	1931
Baradost	1932	14,602-5	1933	14,602-5	1932
Baradost	1933	14,602-5	1934	14,602-5	1933
Baradost	1934	14,602-5	1935	14,602-5	1934
Baradost	1935	14,602-5	1936	14,602-5	1935
Baradost	1936	14,602-5	1937	14,602-5	1936
Baradost	1937	14,602-5	1938	14,602-5	1937
Baradost	1938	14,602-5	1939	14,602-5	1938
Baradost	1939	14,602-5	1940	14,602-5	1939
Baradost	1940	14,602-5	1941	14,602-5	1940
Baradost	1941	14,602-5	1942	14,602-5	1941
Baradost	1942	14,602-5	1943	14,602-5	1942
Baradost	1943	14,602-5	1944	14,602-5	1943
Baradost	1944	14,602-5	1945	14,602-5	1944
Baradost	1945	14,602-5	1946	14,602-5	1945
Baradost	1946	14,602-5	1947	14,602-5	1946
Baradost	1947	14,602-5	1948	14,602-5	1947
Baradost	1948	14,602-5	1949	14,602-5	1948
Baradost	1949	14,602-5	1950	14,602-5	1949
Baradost	1950	14,602-5	1951	14,602-5	1950
Baradost	1951	14,602-5	1952	14,602-5	1951
Baradost	1952	14,602-5	1953	14,602-5	1952
Baradost	1953	14,602-5	1954	14,602-5	1953
Baradost	1954	14,602-5	1955	14,602-5	1954
Baradost	1955	14,602-5	1956	14,602-5	1955
Baradost	1956	14,602-5	1957	14,602-5	1956
Baradost	1957	14,602-5	1958	14,602-5	1957
Baradost	1958	14,602-5	1959	14,602-5	1958
Baradost	1959	14,602-5	1960	14,602-5	1959
Baradost	1960	14,602-5	1961	14,602-5	1960
Baradost	1961	14,602-5	1962	14,602-5	1961
Baradost	1962	14,602-5	1963	14,602-5	1962
Baradost	1963	14,602-5	1964	14,602-5	1963
Baradost	1964	14,602-5	1965	14,602-5	1964
Baradost	1965	14,602-5	1966	14,602-5	1965
Baradost	1966	14,602-5	1967	14,602-5	1966
Baradost	1967	14,602-5	1968	14,602-5	1967
Baradost	1968	14,602-5	1969	14,602-5	1968
Baradost	1969	14,602-5	1970	14,602-5	1969
Baradost	1970	14,602-5	1971	14,602-5	1970
Baradost	1971	14,602-5	1972	14,602-5	1971
Baradost	1972	14,602-5	1973	14,602-5	1972
Baradost	1973	14,602-5	1974	14,602-5	1973
Baradost	1974	14,602-5	1975	14,602-5	1974
Baradost	1975	14,602-5	1976	14,602-5	1975
Baradost	1976	14,602-5	1977	14,602-5	1976
Baradost	1977	14,602-5	1978	14,602-5	1977
Baradost	1978	14,602-5	1979	14,602-5	1978
Baradost	1979	14,602-5	1980	14,602-5	1979
Baradost	1980	14,602-5	1981	14,602-5	1980
Baradost	1981	14,602-5	1982	14,602-5	1981
Baradost	1982	14,602-5	1983	14,602-5	1982
Baradost	1983	14,602-5	1984	14,602-5	1983
Baradost	1984	14,602-5	1985	14,602-5	1984
Baradost	1985	14,602-5	1986	14,602-5	1985
Baradost	1986	14,602-5	1987	14,602-5	1986
Baradost	1987	14,602-5	1988	14,602-5	1987
Baradost	1988	14,602-5	1989	14,602-5	1988
Baradost	1989	14,602-5	1990	14,602-5	1989
Baradost	1990	14,602-5	1991	14,602-5	1990
Baradost	1991	14,602-5	1992	14,602-5	1991
Baradost	1992	14,602-5	1993	14,602-5	1992
Baradost	1993	14,602-5	1994	14,602-5	1993
Baradost	1994	14,602-5	1995	14,602-5	1994
Baradost	1995	14,602-5	1996	14,602-5	1995
Baradost	1996	14,602-5	1997	14,602-5	1996
Baradost	1997	14,602-5	1998	14,602-5	1997
Baradost	1998	14,602-5	1999	14,602-5	1998
Baradost	1999	14,602-5	2000	14,602-5	1999
Baradost	2000	14,602-5	2001	14,602-5	2000
Baradost	2001	14,602-5	2002	14,602-5	2001
Baradost	2002	14,602-5	2003	14,602-5	2002
Baradost	2003	14,602-5	2004	14,602-5	2003
Baradost	2004	14,602-5	2005	14,602-5	2004
Baradost	2005	14,602-5	2006	14,602-5	2005
Baradost	2006	14,602-5	2007	14,602-5	2006
Baradost	2007	14,602-5	2008	14,602-5	2007
Baradost	2008	14,602-5	2009	14,602-5	2008
Baradost	2009	14,602-5	2010	14,602-5	2009
Baradost	2010	14,602-5	2011	14,602-5	2010
Baradost	2011	14,602-5	2012	14,602-5	2011
Baradost	2012	14,602-5	2013	14,602-5	2012
Baradost	2013	14,602-5	2014	14,602-5	2013
Baradost	2014	14,602-5	2015	14,602-5	2014
Baradost	2015	14,602-5	2016	14,602-5	2015
Baradost	2016	14,602-5	2017	14,602-5	2016
Baradost	2017	14,602-5	2018	14,602-5	2017
Baradost	2018	14,602-5	2019	14,602-5	2018
Baradost	2019	14,602-5	2020	14,602-5	2019
Baradost	2020	14,602-5	2021	14,602-5	2020
Baradost	2021	14,602-5	2022	14,602-5	2021
Baradost	2022	14,602-5	2023	14,602-5	2022
Baradost	2023	14,602-5	2024	14,602-5	2023
Baradost	2024	14,602-5	2025	14,602-5	2024
Baradost	2025	14,602-5	2026	14,602-5	2025
Baradost	2026	14,602-5	2027	14,602-5	2026
Baradost	2027	14,602-5	2028	14,602-5	2027
Baradost	2028	14,602-5	2029	14,602-5	2028
Baradost	2029	14,602-5	2030	14,602-5	2029
Baradost	2030	14,602-5	2031	14,602-5	2030
Baradost	2031	14,602-5	2032	14,602-5	2031
Baradost	2032	14,602-5	2033	14,602-5	2032
Baradost	2033	14,602-5	2034	14,602-5	2033
Baradost	2034	14,602-5	2035	14,602-5	2034
Baradost	2035	14,602-5	2036	14,602-5	2035
Baradost	2036	14,602-5	2037	14,602-5	2036
Baradost	2037	14,602-5	2038	14,602-5	2037
Baradost	2038	14,602-5	2039	14,602-5	2038
Baradost	2039	14,602-5	2040	14,602-5	2039
Baradost	2040	14,602-5	2041	14,602-5	2040
Baradost	2041	14,602-5	2042	14,602-5	2041
Baradost	2042	14,602-5	2043	14,602-5	2042
Baradost	2043	14,602-5	2044	14,602-5	2043
Baradost	2044	14,602-5	2045	14,602-5	2044
Baradost	2045	14,602-5	2046	14,602-5	2045
Baradost	2046	14,602-5	2047	14,602-5	2046
Baradost	2047	14,602-5	2048	14,602-5	2047
Baradost	2048	14,602-5	2049	14,602-5	2048
Baradost	2049	14,602-5	2050	14,602-5	2049
Baradost	2050	14,602-5	2051	14,602-5	2050
Baradost	2051	14,602-5	2052	14,602-5	2051
Baradost	2052	14,602-5	2053	14,602-5	2052
Baradost	2053	14,602-5	2054	14,602-5	2053
Baradost	2054	14,602-5	2055	14,602-5	2054
Baradost	2055	14,602-5	2056	14,602-5	2055
Baradost	2056	14,602-5	2057	14,602-5	2056
Baradost	2057	14,602-5	2058	14,602-5	2057
Baradost	2058	14,602-5	2059	14,602-5	2058
Baradost	2059	14,602-5	2060	14,602-5	2059
Baradost	2060	14,602-5	2061	14,602-5	2060
Baradost	2061	14,602-5	2062	14,602-5	2061
Baradost	2062	14,602-5	2063	14,602-5	2062
Baradost	2063	14,602-5	2064	14,602-5	2063
Baradost	2064	14,602-5	2065	14,602-5	2064
Baradost	2065	14,602-5	2066	14,602-5	2065
Baradost	2066	14,602-5	2067	14,602-5	2066
Baradost	2067	14,602-5	2068	14,602-5	2067
Baradost	2068	14,602-5	2069	14,602-5	2068
Baradost	2069	14,602-5	2070	14,602-5	2069
Baradost	2070	14,602-5	2071	14,602-5	2070
Baradost	2071	14,602-5	2072	14,602-5	2071
Baradost	2072	14,602-5	2073	14,602-5	2072
Baradost	2073	14,602-5	2074	14,602-5	2073
Baradost	2074	14,602-5	2075	14,602-5	2074
Baradost	2075	14,602-5	2076	14,602-5	2075
Baradost	2076	14,602-5	2077	14,602-5	2076
Baradost	2077	14,602-5	2078	14,602-5	2077
Baradost	2078	14,602-5	2079	14,602-5	2078
Baradost	2079	14,602-5	2080	14,602-5	2079
Baradost	2080	14,602-5	2081	14,602-5	2080
Baradost	2081	14,602-5	2082	14,602-5	2081
Baradost	2082	14,602-5	2083	14,602-5	2082
Baradost	2083	14,602-5	2084	14,602-5	2083
Baradost	2084	14,602-5	2085	14,602-5	2084
Baradost	2085	14,602-5	2086	14,602-5	2085
Baradost	2086	14,602-5	2087	14,602-5	2086
Baradost	2087	14,602-5	2088	14,602-5	2087
Baradost	2088	14,602-5	2089	14,602-5	2088
Baradost	2089	14,602-5	2090	14,602-5	2089
Baradost	2090	14,602-5	2091	14,602-5	2090
Baradost	2091	14,602-5	2092	14,602-5	2091
Baradost	2092	14,602-5	2093	14,602-5	2092
Baradost	2093	14,602-5	2094	14,602-5	2093
Baradost	2094	14,602-5	2095	14,602-5	2094
Baradost	2095	14,602-5	2096	14,602-5	2095
Baradost	2096	14,602-5	2097	14,602-5	2096
Baradost	2097	14,602-5	2098	14,602-5	2097
Baradost	2098	14,602-5	2099	14,602-5	2098
Baradost	2099	14,602-5	2100	14,602-5	2099
Baradost	2100	14,602-5	2101	14,602-5	2100
Baradost	2101	14,602-5	2102	14,602-5	2101
Baradost	2102	14,602-5	2103	14,602-5	2102
Baradost	2103	14,602-5	2104	14,602-5	2103
Baradost	2104	14,602-5	2105	14,602-5	2104
Baradost	2105	14,602-5	2106	14,602-5	2105
Baradost	2106	14,602-5	2107	14,602-5	2106
Baradost	2107	14,602-5	2108	14,602-5	2107
Baradost	2108	14,602-5	2109	14,602-5	2108
Baradost	2109	14,602-5	2110	14,602-5	2109
Baradost	2110	14,602-5	2111	14,602-5	2110
Baradost	2111	14,602-5	2112	14,602-5	2111
Baradost	2112	14,602-5	2113	14,602-5	2112
Baradost	2113	14,602-5	2114	14,602-5	2113
Baradost	2114	14,602-5	2115	14,602-5	2114
Baradost	2115	14,602-5	2116	14,602-5	2115
Baradost	2116	14,602-5	2117	14,602-5	

"2. To say that the Assyrians are dying by hundreds is a great exaggeration.

"3. There are nine civil dispensaries in the Qadhas of the Mosul Liwa, five of these are in Assyrian Settlement areas, and all are doing good work. Practically all the settlements are within 15 miles of a Government dispensary.

"4. The infantile mortality is no heavier than that in similar communities in the mountains of the Liwa. It is proportional to the incidence of malaria.

"5. The incidence of malaria is often high in the mountainous districts, but it falls on Moslems and Christians alike.

"6. Practically the entire civil medical personnel of the Mosul Liwa are Christians. It is a mistake to say that there is any discrimination whatever between Christians and Moslems in providing medical facilities.

"7. Under present conditions in Iraq it is impossible to obtain reliable vital statistics from the small towns and villages in any part of the country. However, it is the duty of local mudirs to keep the Administration informed of any unusual sickness or deaths in their areas if a health service official is not present."

The following is the present position (July 1932) —

1. Hospitals and Dispensaries

There are now one first-class hospital and eleven dispensaries in the Mosul Liwa, as follows —

Hospital (first-class)		
Mosul City		
Dispensaries		
Azadiya	Shaikhhan	Sinjar
Rawanduz	Dohuk	Shergat
Zibar	Tel Kaif	Zummar
Aqra	Tel Afar	

Of the dispensaries, the first six on the above list are in areas in which there are Assyrian settlements. Arrangements are also being made to establish two more dispensaries in the Amadia Qadha, one probably at Kani Maas, and the other at a small village near the frontier. These two new dispensaries should be in working order by September 1932.

There are also a "second-class" hospital and two dispensaries in the Arbil Liwa which the Assyrian settlers in that liwa can use —

Hospital (second-class) —
Arbil Town

Dispensaries
Rawanduz
Batu

The Rawanduz dispensary is about 4 miles from the large settlement at Diana, and Batu is the centre of the Dara Harir group of Assyrian settlements, and was established mainly for the benefit of the settlers.

2. Medical Officers and Staff

There is a British civil surgeon at Mosul, and there are doctors at the following qadha headquarters of the liwa

- (1) Zakho, a Christian.
- (2) Amadia, a Christian.
- (3) Dohuk, a Christian (Assyrian).
- (4) Aqra, a Moslem.

These are in Assyrian settlement areas.

With the exception of the Aqra doctor, all employees of the dispensaries north of Mosul City are Christians.

3. Supply of Quinine

Quinine is available at all the dispensaries, and the doctors take supplies of quinine to the village headmen for distribution to villagers when necessary was discontinued because it was found that the headmen were selling them.

It is the policy of the Government to increase the number of hospitals and dispensaries in the northern districts. In carrying out this policy the northern districts will not be forgotten. If some of the Assyrians are settled in such places as the Baradost, the Government will give sympathetic consideration to the provision of medical facilities there.

V.—Allowance paid by Government to the Mar Shimun

In May 1923 a monthly allowance of 300 rupees was sanctioned for payment to the Mar Shimun, and this sum was paid until the 1st April, 1932, when the new Iraq currency was introduced.

The monthly allowance is now 21 375 dinars.

VI.—Assyrians in the Iraq Army, the Iraq Police Force, and the Levies

(1) Iraq Army

The following Assyrians are serving in the Iraq army —

Officers	1
N.C.O.'s	7
Other ranks	
Total	69

(2) Iraq Police Force

The Assyrians serving in the Iraq Police Force are as follows:—

Mosul Liwa	280
Arbil Liwa	111
Kirkuk Liwa	11
Sulaimani Liwa	81
Total	422

(NOTE.—The total of the Iraq Police Force is 8 004.)

In the Mosul Liwa, Assyrians form about 25 per cent of the total force. In the other liwas, Assyrians are serving in districts in which settlements have been established, as the following statistics show:—

	Assyrian Police
Amadiya Qadha	12
Zibar Qadha	31
Aqra Qadha	37
Shaikhhan Qadha	10
Zakho Qadha	9
Other Qadhas	210
Total	34
	16
Total	269

VII.—Assyrian Officials in the Iraq Government

The Assyrians at present employed by the Iraq Government are 15 and 143 in the Department of Railways.

Free grants of land described under the Settlement Schemes Section of this report, remissions of rifle tax or reduced licence fees for their private rifles (amounting to about 6,000) are other privileges granted by the Iraq Government to the Assyrians in this country.

Appendix VII

Letter from Acting Prime Minister to Acting High Commissioner.

Office of the Council of Ministers

Bagdad, August 17-18, 1932

I am now able to give you the following information and observations on the work of the Assyrian Colonization Commission in connection with the settlement of Assyrians on unoccupied Government lands in the Qadhas of Zakho, Dohuk, Amadia and Agra.

President

Measures

Makko Beg Sharbatti, Kalamkam, Dohark

Station

The Mar Shimun was asked by the Kaimakam, Amadiya, to submit a list, but failed to do so.

The members of the commission, and in particular Raphael Effendi, who in himself an Assyrian, were in unofficial contact with various leading Assyrians, and invited their suggestions. The latter were unable to bring to the notice of the commission any notes of which it was not already aware.

3. The commission held its first meeting on the 26th July. Its first task was to examine carefully the list of villages which had been received from the gadhas and to eliminate those which were unsuitable for settlement.

It was decided that the remainder should be inspected, and that, as their report was required urgently, the commission should divide into two parties—the first consisting of the president and Raphael Effendi, the second of Major Wilson and the Katmakam of Delhi.

4. The president and Raphael Effendi, who were accompanied by an irrigation engineer and a doctor, visited the Dashkazi district and the villages of Khala and Jamsna in the Amadiya qadha and the village of Kandazai in the Dohuk qadha.

5. Major Wilson and the Kaimukam of Dohuk, who were accompanied by a doctor, inspected the villages of Dairiski Rubar, Ner Kening, Qarashu and Sarashur in the Dohuk Nahya.

6. As a result of this inspection and of the reports which were submitted to it, the committee reported as follows:—

(i) There are no vacant Government lands or villages in Zakho qadha suitable for settlement

There are a few vacant sites in Aqra qadha, but scarcity of water renders them unsuitable for settlement.

(iv) The Dasht-e Zafar, the Amargosa valley, is suitable for settlement. This valley, which lies between Jabal Lank and Suri on the left bank of the Greater Zab is some 12 miles long and 5 miles broad with the

[2079]

In addition to (a), the remissions of sheep tax and land revenue amounting to 52,609 rupees, (b) the monthly grant of 300 rupees to the Mar Shimon, (c) special educational grants, (d) reduced salaries and allowances for employment in the police, army and other administrative posts, in the winter of 1924, the Iraq Government voted a sum of 96,000 rupees for expenditure on relief to the Assyrian refugees who had been driven back to Amadia by Turkish troops in the autumn of that year.

smaller valleys leading into it. At present there are four inhabited villages—(i) Chalki, Hasan Bakra, Bawan and Rashanek) and six deserted village sites (Awka, Mah-Maidan, Kaula, Shaila Dizi, Suri Kharab and Kozza Rash). The area has for long been in dispute between Fays Agha-al-Zibari, the Sheikh of Barzan and Government and has therefore been but sparsely inhabited. The land is reported

The inhabitants of the village of Chalki were medically inspected and found to be free from malaria. At present the deserted villages can provide accommodation for sixty families. The irrigation engineer who accompanied the commission was of the opinion that it might be possible largely to increase the area of cultivation by diverting water from the Greater Zab, but there was no time for him to study the ground in detail or to estimate the cost of the scheme. The president estimates that a total number of 250 families can be settled in the district if the water can be brought on to the land.

- (iv) Bilmandi village in Barwari Zir (Amadiya Qadha) now holds ten Assyrian families. There will be room for ten more families, if the sum of 70 I.D. is spent on the improvement of the water supply.
- (v) Jamsus (Amadiya Qadha) can be made to accommodate twenty more families by the improvement of its water supply, which is estimated to cost 160 I.D. The health conditions are reported to be good.
- (vi) Dareski and Dareski Rubar villages (Mazuri Nahiya, Dohuk) are now held by ten families. There is no malaria in these villages.
- (vii) Kaula Village (Dohuk Nahiya) is now held by ten Assyrian families. The health conditions are reported to be good. It is a sum of 45 I.D. is required for the improvement of the water supply.
- (viii) Sarshur Village (Mazuri Nahiya) is now held by ten Assyrian families. The health conditions are reported to be good. It is a sum of 45 I.D. is required for the improvement of the water supply.

(ix) Summary:—

- (a) Assyrians can be settled at once in the following villages:—

Dashtazi area—	Families
Awka	10
Mah-Maidan	10
Kaula	10
Shaila Dizi	10
Suri Kharab	10
Kozza Rash	10
Banarenk Uliya	15
Dareski Rubar	15
Total	90

- (b) After the water schemes, whose cost has been estimated, have been carried out, additional families can be settled as follows:—

Bilmandi	10
Jamsus	20
Kaula	10
Total	40

- (c) If it proves feasible to carry out the Dashtazi and Sarshur schemes, it would then be possible to settle, approximately, 190 in the former and forty families in the latter, making altogether a total of 230 families. The total number of families which it would be possible to settle if the schemes set out above are carried out will be 360 families. It should be noted, however, that these figures are only approximate estimates.

- (x) The Commission has also recommended in its report that when the settlement which has been proposed is being carried out—

- (a) The Assyrians should be settled so far as is possible by tribes.
(b) Government should provide such financial assistance as is recommended by the local authorities to enable the Assyrians to develop the villages mentioned above.

7. These recommendations were discussed at a meeting of the Council of Ministers held on the 17th August, 1932, and it was resolved to agree to the following:—

- 1) The settlement mentioned in paragraph ix (a) and (b).
2) To agree in principle to the recommendations made in paragraph (x) of this letter.

Yours sincerely,
JA'FAR AL ASKARI

B 4572 9 931

No. 115

M. de Fleuriau to Sir John Simon — (Received September 8)

M. de FLEURIAU a été chargé par M. Herriot de demander à Sir John Simon de bien vouloir lui communiquer la liste des engagements internationaux que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique et le Gouvernement de l'Irak ont contractés, les uns par l'intermédiaire de la Société des Nations, contenant les garanties données par l'Irak au Conseil de la Société des Nations, "droit d'acquiescer et d'engager financiers".

Le Gouvernement français désire, en effet, être bien assuré que les accords conclus par l'Irak avec le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique, pendant la durée de son mandat, et ceux conclus avec le Gouvernement de l'Irak, pendant la durée de son mandat, sont bien visés par la déclaration en question.

L'Ambassadeur de France serait reconnaissant à son Excellence le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté britannique aux Affaires étrangères de bien vouloir le mettre en mesure de répondre à cette demande de son Gouvernement. Il prie d'agréer, etc.

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 7 septembre 1932.

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No. 116

Papers communicated by the Colonial Office, August 23 to September 6.

(1)

Nuri Pasha to Sir F. Humphrys

(Secret)

Office of the Council of Ministers,
Bagdad, July 21 1932

My dear Sir Francis,
I THINK your Excellency will agree that the time has now come when it is necessary to settle the existing frontier between Iraq and Kuwait.

I therefore request that the necessary action may be taken to obtain the agreement of the competent authority or authorities in Kuwait to the following description of the existing frontier between the two countries:—

From the intersection of the Wadi el Audja with the Batin and thence eastwards passing south of Safwan Wells, Jebel Sanam and Um Qasr leaving them to Iraq and so on to the junction of the Khor Zobeir with the Khor Abdullah. The islands of Warbah, Bubiyan, Maskan (or Mashjan), Failakah, Auhah, Kubbar, Qaru and Umm-el Maradin appertain to Kuwait.

Yours sincerely,
NURI SAID

Confidential Letter from the Political Agent, Koweit, to the Ruler of Koweit

(After compliments.)

August 9, 1932

REFERENCE the conversation which I had with your Excellency yesterday regarding the Iraq-Koweit frontier and the desire of His Majesty's Government to have the frontier between Iraq and Koweit settled before the latter applies for admission to the League of Nations.

I have the honour to enclose for your Excellency's information translation of the letter from the Hon. the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, together with a translation of secret letter⁽¹⁾ dated the 21st July, 1932 from his Excellency Nuri Pasha as-Said, Prime Minister in Iraq, in which the latter proposes a reaffirmation of the existing frontier between Iraq and Koweit, as quoted above.

2. Both letters were forwarded to me by the Hon. the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf under his confidential No. 528/S., dated the 30th July, 1932, a translation of which I also enclose for your Excellency's information⁽²⁾.

3. You will note that the Hon. the Political Resident in his letter states that His Majesty's Government approve of the proposal of the Iraq Prime Minister, and desire me to approach your Excellency, and obtain a similar letter from your Excellency to myself, as representing His Majesty's Government, expressing your formal acceptance and agreement to the reaffirmation of the existing frontier between Iraq and Koweit as described in the letter from the Prime Minister of Iraq to his Excellency the High Commissioner.

4. Your Excellency's letter, when it is received, will be forwarded to the Iraq Government, through the Hon. the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, to the Hon. the Prime Minister of Iraq, and a translation being presented to His Majesty's Government.

5. Your Excellency will note that the description of the frontier line as given by the Iraq Prime Minister follows exactly the words used by his Excellency Sir Percy Cox, in his memorandum of the 19th April, 1923, to the Political Agent, Koweit, when laying down the line which the boundary between the two States followed.

As your Excellency is doubtless aware, the words of Sir Percy Cox in describing this line were as follows:—

"From the intersection of the Wadi-al-Aujah with the Batin, and thence northwards along the Batin to a point just south of the latitude of Safwan, thence eastwards passing south of Safwan Wells, Jebel Sanam and Um Qasr, leaving them to Iraq, and so on to the junction of the Khor Zubair with the Khor Abdullah. The islands of Warbah, Bubiyan (or Maschan), Fahkah, Auhah, Kubbar, Qaru and Um-al-Maradim appertaining to Koweit."

6. In view of the above, I would ask your Excellency to be so good as to let me have the necessary official letter from you accepting the frontier line between Iraq and Koweit, as laid down by Sir Percy Cox in his aforesaid letter to the Political Agent, Koweit, and as now described by his Excellency Nuri Pasha as-Said, Prime Minister of Iraq, in his secret letter dated the 21st July, 1932, to his Excellency the High Commissioner for Iraq.

(Usual ending)

H. R. P. DICKSON, Lieutenant-Colonel,
Political Agent, Koweit

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.⁽²⁾ See Paper (1) above.*Translation of a Confidential Letter from the Ruler of Koweit to the Political Resident, Koweit*

(After compliments.)

August 10, 1932

WITH the hand of pleasure we have received your confidential letter dated the 7th instant (Rabi Thani 1351 (the 9th August, 1932)), and have noted the contents of same, as well as the translation of the letter dated the 25th July, 1932 of his Excellency the High Commissioner for Iraq to the Hon. the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, and the translation of the letter dated the 21st July, 1932, of his Excellency Nuri Pasha as-Said, the Iraq Prime Minister, regarding the Iraq-Koweit frontier. We have also noted the Hon. the Political Resident's letter dated the 30th July, 1932, that the frontier proposed by the Iraq Prime Minister is approved of by His Majesty's Government. And, therefore, we beg to inform you that we agree to reaffirm the existing frontier between Iraq and Koweit as described in the Iraq Prime Minister's letter.

(Usual ending)

AHMAD AL-JABIR

Air Vice-Marshal Ludlow-Hewitt to Jafar Pasha.

(Confidential)

My dear Jafar Pasha,

Bagdad, August 22, 1932

WITH reference to his Excellency Nuri Pasha's letter of the 21st July, 1932, I enclose herewith a copy of a letter⁽¹⁾ from his Excellency the Sheikh of Koweit to the British Political Agent intimating his agreement to the reaffirmation of the existing frontier between Iraq and Koweit which was proposed in his Excellency Nuri Pasha's letter to which I have referred above.

Yours sincerely,

E. R. LUDLOW HEWITT

⁽¹⁾ Paper (5).

E 4654 4654 93]

No. 120.

Sir F. Humphreys to Sir P. Cunliffe-Lister.—(Communicated by
Colonial Office, September 10.)

Sir,

Bagdad, August 1, 1932

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith copies of the latest estimates of the population of Iraq.

2. These figures have been prepared from returns compiled by the Mudirs of Nahiyahs throughout the country, and the Ministry of the Interior inform me that this work has been done carefully. The combined return for each Liwa has also been checked by the administrative inspectors.

3. The right-hand column on the table of racial statistics shows the difference between the totals of the latest estimate and those of the estimate which was made somewhat hurriedly in October 1931 to meet the wishes of the Permanent Mandates Commission.

I have, &c.

F. H. HUMPHREYS,

High Commissioner for Iraq.

Enclosure in No. 120

RELIGIOUS Statistics for Iraq

[illegible][illegible]

RACIAL SITUATION for Iraq.

[illegible]

231

COMBINED Statistics (Racial and Religious) for Iraq.

	(B)	(C)	(D)	(E)	(F)	(G)	(H)
	Sunni	Shiite	Orthodox	Other	Other	Other	Total
1. Kurds	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	6,000
2. Yezidis	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	6,000
3. Armenians	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	6,000
4. Assyrians	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	6,000
5. Persians	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	6,000
6. Jews	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	6,000
7. Christians	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	6,000
8. Others	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	6,000
9. Total	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	6,000
10. Other foreigners	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	6,000
Total	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	6,000

[E 4778 894 93]

No. 121

Papers communicated by Colonial Office, September 15.

(1)

Sir F. Humphrys to Ja'far Pasha

My dear Ja'far Pasha,

Bagdad, June 3, 1932.

THEIR is some question connected with the movements of Imperial forces in Iraq after the latter's entry into the League of Nations which the Air Officer Commanding wishes to clear up now so that no misunderstanding may arise hereafter.

The Air Officer Commanding points out that the movement of Imperial forces in this country are likely to include visits to Iraq for training or other purposes of Imperial forces from Egypt, Palestine, Transjordan or India. These visits might take the form of flights by a number of aircraft flying in formation or by individual aircraft. Similar visits might be paid by armoured car or other motorised transport vehicle. The Imperial Government would of course be notified in advance of all visits by ground forces.

The Air Officer Commanding has, therefore, asked me to confirm that the Imperial Government does not object to Imperial forces moving in or out of Iraq by air, land or sea, and also that members of the Imperial forces while visiting Iraq in this manner shall be granted the same privileges as those granted to members of the Imperial forces permanently stationed in Iraq.

I should be glad if your Excellency would enable me to give the necessary assurance to the Air Officer Commanding.

Yours sincerely,

F. H. HUMPHRYS

(2)

Nuri Pasha to Air Vice-Marshal Ludlow-Hewitt

Dear Ludlow-Hewitt,

Bagdad, August 6, 1932.

I HAVE seen his Excellency the High Commissioner's letter dated the 3rd July, 1932, despatched to the High Commissioner, Sir P. Cunliffe Lister, regarding the movement of Imperial forces in Iraq after the entry of Iraq into the League of Nations.

I think you refer to the question of movement of the Imperial forces across Iraq in transit. This question is provided for in article 7 of the annexure to the treaty of 1930. In accordance with the provisions of this article and article 2 of the annexure in question the Imperial forces, when passing through Iraq in transit, shall have the right to enjoy the same privileges granted to the members of the Imperial forces stationed permanently in Iraq.

Yours sincerely,

NURI AL SA'ID.

Air Vice-Marshal Ludlow-Hewitt to Nuri Pasha

My dear Prime Minister,

Bagdad August 12, 1932.

I ACKNOWLEDGE receipt of your Excellency's letter dated the 6th August, 1932, regarding the movement of Imperial forces. I am glad to hear that the entry of Iraq into the League of Nations will be a great benefit to the country. The matters mentioned in Sir Francis Humphrys's letter dated the 3rd June, 1932, will be regarded as movements of Imperial forces in transit through Iraq as provided for in article 7 of the annexure to the treaty of 1930.

Yours sincerely,

E. R. LUDLOW HEWITT

E 4812 23 93]

No. 122

Sir H. Young to Sir P. Cunliffe Lister—(Communicated by Colonial Office September 20)

(Private)

Sir,

Bagdad, September 6, 1932.

I HAVE the honour to report that during his recent visit to the north of Iraq, His Majesty's representative to Mesopotamia, Mr. A. V. L. Lister, has been informed of what passed between him and His Majesty's representative to Mosul, dated the 2nd August, 1932, and in a short report to the Administrative Inspector, Mosul, dated the 2nd August, 1932, of which I have received a copy.

2. At a recent audience King Faisal reported to me that he had told the Patriarch he went so far as to reveal to him in confidence the same views that he expounded to the Administrative Inspector concerning the value of the Iraqi Government of the Assyrian element in the north of Iraq as a makeweight to Kurdish nationalism. His arguments did not, however, appear to move the Patriarch, who adhered to his determination to visit Geneva and lay his case before the League of Nations.

I have, &c.

HUBERT YOUNG

Acting High Commissioner for Iraq

Enclosure 1 in No. 122

King Faisal to Sir H. Young

(Private.)

Dear Sir Hubert Young,

Bagdad, August 30, 1932.

I WISHED to seize the opportunity of my presence in Baghdad to know the views, intentions, and the real wishes of the Mar Sham'un, to endeavour to persuade him that the programme he followed will only do him harm, and to explain to him my goodwill and my true desire to show the Assyrians the greatest sympathy and mercy. I therefore met him at Baghdad on the 2nd August, 1932, I met the Mar Sham'un from 11 A.M. to 1 P.M. and then from 3 to 4 P.M., when certain discussions took place between us. I explained to him all my views.

stated that I would do all I can except what was contrary to the laws and undertakings, requested him to be sure of my words, and assured him that I would do all that was possible for the comfort and welfare of the community. Unfortunately, he expressed his unpreparedness, owing to the shortness of time, as he alleged, for discussions, informed me that he would be prepared for discussions with the Iraqi delegation in Geneva, and assured me that if his demands had not been accepted there he would emigrate.

I very much regret that I was unable to convince him that he is very much misinformed in his views. I regret that he was unable to understand the value of my verbal assurance to him. I wished to inform your Excellency of the above.

Your sincere friend,
FEISAL.

Enclosure 2 in No. 122

Memorandum from Major Wilson to the Adviser, Ministry of Interior, Bagdad

Very Secret. Mosul, August 28, 1932
I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 25th inst. and in reply to inform you that His Majesty has been very much interested in the Assyrian question and has been very much surprised at the demands which have been put forward.

He began by saying that although naturally he could not broadcast it, the fact is that the Assyrians are a very important element in the future of Iraq, and as a counterpoise to the Kurds (whom His Majesty undoubtedly views with grave suspicion). In order, therefore, to secure Assyrian co-operation, he and the Iraqi Government are prepared to do a very great deal for the Assyrians. There are, however, three demands which could not possibly be granted: (1) The local autonomy of a special area, (2) the establishment of a separate Assyrian Government, and (3) the acknowledgment of Mar Shimun as temporal as well as spiritual head of the Assyrian nation.

(1) and (3) are obvious. His Majesty explained that the reason it is impossible to grant (2) is that, as yet, the inhabitants of Iraq have not sufficient national cohesion to admit of Government agreeing to any differentiation between sects or classes, and that the policy must first be for all classes to realize they are Iraqis. Once they have realized this, class regiments could probably be established if they were found more convenient.

I suggested that possibly it might be advantageous to establish at least one or two Assyrian companies in existing battalions. This proposal His Majesty did not utterly reject.

His Majesty then asked me for information as to the strength of support likely to be afforded to Mar Shimun in the event of the latter resorting to active methods. He also asked which Assyrian leaders were not in wholehearted agreement with Mar Shimun's policy.

I gave His Majesty all the information I possessed on these subjects, and he finally asked whether I considered that if he had a heart-to-heart talk with Mar Shimun he would be likely to achieve any good result.

I replied that it was impossible even to guess what result would accrue, but that such a talk would make it impossible for Mar Shimun to deny that he was ignorant of Iraqi intentions towards the Assyrians, though I personally had no doubt that Mar Shimun was a sincere and disinterested person.

While in Mosul His Majesty interviewed leading Assyrians, including Zava Effendi (uncle of Mar Shimun), Malik Khammo (Baz) and Malik Nimrud (Jilu). The interviews were most cordial, and His Majesty impressed on these Assyrians the very friendly attitude of the Iraqi Government towards them and his sincere hope that they would co-operate with Government in a way which would be to their advantage.

The Assyrians, in reply, thanked His Majesty and affirmed their loyalty to the Iraqi Government.

The uncle and brother of Mar Shimun were also invited to the official tea and dinner parties, and eight other important Assyrians to tea.

On his return from Amadia His Majesty invited me to dinner (only Amin Zaki and Safwet being present), and after dinner related to me his discussions with the Assyrian leaders at Amadia.

His Majesty had an interview lasting two hours with Mar Shimun, and discussed the whole Assyrian question with him.

His Majesty first asked Mar Shimun the reason for all the recent trouble, the levy resignations and disturbances and the despatch of demands to His Britannic Majesty's Government and the League of Nations.

Mar Shimun replied that these were caused by the Assyrians' dissatisfaction with the British Government, which had made promises it had not fulfilled.

His Majesty replied that he did not propose to discuss the merits of this statement (to me he stated it was quite unsupported by the facts), but that within a month Iraq would be a member of the League of Nations, Great Britain would be in England and the League at Geneva, and that the Assyrians would be heard by the Assyrians also, and that clearly the whole question of the future of the Assyrians lay between them and the Iraqi Government. He continued that the Iraqi Government wished heartily for co-operation with the Assyrians, and was prepared to extend them very considerable assistance, but that some of the demands they had submitted were quite impossible of fulfilment. His Majesty discussed the demands he considered reasonable and included the establishment of an Assyrian War Office, the building of a road from Mosul to Baghdad, and the said he could promise a grant of a block of land in South Iraq (presumably on one of the new canals).

His Majesty also asked Mar Shimun what he proposed to do, supposing the League reply was unfavorable. Mar Shimun replied that he would emigrate. His Majesty tried to dissuade him, but Mar Shimun was determined to go, and Mar Shimun could only reply "We must emigrate."

His Majesty stated to me that although undoubtedly Mar Shimun is not a free agent, he is also stupid and obstinate and not a real leader.

I gathered that His Majesty was on the whole disappointed at the result of his interview with Mar Shimun.

His Majesty also interviewed, amongst others, Malik Khoshnaba, who appears to have expressed very different views on Mar Yowalaha's policy. Mar Sarkis and Rais Khayo of Ashut, all of whom stated they wished to telegraph to League of Nations opposing Mar Shimun's recent appeal to the League.

Mar Yowalaha stressed that the Assyrians had been resident in Barwar for hundreds of years and were now happy and contented, and would certainly not follow Mar Shimun in any emigration scheme, and viewed with apprehension the atmosphere created by Mar Shimun's recent actions.

I gathered from His Majesty that what he was most apprehensive of was that dangerous local friction might arise between Kurds and Assyrians, if the latter resorted to their traditional method of settling disputes by bloodshed, leading to a general conflagration.

I may add that in Mosul at present rumours are circulating that with effect from Iraq's entry into the League both Kurds and Assyrians will refuse to pay taxes, and that any attempt to coerce them will lead to a rising against the Government.

Apparently Mar Shimun has decided to go to Geneva and in order to provide funds is levying contributions of Rs. 150 per head on all Assyrians.

It appears that Mar Yowalaha and his Assyrians have definitely refused to contribute.

A humorous point is that Mar Shimun requested His Majesty to arrange special passport facilities for him.

W. C. F. A. WILSON,
Administrative Inspector, Mosul and Arbil Divisions

September 15, 1932

Аппенд 2

September 17 1932

E 4762 9/93]

No. 123

Received September 25, 1992

IN the process in which our Government was proceeding to conclude the 17th September you asked for more information regarding the national circumstances which His Majesty's Government have received from the Irish Government and which are reported in the *Irish Times*. As a result of this and other enquiries by the British Government, particularly in connection with the termination of the periodical visits

217

I have, &c

JOHN SIMON

E 4777/9436 93

No. 124

Foreign Office to Secretary-General, League of Nations

515.

Foreign Office, September 21, 1932

I AM directed by His Majesty's Foreign Secretary of State to lay before the House of Commons a copy of the resolution adopted on the 10th May last, at the 4th Meeting of the Council of the League of Nations during its 67th session, in which the following passage occurs:—

"The Council

"Accordingly recommends that the Powers concerned, whose nationals enjoyed capitulation rights in the former Ottoman Empire, renounce, before the admission of Iraq to the League of Nations, the maintenance of these former jurisdictional privileges in favour of their nationals in future,

" Requests the Secretary General to communicate this recommendation to the Governments of the States which the British Government, in accordance with the present resolution, will approach with a view to the proposed renunciation;

2. In pursuance of this resolution, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom approached the Governments of the Powers concerned, all of whom have now consented to renounce the maintenance in Iraq, on the termination of the mandatory régime, of the capitulatory rights which they possessed in the former Ottoman Empire.

3 I am to add, should such a statement be thought necessary, that the mandatory naturally consents to a similar renunciation.

I am, Sir,

G W RUNDLE.

No. 125

Mr Atherton to Sir John Simon.—(Received September 21.)

United States Embassy.

London, September 20, 1932.

之理。

I HAVE the honour to refer to my note No 219 of the 26th August last and to previous correspondence regarding the release of Iraq from the Mandatory regime, and in connection with matters which I have received from my Government, to enquire, in connection with the forthcoming vote on the admission of Iraq as a member of the League of Nations, whether it is the intention of His Majesty's Government to lay before the appropriate body of the League the recent exchange of correspondence regarding the right of the Government of the United States to be consulted with respect to the conditions under which Iraq is to be administered upon the termination of the mandated régime.

In explanation of this enquiry, I am desirous to state that if His Majesty's Government does not intend to take the action indicated, my Government will wish to do so, in view of the importance which it attaches to having its position in the matter made clear to the members of the League.

I have, &c

RAY ATHERTON.

Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

1 4804 9/93

No. 126

Sir John Simon to Mr. Atherton.

Foreign Office, September 24, 1932

411

Foreign Office, September 24, 1944

Sir, I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 24th September in which you refer to a letter of the 17th of the same month from the Ministry of Government in the United Kingdom to lay before the appropriate authorities in London. Notes are being exchanged at present in London regarding the right of the United States Government to be consulted with respect to the conditions under which Iraq is to be administered upon the termination of the mandatory régime.

2 I presume that the correspondence to which you refer in your note is the ~~to~~ Mr. [redacted] letter of the 1st May to Mr. Baxter Mr. Rendell's reply of the 1st May and the letter from Mr. [redacted] on the 1st at the Foreign Office to Mr. [redacted] on the 1st May my note to you of the 22nd July and your reply of the 28th August to that note.

of the 28th August to that note.

5. The position, as His Majesty's Government understand it from the fact that the Government of the United States have not yet taken any action, is that the United States Government do not wish to raise any difficulties in the particular case of Hong Kong, but are nevertheless concerned to preserve the rights which, in their opinion, they possess by treaty with regard to the territory of mandated islands, and the principles upon which they see the territories

4. It had not originally been the intention of His Majesty's Government to communicate the correspondence in question to the League of Nations but they now agree to do so in view of the fact that the United States Government have expressed a desire that the correspondence should be brought to the notice of the League. In the course of His Majesty's Government the appropriate organ of the League, the Permanent Mandates Commission, and of the receipt of correspondence with the United States Government will give effect to the provisions of paragraph 2 of this note (I shall be pleased to take the necessary steps to ensure that copies of the correspondence in question are communicated to the Permanent Mandates Commission, in order that the views of the United States Government may be ascertained on certain questions relating to the termination of mandates may be on record with the appropriate body of the League).

i have, &c

JOHN SIMON

E 4877, 2436 98

No. 127

(Consul, Genoa, to Sir John Simon. (Received September 28.)

(Na 330. LN)

(1. εγραφή)

Geneva, September 27 1932

FOLLOWING from Mr Cadogan.—

Syrian-Iraqi frontier

Colonial Office.

2 At the suggestion of French delegation and with the authority of the Council of the League of Nations, Sir F. Humphrys and M. Ponsot to examine possibility of parties reaching private agreement on frontier question, which could be communicated confidentially to rapporteur of Mandate Commission and would then relieve that body from necessity of examining the question in detail. Proposal has the full support of secretariat, who are anxious that reference to Mandate Commission should as far as possible be reduced to a mere formality.

3. From his conversations with M. Ponnat, Sir F. Humphreys was satisfied that, while French Government might be willing to accept for its recommendation by the League Commission, including majority recommendation, in Sinjar, they could not be induced to agree to any alteration in northern sector which would give Iraq sound strategical frontier unless they received substantial compensation in Syria and Iraq. Sir F. Humphreys are not prepared to concede

Moreover, all information goes to show that even if His Majesty's Government were to retain full liberty of action before Mandate Commission there would be no prospect whatever of inducing the Council to approve any radical departure from Frontier Commission's unanimous recommendation in face of French opposition.

5. Iraq Prime Minister, who has been kept closely informed throughout and has himself participated in one discussion with M. Foaet, would prefer to make certain of securing the whole of Sinjar now and to wait to obtain sound strategical frontier later by direct agreement when Syria is released from mandate.

"6. He has accordingly requested Sir F. Humphrys to inform M. Pomot that, if the French Government will do likewise, His Majesty's Government and Iraq Government will agree now to accept in principle the frontier recommended by commission, including their majority recommendation.

"7 This would leave us free to attempt to obtain either by negotiation with the French or through Mandate Commission minor rectifications to meet administrative needs, *bon-voisinage* agreements, &c.

"B. Please telegraph urgently whether you agree that Sir F. Humphrys should proceed as proposed in paragraph B above."

[E 4977 2436 93]

No. 128

Sir John Simon to Consul General

(No 49N)

(Telegraphic) **R**

Foreign Office, September 28, 1932

YOUR telegram No 330, L.N., of 27th September: Syria-Iraq frontier

Following for Mr Cadogan :—

^a $\chi^2 = 7.87$, $p < .01$.

E 5111 2436/93]

No. 129

M. Catastini (League of Nations) to Sir John Simon. (Received October 6.)

Geneva, September 28, 1932

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated the 21st September, 1932, by which you inform me that, in pursuance of the resolution adopted on the 12th May 1932 by the Council of the Government of the United Kingdom approached the Governments of the Powers whose nationals enjoyed capitulatory rights in the former Ottoman Empire, and that all these Powers have now consented to renounce the maintenance in Iraq, on the termination of the mandatory régime, of the said rights.

I further note that the mandatory also consents to a similar renunciation. Your letter has been communicated to the Council of the League of Nations.

I have &c
VITO CATASTINI
Director of the Mandates Section.

E 5009/9/93]

No. 130

Foreign Office to Secretary-General, League of Nations (Geneva)

Foreign Office, October 11, 1932

Sir,

I AM directed by His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to transmit to you the accompanying copies of correspondence on the subject of the claims of the United States Government to be consulted on questions relating to the termination of the mandatory régime in Iraq and mandates in general.

2. The United States Government have informed His Majesty's Government that they are anxious that their position in this matter should be made clear to the Council of the League of Nations. His Majesty's Government have undertaken to request that copies of the correspondence may be communicated to the Permanent Mandates Commission in order that the claim of the United States Government may be on record with the appropriate body of the League.

3. The United States Government have also expressed the hope that suitable publicity might be given to the correspondence by members of the League.

4. I am accordingly to ask you to be good enough to bring the correspondence to the notice of the Permanent Mandates Commission, and to place it on record by publication in the Official Journal of the League.

I am, &c
G. W. RENDEL

E 1062/9 93]

Enclosure 1 in No. 130

Mr Cox to Mr Baxter

United States Embassy

London, March 1 1932

Dear Baxter,

As I told you to-day in our conversation, the Department of State is of the opinion that the terms of article 6 of the Tripartite Convention of 1930 between the United States, Great Britain and Iraq the United States agrees to rights with respect to consultation regarding the termination of the special relations between Great Britain and Iraq, it nevertheless retains the right to demand consultation with respect to the conditions under which Iraq is to be administered upon the cessation of the mandatory relationship.

Since the termination of a régime in a mandated territory necessarily involves the position of the territory and affects the interests of American

nationals therein, the right of the United States to be consulted with respect to the conditions under which the territory is to be administered is on precisely the same basis as its right to be consulted with regard to the establishment of a mandatory régime.

The Department of State has learned of the likelihood that the Council of the League of Nations would not consult the United States in the case of Iraq, but would assume that Great Britain, as mandatory Power, has already done so, or would do so, and would see that all interests in the Iraq mandate, whether inherent, expressed or implied, were properly considered.

I am, therefore, sending you a copy of the Foreign Office as to whether the United States Government is correct in assuming that it is to be consulted by the British Government with respect to the conditions under which Iraq is to be administered upon the termination of the "special relations" between that country and Great Britain. I should be grateful if you would let me know the views of the Foreign Office in this matter in order that the Embassy may communicate them to the Department of State.

Yours sincerely
RAYMOND COX

E 1431/9 93]

Enclosure 2 in No. 130

Mr Rendel to Mr Cox

Foreign Office, April 1, 1932

Dear Cox,

IN your letter of the 1st March to Baxter you raised the question of consultation with the United States Government regarding the conditions under which Iraq is to be administered upon the cessation of her mandatory relationship with Great Britain.

In our opinion articles 6 and 7 of the Tripartite Convention signed in London on the 10th January 1930 set out clearly what the position of the United States is in connexion with the termination of the mandatory régime in Iraq. Article 6 reads as follows:—

"No modification of the special relations existing between His Britannic Majesty and His Majesty the King of Iraq as defined in article 1, other than the termination of such special relations as contemplated in article 7 of the present convention) shall make any change in the rights of the United States as defined in this convention, unless such change has been assented to by the Government of the United States."

Under this article the assent of the United States is required before the rights of the United States, as defined in the convention, can be affected by any modification in the special relations existing between His Britannic Majesty and His Majesty the King of Iraq, but the termination of these special relations, which is the case now under consideration, is expressly excepted from the provisions of this article, and dealt with in article 7.

Paragraph 1 of article 7 then says that the termination of these special relations shall have the effect of placing Iraq in the same position as if the second paragraph lays down what is to be the position when this event happens. Paragraph 2 of article 7 then says as follows:

"On the termination of the said special relations, negotiations shall be entered into between the United States and Iraq for the conclusion of a treaty in regard to their future relations and the rights of the nationals of each country in the territories of the other. Pending the conclusion of such an agreement, the nationals, vessels, goods and aircraft of the United States and all goods in transit across Iraq, originating in or destined for the United States, shall receive in Iraq the most favoured-nation treatment, provided that the benefit of this provision cannot be claimed in respect of any matter in regard to which the nationals, vessels, goods and aircraft of Iraq and all goods in transit across the United States, originating in or destined for Iraq, do not receive in the United States the most favoured-nation treatment, it being understood that Iraq shall not be entitled to claim the treatment which is accorded by the United States to the commerce of Cuba under the provisions

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of the Commercial Convention concluded by the United States and Cuba on the 11th day of December, 1902, or any other commercial convention which may hereafter be concluded by the United States with Cuba or to the commerce of the United States with any of its dependencies and the Panama Canal Zone under existing or future laws, and that the United States shall not be entitled to claim any special treatment which may be accorded by Iraq to the nationals or commerce of neighbouring States exclusively "

To put it shortly, it provides for two things, (a) for the commencement of negotiations between the United States and Iraq for the conclusion of a treaty in regard to their future relations, and the rights of the nationals of each country in the territory of the other, and (b) subject to certain conditions, for the grant of most-favoured nation treatment in Iraq to the nationals, vessels, goods and aircraft of the United States, pending the conclusion of such agreement. While

fully defined and safeguarded by the provisions of article 7 of the convention, and that those provisions do not confer on the United States any right to be consulted as to the obligations which the League of Nations may require Iraq to undertake

a member of the League of Nations, I am authorised by the Secretary of State to let you know that His Majesty's Government will be happy to keep you informed of any developments of events in regard to the termination of the armistice.

1. The first step is to identify the key components of the system. This includes understanding the hardware, software, and data involved. For example, in a web application, this might involve identifying the server, database, and user interface.

[illegible][illegible]

The first step in the construction of the model is to define the set of states S . The states are defined as the possible configurations of the system, which are represented by the vector \mathbf{x} . The states are then ordered according to their energy, and the lowest energy state is chosen as the initial state. The next step is to define the set of transitions T . The transitions are defined as the possible moves between states, which are represented by the vector \mathbf{u} . The transitions are then ordered according to their energy, and the lowest energy transition is chosen as the initial transition. The final step is to define the set of actions A . The actions are defined as the possible moves between states, which are represented by the vector \mathbf{a} . The actions are then ordered according to their energy, and the lowest energy action is chosen as the initial action.

and afterwards as to the application of the general conditions to the special case of Iraq. On the basis of the report of the Permanent Mandates Commission the

Council on the 25th January 1991 and that it proposes to amend to include the relevant material in the relevant provisions of the 1991 Act. The Council has also agreed to consider the proposed amendments to the 1991 Act in the light of the above.

towards legitimate foreign interests. The Government of Iraq, and the Government of Iran, have agreed to the elaboration by direct negotiation of the two Governments and the Government of Iraq on the basis of the request of the Permanent Mission

Commission to which I have already referred. Copies of those reports together with a copy of the resolution adopted by the Council of the League on the 28th January last are enclosed herein, (1) and His Majesty's Government will be glad to communicate to the United States Government for their information.

Your Government are already aware of the terms of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance which was signed on the 30th June, 1930, and of which a copy as published in the Treaty Series (Cmd 3797) was communicated to your Embassy.

on the 2nd March, 1931. The treaty will of course only enter into force when once Iraq has become a member of the League of Nations.

Yours sincerely,
G W RENDEL

Enclosure 3 in No. 130

See document No. 112.]

(') Not printed

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No. 131

Sir K. Hilton Young to Sir John Simon — (Received October 12)

$$\frac{1}{2} \frac{d}{dt} \left(\frac{1}{2} \frac{d}{dt} \right)$$

United Kingdom Delegation,
Geneva, October 10, 1932.

I HAVE the honour to report that the Sixth Committee had before it the application of Iraq to be admitted to membership of the League of Nations.

2. It will be remembered that the Council made the termination of the mandatory system in Iraq subject to the acceptance by Iraq of two conditions. First, Iraq was required to subscribe to a declaration whereby it entered into the necessary undertakings in regard to the protection of minorities, the provision of economic safeguards, the judicial organisation, the maintenance of international conventions, acquired rights and financial obligations, and freedom of conscience. Secondly, Iraq was required to obtain admission to the League. The first condition was accomplished by the adoption of the Declaration of the 22nd April 1932, and the second condition was accomplished by the ratification by Iraq of an undertaking approved by the Council.

3. A sub-committee was formed by the Sixth Committee to examine the application of Iraq on the basis of the requirements set forth in article 1, paragraph 2, of the Covenant of the League. These enquiries, made by the sub-committee, followed the usual precedent. The principal were whether--

- (1) Iraq was recognised by other States, and by which
- (2) The country possessed a stable Government and fixed frontiers.
- (3) The country was fully self governed
- (4) Iraq fulfilled the requirements of the League in respect of its international obligations and in respect of its armaments.

4. Satisfactory replies were forthcoming on all heads. It was noted in connection with the reply to the question relating to the proposed system of taxation that the Government of Iraq were not at all satisfied with the view of a declaration by the Iraqi Government that it would for its part accept as final such decision as the Council of the League of Nations might reach in accordance with the procedure instituted by the Council's decision of the 9th December, 1931, at the request of the United Kingdom and French Governments.

5. The sub-committee's report, having been accepted by the Sixth Committee, was presented to the Assembly at a plenary session on the 3rd October, and Iraq was then formally admitted to membership of the League by a unanimous vote. A number of cordial speeches of welcome were made by other members. Reference was made to the precedent which was thus set up for the admission of other States to the League, and, in particular, the French delegate declared himself satisfied with the procedure which might be expected to apply in future to other similar mandated territories.

I have &c
E. HILTON 401 No.

[E 5387/9/981]

No. 142

Mr. Eden to Sir John Simon.—(Received October 17.)

(N₂, 90%)

THE United Kingdom delegate to the League of Nations presents his compliments to the French delegation and has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the letter of the 12th inst. and the exchange of notes with the French delegation respecting Iraq.

United Kingdom Delegation, Geneva,
October 14, 1932

[9079]

Enclosure 1 in No. 132

Protocole entre les Gouvernements du Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord, de la République française et du Royaume de l'Irak.

LES Gouvernements du Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord, de la République française et du Royaume de l'Irak, respectivement représentés par les plénipotentiaires soussignés, qui se sont communiqué leurs pleins pouvoirs, sont d'accord pour reconnaître que les droits et obligations résultant pour le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni de l'accord de San Remo du 24 avril 1920 sur les pétroles et de la convention signée à Paris, le 23 décembre 1920, concernant certains points relatifs aux mandats pour la Syrie et le Liban, la Palestine et la Mésopotamie sont désormais transférés au Gouvernement de l'Irak dans la mesure où les dispositions de ces actes le concernent.

Fait à Genève en français et en anglais en triple exemplaire, le 10 octobre 1932.

JOSEPH PAGANON

ANTHONY EDEN

IRISTAM HAIDAR

Enclosure 2 in No. 132

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Mr. Eden to M. Paganon.

Protocol between the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, of the French Republic and of the Kingdom of Iraq

THE Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, of the French Republic and of the Kingdom of Iraq, respectively represented by the undersigned plenipotentiaries, who have communicated their full powers, are agreed in recognising that the rights and obligations devolving upon the Government of the United Kingdom under the San Remo Oil Agreement of the 24th April, 1920, and the convention signed at Paris on the 23rd December, 1920, relating to certain points connected with the mandates for Syria and the Lebanon, Palestine and Mesopotamia, are henceforth transferred to the Government of Iraq in so far as the provisions of those instruments relate to Iraq.

Done in triplicate, in English and French, at Geneva, the 10th day of October 1932.

United Kingdom Delegation,
Geneva, October 10, 1932.

Sir,
WITH reference to the protocol of today's date, in which the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, of the French Republic and of the Kingdom of Iraq, respectively represented by the undersigned plenipotentiaries, who have communicated their full powers, are agreed in recognising that the rights and obligations devolving upon the Government of the United Kingdom under the San Remo Oil Agreement of the 24th April, 1920, and the convention signed at Paris on the 23rd December, 1920, relating to certain points connected with the mandates for Syria and the Lebanon, Palestine and Mesopotamia, are henceforth transferred to the Government of Iraq in so far as the provisions of those instruments relate to Iraq, I have the honour to inform you that it is the intention of the Government of the United Kingdom to use its good offices for the purpose of ensuring the proper execution of the aforesaid provisions.

I have, &c.
ANTHONY EDEN.

Enclosure 3 in No. 132

SOCIÉTÉ DES NATIONS

M. Paganon to Mr. Eden

Délégation de la République française,

Genève, le 10 octobre 1932.

Monsieur,

VOUS référant au protocole en date de ce jour, par lequel les Gouvernements du Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord, de la République française et du Royaume de l'Irak, respectivement représentés par les plénipotentiaires soussignés, qui se sont communiqué leurs pleins pouvoirs, sont d'accord pour reconnaître que les droits et obligations résultant pour le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni de l'accord de San Remo du 24 avril 1920 sur les pétroles et de la convention signée à Paris, le 23 décembre 1920, concernant certains points relatifs aux mandats pour la Syrie et le Liban, la Palestine et la Mésopotamie sont désormais transférés au Gouvernement de l'Irak dans la mesure où les dispositions de ces actes le concernent, vous avez bien voulu me faire connaître que le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni était dans l'intention d'employer ses bons offices en vue de l'exacte application desdites dispositions.

J'ai l'honneur d'accuser réception et de vous remercier de cette communication.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

JOSEPH PAGANON

E 5548,9 93]

No. 133

Sir H. Young to Sir John Simon — (Received October 25)

(No. 1000. Secret.)

Sir,

Bagdad, October 13, 1932

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the official celebration in Bagdad of the admission of Iraq to membership of the League of Nations took place on the 6th October.

On receipt of your telegram No. 240 of the 3rd October, informing me that, pending the arrival of Sir Francis Humphrys as His Majesty's Ambassador, I had been appointed Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the Court of King Faisal, I made the necessary arrangements with the Minister for Foreign Affairs to depart for Bagdad on the 10th October, and accordingly, in order that I might take my place with my colleagues of the Diplomatic Corps when they called at the palace at 11 o'clock on the same day to offer their congratulations to His Majesty. Unfortunately, as I have already reported in my telegram No. 523 of the 10th October, the formal bearing my credentials was delayed, and these arrangements had, at the last moment, to be cancelled, and my official audience with the King postponed until a later date.

His Majesty was, however, pleased to convey to me, through the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the wish that I should pay him a personal visit of congratulation, and, after he had received the felicitations of the foreign representatives in the capital and the homage of the senior officials and members of Bagdad and of representative delegates from each of the provinces, numbering in all more than 2,000 persons, he received me in private audience.

King Faisal, seated next to the greatest nobility, kissing me on both cheeks, and making me sit by his side while he expressed in the most cordial terms his gratitude to His Majesty the King and His Majesty's Government for all that had been done for the advancement and liberation of his country. In conclusion, he begged me to convey to them his solemn assurance that he fully realised his own responsibility and that of the Iraqi Government towards the Great Power

[8079]

H 3

8. Nuri Pasha is expected here in about a fortnight, and nothing will in any case, be done before he returns. King Feisal is also anxious to consult Sir Francis Humphrys on the whole question, and, unless the arrival of Nuri is delayed, it is probable that some rapid political development, I do not anticipate that any important changes will be made before the arrival of the Ambassador.

I have, &c
HUBERT YOUNG

*Translation of King Faisal's Speech delivered at a Municipal Garden Party
given on October 8, 1932.*

Everyone, irrespective of party and creed, supported me with all his power, and I have seen how each one who assumed office carried on the struggle, bearing the burden of responsibility loyally and sincerely.

Those who were in opposition had no aim except to encourage all that would exult in the welfare of the country.

The people were always alert, criticising those in power as well as the "big" and "small" nations. The shrewdness of the people, and their sincerity and their co-operation for the welfare of the country, were responsible for our attaining our present position, and our admission into the League of Nations, with our beloved flag flying among those of all the nations of the world.

We have crossed this

[illegible][illegible]
$$S = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix}, \quad T = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix}, \quad W = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix}$$
[illegible]

This will no doubt be realised with the help of God and with the co-operation of my people, who should discard selfishness and enmity and consecrate their endeavours to the service of the country.

Every man and woman of the nation should work to attain these high ideals, and anyone who fails to do his duty in this respect will be wanting in true patriotism.

You will see me, as I have always been, advancing, by the help of God, without fear or hesitation, towards the attainment of these objectives and calling on every one of my people to do his best to go forward with me. I am sure that my people will sincerely co-operate with me and will redouble their efforts to raise this country to the highest stage of civilisation and progress.

Be assured that I feel it my duty to acknowledge to the world the great appreciation and gratitude which I feel for the valuable assistance rendered to us by His Majesty King George, his Government and his great nation, and to those of his subjects who are now in this country and those who have been here before.

I also express my thanks to our neighbours and their Governments for the goodwill and strong friendship which they have shown to us. I sincerely hope that we shall always be good and friendly neighbours.

In conclusion, I thank the representatives of all States members of the League of Nations who were present at the Conference. I assure the world that our only aim is peace and the service of humanity.

E 5692, 3910 93]

No. 134

Sir H. Young to Sir John Simon.—(Received October 30)

(No. 345)

(Telegraphic)

Bagdad, October 29, 1932

NURI PASHA arrived Bagdad Wednesday. He had been told at Alexandria by Iraqi consul general, who is a brother of the King's Chamberlain, that the King had decided to call on him to resign and upon Yasin Pasha to form a Government, in which he was to be Minister for Foreign Affairs. On Wednesday evening King Feisal called on him and told him to resign. He refused to do so, but denied that he had decided on Yasin Pasha. On Thursday morning King Feisal sent for me and told me Nuri had spontaneously announced his resignation and that he had decided to accept his resignation and to resign. I pointed out to him that if he resigned, the Ministry would be dissolved, and if Parliament met 1st November, if only for one day, Constitution necessitated payment of indemnities for the dissolution of the Ministry. I reminded him of his promise to Sir F. Humphrys to make no change before latter's return, to which he replied that his promise was only a statement of fact. Sir F. Humphrys and Nuri would return together before opening of Parliament. He asked me to verify constitutional point and see him next day. Meanwhile Nuri and his Cabinet resigned. That evening Nuri called on me and told me facts of his resignation, explaining that as he had clearly lost King's confidence he could not accept formal invitation subsequently extended to him to form a new Cabinet. King Feisal proposed to form a new Cabinet and to appoint Nuri as Minister of Foreign Affairs. I warned him solemnly against hasty action, and offered to mediate between him and Nuri. He then told me what he had done, but agreed to send for Nuri again. The whole day has been spent in fruitless endeavour by Cornwallis and myself to bring them together, King Feisal having obviously made up his mind to part with Nuri, and Nuri feeling that it is useless for them to pretend to be reconciled. I have just left King Feisal after a second audience, at which he told me that he is calling upon Naji Shaukat to form a Government, and that unless he, or whoever accepts office, demands dissolution Parliament will meet on 1st November for Nuri to report as acting Prime Minister on his mission to Geneva. King Feisal assures me that Yasin has put himself out of court by declining to renounce his attitude of hostility to treaty, but he will never be really happy until Yasin is in power, and I cannot guarantee that he will not call upon him.

E 5726 3910 93]

No. 135

Sir H. Young to Sir John Simon.—(Received October 31)

(No. 336)

(Telegraphic)

Bagdad, October 31, 1932

MY telegram 29th October, No. 335

Cornwallis tells me that King Feisal called upon Naji Shaukat on Saturday evening to form a Cabinet, but has now asked him to consider invitation cancelled on the ground that Nuri Pasha has unexpectedly agreed to accept position of Prime Minister. I pointed out to him that if Nuri Pasha must withdraw, it would be better to let him stay. If Nuri agrees to serve as Prime Minister it will only be with the object of minimising dangers to the country and to the King, who has treated him with so little courtesy. He will in any case drive a hard bargain and hold out for non-dissolution of Parliament and retention of Naji Shaukat in Interior, but he may of course fail in one or both. I understand that if agreement is reached Nuri is to be sent to sound me on the views of His Majesty's Government. I propose to reply that I have already warned the King general terms of what would be a real and effective action and other capitals by any precipitate action or public discourtesy to Nuri Pasha, and in London by appointment to high office of any individual concerning whose intention to observe the treaty in the spirit as well as in the letter there can be any doubt or suspicion, and that I have nothing more to say.

Do you approve?

E 5726 3910 93]

No. 136

Sir John Simon to Sir H. Young (Bagdad).

(No. 244)

(Telegraphic)

Foreign Office, November 2, 1932

OF R telegram No. 336 of 31st October. Political crisis in Iraq.

While being careful to avoid any suggestion that His Majesty's Government have any right to question King Feisal's selection of a new Prime Minister or his treatment of the late Prime Minister, and in particular to avoid any impression of personal or official hostility to Yasin Pasha, you should endeavour to keep the situation fluid pending Sir F. Humphrys's arrival.

If Nuri Pasha approaches you, you should inform him privately and unofficially that you personally are confident that King Feisal is too jealous of his own honour and of the good name of Iraq to appoint as Prime Minister any person of whom it is known that he has been expelled from the country. He should be at a loss to understand the political significance of the appointment of one who is still publicly committed to the destruction of the policy upon the basis of which Iraq has entered the League of Nations, and in the circumstances might well ask for an assurance that no change in that policy is contemplated.

If an opportunity presents itself for private conversation with King Feisal, you should, without in any way committing Sir F. Humphrys in advance and while expressing ignorance of what view he will take, suggest that he might justifiably feel disappointed and surprised, in view of the assurances given to him before he left, that His Majesty had seen fit to make so drastic a political change a few days only before his return.

E 5955 9/93]

No. 137

M. Catasini to Sir John Simon.—(Received November 14)

League of Nations,

Geneva, November 11, 1932

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 11th October, 1932, and of the accompanying copies of the correspondence on the subject of the claim of the United States Government to be consulted on certain

questions relating to the termination of the mandatory regime in Iraq and of mandates in general.

I note that the United States Government have informed His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom that they are anxious that their position in this matter shall be made clear to members of the League of Nations, and that His Majesty's Government have undertaken to request that copies of the correspondence may be communicated to the Permanent Mandates Commission, in order that the views of the States concerned may be brought before the appropriate body of the League.

I also note that the United States Government have also expressed the hope that suitable publicity may be given to the correspondence among members of the League.

I am, therefore, with your request, your letter and the accompanying correspondence will be brought to the notice of the Permanent Mandates Commission, and will be published in the official journal of the League.

I have &c.

VITO CATASTINI,
Director of the Mandates Section

E 5950 3910/93}

No. 135

Sir H. Young to Sir John Simon.—(Received November 14)

No. 1060 Secret.)

Sir,

Bagdad, November 3, 1932

ON Wednesday, the 28th October, Nuri Pasha As Said and Rustam Haider arrived in Bagdad by air, the remaining delegates to the Iraqi delegation at Geneva having already returned overland. I drove to the aerodrome to meet them, this being the first occasion on which I had been able to leave my house for ten days. On my return, I was informed that King Feisal was glad to hear that I was better and would like to see me. After a short conversation on matters of no importance, he surprised me by saying that Nuri Pasha was resigning, and that he wished to consult me on the position thus created. He repeated what he had already told me (see paragraph 7 of my report of the 10th October). He said that he had been unable to induce him to make the public recantation of his opposition to the treaty of 1930, which was, of course, an essential condition of his remaining in office. He had, in fact, been altogether unable to do so. Nuri Pasha was, he said, a very capable man, but he was not a Minister, but chiefly because he differed from him fundamentally in his conception of the correct policy for an Iraqi Government to pursue. Nuri was always quoting the precedent of the Earl of Chatham (whom I had some difficulty in recognising), the fact that he had been a Minister of the English Government of no reputation in order to defeat the equally disreputable manoeuvres of the Opposition. He was himself entirely opposed to this theory, the practical application of which would, in his opinion, lead to the ruin of the country. He said that the only true aim was the only true aim. For this reason he was anxious to entrust the task of government to some more scrupulous individual than Nuri as-Said, whom he would prefer to retain as Minister for Foreign Affairs.

2. On my return, I was informed that Nuri Pasha, whose sole task had been to carry through to their successful conclusion the negotiations for the treaty of 1930 and for the admission of Iraq to membership of the League of Nations, would tender his resignation as soon as he returned from Geneva. I replied that I was well aware that some reconstruction of the Cabinet was in contemplation, but that I had not anticipated that Nuri Pasha would actually resign, and that he should announce his intention of doing so within a few hours of his return. He said that he had been in the position of Parliament was a great surprise to me. In any case, I assumed that King Feisal did not

contemplate any such course. I was, however, very anxious to see him, and I was, therefore, very anxious to see him. I was, therefore, very anxious to see him, and I was, therefore, very anxious to see him.

3. I pointed out in reply that, even if he were unsuccessful in inducing Nuri Pasha either to withdraw his resignation or to form a new Cabinet, I saw no necessity whatever to dissolve a Parliament of whom the vast majority were committed to the policy for which the King himself stood, nor did I think that it would be difficult to find a Prime Minister who would be willing to assume office with its support. With regard to the constitutional point, I said that I would if he desired it, take legal advice, but I could hardly believe that there was not some way out of the technical difficulty to which he referred. I then expressed the hope that he would find it possible to compose his differences with Nuri Pasha, which did not appear to me from what he said to be so grave that there was no hope. After promising to do his best, he asked me to consider the constitutional question and to advise him. He said that he was very anxious to see me, and he gave me the impression that he would await the result of my enquiries before making any decision in the matter.

4. The same evening Nuri Pasha called upon me at my house and gave me a different version of what had happened. He said that he had been informed at Alexandria the Iraqi consul-general whose brother in King Feisal's Chamberlain had informed him that it was the King's intention to form a new Government under Yasin Pasha, in which he was to be Minister for Foreign Affairs, and had asked him whether he would accept office. He had naturally declined to give any reply, or to discuss the question, but he had taken the first opportunity after his return to Bagdad of asking the King what his intentions really were. The King, while denying that he had arrived at any decision about who was to be Prime Minister, had admitted that he wished to make a change, and he had asked me to advise him. He said that he was very anxious to see me, and he gave me the impression that he would await the result of my enquiries before making any decision in the matter.

5. The same evening Nuri Pasha called upon me at my house and gave me a different version of what had happened. He said that he had been informed at Alexandria the Iraqi consul-general whose brother in King Feisal's Chamberlain had informed him that it was the King's intention to form a new Government under Yasin Pasha, in which he was to be Minister for Foreign Affairs, and had asked him whether he would accept office. He had naturally declined to give any reply, or to discuss the question, but he had taken the first opportunity after his return to Bagdad of asking the King what his intentions really were. The King, while denying that he had arrived at any decision about who was to be Prime Minister, had admitted that he wished to make a change, and he had asked me to advise him. He said that he was very anxious to see me, and he gave me the impression that he would await the result of my enquiries before making any decision in the matter.

6. Early on Saturday morning Sir Kinahan Cornwallis, who had unfortunately been away from Bagdad, called at my house and we discussed the situation. He had had a long talk with Nuri Pasha as soon as he returned, and had found him very sore at the way he had been treated and reluctant, in the circumstances, to take office again either as Prime

mission to Geneva, but was not quite sure that I had understood him correctly. His Majesty replied that that depended upon the views of the new Prime Minister, whoever he might be, and upon the constitutional point which he had raised with me two days before, and concerning which he was still anxiously awaiting my opinion. I said that, as I had understood him to have decided quite definitely that the existing Parliament was to meet, it had not occurred to me that this problem would arise, and, as he had not mentioned it in the morning, I had not done so either. I had been advised that, on a strict interpretation, it would, as he had suggested, be necessary to pay Senators and Deputies their full salary, even if Parliament only met for one day, but I was of opinion that common sense demanded that they should not in fact be paid more than a reasonable sum, proportionate to the duration of the session. King Feisal said that he shared my view, and hoped that in any case the question would not arise. He then told us that he was summoning Naji Shoukat to form a Ministry, and I returned to my house and despatched my telegram No. 335 of the 29th October. It was clear to me that King Feisal still contemplated the early dissolution of Parliament, and this could only mean that we were dependent upon the British Government for the maintenance of my house.

14. On the morning of the 31st October, Sir Kinahan called at my house and told me that a fresh development had arisen. King Feisal had duly sent for Naji Shaukat on Saturday evening, and invited him to the Government but while the latter was engaged in sounding his colleagues and supporters, he had a meeting with the British Consul-General, Sir Kinahan, in which Sir Kinahan had explained to him the position of the British Government for Foreign Affairs under Viceroy Lord Curzon. The Ambassador, Sir Kinahan, had been very much taken aback, but had perforce submitted with as good a grace as he could. Sir Kinahan had said that Viceroy Lord Curzon had paid a formal visit to the King, and they were to open negotiations for a new treaty. Sir Kinahan had told Sir Kinahan that the King had now come to the conclusion that it was unnecessary for Viceroy Lord Curzon to come to the King. Sir Kinahan had said that he himself would only join Viceroy's Cabinet on two conditions: that Parliament should not be dissolved, and that Naji Shaukat should remain at the Interior. If agreement was reached, Sir Kinahan was to be sent to the King in what capacity I was unable to discover, to sound me on the attitude which His Majesty's Government would take to the new proposal. This conversation led to the despatch of my letter No. 236 of the 31st October.

[illegible]

I have, &c
HUBERT YOUNG

OPINION OF THE PERMANENT MANDATES COMMISSION

Note by the Secretary-General, League of Nations.—(Received in Foreign Office November 17.)

Geneva, November 14, 1932

THE Secretary-General has the honor to communicate herewith to the

Opinion of the Commission

When formulating its opinion, the commission fully realized how delicate

When, on the 24th September, 1932, the Council of the League of Nations took the decision to suspend the application of the Articles of the Covenant to Iraq, it was acting in accordance with Article 22 of the Covenant, and Great Britain was responsible for the application to it of the tutenary principles of this article. Since then Iraq has been emancipated from its guardianship, and admitted to the League of Nations. There is now, therefore, no legal basis for the continued application of the Articles of the Covenant to Iraq. It is a permanent, which henceforth is alone responsible for the administration of the State, could not be heard by the Council.

Subject to this observation the commission, in response to the Council's

"The Permanent Mandates Commission

"Having examined the petitions from the Assyrian community in Iraq which have been forwarded in the form of Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836,

" Having noted the observations of the United Kingdom Government on the above, the Commission has decided to refer the matter to a representative of that Government.

"Endorsing the attached conclusions of its supporters. (1)

" Draws the Council's special attention to the great importance both for the Assyrians themselves and for Iraq of providing the Assyrians with opportunities for settlement in a homogeneous group which would be in keeping with their traditions and would satisfy their economic needs.

"For the rest, it considers, for the reasons stated in its *rapporteur's* conclusions, that there is no need for it to submit to the Council any other special recommendation in regard to those petitions."

Appendix

Conclusions of the Rapporteur to the Permanent Mandates Commission

From a comparison of the documents analysed above^(*) and of the numerous petitions directly addressed to the League by Assyrian groups, on behalf of the Assyrians of Iraq, there arises a certain impression of the Assyrians' dissatisfaction with its present, or its predicted, policy as to its future. A few groups and voices in this concert of complaints and appeals to the League only emphasise its practical unanimity.

It should not, however, be inferred—as the commission has already pointed out on other occasions, while expressing the opinion with which it views the position of the minorities—that either the mandatory Power or the Iraqi

(1) See Appendix.

(2) See Annex.

authorities are open to grave reproach for the manner in which the Assyrians settled in Iraq have been treated under the mandatory system. No proof has been brought against the Iraqi authorities, or that they were victims of an abuse of power. It is remarkable that in the petitions dealt with in the present report no complaint that can be entertained has been brought against these authorities.

Amongst the Assyrians of Iraq the greater number, who have come from Turkey in Asia, have found shelter in this country in the course of the last few years. They are encamped there in conditions which, in most cases, are precarious and miserable: they are "refugees."

They have had to be settled on the land. In fact, these mountaineers have been settled in districts consisting of marshy and unhealthy plains, or dispersed in small groups or families in the midst of the Kurdish or Arab population according to the possibilities offered by the occupation of the soil.

In the petitions which the commission has had to deal with at its previous sessions, it has been pointed out that the conditions of life in Iraq are not only by the climate, with the casualties which it causes in their ranks, by the sterility of the land which has been assigned to them and by the precariousness of their rights to cultivate the soil, but especially by the scattering of their community among populations of other races.

It is this latter circumstance which explains these individual acts of violence, these attacks against persons and property which the Assyrians have constantly complained of, and which they fear—since the cessation of British control has appeared no more certain guarantee against the continuation of the existence of their community definitely intolerable.

The root cause of the state of unrest revealed by the petitions we are dealing with resides in the fact that it has not yet been possible to collect the Assyrians of Iraq into a homogeneous group in a region suitable to their needs.

Your rapporteur is inclined to think that as long as this has not been done the Assyrian problem will remain like a thorn in the flesh of Iraq. This opinion seems to fall in with that of the Government of the United Kingdom when it states that "the return of the Assyrians to their old homes in the Hakkari Mountains would still undoubtedly be the best solution."

It has not been proved to the satisfaction of an impartial observer that lands combining the requisite conditions for the settlement of the Assyrians in a homogeneous group do not exist in Iraq, or that the possibility of resettling them in such a region is not a realistic one. It would be desirable for the United Kingdom to seek its solution in favour of one or other of these solutions being sincerely sought.

We share the confidence of the Government of the United Kingdom in the part which the Assyrian element is destined to play in Iraq, but we are inclined to believe that the Assyrians would be still more likely to remain loyal subjects if they were placed in conditions more closely approaching to those which they had been led to expect in view of the circumstances to which they draw attention.

There is here a situation worthy of engaging the League's attention. It concerns the very existence of a race whose glorious past goes back to the earliest history, and it also concerns the future of Iraq. The League has followed the progress accomplished by this young State, and has consecrated its political emancipation; any factor which may hamper its peaceful and harmonious development cannot leave the League indifferent.

On the other hand, there is one aspiration of the Assyrians which cannot find any encouragement, namely, that of granting the widest administrative autonomy to the Assyrian "nation" ("millet") grouped in the territory which Iraq may designate. The danger of such a solution would imperil the unity of the Iraqi State, and could not but perpetuate the antipathy with which the Assyrians believe themselves to be viewed by the other elements of the nation in the midst of which they are destined to live.

The other specific solutions proposed in the various petitions call for the following observations:—

- 1 The request for the mass transfer of the Assyrian section put forward in the first petition is a matter on which the Permanent Mandates Commission cannot express an opinion.

- 2 A modification of the northern frontiers of Iraq as defined in the Council's decision of 1925, and in the provisions of the Angora Treaty of 1926, suggested in the second petition could only take place as a result of an agreement between the States concerned. Such an agreement might constitute a satisfactory solution and be sought by Iraq should it be found that there was no territory in Iraq itself which was suitable for the settlement of the Assyrians as a homogeneous group.
- 3 As regards the future status of minorities in Iraq, which is also dealt with in this petition, it has already been defined and guaranteed by the declaration recently signed by the Iraqi Government on the recommendation of the Council of the League of Nations. This declaration makes it open in future to the Assyrians, as to the other minorities in Iraq, to resort to the ordinary procedure in the matter of the protection of minorities.
- 4 The Mar Shimun's last petition merely reproduces in more general terms the assertions already contained in his previous petitions, and produces no evidence of a nature to change the commission's opinion.

Annex

Report presented to the Permanent Mandates Commission by M. Orts, Member of the Commission, Rapporteur

At its meeting on the 24th September, 1932, the Council expressed the desire that the Mandates Commission should report to it as soon as possible on the petitions from the Assyrians in Iraq, forwarded to the League by the mandatory Power since the commission's last session.

The petitions from this source, which have so far reached the secretariat, are as follows:—

- I. Two petitions, dealing with the same subject, dated the 20th and the 23rd October, 1931, emanating respectively from certain representatives of the Assyrians of Iraq and from the Mar Shimun, forwarded by the United Kingdom Government, together with its observations, on the 11th March, 1932. (Document C.P.M. 1282.)
- II Petition, dated the 17th June, 1932, from certain Assyrian leaders and representatives of the Assyrian levies in Iraq, forwarded by the United Kingdom Government, together with its observations, on the 5th September, 1932. (Document C.P.M. 1296.)
- III Petition from Bishop Yuwalaha, forwarded by the United Kingdom Government, together with its observations, on the 21st September, 1932. (Document C.P.M. 1298.)
- IV Petition, dated the 22nd September, 1932, from the Mar Shimun, forwarded by the United Kingdom Government on the 27th September, 1932. (Document C.P.M. 1300.) Letter from the United Kingdom Government dated the 2nd November, 1932, stating that it has no observations to make on this petition. (Document C.P.M. 1321.)

The petitions, dated the 20th and the 23rd October, 1931, and the 21st September, 1932, the originals of which were in Syriac, were forwarded by the United Kingdom Government in an English translation. Those of the 17th June and the 22nd September, 1932, were forwarded in English without mention of the language in which they were originally drawn up.

I

The signatories of the petitions of the 20th and the 23rd October, 1931, assert that it will be impossible for them to live in Iraq after the withdrawal of the mandate. They therefore ask that arrangements be made for the transfer of the Assyrians in Iraq to a country under the rule of any of the Western nations, or, if this is not possible, to Syria.

The United Kingdom Government replied in its observations that if the French Government, or any other European Government, were prepared to offer the Assyrians compact accommodation, to guarantee them fair and permanent

conditions, and to finance their transport, and if the Assyrians themselves desired to accept the offer, neither the mandatory Power nor the Iraqi Government would object.

Such a contingency, however, seemed so remote that the United Kingdom Government did not think it expedient to take any steps in the matter.

With regard to the allegation that it will be impossible for the Assyrians to live in Iraq, the United Kingdom Government refers to the conclusions of the Permanent Mandates Commission on Captain Hormuzd Rassam's petitions. It feels confident that as soon as the Assyrians are convinced that their visions of an autonomous Assyrian State within Iraq, or of wholesale immigration is impossible of realisation, they will become a most useful section of the Iraqi nation.

The second petition asks—

1. That the Assyrians be recognised as a "millet" (nation) domiciled in Iraq.
2. That the regions from which they came, now in Turkish territory, be returned to them, and the boundaries of Iraq extended so as to include them.
3. That, if it is impossible to fulfil this latter request, a "national home" be set aside for them, and that this home be open to all Assyrians who are ex-Ottomans, this home to be organised as follows:—

- (a) The whole of the district of Amedia and the adjacent parts of the districts of Zakhoo, Dohuk and Akra to be created a separate and specifically Assyrian district, to be administered by an Arab mutassarif and British adviser.
- (b) An investigation to be made by an authoritative commission with a view to deciding upon improvements in the position of the Assyrian communities in Iraq. The necessary funds to be placed at the disposal of those communities. The land chosen for the settlement of the Assyrians to be conveyed to them as their individual property with regular title deeds.
- (c) Priority to be given to Assyrians in this administrative sub-division in the selection of public officials, except the mutassarif and technical advisers. The official language to be Syriac side by side with Arabic.

4. That the temporal and ecclesiastical leadership of the Mar Shimun over the Assyrian "millet" be recognised by the Government.
5. That the Assyrians and the Patriarch have the right to nominate a member of Parliament.
6. That the Government establish schools at the places to be decided upon in consultation with the Mar Shimun, and that the Assyrian language be taught in these schools in the same way as Arabic.
7. That 500,000 rupees be granted by the League of Nations or by the Iraqi Government for the erection by the Assyrians of residences for the Patriarch and bishops and churches and schools.
8. That a hospital and the necessary dispensaries be established in the sub-division.
9. That men who have served in the Assyrian levies be allowed to retain their rifles.

The United Kingdom Government states that, while the petitioners represent the majority of those Assyrians who have come from Turkey, the autochthonous Assyrians are not represented among them.

Regarding their various claims, the United Kingdom Government makes the following observations:

1. A special national status could not be given to the Assyrians without arousing demands for similar treatment from other racial, linguistic and religious minorities. The national unity of Iraq would thus be endangered.

Further, unoccupied land in Iraq, which the Assyrians could be settled as an autonomous community and which a compact settlement, and a settlement would be made.

2. When the question of the frontier between Turkey and Iraq was before the Council, the United Kingdom Government strongly urged that the lands where the home villages of the Assyrians were situated, most of which were ultimately allotted to Turkey, should be assigned to Iraq.

The best solution would undoubtedly be the return of the Assyrians to the Hakkari Mountains. The Turkish Government, however, has so far refused to permit the Assyrians to return to their old villages.

3. In view of the fact that the Assyrians are already in Iraq, the United Kingdom Government does not feel justified in pressing the Iraqi Government to permit the immigration of large numbers of Assyrians.

- (a) The area claimed by the petitioners for the creation of an Assyrian national home contains about 77,000 inhabitants, of whom 57,000 are Kurds and 16,000 Christians, of the latter, about 60 per cent. are Assyrians. The four qadhas mentioned in the petition have been recognised as predominantly Kurdish within the meaning of article 9 of the Iraqi Government's declaration to the Council.
- (b) With regard to the request for an investigation into the condition of the Assyrian colonies, it is pointed out that a special committee has already been set up for this purpose. On the basis of this committee's conclusions, the Iraqi Government has drawn up a plan for the settlement of the Assyrians. The question of the registration of the Assyrians, and the grant of title to Assyrian refugees on preferential terms would, however, provoke resentment among the other inhabitants.
- (c) It would be inadvisable to give the Assyrians a privileged position in an area where they represent only one-fifth of the population. The request that Syriac should be recognised as the official language is unacceptable for similar reasons and, moreover, ignores the provisions of the Local Languages Law.

4. The Mar Shimun is actually recognised as the spiritual head of the Assyrians. He receives a monthly allowance from the Iraqi Government. The Assyrians enjoy complete autonomy in matters of personal status, religion and education, and the maintenance of this régime in future is assured by article 6 of the declaration made by the Iraqi Government to the Council. In any case, no temporal authority could be granted to the Mar Shimun, which might prevent the application of the laws of the country to Assyrians.

5. The law provides that two Christian Deputies shall be elected by the Mosul Liwa. To guarantee that one of these two Deputies shall always be an Assyrian would be contrary to the law, and might provoke resentment among the other Christian communities, who are more numerous than the Assyrians.

6. The educational rights of minorities will be safeguarded by article 8 of the Iraqi Declaration. The Iraqi Government will sympathetically consider the possibility of increasing the grants given to Assyrian schools.

7. As the petitioners' demands could be obtained, it could be better spent on facilitating the settlement of the Assyrians and the establishment of social services than on the building of residences for the Patriarch and the bishops.

8. At present there are dispensaries at Amedia and Dohuk, and three more dispensaries are to be established in the Amedia Qadha. A new motor road connecting the various Assyrian villages has made it easier for the sick to be taken to the Mosul hospital.

9. There has been no suggestion that the rifles given to the men of the Assyrian levies should be taken from them. Recent amendments to the Arms Regulations have legalised the retention by the Assyrians of their British army-pattern rifles.

III

The third petition is signed by fifty-eight persons, claiming to represent 2,395 families in Iraq. Its object is to refute the Mar Shimun's petition of the 17th June (No. II).

The petitioners assert that the Mar Shimun does not represent the Assyrian community, that he is seeking nothing but personal advantages for himself and his relatives and friends, and that his demands are based on unbound principles.

The Assyrians, both refugees and original inhabitants, are very grateful to the Iraqi Government, which has assisted them in various ways, has given them various privileges, and has secured them justice, prosperity and safety.

The petitioners state that the laws of Iraq, as sanctioned by the League of Nations are sufficient to safeguard their rights. They request that the Mar

Shimun's demands should not be taken into consideration, and that they should be permitted to live in peace under the Iraqi flag.

The United Kingdom Government in its observations gives particulars on behalf of the Assyrian people. The petitioners' claim to represent 2,395 families is certainly exaggerated. In that Government's opinion, however, the petition shows that a considerable body of the Assyrians are not in sympathy with the Patriarch's policy and do not share the alleged dissatisfaction of the Assyrian people with their situation under the Iraqi Government.

IV

In the last petition the Patriarch refers to the recommendations of the commission sent by the League to Iraq in 1925 in connexion with the local autonomy of the Assyrians. It was, he says, those recommendations that led the Assyrians to vote for Iraq when the plebiscite for the Mosul Liwa was taken. The commission's recommendations, however, were not followed, and the mandatory Power has revealed its intention of leaving the Assyrians of Iraq in their present state of insecurity.

The Assyrians, he alleges, have a right to claim from the United Kingdom Government, for which they fought in 1918, either the return of their original homes, or, failing that, the grant of another area to serve as a national home.

The League of Nations has assumed responsibilities in this respect, inasmuch as it has assigned the Hakkari Province—the inheritance of their forefathers—to Turkey and has given the Assyrians assurances of receiving their rights in the Mosul Province. The United Kingdom Government, however, has not followed the League's recommendations, and the mandatory Power has revealed its intention of leaving the Assyrians of Iraq in their present state of insecurity.

(*) The conclusions are reproduced above in the appendix appended to the Opinion of the

[E 5108 249 93]

No. 140

Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received November 21)

No. 1076. Confidential)

Bagdad, November 10, 1932

I HAVE the honour to report that I was received in audience by King Faisal and presented my credentials on the morning of the 9th November, 1932.

2. The master of ceremonies came to the Embassy and conveyed me and my diplomatic staff to the palace in Royal motor cars and, in addition, an escort of Iraqi cavalry was provided.

3. Outside the palace gates a detachment of His Majesty's own cavalry had gathered, and on my arrival I was greeted by the master of ceremonies, who paid the customary courtesies on my arrival.

4. After meeting the chief officials of the Court, who were of course already well known to me, I was conducted into His Majesty's presence. I then delivered my letter of credence to His Majesty and made a short speech, to which His Majesty replied in a most gracious manner. The two speeches are enclosed with this despatch.

5. His Majesty then gave me a most interesting and useful talk, and after they had withdrawn asked me to remain with him for a few minutes' personal conversation. The conversation was most interesting, and I am reporting the tenor of this conversation by next bag.

6. At the conclusion of the audience the master of ceremonies conducted me and my staff back to the Embassy under the same arrangements as those which had been made for our drive to the palace.

I have &c
F. H. HUMPHRYS.

284

Enclosure 1 to No. 140

Speech by Sir F. Humphrys, November 9, 1932

Sire,

I HAVE the honour to report to you at Mosul, the last of the King my august Sovereign, that I have been appointed Extraordinary Ambassador and Plenipotentiary at your Majesty's Court.

It was a great pleasure for me to be able to visit Iraq during the final stages of Iraq's progress towards the goal of independence. That end has now been happily achieved, and I should now be privileged to return as my Sovereign's first Ambassador in Iraq, and thus to be present while Iraq continues her march forward to prosperity, strength and the full realisation of her high destiny. I assure your Majesty that in the task which still lies before her Iraq can count upon the continued sympathy and friendly co-operation of my Sovereign.

It will be my constant aim and endeavour while at your Majesty's Court to preserve and strengthen the cordial relations which happily already subsist between the two realms. I feel confident that in this endeavour I shall receive at the hands of your Majesty and of your Majesty's Ministers every assistance and encouragement.

Enclosure 2 to No. 140

Reply of King Faisal

Your Excellency Sir Francis,

IT gives me great pleasure and satisfaction to receive the letter of His Imperial Britannic Majesty our Brother informing us of your Excellency's appointment as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at our Court.

We regret the recall of his Excellency Sir Hubert Young, His Britannic Majesty's former Ambassador at our Court, and we are glad that the choice of His Majesty our Brother should have fallen on your Excellency to be the first Ambassador to represent His Majesty at our Court. It also gives us especial pleasure to recall with gratitude the great endeavours which you have already made for the realisation of the high aspirations which we have had for our beloved country. You may be confident that we shall not cease to recall your past services with appreciation and gratitude. We are also confident that you will continue these endeavours in the future to assist Iraq to achieve the high ideals for which she is striving. We value very highly the great help and friendship of His Majesty our Royal Brother and we are assured that we shall continue to work in close co-operation with him for the benefit of our two countries. We are pleased to utilise this opportunity to offer you the assurance that we shall spare no effort to co-operate with His Majesty in all that may tend to the development of the mutual interest of our two countries. We have no doubt that the links of friendship and goodwill which, thanks to Almighty God, now prevail between our two countries. In conclusion, your Excellency may rest assured that our Government will do everything in its power to facilitate to enable your Excellency to carry out the mission which has been entrusted to you by our Royal Brother His Britannic Majesty and I wish you all success and happiness.

[E 6228 3910 93]

No. 141

Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received November 28)

No. 1090. Secret)

Sir,

Bagdad, November 17, 1932.

WITH reference to Sir Hubert Young's despatch No. 1090, Secret, of the 3rd November last, I have the honour to report that the King dissolved Parliament on the 9th November. A new Parliament was elected, and was opened by His Majesty before my return to the country is enclosed herewith.

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s 3

2 I understand that the King took his decision on the advice of the new Prime Minister, who felt that he would not receive sufficient support from a Chamber which contained a majority of Nuri Pasha's partisans.

3 I am informed that the Government intend to proceed with the elections at once, but it is impossible, at present, to forecast how they will result.

4 It is probable that the Government will be able to secure a majority in securing the return of a majority of their candidates, but I think it probable that on this occasion the King intends to use his own influence to bring about the election of a Chamber which will include all the principal figures in public life, whether they are supporters of the present Government or not. With such a Chamber it is probable that the King's Majesty will be able to bring about fresh elections.

5 If this plan is carried out, I doubt whether the new Parliament will support Naji Beg for long. He will probably foresee this and may endeavour to resist the King's intention. In that event I fear that another ministerial crisis may develop even before the elections are completed.

6 On the other hand the new Prime Minister, who is a close personal friend of the King, is known to be in complete agreement with His Majesty's plans, even though these may be clearly inimical to their own continuance in office.

I have &c
F. H. HUMPHRYS

Enclosure in No. 141

Translation of the Royal Iradah Dissolving Parliament

WHEREAS the present Chamber of Deputies has been formed as a result of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of the 30th June, 1930, without discussing the plans that were at that time depending on the future, and

Whereas this treaty has now come into force and a new era has opened, differing from the past, and complete independence which will ensure the consolidation of the country's position and its continued progress in all spheres, it has become necessary to ascertain the wishes of the people in this regard, and

Whereas, in order to ascertain the will of the nation, it is necessary to enable it to raise its opinions through its elected representatives, who will speak on its behalf concerning the new era:

We, in pursuance of article 26 of the Organic Law, and in accordance with the resolution passed by the Council of Ministers, have issued our Royal Iradah for the dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies and for the commencement of the election of a new Chamber.

The Prime Minister is charged with the execution of this iradah.

Done at Bagdad on the 24th of November, 1932, corresponding with the 10th of Rajab, 1351.

FEISAL.

NAJI SHAUKAT,
Prime Minister

E 6230/9 93)

No. 142

Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon — (Received November 18.)

(No. 1093. Confidential.)

Bagdad, November 17, 1932

WITH reference to paragraph 5 of my despatch No. 1078, Confidential, of the 16th November last reporting the presentation of my letter of credence to

King Feisal on the 9th November, I have the honour to submit the following account of the private talk which I had with His Majesty on the same evening.

2 The King received me at his country house at Harthiyah, and the interview lasted for nearly three hours.

3 He began by renewing, in the most lavish terms, his thanks to His Majesty King George and to His Majesty's Government for their unfailing help and guidance during the past years, which alone, he said, had enabled Iraq to obtain her independence through admission to the League of Nations. After thanking His Majesty for his generous appreciation of my country's help and referring to his own notable contribution to the work which had led to Iraq's successful apothecosis at Geneva, I observed that the emancipation of Iraq from mandatory control had naturally attracted wide attention. There were many who still thought that this had been done prematurely and events in Iraq would now be watched very closely to see whether the confidence of His Majesty's Government in the fitness of the Iraqi nation for self-government was in fact well founded. I also pointed out that the future of Syria, in which I knew His Majesty was deeply interested, would depend in a large measure on events in Iraq. If all went well and Iraq justified the trust which had been placed in her, it would be much easier for Syria to make rapid progress along the road already traversed by Iraq. On the other hand, if the termination of the mandate over Iraq were followed by disorders or serious deterioration in the administration of the country, then world opinion would certainly harden against an early termination of the mandate in Syria.

4 The King said that he fully realised the very heavy responsibilities which had devolved on Iraq, and he was determined that they should be creditably discharged. He mentioned the fact that the confidence which they had shown in Iraq would prove to have been misplaced. He and his Government would spare no effort to show the world that Iraq was worthy of the place which she had been given in the comity of nations. He also fully appreciated the influence which events in Iraq would have on the fate of Syria, and this fact would prove an incentive to the Iraqi people to safeguard the good name of their country and to prove the fitness of the Arabs to govern themselves in modern conditions.

5 I then referred briefly to the Assyrian question and warned His Majesty that as the reply of the League to the Assyrian petition of last June would probably be a recommendation that the Assyrian Levies should be disbanded, it was likely that the Patriarch would return from Geneva in a very disgruntled frame of mind. I did not, I said, wish to alarm His Majesty but I thought it necessary to warn him that there might be a recrudescence of Assyrian difficulties later in the year. He replied that the Iraqi Government were fully alive to the necessity for adopting the most sympathetic policy in regard to the Assyrians, and were doing all in their power to secure their contentment and peace of mind. In this as in all other important matters he would always seek my advice. Generous treatment of the minorities was, he added, an essential feature of his policy.

6 His Majesty then reminded me that, as he had informed me before I left Iraq, the situation was such that now that Iraq had entered the League of Nations, and the question of her relations with Great Britain had been finally settled, the Government would concentrate on internal affairs and particularly on economic development. He asked me to continue to consult him on the subject of the development of railways and the raising of loans for productive works.

7 This gave me an opportunity to speak to His Majesty about recent political events in Russia. I said that I had had valuable consultations with financial and technical experts in London, and had returned with suggestions which I would offer to His Majesty and his Government. It seemed to me, however, that as Parliament had been dissolved, practical progress with these schemes would be very much delayed, particularly as the new Cabinet were not familiar with the preliminary work which had already been done. It was, I went on to say, a great disappointment to me on my return to Bagdad to find the Government which had done so much good work for the country, and the Chamber which had supported their work, had so recently disappeared. Apart from the difficulties and delays which would arise from these circumstances in regard to carrying out the schemes of development which we had mentioned, the change of Government and the

dissolution of Parliament which had been suddenly effected that morning would, I feared, create new obstacles to the early settlement of a number of important matters, such as the conclusion of the Tripartite Agreement with Persia about the Shatt-al-Arab and the formation of the Railway Corporation, which I had hoped to take up immediately after my return. Moreover, I felt that it would be exceedingly difficult for me to explain to my Government how it came about that the Government and Parliament which had concluded and ratified the Treaty of Alliance of 1930 were dismissed immediately the treaty came into force. At Geneva, too, these events were likely to be regarded with misgiving, since they would quite probably lead to the general conclusion that the Government which had been so successful in the past was no longer fit to carry out its duties and support, and that they had been removed to give place to others who would be more capable of doing so.

8. The King readily seized my point, but assured me most categorically that the change of Government had no connexion whatever with foreign policy. His dissatisfaction with Nuri Pasha had arisen entirely from the latter's handling of internal affairs. He appreciated the great work which Nuri Pasha had done for Iraq during his period of office in the matter of the Treaty of Alliance with Persia, but for a considerable time he had had serious differences with him in regard to his policy in home affairs. Nuri Pasha had, contrary to His Majesty's advice, persistently promoted and appointed to posts of responsibility in the Administration men without either ability or integrity, men whose sole claim to the Prime Minister's patronage had been that they were his personal supporters. This, although perhaps not known to me, was only too commonly known to the man in the street, and, in consequence, Nuri Pasha's Government had fallen into disrepute and the prestige of the Administration had suffered. In spite of His Majesty's frequent exhortations the Prime Minister had refused to change his tactics, and the wide divergence of their views over this question was the principal reason for the Prime Minister's resignation. He was confident, however, that the new Government, by their programme which would be published in a few days, and by their subsequent acts, would rapidly dispel any misgivings which I might feel in regard to the political significance of Nuri Pasha's resignation. They had been chosen carefully, and although none, excepting the Prime Minister, had had previous experience of responsible posts in the Administration. Moreover, and this, His Majesty emphasised, was their chief virtue, none brought with him the contamination of allegiance to any political party or creed.

9. As regards the delay in dealing with the questions to which I had referred, His Majesty thought that no legislation concerning them was likely to be ready to go to Parliament before the elections were over and that in consequence the dissolution would not really interrupt their settlement in any way.

10. I said that I sincerely hoped that His Majesty's optimistic anticipations would be fulfilled, but at the same time I could not help feeling that it would have been wiser and safer to have moved less precipitately. Although I had no wish to enter into a discussion of personalities, I felt, too, as an old friend both of His Majesty and of Nuri Pasha, that it was a great pity that means had not been found to enable the latter to resign with less apparent evidence of His Majesty's displeasure. Nuri Pasha was, I was convinced, one of His Majesty's most loyal and devoted subjects, and deeply interested as I was in His Majesty's welfare I deplored the estrangement which had occurred between them. I hoped that, in view of his past services, His Majesty would do his best, by sympathy and kindness, to assuage the bitterness which Nuri Pasha must feel at the loss of his confidence at the very moment when the crowning success of the work of nearly three years was about to be achieved.

11. The King then mentioned the fact that the disagreement with Nuri Pasha in the realm of politics in no way affected his personal feelings towards him. He still regarded him as one of his oldest and dearest friends. He mentioned the fact that the Government had decided to send Legations at Rome and Berlin to be in charge of a single Minister. Possibly Nuri Pasha could for a time with advantage hold this post.

12. He then said that he wished to tell me of a conversation which he had had the previous morning with the Persian Minister, Sayid Baqir Khan Kazemi.

The Minister had just returned from a hurried visit to Tehran and stated that he had been given authority to negotiate with the Iraqi Government the several treaties and agreements which had already been tentatively discussed. He had mentioned, in particular, the proposed treaty concerning the Shatt-al-Arab. His Government, he had said, were especially concerned to remove the disabilities from which their interests suffered at present in these waters, and were hopeful that the Iraqi Government, in view of their common interests and close friendly relations, would adopt a conciliatory attitude in the matter of the rectification of the frontiers in the Shatt-al-Arab sector.

13. His Majesty had replied that he had thought this issue had already been settled in principle when Nuri Pasha had discussed it with the Persian Minister of the Court during His Majesty's visit to Tehran last spring, and he was surprised to learn that the Persian Government wished to reopen the question of the sovereignty of these waters. It was, however, not a matter which he could discuss himself and no doubt the Minister would take it up with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs if he had been instructed to do so.

14. He then expressed to me the most serious apprehensions concerning the intentions of the Persian Government. He feared that they would make their demands in the Shatt-al-Arab a major political question and might even try to refer it to the League for settlement. He instanced their obstinacy in the matter of Bahrain and said that he felt that they would prove to be proportionately more difficult to deal with in a matter in which far greater interests were involved. For his part he felt that any limitation of Iraq's complete sovereignty over the waters of the Shatt-al-Arab was quite unthinkable and he hoped that His Majesty's Government, in view of the Treaty of Alliance, would give their full support to Iraq in resisting all efforts of the Persian Government to seize part of this vital channel. He also informed me that Feroughi Khan, the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, had intimated his desire for an audience in a few days' time, when passing through Bagdad on his return from Geneva. He feared that Feroughi, too, would probably endeavour to discuss this issue.

15. I said that my advice to His Majesty was to hold the Persian Government to the arrangement for a Conservancy Board, which had been provisionally agreed on last spring. I had myself discussed the Shatt-al-Arab question when I was in Tehran prior to His Majesty's own visit, and the Minister of the Court, to whom I had explained the Conservancy Board proposals, had accepted the principle of the arrangement. I assured His Majesty of my sympathy and support in safeguarding the vital interests of Iraq in any matter which concerned her strategic frontiers.

16. I then referred to the future relations between the Embassy and the British advisers in the Iraqi Government. I said that I did not wish to convey the impression that I proposed to interfere in internal administrative matters, but in our common interest it seemed to me to be necessary that there should continue to be close liaison between the Iraqi Government and the Embassy. This could best be done through the advisers, and I hoped that His Majesty would agree that they should continue to keep me informed about all important matters. His Majesty replied that he regarded it as most desirable that the closest touch should be maintained between advisers and the Embassy, and that he considered it essential that I should be given the fullest information of all important developments. He undertook that orders should be given privately to advisers that there should be no change in this respect, but was obviously relieved when I told him that I proposed to cancel the original official letter which I had written to advisers in my capacity as High Commissioner. I shall, therefore, shortly take the opportunity of doing so. I said that I had written to the advisers on 21st September last, and will convey to the advisers a private intimation in the above sense.

17. It is unnecessary, I think, for me to comment at length on this matter. The statements which Nuri Pasha were, I believe, substantially true, and I do not think there is any cause to fear that this step will result in a change of the Iraqi Government's attitude towards His Majesty's Government. All that I have heard from Sir Hubert Young, Sir Kanahan Cornwallis and Ja'far Pasha since my return to Bagdad confirms His Majesty's statement that his quarrel with Nuri Pasha is far more personal than political. He has undoubtedly tired of Nuri Pasha,

and is jealous of the international reputation which he has won. His complaint that Nuri Pasha tries to exercise his patronage in favour of his own friends means simply that His Majesty desires to reserve this patronage exclusively for himself.

18. The new Ministers, although strangers to Cabinet work, have the reputation of being efficient and trustworthy men, and I do not anticipate any difficulty in my relations with them. Nor do I see any reason to fear that they will misgovern the country. There is, however, a probability that, acting under the King's orders, they may endeavour to expel from the public services a number of men appointed by the late Prime Minister, whom His Majesty regards as undesirable. These men would certainly appeal to Nuri Pasha for protection, and he is likely to employ methods which might seriously embarrass the smooth working of the administrative machine. I think, however, that I have sufficient personal influence to be able to restrain him from recourse to extreme measures, and in the private talks which I have had with him during the last few days, I have counselled him to remain quiet and to await the future with dignity and confidence.

19. The test of King Faisal's own attitude will be found, I think, in the character of the new Parliament, which he will undoubtedly try to pack secretly with his own nominees. Meanwhile, he is eager to assume the direction of affairs himself, and is impatient of the advice of his Ministers. I see no indication, however, of his wanting to dispute with British advisers, and I believe he is not likely to do so. He behaved in an embarrassingly affectionate manner towards me when I took my leave.

I have, &c
F H HUMPHRYS

E 6231 3910 98]

No 143

Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received November 26)

(No 1094. Confidential)

Sir,

Bagdad, November 17, 1932

WITH reference to Sir Hubert Young's telegram No. 340 of the 4th November, I have the honour to enclose herewith a translation of the text of the programme of the new Cabinet, which was published in the press on the 17th November.

2. Its contents suggest that Najib Beg Shaukat and his colleagues, in framing their policy, have to a large extent been guided by the wishes of the King.

3. In the first item I see the intention of vindicating the assurance given to me by His Majesty on the occasion of my long talk with him on the 9th November, that the change in Government implied no change of attitude towards His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, the first three items of the domestic policy outlined seem to be designed to give full satisfaction to His Majesty's wish to eliminate from public services the elements introduced by the late Prime Minister, while the strengthening of the army through some mild form of national service which is adumbrated in a subsequent paragraph, is a project which has for long been dear to His Majesty's heart. The last item of the programme is evidently intended to cover *inter alia* the scheme for His Majesty's new palace, and, in consequence, also bears the trace of Royal inspiration.

4. I do not wish to imply that the programme is on this account open to special criticism, but merely to suggest that it comes as a confirmation of the view which I expressed in my confidential despatch No. 1093 of to-day's date, that the King will probably in the future endeavour to direct very closely the policy of his Ministers and, certainly the present Cabinet are unlikely to resist his will.

I have, &c
F H HUMPHRYS

Enclosure in No. 143

Programme of the New Cabinet

(Translated from *Al Alam-al-Arabi* of November 17, 1932.)

DEPENDING on the Almighty God, and on the precious confidence of His Majesty the King and the support and co-operation of the nation, the Cabinet have taken over the reins of government and resolved to proceed with the administration of State affairs in accordance with the following programme:—

Foreign Policy

To see most carefully into:—

- The strengthening of the relations of amity and friendship with Great Britain, in the spirit of the alliance obtaining between the two States.
- The strengthening of the good relations obtaining between Iraq and friendly States, neighbouring States in particular.
- The fulfilment of the obligations devolving upon Iraq in her quality as member of the League of Nations.
- The strengthening by all possible means of the brotherly relations binding Iraq with neighbouring Arab States in such manner as to lead to the promotion of the spirit of fraternity and the common interests.

Domestic Policy

The reorganisation and improvement of the Administration and the raising of the standard of efficiency therein by —

- Examining State establishments and the classification and distribution of duties (or appointments) in accordance with requirements.
- The adoption of methods calculated to ensure the raising of the standard of efficiency among officials.
- The application of a stricter measure of control and inspection of official works.

The drawing up of a balanced budget having regard to the following:—

- The limitation of normal expenditure to the lowest possible figure compatible with the proper carrying out of the public services.
- The revision of the Five Year Plan on the basis of including therein the more necessary and more beneficial of the major fruitful and development works, and the allotment of the oil receipts for such works.

The exertion of efforts calculated to lead to the finding of foreign markets for Iraqi produce.

Consideration of the possibility of improving the method of collection of the animal (Kudu) tax.

Improvement of agriculture in general, including the regulation of the obligations and rights of cultivators, and seeing into the establishment of agricultural industries.

Strengthening the army, and consideration of the best methods to be adopted for the people to participate in the service of national defence.

Lending attention to public education with a view to:—

- Expanding primary instruction and making it more adaptable to practical needs.
- Making the curricula such as will ensure the development of the spirit of self reliance and (love of) work.

Expansion of health organisations, in particular those relating to the curbing of diseases.

Development of the judicial system.

Arranging that the Iraqi Decree as to the law be made consistent with the provisions of "general" (1) laws having regard to tribal customs. Regulation of labour affairs and ensuring the rights of workmen.

Seeing into the improvement of the conditions of municipalities in general, and the lending of financial assistance to Asanah-al-Azimah to enable it to undertake certain schemes for the betterment of the capital

E 5086 (240, 93)

No. 144

Sir John Simon to Sir P. Humphrys (Bagdad)

(No 687 Secret)

Sir,

Foreign Office, December 8, 1932.

HIS Majesty's Government have had under consideration the question of the future of the British Advisers in Iraq. It is the policy of His Majesty's Government to ensure that the British Advisers in Iraq should be able to perform their duties in the most effective manner possible, and to ensure that they should be able to obtain the necessary facilities for the performance of their duties.

2. It is the policy of His Majesty's Government to ensure that the British Advisers in Iraq should be able to perform their duties in the most effective manner possible, and to ensure that they should be able to obtain the necessary facilities for the performance of their duties.

represented as confirmation of the suspicion which already exists in certain foreign quarters that His Majesty's Government, while relinquishing the responsibilities of the mandate, were attempting to retain its advantages. As you are aware, the Treaty of Alliance of 1930 has already been criticised on these grounds, and was only somewhat grudgingly approved by the Council of the League of Nations. The interchange of information between your Excellency and the British advisory staff in the service of the Iraqi Government were continued and came to the knowledge of foreign Powers. His Majesty's Government might be accused of having retained an excessive degree of control in the Iraqi Administration and of developing a system of British intelligence officers in that Administration to serve their own ends.

3. Moreover, the knowledge that this system existed might expose the British advisory staff themselves to attacks from Nationalist and anti British circles in Iraq. Thus, not only would embarrassments and difficulties probably be created for His Majesty's representative in Iraq and for His Majesty's Government, but the position of the British advisers might also be rendered untenable.

4. You will in the ordinary course, receive information of increasing value from the British consular officers who are about to be appointed in various parts of the country, but it is doubtful whether, during the next few years at all events, this source of information will be sufficient.

5. The position arising out of the continued presence of the Royal Air Force in Iraq under the Treaty of Alliance, and the special responsibilities assumed by His Majesty's Government towards Iraq under article 4 of that treaty, render it of importance that your Excellency shall receive early and reliable information of any event or movement in Iraq likely to affect the security of the country, so that you may be in a position to advise in the event of the occurrence of such an event.

6. After full consideration of all the circumstances, His Majesty's Government consider that the best means of securing this end, while avoiding the dangers indicated above, would be to concentrate the source of information and the channel of enquiry in the person of one well placed British official who, in their view, should be the British Adviser to the Ministry of Interior (at present Sir Kenneth Cornwallis).

7. Although it is obviously desirable that any arrangement whereby Sir Kenneth Cornwallis should be made responsible for communicating information regarding the internal situation of Iraq to you, either on his own initiative or in response to enquiries, should have the knowledge and sanction of the Iraqi Government, His Majesty's Government doubt the wisdom of attempting to obtain such sanction in writing at the present stage. In their view it would be preferable that your Excellency should take up the question privately with His

Majesty King Faisal and the Iraqi Prime Minister, and should obtain their oral concurrence in the arrangement proposed. This procedure, they consider, would be the most effective means of securing the necessary facilities for the performance of their duties. When the time comes for you to vacate the post, it will be desirable to consider the advisability of placing the arrangement on a written basis. (This might be done if, when writing to take leave of the Iraqi Government, you were to express the hope that the Iraqi Government will be willing to extend to your successors the same facilities for obtaining information as have been accorded to yourself, and request the authority of the Iraqi Government to inform your successor that such will be the case.)

8. I request therefore that you will, unless you see objection, approach King Faisal and the Iraqi Prime Minister in the manner suggested with a view to obtaining their concurrence in the proposed arrangement whereby Sir Kenneth Cornwallis or, in his absence, the acting adviser to the Ministry of Interior, would be responsible for communicating to you any information of importance affecting the internal security of the country.

9. I shall be glad also if you will now address to each member of the British advisory staff in Iraq a letter in the sense of the accompanying draft.

I am, Sir,

JOHN SIMON

Enclosure in No 144

Sir P. Humphrys to the British Advisers in Iraq

Sir,

I AM directed by His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to address you as follows:—

2. With the establishment of Iraq as a fully independent State and the consequent entry into force of the Treaty of Alliance between Great Britain and Iraq, which was signed on the 30th June, 1930, the special relation which has existed between His Majesty's Government and the Iraqi Government since April 1920 has come to an end, and consequently the special responsibilities towards His Majesty's High Commissioner in Iraq which were defined in the letter addressed on first appointment to British officials in the service of the Iraqi Government and in the subsequent letter of 1930, have also terminated.

3. The Secretary of State desires me to express to you the satisfaction of His Majesty's Government at the successful culmination of the policy which has been pursued in Iraq during the past twelve years, and to express their appreciation of the manner in which the duties of the British officials in the service of the Iraqi Government have been performed throughout that period.

E 6370 23 93)

No. 145

Consul, Geneva, (No 21) to High Commissioner, Bagdad - (Reputed to Foreign Office; Received December 4.)

No 431 L.N.)

(Telegraphic)

Geneva, December 4 1932

FOLLOWING from Secretary of State:—

"Certain members of Council are impressed by demand of Assyrians for compact and homogeneous settlement in Iraq. They have been reminded that His Majesty's Government have in the past as mandatory expressed view that this is (! impracticable), and it has been pointed out to them that in these circumstances British delegate on the Council could not accept resolution simply requiring Iraq to give effect to Assyrian request. But it is clear that a number of members of Council are not satisfied that everything possible has been done, and, further, that they consider His Majesty's Government have a responsibility in the matter, especially in view of assurances given Assyrians last summer and to our attitude when Mosul frontier was closed."

"I am sure it would be possible to find that Council might appoint League commissioner to visit Iraq and report on possibilities of settlement, and I should be very glad to know whether you think this would be admissible. I should be glad if we could agree to such proposal, and I should like to make it, as I fear that, unless we can accept something that will allay misgivings of other Council members, we may rest under some reproach for abandoning Assyrians now mandate is terminated. I am sure that the League will be able to do so with in next few days. On hearing from you I will confer with Nuri Pasha."

E 6381/23 93]

No. 146.

Sir F. Humphrys (No 240) to Consul, Geneva.—(Repeated to Foreign Office, Received December 4)

(No. 364)

(Telegraphic) R.

Bagdad, December 4, 1932.

FOLLOWING in text referred to in my telegram immediately following:—

"Beatitude.

"In spite of everything that has occurred I am still prepared to offer following conditions for levy service:—

"On condition that you and other leaders will give a solemn undertaking not again to interfere with discipline of Assyrian levies, and on condition that all ranks give undertakings to serve loyally and truly, levies will be maintained at present strength until an answer is given by League to Assyrian petition of 17th June or until 15th December, whichever is earlier date. If however, levies have definitely decided that they do not wish to serve at Basra, one company must be reduced to allow for formation of a company of other Iraqis to take over from Assyrians at Basra.

"On receipt of answer from League, arrangements will be made to retain such men as it may be desired to recruit for forces to be formed under Anglo-Iraq Treaty, 1930.

"It is impossible for me to give you a reply in precise terms as to what I can do at present. I am sure that the League will not be considered as recommending any course of action which is contrary to the general policy of the League. I cannot at this stage commit myself further than to inform you that such questions as recognition of Patriarch, land settlement, representation in Parliament, schools, dispensaries, retention of rifles and conditions of service in Iraqi forces are recognised by me as reasonable subjects for consideration and that earliest and most sympathetic attention to these matters will be pressed by me on Iraq Government and through my Government on League of Nations.

"You may be assured of sincere goodwill of British Government and of our desire to do all that is possible for welfare of Assyrian people. I cannot believe that you will deliberately reject my advice to give up hasty action and to await decision of League so that these important matters may be discussed in a calm atmosphere."

(Reference Foreign Office telegrams Nos 253 and 254: Assyrian petitions.)

E 6382 23 93

No. 147

Sir F. Humphrys (No 241) to Consul, Geneva.—(Repeated to Foreign Office, Received December 5)

(No. 365)

(Telegraphic) R.

Bagdad, December 4, 1932.

FOLLOWING, for British delegation reference my immediately preceding telegram:—

"Statement ascribed to me in *Journal de Genève* (like another which appeared lately in the *Cherch Times*) is entirely without foundation. Only assurances which I gave Assyrians last summer are given in my immediately preceding telegram. Motives underlying these assurances were to preserve the country from the threat of serious disturbance and to save Assyrians from

perpetrating mutinous act which would have destroyed their good reputation for loyal service and would have rendered them unemployable either by British or Iraq Government in future. First six questions mentioned in my letter of 28th June have, in fact, been sympathetically considered by Iraq Government. The police provided that their attitude is satisfactory. The crux of the whole problem is land settlement, in regard to which a strong committee, including an Assyrian and an Englishman, reported last August that there was room for 360 more families in the area mentioned in the petition. It would be very dangerous to encourage Assyrians to hope for more land in Iraq than is reported by committee to be available. Patriarch has already rejected Baradost area, which would provide room for an additional 500 families.

"The fact must be squarely faced that suitable mountainous country does not exist in Iraq which could accommodate Assyrians in compact body. Any attempt to force a solution would be unjust and would result in civil war of far-reaching nature. The only alternative to settlement in scattered communities in Iraq remains, as was clearly pointed out by British representative at the 35th session of the Council in 1925, resettlement in their ancient home lands in Hakkari. I suggest that these arguments be explained confidentially to rapporteur before draft resolution is submitted to the Council and that British representative should insist that resolution as finally approved should contain nothing which would give Assyrians any grounds for claiming special treatment in Iraq. Since this has definitely proved to be impracticable. The resolution adopted by Permanent Mandates Commission in this regard ignores the facts of the situation.

(1) See No. 117

E 6419 23 93]

No. 148

Consul, Geneva, to Sir R. Vannitart.—(Received December 6)

(No. 432 L.N.)

(Telegraphic) R.

Geneva, December 6, 1932.

FOLLOWING from Mr Cadogan:—

"Council yesterday considered Assyrian petitions and formed a committee consisting of United Kingdom, French, Italian and Norwegian representatives to make recommendations on Mandate Commission report.

"Nuri Pasha pointed out that if the Assyrians were to be settled in a compact body, it would be necessary to find a suitable area of land. He reported, no suitable land existed for the purpose in Iraq. He was glad to see that Mandate Commission had not recommended the area of land for the Assyrians, which, as they had pointed out, would imperil the unity of the Iraq State. He would welcome any proposal for settling Assyrians in other territory, failing which they would have to accept a certain amount of dispersion. The present petitions were put forward only by a part of Assyrian inhabitants of Iraq.

"Chairman of Permanent Mandates Commission laid stress on the desire of Assyrians for settlement in a compact body and implied that His Majesty's Government had special obligations towards them. Mandate Commission felt grave apprehension with regard to the future of Assyrians if some solution were not found.

"The United Kingdom representative gave assurance of the interest which his Government had always taken in this problem, and recalled material assistance given the Assyrians when they first took refuge in Iraq. He also pointed out that the frontier laid down by the Council in 1926, by cutting out one piece of land where Assyrians could have been settled as a homogeneous whole, had considerably aggravated the problem.

"Committee met immediately after the Council rose and will continue work to-day."

(Repeated to Bagdad)

No. 140

No. 3156)

18. 11. 1936

1. I sounded King Feisal and Iraqi Prime Minister privately yesterday as to the attitude which Iraq Government would adopt towards proposal, if it should be made by a member of the Council, that the League Commissioner should be sent to Iraq to report on the question of land settlement. They both emphatically stated that such visit would inevitably lead to bloodshed between the Kurds and Assyrians, for which they would be unable to accept responsibility. They also remarked that proposal would imply want of confidence in verdict of the committee referred to in my telegram No. 241 and in statements on the land question repeatedly made by British representative. They indignantly repudiated, as insulting to both British and Iraq Governments, conclusion of *rapporteur* of Mandates Commission that it had not been proved to the satisfaction of an impartial observer that land combining requisite conditions for settlement of Assyrians in homogeneous group did not exist in Iraq. They point out that it was the League which, in spite of warnings of the British representative on the Council, had by its decision of December 1925 effectually extinguished hope of settlement of Assyrians in compact area in Iraq, and pleaded that it would be unjust to impose on Iraq a local investigation which could not fail to create most serious disturbances.

My comments will follow in immediately succeeding telegram

No. 150.

(No. 367.)

(Telegraphic)

Huadad, December 7, 1932

MY immediately preceding telegram.

[illegible]

In my view, the best solution in the ultimate interests of Assyrians themselves, no less than of Iraq Government, would be for Council to give clear decision *without delay*, to include following points:—

- (1) Note to be taken of Nuri Pasha's letter of 2nd August, and of Iraq Government's resolution on report of Land Committee set up last summer, contained in Jafar Pasha's letter of 17th August
- (2) Confident hope be expressed that Iraq Government will offer Assyrians immediately all lands found by committee to be available for settlement and will undertake necessary irrigation works.
- (3) Finding of Land Committee and declaration before the Permanent Mandates Commission of His Majesty's Government's representative to be endorsed that suitable land does not, in fact, exist in Iraq on which Assyrians could be settled in compact homogeneous body
- (4) Possibility of resettling surplus Assyrians in the country of origin might be explored if necessary (this would of course entail offer by Turks of conditions acceptable to Assyrians)

On point (3) above, I feel that it is essential that no further delay should take place in proving fact and giving final question to boggy which might at any time give rise to Kurdish Assyrian conflict

I submit that conduct of His Majesty's Government towards Assyrians has been entirely above reproach and has been characterised throughout by signal forbearance and generosity.

411

1998

(Telegraphic) R

Hayden December 7 1832

YOUR telegram No. 432 to Foreign Office.

Following are some arguments which may be of some use to British representative on sub-committee of Council —

1 The whole of the facts regarding position of Assyrians were set out with complete frankness in special ten year report submitted by British Mandate Commission in June 1931. Mandates Commission passed no adverse comments on this report at that time and there is no justification for any such comment now. The Commission's report was published in the League of Nations Bulletin, No. 100, June 1931, and is available to all.

2. Technical examination of Dushkai area referred to in Jafar Pasha's letter of 17-1-34. The area is 10 miles long and 5 miles wide. It is a very fertile area and now gives reasonable hope of settlement of over 400 families in this area. The Government are now investigating the possibility of undertaking necessary irrigation. Mutesarrif of Mosul has been instructed to proceed at once with settlement of families in other villages in the area.

8 Existing settlement of Assyrians in Iraq as shown in map 11, possession of No. 17341, and settlement of Assyrians have been left to achieve their Permanent Mandates Commission report, and there are no valid grounds for upsetting it.

4 Any special treatment of Assyrians would be determined by the Kurds.

Guarantees given by Iraq provide adequate safeguards for future treatment or why their future should be more in jeopardy than that of Chaldeans or other Christians.

No. 162

*Minutes of the Sixty-Ninth Session of the League of Nations Council.—
(Received in Foreign Office, December 10, 1932)*

Eleventh Meeting (Public) held on Monday, December 5, 1932

President: Mr Connolly

Present: All the representatives of the Members of the Council and the Secretary

3181 *Petitions from the Assyrian Community in Iraq*

NURI PASHA AL SAID, representative of Iraq, the Maronite Theologian of the Permanent Mandates Commission, and M. Oria, representative of the Permanent Mandates Commission, came to the Council table.

M. Benes presented the following report:—

"My colleagues will remember that at its meeting on the 24th September, 1932, the Council's attention was directed by the United Kingdom representative to certain petitions from the Assyrian community in Iraq, which his Government, as the mandatory Power, had forwarded to the Permanent Mandates Commission, in accordance with the usual procedure, since the session of the commission in November 1931.

"The United Kingdom representative pointed out that it was necessary that these petitions should be examined. The United Kingdom and Iraqi Governments desired that the examination should be made and a decision reached as soon as possible. He would have preferred the question to be dealt with immediately, and with that object in view he had suggested asking the Council to set up a special committee to report on the petitions. Having realised, however, that there were insuperable constitutional objections to such a procedure, he had simply urged that the Mandates Commission should give consideration to the petitions and should report to the Council as soon as possible.

On the proposal of my predecessor, the Yugoslav representative, the Council had adopted the recommendation put forward by the United Kingdom representative in regard to the Permanent Mandates Commission.

"In conformity with the desire expressed by the Council, the Permanent Mandates Commission, which is now sitting at Geneva, proceeded without delay to examine the petitions of the Assyrian community and the observations relating thereto forwarded by the United Kingdom Government as the ex-mandatory Power for Iraq.

"We have before us the opinion of the Mandates Commission.

In conformity with its usual method of work, the commission had requested one of its members to submit to it a report based on the examination of the documentary material. The conclusions of that report, which the commission adopted, are annexed to its opinion. Further, the Secretariat inserted in the document which it has transmitted to us the report proper of the *rappporteur* on the commission, summarising the contents of the petitions and the observations of the United Kingdom Government.

"As my colleagues have had time to study the opinion of the Mandates Commission and the documentary material forwarded to them along with it, I will refrain from making a detailed analysis.

"I would simply point out that, very rightly in my opinion, the Mandates Commission acknowledged the delicate nature of its task from the constitutional point of view. When, on the 24th September, 1932, the Council took up the question of these petitions, Iraq was still subject to the régime laid down in article 22 of the Covenant, but has since then been emancipated, on the 3rd October last. The Mandates Commission consequently considered these petitions at a time when there was no longer a mandate or a mandatory Power. However, having received an express recommendation from the Council, the commission did not stop to examine this formal point, it simply noted it in an observation, subject to which its opinion is given."

Nuri Pasha Al Said, representative of Iraq, stated that, having studied with great interest the report of the Mandates Commission, he desired to express his personal views on the subject. He had been very careful and valuable examination of the petitions of the Assyrian community in their country.

Iraq was now an independent State, and, as the Mandates Commission had itself pointed out, there was no juridical basis for its recommendations on this question, while it was prevented, by the nature of its functions, from hearing a representative of the Iraqi Government. He was glad, however, to see that the commission did not feel that the jurisdiction of the Council constituted an obstacle to its examination of these petitions. He recognised that the report had been inspired solely by the desire to assist in reaching a solution of the question, and it was in the same spirit that he desired to offer a few observations upon it.

The *rappporteur* to the commission expressed the view that it would be desirable for the Council to consider the question of the Assyrians in Iraq in one of two solutions—either that the Assyrians should be settled on acceptable

terms in Iraq, or that the possibility should be considered of resettling them in their country of origin.

The first of these suggestions was the proposal to grant the Assyrians in Iraq administrative autonomy, which was in the nature of a suggestion for the future. The Assyrians of Iraq were not a homogeneous community, and it was not possible to settle them in a compact body of land in Iraq. The second suggestion was the proposal to resettle them in their country of origin.

The Iraqi Government had, however, recently appointed a commission, on which an official of British nationality and a representative of the Assyrian community were sitting, to examine what lands suitable for settlement were available. That commission had already presented its report to the Iraqi Government and its recommendations would be carried out as soon as weather conditions permitted. It was pointed out that the Iraqi Government had been made for the settlement of a large proportion of those Assyrians who were still without land, and though, for the reasons already explained, they would not form a single group, care had been taken to avoid the complete dispersion of the Assyrian families and to group together as many households as possible. The Iraqi Government had in this way made every reasonable effort to meet the needs and wishes of the Assyrian community.

He was glad to note that the Mandates Commission had given no support to the desire of the Assyrians to receive administrative autonomy as a separate "millet" grouped in a single territory. The *rappporteur* to the Mandates Commission himself pointed out that the adoption of such a solution would imperil the unity of the Iraqi State, and could not but perpetuate the antipathy with which the Assyrians believed themselves to be viewed by the other elements of the nation in the midst of which they were destined to live.

That statement precisely coincided with the view of the Iraqi Government which was nevertheless anxious to do everything in its power to assure to the Assyrian community in Iraq the fullest enjoyment of their rights as citizens of Iraq. In particular, the nationality laws in force in Iraq gave the Assyrians the same rights as the other communities in Iraq, and the Government of Iraq received sympathetically, on the basis of existing laws, all requests from Assyrians who applied for naturalisation. The Iraqi Government regarded the position of the Assyrians in Iraq as satisfactory, and the same position was in Iraq. The privileges accorded to the other churches were also accorded to the Assyrians.

With regard to the second alternative suggested by the *rappporteur* to the Mandates Commission, the Iraqi Government had no objection whatever to the resettlement of the Assyrian community in their country of origin, if that was their desire, or in any other of the countries adjacent to Iraq, and was prepared to do everything in its power to facilitate the carrying out of such a proposal. If, therefore, the Council so recommended, the Government of Iraq was ready to enter into negotiations with the Government of any other State for the purpose of carrying out such a recommendation, and they would be most grateful for any assistance which the Council, or its *rappporteur*, might be willing to give in order to facilitate such negotiations. He would be very interested to hear the views of the Council on this point.

In conclusion, he observed that it would be a mistake to suppose that the petitioners, whose petitions had been considered by the Mandates Commission, represented the whole, or even a majority, of the Assyrians resident in Iraq. One of the petitioners, indeed, expressed complete dissent from the views stated

by the leaders of the community. It was only a certain percentage of the Assyrian community which, despite the benevolent policy of the Iraqi Government, continued to express discontent with the rights accorded to it under the existing regime.

The Government of Iraq was determined to assure the prosperity, happiness and tranquillity of all the inhabitants of Iraq. It was following the best and most practical path to that end, allowing itself to be guided by the most humane principles, by considerations of the general interest and by respect for existing

to expound briefly the reasons for the grave apprehensions felt by the Permanent Mandates Commission for the future of the Assyrian refugees in Iraq.

On the outbreak of the war, the descendants of that ancient race had been living in the mountains of Kurdistan. About 30,000 had perished in the defence of their homes or succumbed on the road to exile. The disaster had broken up families, severing wives from their husbands, and children from their parents. The survivors were now dispersed in Russia, Persia, and some thirty five to forty thousand of them in Iraq.

For many years the fate of the Assyrians in Iraq had constantly preoccupied the Mandates Commission. In the form of petitions, the mandatory régime had enabled them to bring to the notice of the League.

unhappy people in the League. Their entire attitude had, moreover, shown their

As the Mosul Commission had observed at the time of the 1925 enquiry, all Christians had pronounced in favour of the allocation of the Mosul vilayet to Iraq, since that, in their view, meant that they were placing themselves under British protection. The Assyrians, indeed, did not fail to recall the belief in which they had been upheld, that the British mandate over Iraq would last for not less than twenty five years.

They had had full confidence in the mandatory Power, and had unreservedly placed their fate in its hands. Throughout the duration of the mandate these

country, and had for twelve years maintained order on the Iraqi frontiers and preserved their integrity wherever they were menaced.

Such had been the position right down to the announcement of the forthcoming cessation of British control, which had caused deep perturbation among the Assyrian community in Iraq. From that time petitions had flowed into the League.

The petitions which by its decision of the 24th September last, on the eve of Iraq's entry into the League, the Council had instructed the Permanent Mandates Commission to examine, represented a last appeal to the solicitude of the League and likewise of the former mandatory Power. Had not, indeed, the latter stated, through its accredited representative to the Permanent Mandates Commission, that in recommending Iraq's admission to the League it regarded itself as "morally responsible"?

The Permanent Mandates Commission's report was before the Council and showed that, in the commission's opinion, there was some justification for the apprehensions felt by the Assyrians in Iraq for the future of their race.

Experience, moreover, had shown that in Iraq racial and religious prejudices still held sway. He would merely mention the case of the Bahai sect in Bagdad, which some years previously had been the victim of a denial of justice which had not yet been repaired, notwithstanding the recommendations renewed by the Council on four separate occasions.

There was in the conclusion to the commission's report one proposal, viz., "draws . . . special attention to the great importance, both for the Assyrians themselves and for Iraq, of providing the Assyrians with opportunities for settlement in a homogeneous group which would be in keeping with their traditions and would satisfy their economic needs." In the commission's view—and he would urge this point particularly—there was no other solution for the political, social and economic problem which was the central point in all the Assyrian petitions.

It was by reason of the grave character of the matter before the Council that the chairman of the Permanent Mandates Commission had decided to draw the Council's particular attention to this question. On the solution found might depend the future of the remnant of a Christian community in the East.

The President of the Council having authorized M. Orts, who had drawn

adopted both in its arguments and in its conclusions, to come to the Council table, M. Orts would give the Council any additional information which might be needed to clear up different points in the commission's report and to reply to any objections to which it might give rise.

M. Benes observed that the Council had just received certain documents from the Iraqi Government's representative. These documents contained some new material which, he thought, should be considered in the light of the opinion submitted to the Council of the Mandates Commission. The latter, as, indeed, certain members of the Council had observed, had already emphasised the special character of the question, which might be regarded as having been, so to speak, carried forward from the administration of Iraq under the mandatory régime. This exceptional character of the problem was also due to the fact that it had been placed before the Council at a time when the mandatory régime was on the point of terminating.

In these circumstances, M. Benes thought that the procedure most in keeping with this exceptional character of the problem would be to authorize the

representative of the Mandates Commission to study the matter.

If the members of the Council approved this suggestion, M. Benes would propose the following draft resolution—

The Council.

"Noting the opinion of the Permanent Mandates Commission, dated the 14th November, 1932, regarding the petitions of the Assyrian community in Iraq forwarded previous to the termination of the mandate over that territory.

"Noting further that the Iraqi Government has submitted to the Council other material for the study of the question.

"Entrusts that study to a committee composed of the representative of

Norway, and the United Kingdom.

"The committee thus constituted will have the right to obtain any explanations that may be desirable from the representative of the Permanent Mandates Commission.

"It will submit a draft resolution to the Council at the earliest possible date."

Auri Pasha Al Said pointed out that, both in the interests of the Assyrians

question should have been finally disposed of by the Council at that meeting. While he did not oppose the rapporteur's suggestion that the matter should be referred to a committee, he would merely ask that there should be no undue delay in view of the vital importance of an early decision to all concerned. He hoped that the committee, if constituted, would find it possible to present its report in time to be considered by the Council at its present session.

M. Benes's proposal. The past glories and present misfortunes of the Assyrian people gave it no strong a title to the solicitude of the Council that the latter could not but associate itself with the anxieties which had given rise to the discussion, and which had found expression both in the Mandates Commission's report and in the statement by its chairman.

Moreover, the very special character, to which the rapporteur had not failed

Means must be found for putting an end to a problem with which the Council had been previously concerned following on reports from the Mandates Commission at the time when Iraq was still in a state of tutelage. In this connexion M. Massigli expressed his keen satisfaction that the Council had been able to

That being the case, M. Massigli, while emphasizing the importance of the Assyrian people's recovering, as soon as possible, the feeling of security which was one of the conditions for its development, would not put forward the hope that the Council committee, which it was proposed to set up, would speedily bring this work to a successful conclusion.

needed

It so happened that the Moral boundary, as decided by the Council, did not coincide with the United Kingdom Government's boundary, which separated the district on the Turkish side from which many of these refugees came. Whilst not in any way challenging that decision, the United Kingdom Government could not but view with gravity the present position of these people. He thought therefore that the best course would be for the Council to do as Mr. Beaumont suggested and appoint a small committee of the Council to consider impartially and without prejudice the best way in which this most difficult question might be dealt with in order to do justice to all concerned.

M. Andriord accepted the resolution proposed by the rapporteur, and stated that the Norwegian Government attached great importance to the satisfactory solution of this problem. It concerned the fate of a people which had been sorely tried for many years, which was justified in counting on the realisation of its hopes and whose only object was to live in peace.

Baron von Weizsäcker said that the remarks made by the various speakers proved the interest taken by the Council in the fate of the Assyrian community.

M. Benes thanked his colleagues for accepting his proposal. The question was a grave one and involved the moral responsibility of the Council and the League. The Council was bound to settle this question to the satisfaction of all concerned. That was perfectly feasible.

Council would probably be asked to meet that day and would endeavour to find a solution. It should, however, be pointed out that the discovery of that solution would probably take some time, but the committee would do everything in its power to submit proposals to the Council at the earliest possible moment.

The President expressed the hope that a solution would be found

No. 159

(No. 873)

(Telegraphic)

Bagdad December 11, 1932

I FEEL summary of salient facts of Assyrian case may be useful. They appear to me to be as follows -

- My own view is that in a case of this kind, where no charge of injustice or oppression is made, and where the question is to be left to the judgment of the authority which has to bear the responsibility for the result.

While mandate was in force His Majesty's Government had to bear that responsibility. It now rests on Iraqi Government alone.

I have clearly put before Feisal and his Ministers all the arguments used at Geneva, and have specially stressed the fact that Nuri Pasha was convinced by them. Nevertheless I am satisfied that Feisal and present Prime Minister (who, as Minister of the Interior and former Governor of Mosul, has intimate experience of the problem), will never agree to nomination by outside body of foreign expert to assist in settlement of operations. I am confident that Iraqi Government will do its utmost to win the position of the League, their treatment of Assyrians equally with other minorities, but will continue to resist suggestion of special outside supervision.

There are, of course, no grounds whatever for imputing wilful or unintentional misrepresentation to His Majesty's Government or to British officials in the service of the Iraqi Government, who have laboured sympathetically in Assyrian settlement.

I earnestly hope that amended draft of resolution will be accepted by Council to-morrow.

E 6604 23 93]

No. 154

Sir F. Humphrys (No. 254) to Consul General. (Repeated to Foreign Office, Received December 12)

(No. 374)

(Telegraphic) R.

Bagdad, December 12, 1932

FOLLOWING is text referred to in my immediately following telegram.

"Notes with satisfaction declaration by representative of Iraq of intention of Iraqi Government to carry out their scheme for settlement of Assyrians of Iraq under suitable conditions and as far as possible in homogeneous units, it being understood that existing rights of present population shall not be prejudiced, and of their intention to select from all landless inhabitants of Iraq, including Assyrians."

E 6692 23 93]

No. 155

Sir F. Humphrys (No. 255) to Consul General. (Repeated to Foreign Office, Received December 15.)

(No. 375)

(Telegraphic)

Bagdad, December 15, 1932

FOR R telegram No. 30 of 14th December

by Council committee of resolution contained in your telegram No. 31. They accept new draft, and have asked me to convey their thanks to British delegation at Geneva for "valuable and most appreciated help they have extended to Iraq in this important resolution."

I am very grateful for agreed solution obtained with so much difficulty, and believe, given goodwill on both sides, it will work well in practice.

E 6843, 5866, 93]

No. 156

Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon. (Received December 20)

(No. 1157. Secret)

Bagdad, December 15, 1932

I HAVE the honour to submit the following observations in amplification of the views which I expressed in my secret telegram No. 356 of the 26th November last.

2. It is suggested that a rule of non-interference should be absolutely prohibited, and that it shall be agreed as between the high contracting parties at the Disarmament Conference that all bombardment from the air shall be abolished, subject to agreement being reached with regard to the rule of non-interference for the purpose of rendering the observance of this rule effective, and I have been invited to state my views as to the effect which an

in regard to the necessity, or otherwise, for revising the 1930 treaty) and, generally, on the future of Iraq.

3. The Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, which was signed on the 30th June, 1930, and which came into force on the admission of Iraq to membership of the League of Nations on the 3rd October, 1932, is essentially a treaty of alliance. It was felt at the time, when the treaty was being negotiated, that the young State of Iraq, with a population of barely 3 millions, with land frontiers extending to

1,600 miles, and an army of only 10,000 men, could not be expected to stand alone during the first twenty five years of its existence. The Council of the League, in its session on the 4th September, 1931, adopted a resolution confirming the report of the Permanent Mandates Commission, that one of the conditions which must be fulfilled before a mandated territory could be released from the mandatory régime, was that it must be capable of maintaining its territorial integrity and political independence. The view expressed by the Permanent Mandates Commission last year was that Iraq would be unable for many years to fulfil this condition without the assistance of a defensive alliance with a Great Power, and this opinion will be endorsed by every unprejudiced person, either inside or outside Iraq, who is acquainted with the facts of the situation. In other words, without the British alliance there is no doubt that Iraq would be still under mandate.

4. It has been recognised from the beginning in London that a defensive alliance with Iraq would be dangerous, if not an impracticable commitment. It was, however, recognised that a defensive alliance with Iraq was essential in order to enable His Majesty's Government to maintain a British air force in Iraq in case of need unless there was some nucleus of a British air force and aerodrome organisation on the spot to receive them. Stores, spare parts, etc., would be sent from this, it would clearly be impossible for air reinforcements to set out for Iraq without the assurance that they could land at aerodromes there in case of emergency, and that Iraq would be able to maintain a British air force in the Persian Gulf and Basrah, in time to be effective."

5. One of the objects which the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930 was designed to secure was the defence of Iraq from external aggression; the other principal object was "the permanent maintenance and protection in all circumstances of the integrity and independence of Iraq." It was, however, recognised that a defensive alliance with Iraq was essential in order to enable His Majesty's Government to maintain a British air force in Iraq in case of need unless there was some nucleus of a British air force and aerodrome organisation on the spot to receive them. Stores, spare parts, etc., would be sent from this, it would clearly be impossible for air reinforcements to set out for Iraq without the assurance that they could land at aerodromes there in case of emergency, and that Iraq would be able to maintain a British air force in the Persian Gulf and Basrah, in time to be effective."

6. The forces which His Britannic Majesty is authorised to maintain in Iraq in accordance with the terms of article 5 of the treaty shall comprise Royal Air Force units, together with ancillary services. An exception was made in case of emergency, when the two high contracting parties agreed that the special Iraqi guards were inadequate for the defence of Iraq. It was, however, recognised that a defensive alliance with Iraq was essential in order to enable His Majesty's Government to maintain a British air force in Iraq in case of need unless there was some nucleus of a British air force and aerodrome organisation on the spot to receive them. Stores, spare parts, etc., would be sent from this, it would clearly be impossible for air reinforcements to set out for Iraq without the assurance that they could land at aerodromes there in case of emergency, and that Iraq would be able to maintain a British air force in the Persian Gulf and Basrah, in time to be effective."

7. The cost of the Air Defence Force, will amount to about £300,000 a year, whereas the "additional" cost of maintaining land forces in lieu of air forces would be at least ten times greater, even if it were possible in the changed conditions to obtain Indian battalions from the Government of India. I take it for granted that no British Government would be prepared to incur the additional cost of maintaining a British air force in Iraq in time of peace, even if the Iraqi Government could be persuaded to agree to such an arrangement.

7. I now venture on to ground which is technically outside my province. I am of course referring to the subject of the Committee of Imperial Defence), which indicates the aid to be furnished by Great Britain in the capacity of an ally, should Iraq become engaged in war. Presumably such a war would be brought about by an invasion of the country by Turkey, Persia or Saudiyah Arabia. I have always assumed that British assistance in the event of a threat of such an invasion would be confined to air action in the mountain passes to the north or east, or in the desert to the south or west. In 1924, when Turkish troops invaded Iraqi territory as far as Rawanduz, they were successfully bombed out of the country in a comparatively short time and at very small cost, without any declaration of war. Any other method of dealing with this incursion would have entailed enormous expenditure and a serious weakening of the British position in the Middle East. It seems not unreasonable to hope that a Turkish or Persian advance might be held up in the early stages by intensive bombing operations by the Royal Air Force, thus putting an end to hostilities. It should not be difficult to reinforce the Royal Air Force in this country from Egypt and Transjordan in order that air action of this nature might be rendered effective, and the land and air forces could then be employed in the best of their ability in the operations. The landing of British or Indian divisions, however, to take part in the defence of Iraq, seems to me to be out of the question, both on account of the enormous expense to the British Treasury which would be involved, and because they could not arrive in time to prevent the occupation by enemy forces of the principal strategic points. I am not aware what action could be taken in regions outside Iraq and its immediate borders to check a Turkish invasion but it is clear that the occupation of a vital strategic point would have a very dangerous effect on the internal stability of the whole country. To sum up, I regard the employment of the Royal Air Force with the unfettered right to make full use of the weapon of aerial bombardment, as the only practicable means we can employ locally of repelling foreign invasion, and I would add that, so long as the Royal Air Force remain in this country with unrestricted powers of offence, the risk of an attack on Iraq by one of her neighbours may be dismissed as almost negligible.

8. On the other hand and here I find myself once more trespassing outside my legitimate province, I feel that, if the Royal Air Force in this country were restricted to reconnaissance work and the use of machine guns, their effective value in protecting the frontiers of Iraq from invasion would be reduced to vanishing point. I may perhaps be forgiven for pointing out that machine-gunning has to be undertaken at low altitudes, which, while exposing the aircraft to the risk of heavy casualties, cannot be expected to produce the moral and material effect which would be necessary to check the advance of determined troops. The casualties which machine-gunning on a large scale would involve would, in any case, need to be replaced by reinforcements which would in all probability prove beyond our capacity to provide. The intensive bombing of an invading army which was straggling with a long transport train through a narrow mountain pass would be a far more effective weapon, but this is a matter

From the air would be likely to have on our ability to implement the obligations of the League of Nations. In the event of a decision to implement the mandate, we were faced with the alternative either of cancelling the alliance altogether, or arranging to implement it in some other way, e.g., by the location of Imperial land forces in this country in time of peace. The first alternative appears to me to be a betrayal of our trust and of the obligations which we assumed before the League when we persuaded them to agree to the termination of the mandate. I have attempted to show that the second alternative could not be successfully negotiated with the League. The cost of the occupation of Iraq, which would be a heavy financial burden, would be foreseen, would bitterly oppose the location of Imperial land forces in Iraq for the period of the treaty as an occupation which would, in effect, transform the country into a British protectorate and, in my evidence before the Permanent Mandates Commission at Geneva, I admitted that there would be some force

in this argument (see p. 121 of the minutes of the 21st session of the Permanent Mandates Commission)—“If there had been any question of maintaining infantry battalions, for instance, the chairman's doubts might have been much more difficult to dispel.”

10. I have refrained from alluding to a third alternative, viz., that we should maintain an alliance in name in the knowledge that we had no means of implementing our undertaking to come to the defence of Iraq, as I have assumed that such a cynical view of our obligations would never find favour with His Majesty's Government.

11 I will now turn to the question of the effect which the prohibition of aerial bombardment might be expected to have on the future of Iraq, with special reference to the internal stability of the country. I leave aside the question whether or not the Iraqi Government would be invited to subscribe to a self-denying ordinance in regard to aerial bombing in dealing with their internal troubles; and I may be permitted to express the opinion that neither Persia nor Turkey would be prepared to consent to such a restriction in the case of their own nationals. Although it is true that under article 5 of the 1930 Treaty, the responsibility for the maintenance of internal order in Iraq rests with the King of Iraq alone, there are (apart from the lives of about 1,000 British, and 3,000 British

the operations undertaken by the Royal Air Force during the last three years against the tribes of the Southern Desert, and Sheikh Mahmud and Sheikh Ahmad of Barzan in the north, I believe it is correct to say that less than half a dozen casualties among the non-combatant population in Iraq were caused by bombing, which means that it is far the most humane as well as inexpensive method of punishment that can be employed in these regions. It is generally agreed that bombing of rebel tribesmen in the East produces more effect and far less resentment than ground operations against their villages. The reason for this is obvious. Ground troops, unless under the strictest discipline, are prone to indulge in practices regarded as insults of the women who withdraw from the air is regarded almost as an act of God, to which there is no effective reply, but immediate submission.

12. I trust I have said enough to indicate my conviction that whatever formula may be adopted at Geneva for the limitation of armaments, the imposition on the Royal Air Force of an unequivocal restriction on aerial bombing is the

Iraq of to-day would strike at the roots of the policy which has been followed by successive Governments in Great Britain during the past few years. I do not think it is going too far to say that the effectiveness of the Royal Air Force would be completely paralysed thereby, and that it would no longer be worth while for us to retain air forces in this country at all. I have stated my opinion on former occasions that Iraq cannot be expected to stand on her own legs without a British alliance, or to maintain her internal stability during the next few years without the moral effect which is produced by the presence of British air forces, especially

opinion, would imperil her security, both from within and from without, and would place in jeopardy important British interests and the maintenance of our Imperial communications in this country.

written under difficult conditions. I do not know whether the views expressed therein on a highly technical subject will find favour elsewhere; such as they are, they are my own and strongly held.

I have, &c.

F H HUMPHRYS

E 8838 4478 65)

No. 157

Sir F Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received December 20)

(No. 1164. Secret.)

Sir,

Bagdad, December 21, 1932

I HAVE the honour to communicate the following record of a conversation which I had with King Faisal on the morning of the 20th December.—

2. His Majesty said that he wished to ask my opinion about the proposal that an Arab Congress should be held in Bagdad. This proposal was an outcome of the growing movement among the Arab *intelligentsia* towards a closer union among all Arab peoples. Although for the next decade the chief task of the Iraqi Government would be to develop the resources of the country and to raise the standard of education and living of the people, he felt that, taking a long view of things, the Government should ignore. On the north and east Iraq was overshadowed by powerful neighbours, whose growing nationalism might in the future constitute a danger to Iraq's independence. In Persia dreams of the old Sassanian Empire were being revived, and in the schools children were taught to think of Ctesiphon as the rightful capital of the Persian King of Kings. Turkey, for the moment, was a safe neighbour, but no one could be sure that her old claims to the Mosul Vilayet might not be revived again later on. On the west, too, there would always be a threat to Iraq so long as the French remained in their present strong position in Syria. They, too, had once coveted Mosul and its oil. Could one be sure that they no longer dreamt of being masters of the Mosul oilfields?

3. It was true that by virtue of her alliance with Great Britain, Iraq had nothing to fear from her neighbours at present, but he was looking ahead, and he thought that it would be unfair to Great Britain for Iraq to rely indefinitely on her for support. Bearing these considerations in mind, His Majesty felt that it was necessary for Iraq to seek some means of reinforcing her position, and to his mind the pan-Arab movement promised the best source of additional strength. If Iraq could rely on the support of all the other Arab peoples, if, more especially, she and the Arabs of Syria could stand firmly side by side, the dangers which threatened Iraq's future integrity would be greatly diminished.

4. While, therefore, he believed it to be in Iraqi interests to give discreet encouragement to the Arab Congress as a means of strengthening ideas of Arab unity, he thought that the Government should be careful of its attitude towards both the pan-Arab movement and the Arab Congress. For this reason he wished to ask my private opinion, firstly, as to whether I thought that His Majesty's Government should encourage the Arab cause that they had shown during the war, and, secondly, whether it was likely that His Majesty's Government would regard with disfavour the holding of an Arab Congress in Bagdad.

5. I said that His Majesty's remarks and the two questions with which they had concluded raised very far-reaching considerations. I entirely agreed with him that Iraq should not rely indefinitely on British support for her safety, but I had some doubts as to whether the ideals of the movement for a closer union of Arab peoples really offered the best means of strengthening her position. Turkey, I feared, would view with misgivings any consolidation of the Arab peoples on her southern frontier. Persia, whose outlet to the sea in the south lay in an area predominantly inhabited by Arabs, would certainly be hostile to such a movement, while France, though now evidently prepared to follow in Syria the policy adopted by Great Britain in Iraq, was unlikely to relinquish her hold over the country. Any movement aiming at the political unification of the Arabs and thereby threatening the Lebanon from the east. It seemed to me, therefore, at first view,

Iraq's position, might very easily provoke active hostility against her among her neighbours and accentuate the dangers which His Majesty feared, dangers which were, I believed, far less real than he imagined. I did not myself share His Majesty's apprehensions that either Turkey or Persia had any designs in present circumstances on Iraqi territory, and the French clearly had their hands quite full enough already and had not, I was convinced, the least intention of

all these considerations were largely speculative and neither His Majesty nor the Iraqi Government need greatly concern themselves for the present with what was likely to happen in ten years' time. For the present their membership of the League and their alliance with Great Britain gave them a security enjoyed by few other countries in the world, and as he had himself remarked the pressing need of the moment was to set their own house in order. The best way Iraq could serve the Arab cause was, through her own economic and cultural progress, to win back for the Arabs the prestige which they had once enjoyed among the nations of the world.

6. As regards the attitude of His Majesty's Government towards the Arabs and towards the proposal for holding an Arab Congress in Bagdad, His Majesty had, I thought, seen in British policy in Iraq clear evidence of their continued sincere sympathy with the aspirations of the Arab nation to take their legitimate place among the free and enlightened nations of the world, and it was unnecessary for me to say anything more on that point. The idea of holding a

well known to exist, should not give rise to any difficulties if common sense, tact and restraint were exercised by those who took part. I warned His Majesty, however, that if it were held in Bagdad the Iraqi Government would necessarily become responsible if anything were said or done to give offence to their neighbours, whereas if it were held elsewhere, for example Mecca, the Iraqi Government would have no responsibility for what occurred. I could not give any official opinion of how such a congress would be regarded by His Majesty's Government without first referring the matter to them, but speaking privately and without having had an opportunity to consider the proposal in detail, it seemed to me that if His Majesty wished to avoid embarrassment from the deliberations of the congress, the following conditions should be imposed on the organisers if it were held in Bagdad.—

The agenda of the congress should be restricted to cultural and economic questions and politics should be excluded from their discussions.

The utmost care should be taken to avoid inciting the Arabs of Syria to resort to other than peaceful means for reaching agreement with the French; and to avoid stirring up the Arabs of Palestine against the Jews.

7. The King said that he agreed with my views, and while he could not give a positive assurance that someone might not in a speech commit an indiscretion he felt that this was unlikely, as those who would take part were all responsible men of experience. It was the intention of the organisers to limit, as I had suggested, the discussions of the congress to cultural and economic questions, and he was confident that the congress, if it were held, would conform to the conditions which I had laid down.

8. I asked His Majesty when the congress was likely to take place. He replied that it would probably be completed by March.

9. I consider that King Feisal is unwise to encourage the holding of the congress. It is a very serious step and it is not in my province to take up a definitely hostile attitude towards it.

10. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's representatives at Cairo, Telran, Jerusalem, Istanbul, Jeddah and Beirut.

11. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's representatives at Cairo, Telran, Jerusalem, Istanbul, Jeddah and Beirut.

I have, &c
F. H. HUMPHREYS

[E 8839/66/34]

No. 158

Sir F. Humphreys to Sir John Simon.—(Received December 29)

(No. 1168)

Sir

Received December 22, 1932

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 19th inst. in relation to the proposed meeting of the two Governments at Baghdad.

Yours letter of the 19th inst. has been forwarded to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and I am sending you a copy of the reply thereto. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has decided to accept the proposal of the two Governments to meet at Baghdad, and to discuss the question of the frontier zone. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has also decided to accept the proposal of the two Governments to meet at Baghdad, and to discuss the question of the frontier zone.

(For the Ambassador),
O. H. BATEMAN

Enclosure in No. 158

Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs to Persian Minister (Bagdad)

(Translation.)

M. le Ministre,

Bagdad, December 6, 1932.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that, being fully and honestly desirous of co-operating with the Persian Government in the maintenance of security along the frontiers of the two States, my Government have asked me to communicate to you, in their name, the following provisions to constitute a provisional basis for such co-operation between the two countries:—

Article 1. Each of the two States, the Iraqi and the Persian, shall appoint six commissioners from among their respective nationals, in the undermentioned districts:

Stations of Iraqi Commissioners	Stations of Persian Commissioners
Basra	Mohammerah
Al-Qadisiyah	Fakah
Bagdad	Mausurabad
Kut	Qasr-i-Shirin
Hillah	Bana
Ramadi	Ashnawiyah

Each of the two States shall immediately communicate to the other the names and designations of the commissioners, and also any subsequent changes in the same.

Art. 2. A commissioner may depute any official junior to himself in rank on his behalf to adopt the necessary measures for the settlement of minor disputes. The commissioner shall be responsible for the actions of his deputy under the supervision of the commissioner himself or with his approval. The commissioners shall be responsible for the actions of their deputies and designations of such officials.

Art. 3. The duties of the commissioners shall be as follows:—

Firstly.—They shall use all means within their power to prevent any person or persons, whether armed or unarmed, from forming bands for the commission of acts of robbery in the frontier zone, and shall also prevent such persons from crossing the frontier and from undertaking any kind of propaganda or agitation against the other party.

Secondly.—When it comes to the knowledge of a commissioner that any person or persons, whether armed or unarmed, is or are making preparations for the commission of acts of robbery or pillage in the territory of the other party, he shall immediately, and without any "opportunity" [i.e. delay], inform the other party accordingly.

Thirdly.—The commissioners of either party shall without the least "opportunity" [i.e. delay] report to the commissioners of the other party all cases of robbery and pillage committed in the territories of their own State if they believe that the offenders will abscond to the frontier; and the commissioners of such other party shall thereupon (i.e. upon the receipt of such report) do all that is within their power to prevent the offenders from crossing the frontier.

Fourthly.—When any armed person or persons, having committed a delict or crime in the territories of either party, succeeds or succeeds in absconding to the frontier, the commissioners of the other party, if they have good reason to believe that such person or persons has or have committed a delict or a crime within the territories of the former party, shall place such person or persons in custody pending the receipt, in due form, of an application for his or their extradition in accordance with the Provisional Agreement for the Extradition of Offenders between Iraq and Persia. If no application for extradition is received within two months from date of arrest, then the person or persons concerned shall be set free.

The frontier zone shall be deemed to extend into the territories of either party to a depth of 75 kilom. from the frontier line.

Fifthly.—To prevent the smuggling of goods from either State into the other.

Sixthly.—To settle all disputes arising between the two States, and to give effect to decisions adopted . . . (in this regard).

The commissioners are not authorised to undertake the settlement of frontier, land or water disputes. Neither may the commissioners of either party interfere in the political or domestic affairs of the other party.

Art. 4. In order to settle any dispute by correspondence, the settlement of minor matters, or in the case of a dispute, the commissioners may also, when necessary, send to the frontier commissioner of the other party, a person having a claim accompanied, if necessary, by a representative of the party sending out such person, for the purpose of establishing his claim. Such person shall also be accompanied by a letter setting forth the details of the case. In such cases the claimant and the representative accompanying him shall be exempt from the provisions of the passport laws of the two States, and the claimant shall also be immune from arrest and imprisonment. If the case proves impossible of settlement in the foregoing manner to the satisfaction of the two parties, the frontier commissioners shall thereupon undertake its settlement by personal interview and verbal discussion. A place of meeting will be fixed by agreement between the commissioners of the two parties, who may adopt in this connexion a

procedure whereby meetings will be held in rotation in the territories of both parties.

Art. 5. If the case proves impossible of solution by them, the commissioners shall draw up a report thereon in duplicate, each commissioner submitting "his report" (a copy of such report), after signature, to his higher authorities, in order that the case be settled between the two States through the diplomatic channels.

Art. 6. When a commissioner of either party wishes to proceed to the territory of the other party to meet a commissioner of such other party, he shall detail such guard as may be necessary to accompany him while passing through the territory of the other party. Commissioners so proceeding (into the territory of the other party) shall limit the number of their followers to the minimum.

Art. 7. The provisions of the present provisional agreement shall come into force as from to-day, and shall continue in force for a period of six months. The commissioners shall proceed with the carrying out of their duties after the lapse of fifteen days from the date hereof.

Please accept, M. le Ministre, the expression of my highest respect

ABDUL QADIR RASHID,
*Minister for Foreign Affairs in
the Iraqi Government*

CHAPTER IV.—PALESTINE AND TRANSJORDAN.

E 3147 606 31]

No. 150

Sir John Simon to Lord Tyrrell (Paris).

(No. 1415)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, July 2, 1932.

I HAVE to inform your Lordship that the question of the possibility of extending Imperial preference to Palestine under clause 5 (2) of the Import Duties Act, 1932 (a copy of which is enclosed herein), has recently been under consideration by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, and that as a first step it has been decided to ascertain the views in regard thereto of certain foreign Governments likely to be interested, of which the French Government are one. The French Government have been included among the Governments to be approached, because it seems probable that the French Government, owing to their position in Syria, may have an interest in this question somewhat similar to that of His Majesty's Government.

2. I shall accordingly be glad if you will inform the French Government that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom propose to give a preference to the import of produce from Palestine, but that they do not consider that by reason of such an extension of Imperial preference to Palestine they would be obliged to extend similar benefits to foreign countries in virtue of their obligations under the most favoured nation clauses of their existing commercial treaties. It is in harmony with the spirit of friendly co-operation which so happily exists between His Majesty's Government and the French Government in regard to questions concerning the territories of the Middle East for which France and Great Britain are jointly responsible. You should add that, as regards the preference which is accorded to goods consigned from and grown, produced, or manufactured in certain other mandated territories administered by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, it will also be desirable to inform the French Government that it is, of course, not proposed that the Government of Palestine should grant a preference to produce imported from the United Kingdom.

3. I request that you will endeavour to obtain a very early reply from the French Government and will acquaint me with it at the earliest moment.

I am, Sir, very respectfully,
Yours faithfully,
JOHN SIMON

E 3147 606 31]

No. 160

Sir John Simon to Sir R. Lindsay (Washington).

(No. 890)

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 2, 1932.

I HAVE to inform your Excellency that the question of the possibility of extending Imperial preference to Palestine under clause 5 (2) of the Import Duties Act, 1932 (a copy of which is enclosed herein), has recently been under consideration by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, and that, as a first step, it has been decided to ascertain the views in regard thereto of certain foreign Governments likely to be interested, of which the United States Government is one.

2. His Majesty's Government do not consider that the United States Government would be entitled, under the most favoured-nation provisions of the Convention of Commerce between the United Kingdom and the United

[8079]

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In reply, I regret to state that this Government is unable to concur in the feeling of the British Government respecting the right of the United States under the most favoured-nation provisions of the Convention of Commerce between the two countries signed on the 3rd July, 1815, to claim such preference. The Government of the United States considers that Palestine is a "foreign country" within the meaning of the term as used in article 2 of the convention, and therefore holds that any tariff privileges accorded to Palestine should also accrue to the United States.

In regard to preferential treatment of goods originating in or consigned from those other British mandated territories named in your note of the 6th August, 1932, I wish to inform you that the Government of the United States in the case of the Cameroons under British mandate, and Togoland under British mandate should, in matters of trade preference, be treated as if they were possessions of the mandatory Power. I feel therefore called upon to state that the position of the Government of the United States with respect to these territories is the same as its position with regard to Palestine.

Accept, &c.
JAMES GRAFTON ROGERS

E 4703 1241 25]

No. 104

High Commissioner for Transjordan to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Received in Foreign Office, September 15.)

(Secret.)

Sir,

September 2, 1932

IN fulfilment of the statement made in my telegram of the 2nd September, I have the honour to submit the following fuller report on my interview with the Amir Abdullah at Amman on the 1st September. Colonel Cox was present throughout. Sheikh Fuad-el-Khatib, personal adviser to the Amir, acted as interpreter.

1. I began the conversation by referring to the fact that in the agreement of 1928 he had agreed to be guided by the advice of His Majesty, tendered through the High Commissioner, in all matters concerning the foreign relations of Transjordan, as well as in all important matters affecting the international obligations of His Majesty in respect of Transjordan.

2. In the course of the talk I said that it was his duty not to act loyally, but to convince others he was giving no support to His Majesty. As a result of this statement, the Amir said that he had signed a treaty with His Majesty's Government, I looked on Ibn Rifada and all who helped him as people who worked against His Majesty's Government. At that talk the Amir had promised me that he would take measures to convince everyone that he was not instigating rebellion against Ibn Saud. I considered that the measures which he had taken so far had not produced the required conviction, and I said that I must now ask him to give me a clear promise to recognise Ibn Saud as soon as His Majesty's Government called upon him to do so. I made it clear to the High Commissioner that the question of the Amir and the question of a treaty of friendship must be treated as entirely separate.

3. For some time the Amir argued that before making such a promise he should be recognised as Amir of Transjordan. I said that I was not in a position to give any pledge, and that I did not know if His Majesty's Government would raise the question of a treaty of friendship must be treated as entirely separate.

4. The Amir eventually said that since he was a loyal friend of His Majesty's Government (as he had proved not only at the time of the Druse troubles and of the 1928 riots, but on many other occasions), and since His Majesty's Government attached so much importance to the matter, he was ready to recognise Ibn Saud.

In order that there should be no doubt on the point, I asked him if I was correct in understanding that I might inform you that he was ready to give his

unqualified recognition to Ibn Saud. He assured me that I might do so since His Majesty's Government strongly desired it.

5. At the same time he requested me most earnestly to ask His Majesty's Government to insist on Ibn Saud's giving him mutual recognition. I said I would give no pledge, except that I would inform His Majesty's Government of the Amir's views. I said that I was sure that his promise to recognise Ibn Saud would create a very favourable impression on the minds of His Majesty's Government.

6. The Amir continued by saying that as he had given a pledge to recognise Ibn Saud he hoped His Majesty's Government would arrange that a treaty of friendship should be made with Ibn Saud by which he (the Amir) and Transjordan would gain certain advantages in view of his assenting to recognition.

On the point of the Amir's request, I said that I was very willing to lay His Highness's views before His Majesty's Government and to state what conditions should, in the Amir's opinion, be included in any such treaty. The Amir said that Ibn Saud had said that he had only entered the Hejaz to rid it of King Hussein and his sons and that he wanted something which could obliterate this insult.

7. I then turned to the following points, which the Amir had lately informed Colonel Cox should be included in the treaty of friendship—

(1) That Ibn Saud should recognise the *de facto* southern frontier

I agreed that recognition of this frontier was most desirable, but I said that I did not know if His Majesty's Government would consider the present a favourable time to discuss the question with Ibn Saud.

(2) That Ibn Saud should put in order the section of the Hejaz Railway lying in his territory

I said I thought this question could hardly be brought up in discussing a "bon-voisinage" agreement, but that I realised its importance and would later suggest to His Majesty's Government that the question should be raised with Ibn Saud.

(3) That the pilgrimage be opened to the Amir and his family

The Amir pointed out that the pilgrimage is a duty imposed on him by his religion. The point was not pursued.

(4) That the heirs of King Hussein should have the right to appoint an agent of their own choice to look after their properties in the Hejaz

The Amir pointed out that not a piastre had been paid them since the occupation by Ibn Saud, he said that King Ali was the person responsible to the Hejaz for the loss of their properties, and that they should have the right of appointing an agent. The Amir continued that he would ascertain how much was due to them.

(5) That His Majesty's Government should guarantee the due performance of these conditions.

I informed the Amir that I would represent his views to His Majesty's Government, but could not promise what views His Majesty's Government would take of the several points raised.

8. The Amir then said that he had always understood that the questions of recognition and the conclusion of a "bon-voisinage" agreement would be treated together. I told him that for the present the two subjects must be treated independently. He accepted this but said that his desire for recognition would not produce the good result for which I hoped, whereas a treaty of friendship which ensured fair dealings among tribesmen who normally graze both in the Hejaz and Transjordan would have a more lasting and better effect than a mere recognition by him of Ibn Saud.

The Amir pointed out that the Ma'an Vilayet was recognised as being a part of Transjordan, and that King Ali was the person responsible for its loss.

I feel strongly that, if Ibn Saud recognises the Amir or gives some *quid pro quo* for the Amir's recognition of him, the security in the country will be

increased, frequency of raids diminished and the reliance we can place on the Amir's actions in the future strengthened.

An agreement which included the acceptance by Ibn Saud of the present *de facto* southern frontier of Transjordan would go far to attain these objects.

7. The Amir informed me that I might from this moment confidently count him innocent of any connexions with further troubles which may take place in the Hejaz.

8. I then turned the conversation on to the rebellion of Ibn Rifada and its total failure. I told the Amir that the refugee rebels all said that he had encouraged the rebellion of Ibn Rifada. The Amir drew attention to the fact that defeated rebels always say that they were given every sort of promise by important leaders. He said that Ibn Rifada had only gone to the Hejaz because he thought many leaders in the Hejaz would join him. This they would have done, owing to the misgovernment of Ibn Saud, but when the leaders learned that British troops, supported by aeroplanes, were placed all along the frontier, they realised that no rebellion had any chance of success, and, though they hated Ibn Saud, decided not to rebel against him. Consequently Ibn Rifada was easily crushed.

The Amir expressed his anxiety to know what we intended to do with the survivors who had crossed our border and were now in Transjordan.

I replied that we were at present feeding them and had not yet reached a final decision. The Amir replied it would be unthinkable to turn them back into the Hejaz, as they were political offenders; and should they be thrust back into the Hejaz, then, without doubt, everyone of them would be slain by the Wahabis.

9. The interview then came to an end. It was evident that the Amir was much perturbed and that it had been a great wrench for him to promise to recognise Ibn Saud, the enemy of his family.

Except for my one interview on the 7th July, I had felt it advisable for me not to meet the Amir during the past three months. We now parted on friendly terms and I accepted his invitation to stay a night with him in camp.

I have, &c.

A. G. WAUCHOPE.

P.S.—The Amir told me that he expected King Feisal at Amman during September. I told him that I should be very willing to entertain both him and his brother in Jerusalem during His Majesty's visit.

A. G. W.

[E 4725/606/31]

No. 165.

Sir G. Grahame to Sir John Simon.—(Received September 16.)

(No. 305.)

Sir,

San Sebastian, September 12, 1932.

WITH reference to your telegram No. 27 of the 30th ultimo, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy and a translation of a note from the Minister of State, dated the 8th September, expressing the views of the Spanish Government on the proposal that Imperial preference should be extended to Palestine.

2. I also beg leave to enclose copy of the note addressed by His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires to the Minister of State, dated the 9th July, (*) to which his Excellency has now replied.

I have, &c.

GEORGE GRAHAME.

Enclosure in No. 105.

Minister of State to His Majesty's Ambassador, Madrid.

(Translation.)

Your Excellency,

Madrid, September 8, 1932.

IN reply to the notes which your Excellency addressed to this Ministry on the 9th and 15th July last and the 10th ultimo, in which you solicited the views of the Spanish Government on the proposal of His Majesty's Government in the

(*) Not printed.

United Kingdom to extend Imperial preference to goods imported into the United Kingdom from Palestine, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that the Government of the Republic are of the opinion that, in accordance with the terms of article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, and of the stipulations laid down in article 18 of the mandate over Palestine ceded to Great Britain, the territory in question can in no way be considered as Imperial territory, but only as a foreign country dependent on the League of Nations, which, from an economic point of view, is in a similar position as regards the mandatory Power as it is in regard to other countries and sovereign States. Proof of this is to be found in the fact that Palestine is prohibited from according differential treatment to British products, it being stipulated that these shall be subject to the same treatment as those proceeding from any other State belonging to the League of Nations.

In view, therefore, of the foregoing, the Government of the Republic, basing their attitude on the most-favoured-nation treatment, which article 8 of the relevant Anglo-Spanish Commercial Treaty accords without any reserves to Spanish goods imported into the United Kingdom, are unwilling to renounce the benefits of any privileges which Great Britain might eventually accord to Palestine, and accordingly maintain that any such privileges of whatever nature they may be shall be automatically applied to similar products of Spanish origin.

[E 5408/6004/31]

No. 166.

Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received December 6.)

(No. 1106.)

Sir,

Bagdad, November 24, 1932.

I HAVE the honour to report that his Highness the Emir Abdullah arrived in Bagdad on the 16th November, 1932, to visit his brother King Ali, who has for some weeks been indisposed. The latter had hoped to join the Amir on the shooting expedition which he recently made through Azraq to the Hamad, but illness prevented him from doing so. I called on his Highness on the day after his arrival and found him looking extremely well and much pleased with the good sport which he had enjoyed on his trip into the desert.

2. Apart from formal courtesies our chief topic of conversation was the Haifa Railway. We had already touched upon this subject when I met his Highness at Amman on my journey out from England, and it was apparent that it was one in which he was particularly interested. His Highness was full of hope that work on the railway would soon begin, and was convinced that it would bring prosperity to his country. In addition to its commercial possibilities he foresaw a large pilgrim traffic if only something could be done to persuade Ibn Saud to rebuild the Hejaz Railway from Mudawara to Medina. Pilgrims from India would then, he thought, come by ship to Basra and travel by rail via Bagdad and Amman to Medina. I asked his Highness's opinion on the possibility of finding a suitable alignment for the Haifa Railway via Zerka instead of Mafrak. He said that he thought that the Zerka Valley should offer a way through the mountains which would be much less difficult and expensive than the proposed alignment via Mafrak.

3. On the 19th and the 20th November, military and boy scout displays were organised in the Amir's honour, and on the 21st his Highness was my guest at a dinner party at the Embassy. He informed me with a twinkle in his eye that he understood from his brother that I disliked raiding in the desert, and assured me that he had made up his mind to cultivate better relations in future with his neighbours. The Amir expressed warm gratitude to His Majesty's Government for their liberal policy in Iraq, and hoped that the French in Syria would soon follow the British example.

4. His Highness left Bagdad by motor car early on the morning of the 22nd November to return to Amman.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the High Commissioner for Palestine and Transjordan at Jerusalem.

I have, &c.

F. H. HUMPHRYS.

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[E 6855/608/31]

No. 167.

Sir John Simon to Lord Tyrrell (Paris).

(No. 2473.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, December 19, 1932.

I HAVE received your Lordship's despatch No. 1192 (C) of the 2nd September, transmitting a copy of a note from the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs, on the subject of the proposed extension of imperial preference to Palestine.

2 You will see from the enclosed copy of the reply of the Brazilian Government that the latter were prepared to acquiesce conditionally in the proposal of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, but the replies of the other Governments who were consulted on the subject were, as you will have seen from the copies which have reached you in the print sections, definitely unfavourable.

3 I do not propose to make any further communication on the subject to the United States, Spanish, Italian and Brazilian Governments; but, in the case of the French Government, special considerations apply. As indicated in my despatch No. 1415 of the 2nd July last, the French Government were included among the Governments to be approached, not because there was any reason to anticipate that the trade of France was likely to be particularly affected, but because it seemed probable that the French Government, owing to their position as mandatory in Syria, might have an interest in the question somewhat similar to that of His Majesty's Government.

4 For the same reason I request that you will inform the French Government briefly, and without going into detail, that, in the light of the replies which have been received from the other Powers who were consulted, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have decided not to proceed with their original proposal to extend imperial preference to Palestine. At the same time you should express His Majesty's Government's appreciation of the attitude of the French Government in this matter, as shown in the note from the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs, of which a copy was enclosed in your Lordship's despatch under reference.

I am, &c.

JOHN SIMON.

Enclosure in No. 167.

M. de Mello Franco to Mr. Keeling.

(Translation.)

Mr. Chargé d'Affaires,

*Ministry for Foreign Affairs,**Rio de Janeiro, August 15, 1932.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 24th July, in which you communicated the desire of your Government to extend to Palestine the treatment of Imperial Preference, set forth in clause 5 (2) of the Customs Tariff of 1932, and consult the Brazilian Government regarding this matter, in view of the commercial agreement between the two countries, signed on the 11th September, 1930.

In reply, I have to inform you that the question of determining whether Palestine should be considered a foreign country, as the text of the agreement contemplates, or to what point her relations of dependency, by virtue of the mandate exercised there by Great Britain, incorporate her in the British Empire, does not appear to be one on which other countries are properly entitled to express an opinion.

The Brazilian Government, meanwhile, would have no objection to raise against this assimilation of Palestine to the other territories of the Empire, for the purpose of the preferential tariff, if it could have the assurance that the projected concessions would not be extended to oranges, so that the similar product of Brazil exported to Great Britain would not be unfavourably affected.

I take, &c.

A. DE MELLO FRANCO.

CHAPTER V.—GENERAL.

[E 3321/9/93]

No. 168.

Lord Tyrrell to Sir John Simon.—(Received July 2.)

(No. 906.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Paris presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit to him copy of a note from the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs respecting Iraq.

Paris, July 1, 1932.

Enclosure in No. 168.

*Note from Ministry for Foreign Affairs.**Paris, le 30 juin 1932.*

M. l'Ambassadeur,

EN procédant, le 18 mai dernier, avec vous à l'échange des notes consacrant la renonciation du Gouvernement de la République à ses droits capitulaires en Irak, le Secrétaire général de mon département vous avait dit que le Gouvernement français recevrait avec satisfaction l'assurance que, dans le cas où il souhaiterait poursuivre l'émancipation d'un quelconque des Etats du Levant placés sous son mandat, il rencontrerait, de la part du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté dans le Royaume-Uni, le même bon vouloir qu'il avait lui-même manifesté à l'occasion de l'émancipation de l'Irak.

Vous aviez alors répondu que le Gouvernement de la République n'avait pas lieu de craindre que, dans cette hypothèse, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté lui créerait des difficultés sans nécessité.

Vous avez bien voulu, par lettre du 9 juin, me donner confirmation de ces déclarations au nom de votre Gouvernement, dont vous avez tenu à prendre les instructions.

J'ai l'honneur de vous remercier de cette communication, dont je prends acte au nom du Gouvernement de la République.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

(Pour le Président du Conseil,

Ministre des Affaires étrangères),

Le Ministre plénipotentiaire, Directeur
des Affaires politiques et commerciales,
ALEXIS LEGER.

[E 5502/1102/65]

No. 169.

Papers relative to the Definition of the Frontier between Iraq and Transjordan.—
(Communicated by Colonial Office, October 20, 1932.)

(1)

Translation of Letter of July 31, 1932, from the Prime Minister of Iraq to the
Chief Minister of the Government of Transjordan.

Your Excellency,

IN view of the close and friendly relations existing between the two countries which have recently been confirmed in a special treaty, the Iraqi Government consider that the time is now opportune to define more precisely the existing frontier between Iraq and Transjordan in mutual agreement by means of an

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exchange of notes. I am accordingly authorised to suggest that the frontier should be defined as follows:—

"The frontier between Iraq and Transjordan starts in the south at the point of junction of the Iraq-Nejd frontier and the Transjordan-Nejd frontier and ends in the north at that point on the Iraq-Syria frontier and the Transjordan-Syria frontier, as ultimately delimited, which is nearest to the summit of the Jebel Tenf. Between these two terminal points the frontier follows where possible prominent physical features, provided that it shall not diverge more than 5 kilom. from a straight line between these two terminal points."

The Iraqi Government will be glad to know whether the Transjordan Government approve of this definition of the frontier between Iraq and Transjordan.
(Usual ending)

NURI-EL-SAID
Prime Minister.

(2)

Translation of Letter of August 9, 1932, from the Chief Minister of the Transjordan Government to the British Resident, Amman.

REFERENCE your Excellency's letter of the 15th June, 1932, since the Iraq Government asked that some amendment be made in their preceding proposal regarding the defining of the frontiers between both countries by exchange of letters, I forward to your Excellency herewith copy of the last letter⁽¹⁾ received from the Prime Minister of the said Government for favour of your Excellency's views regarding its contents.

(Usual ending)

ABDULLAH-AL-SARRAJ, Chief Minister,
Transjordan Government.

(3)

Letter of August 13, 1932, from the British Resident, Amman, to the Chief Minister of the Transjordan Government.

Your Excellency,

I HAVE the honour to refer to your letter of the 9th August, 1932, in which you ask for the views of His Majesty's Government on the proposal contained in letter of the 31st July, 1932, to your Excellency from his Excellency the Prime Minister of the Iraq Government that:—

"In view of the firm and friendly relations existing between the two countries which have recently been confirmed in a special treaty, the Iraqi Government consider that the time is now opportune to define more precisely the existing frontier between Iraq and Transjordan in mutual agreement by means of an exchange of notes. I am accordingly authorised to suggest that the frontier should be defined as follows:—

"The frontier between Iraq and Transjordan starts in the south at the point of junction of the Iraq-Nejd frontier with the Transjordan-Nejd frontier and ends in the north at the point on the Iraq-Syria frontier and the Syrio-Transjordan frontier as ultimately delimited which is nearest to the summit of the Jebel Tenf. Between these two terminal points the frontier shall as far as possible follow prominent physical features, provided that it shall not diverge more than 5 kilom. from a straight line drawn between these two terminal points."

I am directed to convey to your Excellency the approval of the mandatory Power that your Excellency should accept the Prime Minister's proposal.

I have, &c.

C. H. F. COX,
British Resident.

⁽¹⁾ Document (1).

(4)

Translation of Letter of August 16, 1932, from the Chief Minister of the Transjordan Government, to the Prime Minister of Iraq.

Your Excellency,

REFERENCE your letter dated the 31st July, 1932.

I have the honour to inform your Excellency that the Transjordan Government, after seeing the request made by the Iraqi Government to define more precisely the existing frontier between Iraq and Transjordan in mutual agreement by means of an exchange of notes, have authorised me to reply to your Excellency that they agree to the definition of the frontier as follows:—

"The frontier between Iraq and Transjordan starts in the south at the point of junction of the Iraq-Nejd frontier and the Transjordan-Nejd frontier and ends in the north at that point on the Iraq-Syria frontier and the Transjordan-Syria frontier, as ultimately delimited, which is nearest to the summit of the Jebel Tenf. Between these two terminal points the frontier follows where possible prominent physical features, provided that it shall not diverge more than 5 kilom. from a straight line between these two terminal points."

(Usual ending)

ABDULLAH-AL-SARRAJ, Chief Minister,
Transjordan Government.

[E 6030/6030/65]

No. 170.

Sir G. Clerk to Sir John Simon.—(Received November 18.)

(No. 353.)

Sir,

Angora, October 31, 1932.

AT the end of a memorandum of the 26th September last by Mr. Hall, of the Colonial Office, enclosed in a semi-official letter from Mr. Rendel to me of the 12th instant, it is stated that Nuri Pasha understood that the Turkish Foreign Minister intended to seek an interview with you to investigate the possibility of some sort of Security Pact, the precise nature of which Nuri Pasha was unable to explain.

2. I am unaware whether Tefik Rüştü Bey ever carried out his intention, but when he was explaining to me this afternoon the discussions which he intended to have with Feroughi Khan, he said that one of the points was a possible pact or agreement of non-aggression between the three limitrophe States of Turkey, Persia and Iraq, to which it was hoped Great Britain would adhere. His Excellency seemed to expect that His Majesty's Government would, now that Iraq was fully independent, consider that the Treaty of Angora no longer applied, so far as His Majesty's Government were concerned, and would desire to have the new situation formally recorded, and he appeared to think that this would give a suitable occasion to put forward the above proposal.

3. His Excellency promised to enlighten me further after his talks with Feroughi Khan.

4. I have sent a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have, &c.

GEORGE R. CLERK

[E 6035/6030/65]

No. 171.

Sir G. Clerk to Sir John Simon.—(Received November 18.)

(No. 363.)

Sir,

Angora, November 9, 1932.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 353 of the 31st October last, I have the honour to report that when the Minister for Foreign Affairs was talking to me of the political agreements made with his Highness Feroughi Khan, as recorded

in my despatch No. 362 of yesterday, he again alluded to a possible pact of non-aggression between Turkey, Persia, Iraq and Great Britain. His Excellency said that Feroughi Khan and he had agreed that the Government in each of the three limitrophe countries—he appeared to take the assent of Iraq to this plan, notwithstanding the change of Prime Minister, for granted—should sound His Majesty's Government as to whether the idea found favour with them. Tefvik Rüstü Bey said that in thus speaking to me he considered that he had done his part of the sounding, and emphasised that there was nothing whatever official in his *démarche*.

2. When the Minister for Foreign Affairs spoke to me he was so vague and seemed to have so little an idea in his own mind of what he really wanted that I felt I could not report to you without more precise data, and being myself confined to the house, I asked Mr. Morgan to attack his Excellency on my behalf. The result is contained in the enclosed memorandum from Mr. Morgan of his interview with the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

3. While Tefvik Rüstü Bey's proposal calls for considerably closer definition and a careful study of all its implications, which I doubt if Tefvik Rüstü himself has given to it, I venture to submit that it should not be turned down out of hand. It is not unlikely that Tefvik Rüstü, who will probably be going to Geneva towards the end of this month, will take the opportunity when there to raise the question personally with you, and meanwhile little harm and much good would be done if I were authorised to tell his Excellency that the question is receiving the very careful consideration which is called for by its importance.

4. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's representatives at Moscow, Bagdad, Tehran and Kabul.

I have, &c.

GEORGE R. CLERK

Enclosure in No. 171.

Memorandum.

DR. TEVFIK RÜSTÜ'S idea is that Turkey, Persia, Iraq and Great Britain should conclude a "plurilateral" agreement of non-aggression. Each party to the agreement would bind itself not to attack any of the others. He could see no reason why they should not do this, as all the countries concerned were members of the League, and the terms of the proposed agreement merely repeated what members of the League were already bound to do under the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and the terms of the Covenant of the League. Its peculiarity lay in the fact that the general principles of the League would be given a "regional" application. Turkey's support of the proposal arose from the fact that she wanted to do in the East what she had done in the West, namely, assure peace for herself by making agreements of friendship with her neighbours. His one desire was for peace. He would not be drawn into war under any consideration, as Turkey must have years of peace to carry out her work of interior reform and reconstruction. But while he was willing to make agreements of friendship with every nation, he would not be drawn into any treaties of alliance or definite engagements with any Power or group of Powers which might necessitate Turkey's taking part in a war or taking sides in a war, nor had he been drawn into such engagements. He would never, as long as he held office, sign any document which would engage present-day Turkey, or coming generations of Turks, to engage in war. But there were possibilities which frightened him. He was in a "blue funk" as to what might happen if Russia and Roumania went to war. Reverting to the project of the "plurilateral" agreement, Tefvik Rüstü said he thought that the time was favourable for it, as the greatest friendliness prevailed between all the parties concerned. I asked how Great Britain came to be included in the scheme, seeing that it was to be an agreement between, as he said, limitrophe States, and also why Syria was excluded. He said Great Britain had a maritime frontier with all the States concerned. She was "the" sea Power. Syria was excluded because she was not an independent State. She was not in a position to sign for herself and to bind herself. He made it plain that one of the principal benefits—if not the main one—which would accrue to Turkey would be that she would then feel sure of her being able to preserve her neutrality, and of having her neutrality respected.

I asked him if he had spoken of his scheme to Sir John Simon at Geneva. He said he had not, and it seemed to me that it had taken concrete shape in his mind since his recent conversations with Feroughi Khan.

This impression was deepened when he went on to say that, if the "plurilateral" agreement could be realised, it might then be followed up eventually by an agreement between Persia and her northern neighbour, and between Persia and Afghanistan—which would complete the "plurilateral" agreement. These two neighbours of Persia, by signing pacts of non-aggression with Persia, would place Persia in a position like that of Switzerland. She would be certain of having her neutrality respected. Turkey would be greatly relieved also, as all the land means of contact or of clash between the two Great Powers (England and Russia) being eliminated, Turkey could live quiet days without anxiety or care. As to what the two Great Powers might do to each other on sea, that would be far away from Turkey.

It seemed to me as he spoke that Feroughi Khan had given him to understand, or that Tefvik Rüstü had read into Feroughi Khan's utterances, or, with his pre-conceived notions had led himself to believe after conversation with Feroughi Khan, that Persia wanted to feel and be assured that she would not be used as a pawn or as a battlefield in a possible Anglo-Russian conflict, or be converted into an arena of Anglo-Russian rivalry. She wanted, as Tefvik Rüstü said, a position like that of Switzerland.

The sanction for the proposed plurilateral agreement would be that if "A" broke his word towards "B," then "C" and "D," while not being obliged to take any action, would, perforce, see that "A's" word was not to be trusted, and that, as he had already broken his word towards "B," he could, without scruple, break his word towards "C" and "D" also. "C" and "D" would then take whatever measures seemed to be necessary or expedient.

I said that, as he knew, Great Britain refused in general to be drawn into any entanglements or alliances with any Power or group of Powers, or to bind itself to any group, and he replied that this was precisely Turkey's attitude, but that the agreement he proposed would not prejudice this attitude, since it was, in sum, a local and "regional" application of League principles already subscribed to by the parties to his proposed pact.

My general impression was that he wanted Turkey at all cost to remain neutral in a big war, and, more particularly—as it concerned Turkey most nearly—a war between Great Britain and the Soviet republics. He wanted, by prior agreements, to put Turkey in the position of not having to declare herself for either side, and, as both the possible belligerents would have already agreed with Turkey to commit no act of aggression against her, neither would violate her neutrality and therefore neither would get at the other across her territory. The war would therefore not come Turkey's way, and therefore not oblige her to participate, or face the dilemma of whether to participate or not, and also that of having to decide on which side to participate.

Tefvik Rüstü's interest in Persia's being a party to the proposed pact was that, if Persia were a party, and if Russia and Afghanistan were likewise parties, Persia also could not become a bone of contention between the two Great Powers and would not have her neutrality violated, or be in a similar dilemma to that of Turkey—as described above. Moreover, as no troops of the two Great Powers would be moving near the Turco-Persian frontier, Turkey would be more completely certain of avoiding trouble with either belligerent, as there would be no possibility of an "incident" on the Turco-Persian frontier which might oblige Turkey to decide whether to take action or no.

But while Turkey could secure herself by the proposed pact from trouble, or dreadful necessities of choice, in case of an Anglo-Russian war, she does not like to think of the possibilities of a Russo-Roumanian war.

A final saving of Tefvik Rüstü's was that his pact, as ultimately completed, would be useful for Great Britain in India.

JAMES MORGAN.

Angora, November 9, 1932